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Abstract 
This thesis examines the emergence of a trend in American post-
millennial television often described in journalistic discourses with the 
term ‘feminist quality TV’. While the strategic reliance on feminist 
politics is a historically established method in American television to 
promote certain programming’s cultural value, the cultural specificities 
of the early 21st century deem this phenomenon unique enough for an 
in-depth study. The emergence of ‘feminist quality television’ is 
governed by the rhetorical subversion of two phenomena 
simultaneously: the much-debated development of the era’s masculine-
coded ‘quality television’ culture on the one hand, and the dominance 
of ‘postfeminist’ popular culture on the other. 
Post-millennial ‘quality television’ culture cultivates the idea of 
aesthetic-generic hierarchies among different types of scripted 
programming. This category’s development has facilitated academic 
interest in television texts’ evaluative analysis based on aesthetic merit, 
an approach that other strands of TV scholarship contest for 
sidestepping the gendered and classed processes of canonisation 
informing the phenomenon. By the mid-2010s, the debate between 
aesthetic versus political analysis had intensified in television studies. 
The thesis intervenes in this by arguing for a synthesis of approaches 
that does not further foster already prominent processes of 
canonisation, but interrogates the cultural forces underlying them. Via 
detailed analyses of four programmes emerging within the ‘feminist 
quality TV’ trend, namely 30 Rock (2006-2013), Parks and Recreation 
(2009-2015), The Good Wife (2009-2016), and Orange Is the New Black 
(2013-), it seeks to understand how they mediate their cultural 
significance by negotiating formal-aesthetic exceptionalism and a 
politicised rhetoric around a ‘problematic’ postfeminism, thus linking 
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ideals of political and aesthetic value. The ultimate purpose of this 
research is to demonstrate the necessity in television analysis of 
unpacking both the specific genderedness of television’s cultivation of 
aesthetic value, and the context of aesthetics and form in which the 
programmes’ political implications emerge.  
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Introduction 
 
‘Woman, writer, New York: those are all on my list of “TV no-no words.”’ 
Kenneth Parcell, 30 Rock (‘Hogcock!’) 
 
The above words are uttered by Kenneth (Jack McBrayer), the NBC-
page-turned-network-president in the NBC series 30 Rock (2006-2013), 
a meta-sitcom set behind the scenes of a fictional sketch comedy show, 
and whose main protagonist is the show’s head writer Liz Lemon (Tina 
Fey). Kenneth says this in response to Liz’s pitch for a series based on 
her life as a woman TV writer working in New York. To support his 
comment, he also presents a piece of paper with a list of words on it, 
titled ‘Kenneth’s TV No-no Words’, and explains to Liz American 
network television’s imperative of providing easy entertainment for 
audiences. The list, which the viewer can examine by pausing the TV 
image, includes the following expressions: urban, woman, shows about 
shows, writer, dramedy, politics, high concept, complex, niche, quality, 
edgy. To Liz’s objection that ‘TV can be successful without sacrificing 
quality’, he disapprovingly points out the word on his list. Liz retorts: 
‘Maybe I shouldn’t bring my ideas to NBC. I’ll go to cable where you can 
swear and really take time to let moments la…’ We never hear her finish 
the word ‘land’ because the scene abruptly ends to cut to the next one. 
This sequence’s satire works with the audience’s awareness of American 
‘quality’ television culture and the distinction between the features and 
cultural values assigned to network and cable television. But it also 
assumes the underlying genderedness of these distinctions: 
‘progressive’ female representations in this setup belong in the ‘edgy’ 
world of cable television. Yet as an NBC series about a woman writer 
and as ‘urban’ showbiz comedy, 30 Rock’s satire reassures viewers that 
it is all of these things: edgy (frequently thematising contentious 
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political-cultural issues), self-reflexive (it is already understood to be the 
autobiographical rendering of Tina Fey’s own career as television 
writer), and complex quality comedy. Further, it treats its audiences as 
savvy-smart (they will freeze-frame the image for the extra jokes on 
Kenneth’s list and get the hall-of-mirrors metacommentary), and 
centralises the politics of urban womanhood, sending up popular 
debates about contemporary feminism. All of this on network television, 
with the programme, and its broadcaster NBC, reassuring us of its 
difference from other networks with their mediocre and sexist 
programming targeting provincial audiences, by satirising both them 
and itself. In this scene then, just as in the whole of the series, television 
culture’s negotiations of cultural value, aesthetics, and gender politics 
become the comedy’s central theme and are treated as fundamentally 
intertwined. 
This thesis is interested in the issues that 30 Rock thematises here and 
of which the series is also a prominent example: it investigates the 
emergence of a group of programmes in American television after the 
millennium whose categorisation as ‘quality television’ is predicated on 
their understanding as ‘feminist television’. While the strategic 
association between cultural value and politics, especially gender 
politics, is nothing new in American television – to the extent that it 
might be called a staple of its heritage – the post-millennial makeup of 
this connection deems it unique enough to call for an in-depth 
examination. The tendency has become widespread enough in the 
second decade of the 21st century to form patterns, and scholarship has 
started to examine its attributes from a feminist perspective (Nygaard 
and Lagerwey 2016; Lagerwey, Leyda, and Negra 2016). This category of 
programming, in popular journalism occasionally declared a new era of 
‘feminist quality television’ (Blay 2015), has been attributed with 
subverting two dominant phenomena simultaneously. In keeping with 
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the Western tradition of evaluating cultural products in a negotiation of 
socially ‘realistic’ representation and artistic expression, one subversion 
is broadly linked to politics and the other to aesthetics. The political 
subversion targets the previous (millennial) era’s limited 
representations of female subjectivity associated with postfeminism, 
while the aesthetic subversion upsets the value hierarchies of a 
masculinist and ‘non-televisual’ quality television.  
My primary goal is to understand the relationship between these two 
discourses of subversion in a cultural period in which feminism has once 
again become a popular and contested buzzword, and in which the 
most recent ‘Golden Age of Television’ is both celebrated for its 
aesthetic innovations and criticised for its reliance on patriarchal ideals 
of cultural value. The investigation seeks to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. What are the patterns of subversion/negotiation of postfeminist 
politics in ‘feminist quality television’ and how are these 
connected to genre and aesthetic conventions? 
2. What are the patterns of the ‘quality’ descriptor in ‘feminist 
quality television’ in terms of aesthetic and formal innovation 
and how are these mobilised to engage with the struggle 
between the postfeminist/feminist? 
3. How do institutional and media discourses make sense of 
‘feminist quality television’s negotiations of gender politics and 
aesthetic value?  
The thesis takes four American television programmes as case studies to 
examine these issues. The selected programmes are understood in their 
reception to negotiate the ‘masculinism’ of millennial quality television 
and to foreground gender politics and feminism as historic political 
movement. In order to highlight the role that television genres and their 
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cultural work play in the attribution of cultural value, the thesis looks at 
two comedies and two dramas respectively: the comedies are 30 Rock 
and Parks and Recreation (Parks, 2009-2015), the dramas are The Good 
Wife (2009-2016) and Orange Is the New Black (Orange, 2013-). The fact 
that Orange’s generic description has created much confusion in 
industry and press discourses – vacillating between comedy, drama, and 
dramedy without much consensus – is a point that will be discussed in 
detail and which feeds into my argument about the rhetorical 
negotiation processes around cultural value, genre, and gender in these 
programmes. 
As indicated, the thesis examines the discursive interconnection 
between political value and aesthetic value in these programmes, and 
as such draws on similarly two-pronged scholarly traditions of television 
studies in its intervention: the established approach of feminist media 
studies, or in a broader meaning, a cultural studies analysis on one 
hand, and the emerging but popular field of ‘television aesthetics’ on 
the other. As will be shown, television studies as a still young and 
somewhat unacknowledged field of scholarly interest – itself bound up 
in anxieties over academic legitimation – has in its short history been a 
territory fraught with tensions over the question of which approach 
should take dominance; a situation not helped by popular and often 
academic declarations about the new age of aesthetically valuable 
television (or the 'aesthetic turn' [Lury 2016, 120]). These theoretical 
debates will be outlined in some detail in the last section of the 
Introduction, but here I want to signal a wariness around the either/or 
understandings of the debate. Specifically, I argue that the emergence 
of ‘feminist quality television’ provides an opportunity to demonstrate 
the necessity of combining these approaches: the programmes’ cultural 
work cannot be accounted for without being aware of and unpacking 
the profound genderedness of television’s cultivation of aesthetic value 
 12 
 
in this latest ‘Golden Age of Television’; and similarly, the political 
implications of this programming cannot be unearthed without 
considering the context of aesthetics and form. Further, both subfields 
have had a definitional struggle over a popularly coined term at their 
centre – ‘quality television’ and ‘postfeminism’ respectively – that has 
structured their recent development and their academic utility. The last 
section of the Introduction briefly details these definitional struggles as 
part of the discussion of the theoretical debates. Moreover, since there 
is a rich theoretical background to both feminism/postfeminism and 
‘quality television’ that needs exploring, I devote three chapters to 
these questions in the main body of the thesis. 
 
Methodology 
 
I analyse the four programmes via a combination of textual analysis, 
production discourse and institutional analysis, and critical reception 
analysis, the latter including popular reception and academic writings. I 
exclude audience reception analysis, or discuss it only generally in cases 
when the other factors are influenced by a series’ apparent cultural 
work among audiences (e.g. Netflix capitalising on female fandom 
practices around Orange to promote the series’ ‘progressive’ gender 
politics). These analytical methods aim to demonstrate how gender 
politics and the foregrounding of popular feminism are utilised in these 
texts’ branding as quality TV, and to tease out the (often contradictory) 
negotiations of gendered cultural value and genre signifiers. The 
relatively small sample size of four programmes allows me to carry out a 
detailed analysis of their formal-political features and of the 
characteristics of their circulation in public discourses. 
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I selected these programmes as case studies because they answer to the 
following criteria, which together make them the most useful examples 
on which to examine the features of ‘feminist quality television’: 
1. Their production falls into a period between 2005-2013 and is 
limited to American television.  
2. All four series are widely regarded as mobilising a feminist 
rhetoric at odds, or dialoguing with postfeminist discourses by 
highlighting a political narrative context, centralising female 
protagonists in public-political environments, and dramatising 
and reflecting on feminism as historic and mediated political 
movement.  
3. All four programmes are regarded in media and industry 
discourses as ‘quality television’, a descriptor in which aesthetic 
exceptionality and novel gender politics converge. 
Regarding the first criterion, my interest is in examining the patterns of 
this category in this period and production context as it is emerging, and 
three out of the four case studies each provide an example of being a 
symbolic ‘first’ at a specific phenomenon in American television culture: 
30 Rock is, to my knowledge, a first of post-millennial prominent quality 
programming that centralises feminism as political force; The Good Wife 
is the first prominent quality drama to do the same; Orange is the first 
series that continues this trend on non-network (and non-cable) TV, 
providing a case study for the convergence era ‘quality’ industry’s usage 
of feminism for branding practices. While Parks is hardly a first of 
anything in these terms, its inclusion is justified by the intense media 
discourse around the series as feminist quality comedy par excellence, 
and, crucially, by this discourse’s frequent evaluative contrasting with 
30 Rock on the basis of the two series’ different engagements with 
feminism, into which feeds the media promotion of Amy Poehler's and 
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Tina Fey’s, the two series’ stars’, ‘feminist’ friendship. Pairing Parks up 
with 30 Rock in my examination of quality comedy provides an 
opportunity to unpick the shifts in popular evaluative practices around 
what counts as ‘ideal’ feminist comedy.  
In terms of the series’ mobilisation of feminist discourses, the shift in 
focus and rhetoric around representations of womanhood can be linked 
partly to the recessionary cultural environment (Negra and Tasker 2014; 
Lagerwey, Leyda, and Negra 2016) in which the postfeminism of earlier 
texts predicated on prosperity and classed consumerism is no longer 
viable and requires a reconfiguration of the meaning of ‘women’s 
empowerment’. This political-social background will be considered in 
my analysis as contributor to these programmes’ emergence, but is not 
a fundamental aspect of the investigation, since I see it as one in a 
group of interacting factors. 30 Rock’s start predates the 2008 recession 
by two years – having been in pre-production for at least another year –
, and its political satire treats feminism, postfeminism, capitalism, race 
politics, and so on, as central to its narration. Rather than an exceptional 
precursor to recessionary women-centred media, it signals the growing 
politicisation of comedy in American culture after the millennium. This 
has given more space to women comedians’ focus on gender politics 
(Mizejewski 2014), a process that in turn has become even more 
prominent in the recessionary period. Again, I see the cultural shift that 
the recession has brought about as an important factor in this 
development but not a defining one. 
While the terms of the third criterion are admittedly vague and would 
allow for the inclusion of a number of other programmes, I identify a 
specific feature (a sub-criterion) in the selected programmes that justify 
their unique usefulness for my purposes: they each upset gendered 
conventions of genre, narrative, and aesthetics in ways that effect a 
(case-specific) cultural unease around either their generic-aesthetic 
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positioning or the purported progressiveness of their gender politics, or 
both, which in each case has a consequence on the discursive 
assignment of cultural value. The aspect of genre hybridity affected by 
gender politics is evident in other, more recent programming as well, 
but in keeping with my interest in the phenomenon as it is emerging, I 
concentrate on those that provide the earliest examples. 
Following from these criteria, I exclude a number of programmes that 
can be understood as prominent examples of female-centred quality 
programming foregrounding genre hybridity, feminist discourses, and 
gender politics, such as The Fall (2013-), Top of the Lake (2013-), 
Outlander (2014-), Transparent (2014-), Jessica Jones (2015-), 
Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt (2015-), Veep (2012-), Broad City (2014-), 
Masters of Sex (2013-), Homeland (2011-) etc. Orange could be argued 
as exception to the criteria as it is relatively ‘late’ in the examined 
period. However, its inclusion allows me to show the wider cultural 
traction of ‘feminist' rhetoric in the online programming platform 
Netflix’s reliance on it as brand identifier. Contrasted with the other 
three programmes, all of which were produced for network television, it 
also demonstrates the relevance of technological-narrative shifts and 
changing viewer habits in the media convergence era influencing the 
ways in which feminist rhetoric is mobilised.  
My sub-criterion around form explains why the HBO series Girls (2012-), 
a much-discussed representative of female-centred quality 
programming, is excluded from my selection. While the programme has 
since its debut been at the centre of debates about gender, body 
politics, and HBO’s cultivation of quality (Nash and Whelehan 2017), 
these are inevitably linked to the half-hour dramedy’s cultural work, and 
specifically to the legacy of the HBO dramedy Sex and the City (1998-
2004). My discussion of subversions of gendered forms and genres takes 
the cultural dominance of the ‘postfeminist’ half-hour dramedy and the 
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melodramatic mode as templates against which the examined case 
studies define themselves in aesthetic-formal terms, as well as 
politically. While Girls undoubtedly performs much of its cultural 
significance via politically defining itself against (or updating) Sex and 
the City, it leaves the televisual format intact, which means that genre is 
a contested issue in its reception only to the extent to which the series 
dialogues with the politics of the predecessor – and as such provides a 
less useful example for my purposes. I will refer to this issue in relevant 
parts of the thesis. 
 
Structure 
 
The thesis consists of two parts: theoretical discussion and analysis of 
case studies. The theoretical section expands on the terms briefly 
explained in the Introduction. Since these terms and phenomena, 
specifically quality television and postfeminism/popular feminism, are 
much debated in both scholarship and popular discourses, and my 
hypotheses about both need demonstrating in a detailed argument, 
each is a focus of a chapter. Chapter 1 concentrates on the question of 
gender politics, and has two aims: first, to summarize the academic 
debate about postfeminism and feminism’s presence in popular culture, 
and second, to demonstrate the renewed emergence of a feminist 
rhetoric in public discourse and the ways in which it signals a cultural 
unease with postfeminism in recessionary media production. This 
chapter provides the theoretical basis for the case study chapters’ 
discussion of the programmes’ negotiation of gender politics. Chapter 2 
picks up on debates around contemporary quality television, and turns 
to a detailed examination of the ‘quality’ brand’s specificities as a 
category or genre of television, focusing on both the term’s academic 
production, and on the debate that revolves around the gendered and 
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classed processes of canonisation. This chapter concentrates on gender 
politics’ relevance for these processes, and also includes an historical 
examination of the term’s definition and gendered implications. Chapter 
3 centralises the question of culturally sanctioned transgressions 
(‘edginess’), an aspect of quality television that carries heightened 
significance for its branding power. It examines the masculinism of the 
contemporary quality paradigm from the perspective of its cultivated 
subversion of ‘traditional’ television’s content regulations. I contrast this 
kind of subversion with the issue of political transgression, and 
specifically American television’s legacy of a ‘feminist’ transgression of 
expectations of femininity; a notion which has its own historical 
connection with assignations of cultural value. As seen, both Chapters 2 
and 3 consider the history of the ‘quality’ brand from a gender 
perspective, an aspect that undergirds my later discussions of the case 
studies’ appeal to a transgression of gendered political and aesthetic 
traditions. 
The second part of the thesis comprises the case studies, and is divided 
into two chapters organised around genre. Chapter 4 discusses the half-
hour comedies, and Chapter 5 the hour-long dramas/dramedies. This 
structure around form and genre corresponds to the thesis’ focus on the 
connection between questions of aesthetics and gender politics, and 
also aligns with the programmes’ categorisation in industry and media 
discourses according to their genre signifiers. This latter aspect is central 
to my discussion, since the respective series’ feminist credentials are 
produced in the specific context of their genre positioning. 
Rather than discussing each series separately, both chapters are split 
into thematic sections. The two main sections within each chapter are: 
A) issues of cultural value, genre, and aesthetics, and B) the negotiation 
of feminist rhetoric and postfeminism. The concentration on these two 
aspects answers to the twofold theoretical approach of the thesis, 
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aiming to show the interconnection of aesthetics and politics in the 
series’ appeal to cultural value. Within each section, I treat the 
respective series to separate analyses but also provide comparative 
study when useful. 
Additionally, the comedy chapter contains a third section concentrating 
on body politics, acknowledging the centrality of the body within the 
genre. Corresponding with this centrality, academic literature assigns 
importance to the ways in which physical humour and embodied comic 
performance are linked to the genre’s expressive power and cultural 
value, and, crucially, to the ways in which this is used in women’s 
comedy as a site of politics. As such, the significance of this discussion is 
the comic female body’s treatment in quality comedy’s modes of 
expression. As discussed in Chapter 3, a central feature of the quality 
category is its subversion of television’s strict regulations of visual 
depictions of the corporeal, and the setup of these institutional 
regulations and subversions (the network versus cable dichotomy) is 
profoundly gendered. Therefore, the two comedies’ treatment of the 
comic female body, as already a site of intense cultural anxieties, gains 
specific importance and is essential to their appeal to cultural value. 
While the drama chapter does not include a similarly discreet section on 
body politics, the question of embodied performance and sexual politics 
as signifiers of ‘feminist quality’ is crucial here as well, and is discussed 
integrated into the two main sections.  
 
Research context 
 
The thesis combines a twofold approach, using feminist media studies’ 
analysis of television on the one hand, and the academic discourse 
around aesthetic evaluative practices, i.e. the ‘quality television’ debate 
on the other. While the two fields occasionally overlap, recent academic 
 19 
 
interest in the aesthetics of television has resulted in a renewed tension 
between these fields around the limits of validity and usefulness of their 
respective analytical methods. Although my thesis calls for their 
combination – or, perhaps idealistically, for abolishing their discursive 
opposition – I will here discuss separately their approaches and the 
dominant terms operating in them.  
Anglo-American feminist scholarship has at least since the 1990s been 
governed by debates around the cultural dominance of postfeminism, a 
concentration inevitably central to feminist television scholarship as 
well, given the phenomenon’s strong ties to, and roots in, popular 
media representation. The term and its cultural influence have been 
described by critical analysts as, historically, a cultural-political backlash 
against second-wave feminism (Faludi 1991), and as a popularised – and 
therefore distorted and simplified – understanding of and response to 
the mainstream second wave’s political, economic, and cultural 
struggles against the patriarchal makeup of modern societies. Since 
second-wave feminism most prominently and publicly concentrated on 
the liberation of one particular social group – white heterosexual 
middle-class women – the movement has become associated with this 
image, and has been criticised by a number of feminist theorists for 
ignoring other, less visible social groups. Scholarship also argues that 
the way feminism’s struggles have become incorporated into Western 
culture follows logically from the political and economic necessities of 
late modern neoliberal capitalism (McRobbie 2009, Tasker and Negra 
2007, Negra 2009, Gill 2007). The entering of this subset of women into 
the education system and labour market from the 1960s onwards 
created a new consumer group whose existence in turn required new 
marketing strategies, ones that make use of the ‘common sense’ 
aspects of feminist ideas – those most marketable and realisable with 
leaving the status quo intact – while at the same time producing a type 
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of consumer-spectator citizen who is constantly in search of self-
betterment through consumption.  
In Angela McRobbie’s seminal term, this is the process of ‘feminism 
taken into account’ (2009, 2) in most areas of Western culture and 
policymaking. Popular media’s perpetuation of the image of the 
economically-emotionally independent, sexually liberated and 
empowered woman ensures the maintenance and reproduction of this 
structure, as long as the idea of empowerment is understood in 
individualised-intimate ways and does not entail political solidarity 
across boundaries of social categories. Further, postfeminist popular 
culture (re)produces an ideological struggle between the ideal of 
women’s sexual-professional empowerment on one hand and the social 
primacy of coupledom, heterosexual romance, and the nuclear family 
on the other, perpetuating the issue of individual ‘choice’, rather than 
larger social-political forces, for female agency and happiness. As Diane 
Negra writes, ‘postfeminism looks disapprovingly upon those forms of 
female agency unrelated to couple and family formation, preferring a 
self-surveilling subject whose concepts of body and behaviour are 
driven by status anxiety’ (2009, 153). 
These theorisations of postfeminism have become widely accepted in 
feminist cultural criticism, while also being debated for their broader 
consequences for Western societies’ gender politics, particularly in 
respect to postfeminism’s links to popular media’s cultural work and 
logics of production. Scholarship contesting the criticism of 
postfeminism argues that historically, feminism’s social-cultural power 
has always been entangled in its popular media presence, and the 
widespread pessimism of feminist academics regarding postfeminism’s 
cultural work neglects the diachronic legacy and transformations of this 
entanglement, or indeed the ever-present negotiations of gender scripts 
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in cultural products, and issues of audience engagement (Lotz 2001, 
Hollows and Moseley 2006, Johnson 2007). 
Recent years have seen a renewed popular cultural interest in feminism 
as a marketable and contested term and political tool, aided by the 
increased significance of online social media platforms as sites of 
politicised public communication. These phenomena signal a growing 
cultural unhappiness with the utility of postfeminism, especially its 
premise on narrow definitions of womanhood, consumer citizenship, 
and prosperity. Both this ‘rebooted’ feminism, its intense contestations, 
and its instrumentalisations in popular media products became 
especially increased upon the 2008 economic recession’s wider cultural 
impact (Negra and Tasker 2014, Banet-Weiser 2015). Chapter 1 
discusses in detail the debates in scholarship around the usefulness of 
postfeminism as theoretical term, and its apparent contestations in 
recent years. The latter includes the ways in which postfeminism’s 
academic status as contested and structuring concept becomes 
reflected in the recent re-emergence of popular feminism in media 
products. This is tightly linked to television culture and to the field of 
‘quality television’ analysis; not only because the medium is commonly 
regarded as a prime indicator of a society’s social-cultural mood, but 
also because a prominent commonality between postfeminist media 
culture and quality television culture is their production of and appeal 
to upmarket consumer-spectators. Therefore, the status of the 
gendered public sphere, signalling an unease with the postfeminist 
premise of narrowly defined female subjectivity and affluence, is linked 
with the increased promotional value of ‘diversity’ politics and 
dramatisations of a ‘problematic postfeminism’ in prestige television 
culture. 
The academic debate around ‘quality television’ has produced a 
similarly pronounced tension in television scholarship, here in a more 
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broadly outlined antagonism between aesthetic and political 
approaches, or as James Zborowski (2016) describes these, the ‘TV 
aesthetics’ and ‘media and cultural studies’ groups (see also Lury 2016). 
This contestation is partly due to the term’s coinage in the industry and 
journalistic discourse, which makes it unstable and subject to constant 
strategic re-appropriations in the television industry. Given feminist 
scholarship’s historic contributions to the establishment of the main 
concepts of television studies, behind the tension between political and 
aesthetic approaches looms large that between the tools of feminist and 
aesthetic analysis. As will be shown in Chapter 2, the advancement since 
the early 2000s of a primarily aesthetic analysis of television texts in 
academia is linked to the American television industry’s re-definition of 
‘quality television’ on the basis of the production of ‘cinematic’ content, 
reproducing a gendered binary of aesthetic value where the masculine-
coded cinematic appropriates the spaces of the feminine-coded 
televisual.  
Since the medium’s significance for academic research is historically 
linked to its political value and economic-institutional practices, the 
suspiciousness in cultural studies about this recent academic 
development follows from the latter’s perceived close ties to the 
paternalistic processes of industry and media discourses. More bluntly, 
television aesthetics analysis is seen to be a servile follower to the 
masculinist elitism underlying the emergence of convergence-era 
quality television (Newman and Levine 2012, 153–71). As will be shown, 
debates around the gendered and classed elitism in academic 
discussions of cultural distinctions and hierarchies have been a staple of 
television scholarship at least since the 1980s, growing in significance in 
concord with cultural critics’ centralisation of postmodern culture’s 
contested impact. Academics heralding the recent emergence of 
aesthetically-narratively different television culture, and feminist 
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scholarship’s suspicion of this enthusiasm falls into this earlier pattern 
of debates, which includes the self-perceived ‘underdog’ status of each 
group. A power struggle is evident in this academic conflict, one that 
similarly structured the field in the 1980s and 1990s – with the 
difference that feminist television studies was then struggling for 
academic emancipation and for the legitimation of the study of a whole 
medium and its derided forms, while it is now often seen as the 
dominant approach that forecloses others, and is bogged down in 
questions of political representation and ideological processes of 
canonisation. Scholars like Jason Mittell (2015) and Sudeep Dasgupta 
(2012) warn against television studies ‘limit[ing] itself to defending 
popular culture against “Quality TV”’ (ibid.) on the basis of the field’s 
deeply embedded political agenda; while, in contrast, feminist critics 
Taylor Nygaard and Jorie Lagerwey call for a ‘challenge [to] the 
hierarchies of value placed on all modes of TV in order to reclaim TV 
studies’ feminist roots and re-center feminine subjects’ (2016).  
This thesis aims to intervene in these debates, which seem to 
correspond to American television culture’s categorisations of cultural 
value divided along the lines of aesthetics and politics. Precisely these 
demarcations begin to collide in the emergence of convergence-era 
‘feminist quality television’: as will be shown in the individual analyses, 
each examined programme takes the ‘masculinism’ of 
contemporaneous quality television culture for granted, and establishes 
its ‘feminist aesthetics’ in response to this; a practice in which network 
and online television companies’ institutional self-branding and 
promotion feature with specific significance. But as argued, the 
‘feminism’ mobilised involves the rhetorical contestation of preceding 
postfeminist representational strategies linked with generic traditions. 
This trait of the programmes deems them central to feminist television 
scholarship, which, as stressed, has a historically rich literature 
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examining the ramifications of postfeminist television culture for the 
creation of the ‘new female subject’ both as consumer-spectator and 
protagonist. Because these series incorporate so prominently in their 
generic and narrative features the signifiers of the ‘quality’ brand and 
the politics of recent female-targeted television, their analysis needs to 
combine these apparently conflicted approaches to begin to unearth 
their cultural work. While this argument echoes Zborowski’s (2016) in its 
conciliatory tenor, unlike his, it highlights the necessity of considering 
the specific findings of feminist scholarship.  
The thesis is not interested in gauging and evaluating these series’ 
feminism or postfeminism; nor does it champion their inclusion into the 
quality television canon, whether on aesthetic or political grounds. 
Rather, it examines how the texts and their promotional and 
institutional contexts utilise these terms to produce novelty 
programming in an age of television habitually described in TV 
journalism with the ominous phrase ‘Peak TV’ (Garber et al. 2015). My 
argument agrees with ‘TV aesthetics’ analysts that American television 
has undergone crucial aesthetic-generic shifts in need of interrogation; 
but it also agrees with its critics that canonisation processes are 
problematically gendered. Moreover, it supports feminist criticism’s 
contention that this gendering is informed by postfeminism’s and 
feminism’s popular cultural presence and promotional power. It is in the 
nexus of these complex phenomena where characters like Liz Lemon 
emerge. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Feminist scholarship, (post)feminism, and American 
popular culture 
 
Since the late 1980s, a prominent strand of Anglo-American feminist 
media theory has been characterised by a concentration on the 
postfeminist cultural paradigm in Western societies, yielding a body of 
work that understands postfeminism as the primary expression of 
contemporary popular culture’s relationship with feminism. This 
relationship has typically been conceptualised as detrimental for 
feminist politics and activism, and, in some academics’ view, for feminist 
media scholarship as well, for the ways it has provoked undue scrutiny 
of and reflection on methods of feminist scholarly engagements with 
popular culture. Karen Boyle’s (2008) analysis is representative, finding 
that the rhetoric of women’s individualised empowerment in Western 
societies, the rise of self-help culture, and the language around 
feminism as lifestyle choice has created an understanding of feminism 
‘that is focused on the aspirations and possibilities for individual women 
(typically, white, affluent, American women) but rejecting of second-
wave feminism’s demands for structural change’ (ibid., 179). For Boyle, 
when academic thinking becomes primarily occupied with this popular 
cultural understanding of the movement and what it means for the 
academic study of (post)feminism, it runs the risk of becoming 
entangled in debates whose terms are set by popular culture’s hardly 
rigorous, and commercially driven, agendas. 
Boyle’s criticism of postfeminism, and also of feminist media scholarship 
that similarly tends to concentrate its studies on questions of 
(individualised) womanhood, is a recurring one in the field. Her view, 
and that of many other critics, is rooted in the concept that feminism is 
(or should be) first and foremost an anti-establishment political 
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movement and as such antagonistic to, or at least highly suspicious of, 
the ways in which the culture industries feed upon and exploit its most 
profitable aspects. However, a different line of argument has also 
emerged in academia that describes this relationship in a less sceptical 
light. Characteristic of this opinion is Joanne Hollows and Rachel 
Moseley’s (2006) seminal analysis of feminism’s history since the 1970s 
women’s liberation movement, and its presence in the popular. In an 
argument opposed to that of academics like Boyle or Angela McRobbie 
(2009), they posit that ‘an insistence that feminism needs to exist in 
opposition to consumer culture frequently precludes the possibility of 
feminism becoming mainstream’ (Hollows and Moseley 2006, 10–11). In 
their formulation, feminist academics’ sceptical stance on popular 
culture’s usefulness in disseminating feminist concerns implicitly betrays 
a position that thinks itself morally superior to both the culture 
industries and audiences, and is even purist; ‘reproduc[ing] the idea that 
the feminist has good sense and therefore the moral authority to 
legislate on gendered relations, and also reproduc[ing] hierarchical 
power relations between “the feminist” situated outside the popular 
and “the ordinary woman” located within it’ (ibid., 11). However, they 
stress, it is precisely the area of the popular, rather than the academic 
or strictly political, where many people get their first understandings of 
feminism, and the representations that the popular provides form the 
initial basis of potential political involvement and activism. 
Consequently, a theorisation of feminism and popular culture should 
not be based on an inside–outside (of capitalist institutions and of 
consumer culture) model; this relationship is thoroughly dynamic as 
both areas need the other for their cultural validation.  
In turn, this vision of feminist political consciousness potentially 
developing through consumption of popular culture has been 
problematised by scholars who come to the exact opposite conclusion 
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from the same notion, best exemplified by Ednie Kaeh Garrison’s (2007) 
argument:  
Coming to feminist political consciousness today involves weeding 
through disjointed, conflicting and apparently contradictory 
conversations. This includes contending with the tension between 
what gets to be establishment feminism in the eyes of the media, 
subsequent popular consciousness of feminism, and more complex 
articulations, comprehensions and practices (…). (Ibid., 194-195) 
Thus, Hollows and Moseley’s argument about feminism becoming (or 
even having always been) a mainstream cultural force via its popular 
cultural representations counters an established view in academia that 
understands the movement’s cultural-political critique to be 
irreconcilable with its dilution into the popular. Angela McRobbie’s 
(2009) sociopolitical account of the latter problem is an influential one 
in the field. Scrutinising the incorporation of feminist concerns into late 
capitalist Western societies’ policymaking, legislation, education, 
popular culture, and popular consciousness, she finds that these 
processes have resulted in a ‘suspension of the critique of capitalism’ 
that has arguably always been a foundational aspect of the movement 
(ibid., 3). Thus, her understanding of feminism is firmly grounded in an 
anti-establishment, counter-cultural, and self-organised politics; one 
that contemporary late-capitalist consumer culture primarily associates 
with the second wave’s (allegedly dated) political and cultural role. In 
this argument, disruptions and subversions of the status quo cannot by 
definition come from ‘within the system’, invoking Audre Lorde’s much-
circulated aphorism about feminism’s race politics, ‘The master’s tools 
will never dismantle the master’s house’ (2007 [1984], 110–114). 
Further, feminist politics’ incorporation into policymaking and popular 
culture ‘in the guise of modern and enlightened “gender-aware” forms 
of governmentality’ (McRobbie 2009, 2) works to contain and stifle its 
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potentially radical political influence. McRobbie contends that this 
phenomenon, summarised in her seminal phrase ‘feminism taken into 
account’, demonstrates that the movement is still viewed as a ‘source of 
anxiety, concern and pre-emptive action, on the part of those bodies 
and institutions and organisations which do not wish to see established 
power and gender hierarchies undermined’ (ibid.). 
The difference of opinion about feminism’s potential/ideal/actual 
position and cultural work in Western societies has become a 
structuring one, and deeply embedded into the field of feminist media 
scholarship. Since roughly around the millennium – i.e. since 
postfeminism developed fully into its ‘feminism taken into account’ 
state – scholarly interpretations of feminism’s relationship with the 
popular, and of this relationship’s consequences for feminist politics and 
theory, appear to have grouped into two identifiable camps, according 
to their distinct levels of scepticism about this relationship. Merri Lisa 
Johnson engages in detail with this divide in the introduction to her 
edited book Third Wave Feminism and Television (2007b), a collection of 
essays about the sexual politics of US television programmes, intended 
to provide alternative, ‘sex-positive’ and third-wave readings of a 
variety of TV texts. Since Johnson’s account focuses specifically on 
television, it involves considerations of its medium-specific functions 
when discussing feminist academia’s relationship with television’s 
cultural work. As such, she considers television a primary site on which 
feminism and popular culture’s relationship is negotiated, and factors 
into this dynamic television’s own contradictions as ‘bad pleasure’ or 
‘idiot box’ versus its disruptive potential in allowing viewers to reflect on 
their political and other anxieties (however, the issue of ‘quality’ 
television and its claims to cultural value precisely via strategic 
disruptions of social mores do not come up in her discussion). Johnson 
provides a review of what she sees as two oppositional strands of 
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thought in third-wave feminist thinking about TV, divided along the 
rhetoric of ‘danger’ versus ‘pleasure’; she calls these two groups 
‘separatist feminist media critics’ versus ‘sex radical media critics’ or ‘ 
visual pleasure libertarians’ (ibid., 14–16). The former group is marked 
by its scepticism toward popular media that lures the viewer into a 
‘false consciousness’, and sees TV as an expression of the ‘always-
already-ness of patriarchal capitalist white supremacist media 
manipulation and commodification’ (ibid., 14); exemplified by varied 
bodies of work of established theorists like Tania Modleski, bell hooks, 
or Susan Bordo. The other group, with which she strongly identifies, 
understands TV as a site of multiple pleasures, concentrating on how 
this pleasure works, how viewers use it, and how subversive ideas 
operate in its ostensibly ‘patriarchal’ texts. Drawing on the works of 
Kristyn Gorton, Patricia Pender, and Amanda Lotz, Johnson advocates a 
view of popular culture that understands it as a ‘source of theory’: 
Reading television as theory opens up the possibility of granting 
media culture a more important role in contemporary conversations 
about gender and sexuality; each show is a performance of theory, a 
dramatization of its insights and impasses. Television is, as Linda 
Williams once said of pornography and Colin McArthur of gangster 
films, one of the ways our culture talks to itself about itself (ibid., 19). 
Johnson presents the academic work of this latter group, and by 
extension of the essay collection she introduces, as an unpopular and 
thus far uninfluential strand of thought in feminist media scholarship – 
the essays are intended to ‘counter the trend in feminist television 
studies of reading for the wry pleasures of catching patriarchy at its old 
tricks again’, because ‘there is not enough work being done to articulate 
what we like about television’ (ibid., 16) as a source of political pleasure.  
Despite the alleged underdog status of Johnson’s ‘visual pleasure 
libertarian’ camp, it could easily be argued that their ‘cultural 
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optimism’1 is very much grounded in an established conceptual 
background in feminist cultural theory and philosophy, and not such an 
unpopular thought after all.2 As an example, Johnson’s project of 
uncovering and interpreting feminist theories’ cultural work in allegedly 
sexist TV texts evokes Rosi Braidotti’s philosophical concept of 
affirmative feminism. For instance, in one of the collection’s essays, 
Johnson analyses how The Sopranos (1999-2007) uses the figure of the 
violently-beaten-to-death pregnant stripper, concluding that far from 
mere shock value and titillation, the series knowingly brings to light and 
criticises patriarchal power relations through this trope (Johnson 
2007a). Braidotti (2003) develops an idea of female sexuality – mainly 
based on Gilles Deleuze’s and Luce Irigaray’s work – that is ‘nomadic’, a 
‘subject-in-process’, always in becoming, and not defined and fixed by 
the Oedipal construction of ‘phallogocentric’ modes of thought. In this 
concept, masculinity, ‘as the privileged referent of subjectivity, the 
standard-bearer of the norm/law/logos (…) is antithetical to the process 
of becoming and (…) can only be the site of deconstruction or critique’ 
(ibid., 49). Thus, the project of ‘becoming-woman’ or destabilising fixed 
gendered and other identities ‘signifies the potential becoming, the 
opening out, the transformative power of all the exploited, 
marginalized, oppressed minorities’ (ibid., 52). Braidotti’s concept 
outlines a subversive moving away from 19th and 20th century erotic 
imaginaries, where woman signifies a sexuality ‘simultaneously titillating 
and denied’, toward one that is ‘more attuned to the technologically 
mediated forms of desire that are experienced and experimented with 
nowadays’ (ibid., 57). In this we can discover a philosophical foundation 
that underpins Johnson’s project of highlighting trends in television that 
                                                          
1Indeed, in the debate echo historic academic differences about the working mechanisms of the culture 
industries and postmodernity, going back to the ‘cultural optimist’ versus ‘cultural pessimist’ stances of the 
Frankfurt School’s theorists. 
2 McRobbie for instance finds it necessary to devote a whole chapter to argue against these concepts, 
supposedly against the grain (2009, 150–170), both in the areas of policymaking and legislation (the politics of 
gender mainstreaming), of culture and female representation (third-wave feminism and Girlie culture), of 
philosophy (the philosopher Rosi Braidotti’s affirmative feminism), and of higher education. 
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speak to these ‘forms of desire’. In turn, McRobbie’s analysis of 
Braidotti’s development of such ‘joyful feminism’ that concentrates ‘on 
the cracks and fissures, and possible points of rupture’ of late capitalism 
(2009, 159), criticises it on socio-historical grounds. She contends that 
Braidotti’s ideas of new modes of becoming and mutant/nomadic 
sexualities ‘are the inventions of those who are already located within, 
or at least are moving towards, a space of affirmative feminism’ (ibid., 
160). In other words, McRobbie sees Braidotti’s (and, I would add, 
Johnson’s and other feminists’ whose work shares these views) 
feminism as a utopian one that does not consider concrete social and 
cultural factors determining women’s relationship with feminism today 
– in fact, McRobbie likens this strand of thought to feminist science 
fiction. 
McRobbie’s stance may represent a stubborn scepticism in its criticism 
of contemporary cultural (and other) manifestations of feminism and in 
heavily opposing its presence in popular culture, and thus her opinion 
could easily be explained away on the grounds of its straightforward 
dismissal of third-wave feminist thinking that embraces popular culture. 
However, these disagreements are also present in scholarship that does 
embrace popular culture, but here the focus lies elsewhere. Johnson’s 
above cited introduction is instructive in this regard: in its attempt to 
describe feminist theory’s relationship with popular culture along the 
lines of the pleasure/danger divide, I want to highlight her account’s 
primary preoccupation with categorising academic thinking in order to 
explain her own relationship with television’s cultural work. Indeed, 
since postfeminism’s theorising became more or less widely accepted in 
scholarship, debates have started to shift towards a problematisation of 
this scholarship’s modes of engagement with postfeminism and popular 
culture in general. This academic tension follows from the fact that 
feminism is so heavily entangled with its own mainstream 
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representations, and its terms and meanings are negotiated on these 
slippery, loosely defined grounds. Consequently, academic thinking 
continues to be developed highly self-reflexively, and revolves around 
questions of method, nomenclature, and of categorising scholarly work 
on the popular (a pursuit that has further intensified after the 2008 
global recession and its cultural impact – see more on this later in this 
chapter).  
In another example, television theorist Amanda Lotz’s work is often 
engaged with reflecting on scholarly thinking about feminism’s presence 
in popular media, and she conceptualises the post-millennial ‘state’ of 
popular-political feminism in order to provide alternatives for scholarly 
thought. In her articles ‘Postfeminist Television Criticism’ (2001) and 
‘Theorising the Intermezzo: The Contributions of Postfeminism and 
Third Wave Feminism’ (2007), she proposes new taxonomies and new 
ways of thinking about postfeminism, both grounded in a culturally 
optimistic view of feminism and popular culture’s relationship. 
Suggesting these new methodologies and categories, Lotz’s perspective 
appears to be exemplary of Johnson’s ‘political pleasure’ camp in urging 
academics to consider ‘progressive’ elements of popular culture. To this 
end, she proposes to re-name the post-millennial cultural era an 
‘intermezzo’ (intended to relieve academia from grappling with the 
multiple meanings and layers of terms like postfeminism and third-wave 
feminism): an expression that implies that ‘the overwhelming structural 
impediments to gender justice that existed before the activist efforts of 
second wave feminism’ have been overcome but ‘in which complete 
equity has not been achieved’ (2007, 72). In this, her writing betrays a 
thinking that envisions feminism’s work as an evolution, a continuous 
development towards a future of complete gender equality in 
representation and in real life – implicitly presuming a universal 
agreement among feminists about these terms and their relationships. 
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In accordance with this stance, Lotz’s implied suggestion is (similar to 
Johnson’s) that theory would benefit from a concentration on the ‘how’ 
of this evolution, which would mean a concentration on the ‘positive’ 
(i.e. ‘feminist’) elements of it. In other words, Lotz’s proposal of new 
theoretical frameworks, languages, and methods to think about popular 
culture’s and feminism’s relationship is rooted in her particular stance 
on feminism’s presence in popular culture as a positive one. This yields 
suggestions about how academics should relate to this (more 
optimistically), and what they should emphasise in it (the progressive 
elements). Consequently, when she proposes new ways to overcome 
existing academic tensions, her method still firmly grounds her in one of 
the camps that this tension has created, which helps little in advancing 
the debate. 
A similar contradiction characterises Karen Boyle’s already cited article 
(2008) which, like Lotz’s and Johnson’s works, provides an overview of 
feminist scholarly engagement with popular culture in order to point 
out its shortcomings and to offer a solution to them. In Boyle’s view, 
these problems are rooted in the extreme nature of academics’ 
investment in the question of what is the best way of representing 
women and feminism in popular culture – a preoccupation that for her 
puts too much weight on the issue of the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ kinds of 
feminism, and that also frequently omits to consider those medium-
specific elements that complicate interpretations of TV texts. Further, 
she argues, this exclusive interest follows from popular discourses’ own 
anxious preoccupations with portraying contemporary womanhood. In 
other words, when scholarship debates the ‘feminism’ of individualised, 
iconic cultural, and often fictional, figures (good/bad Buffy, Ally, Carrie, 
Bridget, Madonna), it ‘allow[s] the popular debate to set the parameters 
of [its] own study’ (ibid., 178), which results in turning academic 
attention away from those ‘important challenges’ that ‘feminism as a 
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movement poses and continues to pose’ (ibid., 185, italics in original). As 
an example of this proposed challenge, she engages with the structural 
nature of inequities and of gendered violence. In the last section of her 
article, Boyle offers a reading of Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Buffy, 1997-
2003) that is intended to demonstrate what she means by such an 
engagement: her analysis asserts that the series, far from simply 
introducing a problematic (post)feminist female action hero, is also 
concerned to comment on and critique male violence as a social 
problem; an aspect of the programme that, in Boyle’s view, eludes 
feminist scholars’ attention, and needs further exploring. 
Boyle’s criticism of feminist media theory’s overwhelming interest in 
feminism’s ‘face’ in television culture places her opinion outside the 
above camps by offering a different method of thinking. However, her 
analysis of Buffy’s thus far underexplored ‘type’ of feminism directly 
undermines this argument. Boyle at one point cites Charlotte 
Brunsdon’s much-quoted formula of the ‘Ur-feminist article’ (2005, 
110–116), that in Brunsdon’s view has become the go-to model in 
feminist media studies for engaging with popular texts. In this model, 
the feminist author first introduces a ‘traditional’ mode of feminist 
thinking in analysing popular media, producing a list of expectations 
that make a text feminist and which the analysed text in this traditional 
(i.e. outdated) mode of thinking fails to meet; the author then 
disidentifies with this paradigm and demonstrates how these 
expectations are outdated by mobilising her own progressive reading 
and thus a more up-to-date feminism, which the text passes and is thus 
proven progressively feminist. This model is similar to Tania Modleski’s 
famous argument about the feminist syllogism (1991, 45), and which 
Boyle also quotes as characterising feminist television criticism. With 
these concepts in mind, Boyle’s critique of trends in the field that focus 
on judging celebrities’ and fictional figures’ feminism, yielding that men 
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and masculinity can ‘slip under the radar’, is somewhat weakened by 
her subsequent analysis of Buffy. Despite her assertion that her 
intention is not to demonstrate how the series conforms to her own 
version of feminism, it results precisely in this. Regardless of the veracity 
of her critique of scholarly obsession with good/bad feminism, her 
method ends up setting up an existing – dominant – mode of feminist 
thinking, then pointing out its elision of a particular aspect of feminism 
to finally highlight this aspect in a particular series – producing the kind 
of academic work that Brunsdon, Modleski, and herself warn against. 
Contending that contrary to previous readings, Buffy is not exclusively 
concerned with issues of postfeminist femininity, and thus its analysts 
are wrongly entangled in the postfeminist paradigm of concentrating on 
this question, Boyle sets out to prove the hidden – or not so hidden, 
only neglected in her view – feminist message of the series in its critique 
of structural oppression and masculinism – ending up doing the kind of 
‘resistant reading’ that she critiqued earlier, and which she sees as 
constraining academic thinking about popular culture.  
My point is not to dispute the validity of Boyle’s critique of the field of 
feminist media studies or even her alternative reading of Buffy. Rather, I 
want to highlight in both her analysis, and in that of Johnson and Lotz 
and also in their opponents’, the contradictions in which these academic 
texts are caught up and which they also reproduce. The postfeminist 
paradigm has been thoroughly described and criticised in academia 
since the millennium; its inherent contradictions of the empowerment 
and ‘choicoisie’ rhetoric, and their links to Western late capitalism’s 
reliance on consumer citizenship brought to light and criticised in 
multiple accounts of feminist media theory, feminist social studies, 
postcolonial feminism, and so on. Simultaneously with its 
establishment, this body of work sparked its own reflection and 
criticism, producing the above outlined camps, and yielding a new set of 
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ambiguities that allow for this ongoing debate to continue without 
resolution. Thinking about postfeminist femininities has become a 
dominant theme for feminist scholarship. However, the same is also 
true for the criticism that pointing out the sexism of this paradigm is a 
neither new nor productive mode of engagement, and that it is more 
imperative to concentrate on how the culture industries strategically 
use feminism in the popular (Bonnie Dow already argued for this view in 
1996). Both of these lines of argument are permanent staples now of 
academic thinking, even more so considering that a similar tension has 
long held sway over the history of feminist media criticism and activism, 
for instance in the ‘feminist sex wars’ of the 1970-80s, or in analyses of 
the ‘feminist’ TV sitcom of the 1970s highlighting the ‘liberated woman’ 
figure’s contradictory nature. The 2008 recession and its gendered 
effects (Negra and Tasker 2014) have only intensified this debate such 
that it is moving its points of tension to new territories in which this 
question’s contested nature itself provides the ground for a new 
impasse or a consensus – a consensus about the very prevalence of this 
contradiction. On one hand, the notion of postfeminist womanhood, 
and its problematic omission of a number of feminist concerns (as 
demonstrated by feminist scholars), is no longer a radical or 
marginalised opinion either in academia or in popular culture. Yet, 
paradoxically, the same is true for the academically and popularly 
expressed admission that contemporary feminist theory and activism 
does provide new impulses for popular culture to negotiate. 
I contend that this notion, i.e. the ongoing tension and the widespread 
agreement about its irresolvable existence, has become mirrored in the 
contradictions that currently characterise popular culture’s relationship 
with feminism. Popular discourses about gender issues have started to 
become prominent and to echo the debates that have occupied feminist 
academia since the postfeminist paradigm’s establishment, a 
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development that to some extent has followed from the recent 
economic insecurities of Western societies. Heated discussions about 
the problematic nature of privileged womanhood and its 
representations, of systemic oppression and marginalisation on the 
basis of gender, race, body image, sexual orientation, and other non-
normative identities permeate the American public sphere and cultural 
imagination, also sparking a new interest in discussions about 
feminism’s role in negotiating such problems. I argue that this renewed 
popular interest reflects the existing academic tensions, and has 
crystallised around well-identifiable issues to the extent that they have 
become available for fictional dramatisations. Television is a prominent 
site of negotiating these conflicts – unsurprisingly, considering the 
medium’s long established claims to immediacy and realism, its 
discursive amicability in American culture to liberal feminist politics and 
to female talent, and also its suitability for portraying cultural conflicts 
in an endlessly reproducible fashion.3  
Anglophone feminist media scholarship has started to interrogate the 
renewed popular cultural fascination with feminism after the 2008 
recession, and the various cultural phenomena this produces in the 
spheres of the cultural industries and media production, social media, 
celebrity culture, corporate branding practices, and so on. 
Representatively, the main theme of the 2015 annual ‘Console-ing 
Passions’ conference, the largest international event organised for 
feminist media academics, was dedicated to the idea of ‘Rebooting 
Feminism’, inviting delegates to scrutinise the implications of this 
notion. Similarly, the emerging figure of the ‘feminist celebrity’ (Hamad 
and Taylor 2015) and the sporadic appearance of Hollywood 
blockbuster films marketed for a gender-swapping or ‘feminist’ 
sensibility have been, as subjects of intense debate in both cultural 
                                                          
3 See more on these notions in Chapter 2. 
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criticism and fan cultures, examined in feminist academia (Savigny and 
Warner 2015b). The idea of a ‘rebooted’ popular feminism continues to 
be investigated in relation to the overarching theoretical framework of 
postfeminism and its embeddedness in the neoliberal market economy 
and governmentality, especially in the ways in which the culture 
industries constantly reconfigure and circulate ideals of citizenship, be it 
‘consumer’, ‘entrepreneur’, or ‘activist’. As Diane Negra notes in her 
examination of ‘feminist’ celebrity memoirs, ‘our economic lives are 
both shaped by and embedded within popular and representational 
culture’ to the effect that ‘popular culture helps to mobilise emotion 
and to allocate blame, frequently redirecting resentment and anger at 
structural problems away from elites’ (2014, 276). Savigny and Warner 
reflect a similar scepticism about this popular feminism, in their 
introduction to their edited collection emphasising a strong link 
between mediatised feminism and consumer culture which by and large 
operates to de-politicise the movement and re-package it as branded 
product (2015a, 1–24; see also Gill 2016).  
Yet the intensified polarisation of American political culture and 
simultaneous centralisation of identity politics especially in the areas of 
gender, class, and race has unavoidably produced popular media 
phenomena that keenly emphasise a politicised approach at odds with a 
pre-recession liberal (post)feminism. The incorporation of the term 
‘intersectionality’ (its academic coinage widely associated with race 
scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw’s work [1989]) into the vernacular of some 
media products, media criticism, and punditry is a symptomatic aspect 
of this, as are numerous efforts in media production and discourses to 
speak to the increased sociocultural requirement of thematising identity 
as politics, seen for instance in the increased promotional value of 
‘diversity’ in television (and, to a lesser extent, cinema) production. 
Feminist media scholarship interrogates these aspects of popular 
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culture within the interlocking connection of creative labour and market 
demands (involving postfeminism as governing backdrop), as for 
example seen in Linda Mizejewski’s (2014) examination of the rising 
popularity of ‘feminist’ women’s comedy on American television. In a 
similar example, the dubious prominence of the ‘feminist’ female 
celebrity is further intensified in the case of Beyoncé, whose 2013 
‘coming out’ as black feminist threw into sharp relief the contrast with 
her pre-existing star image as ‘post-race’, postfeminist black diva 
(Durham 2012, Weidhase 2015). Yet another contentious issue is the 
increased presence of feminist activism on social media platforms and 
often in conjunction with commercial media’s branding practices and 
with celebrity activism (Keller 2015). Previously marginalised strands of 
emancipatory efforts like transgender political activism have also 
become more visible and tied to the imperatives of popular media’s 
political economy, as seen in the celebrity activism of Laverne Cox, Janet 
Mock, and the discourses around reality TV personality Caitlyn Jenner’s 
widely publicised coming-out as transgender woman – each in specific 
ways throwing into relief processes of negotiation between transgender 
feminism’s efforts to upset gender binaries, transgender 
‘mainstreaming’, and homonormativity (Stryker 2008, Irving 2008, 
Lovelock 2016). 
The above examples demonstrate the ways in which American popular 
discourses have started focalising the questions that academic 
reflections on postfeminism have for some time been asking about its 
relationship with feminist politics, and about its selective incorporation 
of feminist rhetoric into popular cultural production. The contradictions 
that this process creates reproduce on popular platforms the tensions 
that have long been present in feminist media theory about the 
relationship between feminism and popular culture. In a recessionary 
cultural environment, the circulation of such high-profile debates has 
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intensified in popular entertainment around the ways in which the label 
‘feminist’ is used when invoking historically less visible feminisms (e.g. 
black and postcolonial, transgender). These debates demonstrate how 
the inquiries which had historically been marginalised in the popular for 
their critique of the working mechanisms of structural oppression, of 
postfeminism, and of liberal feminism, have been seeping into these 
popular representations and the discourses around them. However, 
since these representations continue to be subject to the logic and 
forces of commercial culture in their interpretations of feminist critique, 
pessimistic scholarly opinions about popular cultural treatments also 
continue to be valid. I argue that precisely this circular nature keeps 
feeding further marketable tensions into these discourses, since it 
shows which facets of these marginalised voices and criticisms are 
deemed fit or unfit for popularisation, which in turn keeps unsettling 
the ideal narratives of public discourse and provides it with further 
productive tensions.  
The above interrogation of academic feminism’s contemporary 
relationship with popular culture serves to support my main argument 
that the tensions surfacing in this are also increasingly present in 
fictional narratives that engage with representations of feminism and 
issues around gender. This is especially true for television, a medium 
that has a reputation of being the ideal fit for representing ‘women’s 
issues’ and other social tensions that can be dramatised at length in 
serialised and episodic narratives. Further, these dramatisations appear 
increasingly in the controversial subcategory of ‘quality television’, 
where they can foreground a feminist politics as marketable novelty 
that strives to dialogue with and emphatically distance itself from 
earlier, ‘postfeminist’ gender representations. This process will be 
shown in the individual analyses in detail, but to cite a typical example, 
consider Orange‘s promotional strategies and establishing narrative 
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technique. The series and its paratexts stress that its portrayal of 
women is the opposite of the traditional postfeminist representation of 
womanhood, and this is its primary claim for ‘quality’ status in the ‘Peak 
TV’ and convergence media culture. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, 
creator Jenji Kohan stresses in interviews that she used the trope of the 
privileged attractive white woman in a central protagonist role as a 
‘Trojan horse’ to pitch the series to TV executives, in order to sell the 
idea of exploring stories of diverse women in prison. Similarly, the 
programme’s dialogues and narratives frequently reinforce this notion 
of exposing and ridiculing a ‘postfeminist’ womanhood. 
The observation that the examined series use their status as ‘quality’ TV 
to explore issues around gender merits further investigation, 
considering television’s historic associations with both the feminine and 
lower culture – thus, in the next chapter I look at how the contemporary 
formation of a ‘quality’ TV that presumably distances the medium from 
its connotations with aesthetic mediocrity and unculturedness affects 
its gendered working mechanisms. This enquiry is all the more crucial to 
my project considering two contradictory aspects of American TV 
history’s relationship to gendered cultural value: first, in the historic 
emergence of the term, ‘quality’ as buzzword was initially used to 
promote the 1970s ‘feminist’, female-centred sitcom. Second and in 
contrast, the early 21st century establishment of ‘quality television’ 
mobilises ideals of cultural value governed by an underlying masculine-
coded understanding of genre and aesthetic judgement. I tease out the 
details of this apparent contrast by providing a diachronic analysis of the 
term’s gendered development in American culture from the 1970s 
onwards. Through this I demonstrate how the series I use as case 
studies formulate and navigate their gender politics both in the current 
landscape of ‘quality’ TV and in the historic context.   
 42 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Quality TV and gender 
 
Defining quality television 
 
There has been much debate in television scholarship since turn of the 
millennium about the definition and usefulness of the term ‘quality 
television’. To some extent this derives from the fact that the expression 
– similarly to ‘postfeminism’ – originates in popular discourse, and is 
thus elusive to academically rigorous definitions. Most scholars agree 
that the category’s features have solidified to an extent that allows for 
theorising it as a separate genre or specific type of television 
programming. The term itself is not new – as it has been circulating in 
popular discourses and in scholarship at least since the 1970s – but its 
understanding has changed significantly in the post-network era, in 
concord with shifts within the industry and in the medium’s public 
image.   
While quality TV is theorised as a separate category of television, 
scholarly writings also acknowledge that traditional televisual genres 
continue to operate within it, and accordingly distinguish between 
quality comedy and drama. Nonetheless, when describing 
characteristics of ‘quality’ features in terms of what sets them apart 
from other forms of TV, academics tend to emphasise commonalities 
among these forms in order to highlight definitive features relevant to 
all. For instance, Jason Mittell devotes detailed analyses to both quality 
drama and comedy programming to demonstrate how ‘narrative 
complexity’ works in each form (2006). Similarly, when Janet McCabe 
and Kim Akass (2007b) examine HBO programmes’ strategies of using 
explicit content, their examples include both The Sopranos and Curb 
Your Enthusiasm (2000-). However, despite considerations of different 
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formal-generic traditions in these examples, concepts about quality TV 
tend to concentrate on quality drama as the default genre on which its 
working mechanisms are most effectively illustrated. This follows from 
drama’s and comedy’s historically different cultural estimations: 
comedy, being a genre of lower cultural status, may gain a ‘quality’ 
descriptor, but since drama and tragedy are positioned in Western 
culture on a ‘higher dramatic plane’ (Rowe Karlyn 1995b, 97), both the 
contemporary concept and the longitudinal development of quality 
television are connected to quality drama’s emergence.  
Jonathan Bignell (2013) identifies three main characteristics of quality 
television: first, an aesthetic ambition ‘with the literary values of 
creative imagination, authenticity and relevance’, which differentiates 
the programme from other programming seen as ‘generic’ and 
‘conventional’. Second, it exhibits high production values that ‘prioritise 
strong writing and innovative mise-en-scène’. Third, it is targeted to 
‘valuable’ or quality audiences (middle-class, educated, affluent), in 
order for the production to become economically valuable (ibid., 179). 
Television scholarship generally agrees with this definition, including the 
argument that quality television is best understood as a genre 
(Thompson 1997, Mittell 2006, Cardwell 2007). Its theorisation as a 
genre then somewhat contradictorily involves the notion that it resists 
the ‘generic’, or formulaic, dimensions of television narration. Sarah 
Cardwell in particular goes to great lengths to conceptualise quality TV 
in these terms, arguing for stripping the word of its evaluative 
implications and highlighting specific generic features instead, which 
presumably creates a more democratic and objective atmosphere for 
critical judgements over any type of television (ibid., 23 and 32-33). 
However, this argument fails to take into consideration that the term’s 
evolution and contemporary generic meaning originate in evaluative 
critical judgements and cultural hierarchies, which betrays the 
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prominence of certain types of subjectivities in this process. This 
becomes clear in the term’s historical development to which I now turn. 
Before the 1990s, ‘quality TV’ was primarily associated with 
programming aimed at a ‘quality’ demographic (Feuer, Kerr and 
Vahimagi 1984). This definition also cultivated in the network era an 
aesthetic that is ‘clean’, ‘least objectionable’, and profoundly televisual 
(Lentz 2000). Mittell (2006) provides an exhaustive account of the 
factors that changed institutional practices in the 1990s to facilitate a 
different kind of programming, in order to explain the emergence of 
‘narrative complexity’, his term for the new feature of American TV 
programmes. In his subsequent book Complex TV (2015a), Mittell 
expands on this concept and also expresses his disapproval of the term 
‘quality’ for its hierarchal connotations, instead proposing ‘complex TV’ 
– an expression signifying a TV text’s aesthetic efforts while, 
purportedly, avoiding an elitist hierarchy between ‘complex’ and 
‘simple’ TV, similar to Cardwell’s concept.4 Listing key facilitators of 
narrative complexity (2006, 31–32), Mittell highlights series creators’ 
increasing interest in television as new territory of artistic freedom, 
pointing out that many of them come from a career in cinema. He 
explains the trend of film directors’ and screenwriters’ discovery of 
television with the medium’s presumed amicability to innovative 
storytelling as opposed to blockbuster cinema’s preference for visual 
spectacle (ibid., 31). Film directors’ and screenwriters’ move towards 
television is then beneficial for all parties: creatives are given more 
room for artistic experimentation while the television industry 
capitalises not just on the new and innovative products but on the 
higher regard in which these producers and creators are held, given 
their association with cinema. Quality in television is therefore 
                                                          
4 Chapter 5 examines Mittell’s argument in Complex TV in more detail. 
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formulated in relation to cinema, rooted in the latter medium’s cultural 
estimation as superior to television.  
Jane Feuer’s (2007) critical analysis of quality television further specifies 
the importance of television’s and cinema’s different cultural status. She 
postulates that when television lures creative personnel away from 
cinema, with them arrives an aspiration to associate quality television 
with art cinema (as opposed to ‘formulaic’ genre cinema). Thus, what is 
regarded as certain television programmes’ higher artistic value and 
originality than the norm, implies a cultural hierarchy between the two 
mediums that is extended to a parallel hierarchy among television 
genres and programmes. Feuer’s criticism of this cultural hierarchy is 
echoed by a number of television theorists (e.g. Newman and Levine 
2012, Mills 2013).  
A further aspect of the role cultural hierarchies play in the emergence of 
contemporary quality TV is the way premium cable television handles 
explicit content. McCabe and Akass (2007b) describe the process in 
which HBO created its ‘not TV’ brand in the 1990s, which involved 
capitalising on its exempt status from broadcasting regulation practices 
as subscription-based premium cable channel. Their investigation shows 
how the graphic sexuality and violence that is a frequent feature of 
HBO’s (and later other cable channels’) original programming, 
contributes to its brand identity as trailblazer of quality television. In 
what they phrase as HBO’s practice of ‘courting controversy’, the ideas 
of quality that discourses around series like The Sopranos and 
Deadwood (2004-2006) evoke, are associated with an explicitness 
justified through ‘creative risk-taking and artistic integrity’ (McCabe and 
Akass 2007, 69). HBO and its auteur producers legitimate ‘illicit’ content 
by linking it to exceptional aesthetics, authenticity, and ‘dramatic 
verisimilitude’ (ibid., 70-75). Although the authors do not emphasise it, 
their short case studies also illustrate how the idea of cinema as bearer 
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of higher cultural value affects the two series’ development in generic 
terms. Both draw on American cinema’s legacies of ‘tough’ genres like 
the gangster film and western, and as such are deeply embedded in 
discourses of tradition around nation and masculinity.5 However, HBO’s 
self-promotion that constantly seeks to re-confirm its headliner 
programming’s high cultural status through associations of the illicit 
with cinematic and literary values and authenticity, betrays an anxiety 
around the cultural positioning of illicit content (ibid., 73). A clear sign of 
this is the channel’s much more muted promotion of its consequently 
lesser known, but just as explicit, programming like its sex 
documentaries: HBO’s ‘internal regulation is cautious in handling the 
salacious and gratuitous, and absorbs the illicit into the serious business 
of making original groundbreaking programmes’ (ibid.). 
HBO’s frequent rationalisation of the ways explicit content features in 
its flagship programmes further points to the anxiety with which 
industry and media discourses around ‘quality TV’ (not just on cable) are 
involved in efforts to re-position and re-define the term’s meanings. The 
appeal to the cinematic or ‘above TV’ status creates a paradoxical 
situation, since scholarship and TV criticism simultaneously praise 
quality TV as profoundly televisual in utilising to the maximum the 
medium’s specific characteristics, as seen in Mittell’s analysis of 
‘narrative complexity’. He defines this as ‘a redefinition of episodic 
forms under the influence of serial narration’ that uses the seriality of 
soap operas, while ‘rejecting … the melodramatic style’ (2006, 32).6 
While pointing out the culturally less valued soap opera’s legacy in the 
formation of contemporary narrative complexity, and as such 
                                                          
5 The justification of portrayals of explicit sex and violence as a claim to realism recalls the ways producer 
Norman Lear’s ‘relevance’ sitcoms were discursively positioned in the 1970s, invoking the ‘authenticity’ of 
profanity as masculine trait. I detail this historic discourse in a later section of this chapter drawing on Lentz 
(2000). A crucial difference is that the ‘relevance’ sitcom’s significance is limited to its claim to televisual realism 
(as opposed to cinematic aesthetic), and thus it becomes positioned as non-quality through its attachment to 
racial politics and ‘working class’ profanity. 
6 Mittell changes his stance on melodrama’s influence in Complex TV (2015a) but a gendered evaluative 
judgement continues to govern it. See Chapter 5. 
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contending that it uses narrative forms specific to television, Mittell’s 
rhetoric also asserts the relative cultural position of these two types of 
TV: ‘[w]hile certainly soap opera narration can be quite complex and 
requires a high degree of audience activity (...), narratively complex 
programming typically foregrounds plot developments far more 
centrally than soaps, allowing relationship and character drama to 
emerge from plot development in an emphasis reversed from soap 
operas’ (ibid.). Since the article’s purpose is to demonstrate the ways in 
which this new type of TV is ‘innovative’ in opposition to ‘conventional’ 
programming (ibid., 29), this sentence makes a clear statement about 
which kind of storytelling practice (foregrounding plot versus 
foregrounding relationship drama) is understood to be more valuable. 
Mittell rhetorically distances ‘complex’ TV from soap traditions in 
parallel with drawing comparisons with cinema. Defining ‘complex’ TV’s 
‘operational aesthetic’ as a set of narrative devices that bring viewer 
attention to the mechanics of plotting, he explains this in the context of 
the cinema of attractions, where television’s ‘narrative special effects’ 
appeal to viewer appreciation akin to cinema’s narrative-stopping visual 
spectacle (ibid., 35). 
Mittell’s account of narrative complexity presents an example of the 
discursive struggle around the positioning of quality TV in cultural 
hierarchy. These discourses invoke the cinematic in an effort to provide 
aesthetic validation, while downplaying television’s own heritage as 
something that quality TV may have grown out of but has definitely 
outgrown. Television’s recent aesthetic validation in scholarship, 
championed prominently by Mittell, has effected an intense debate, 
evidenced in rebuttals from Feuer (2007), Kackman (2008), Mills (2013), 
Imre (2009), Newman and Levine (2012), and Nygaard and Lagerwey 
(2016). These works problematise the notion of ‘quality’ or ‘complex’ 
television by bringing attention to the inherent elitism of its discursive 
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development on the grounds of classed and gendered ideals of cultural 
value. Melodrama’s and soap opera’s influence on television’s generic 
and political traditions features significantly in these arguments, 
bringing to mind Lynne Joyrich’s (1988) investigation of a similar 
phenomenon two decades earlier.7 Similarly, Patrice Petro’s (1986) and 
Charlotte Brunsdon’s seminal essays (1990) brought attention to these 
questions through examinations of academic valuations of Anglo-
American media culture in a time when our current understanding of 
quality TV was just about to emerge. While Petro and Joyrich 
foreground the question of gendered cultural hierarchies, Brunsdon’s 
concern was primarily with Bourdieusian issues of class and social 
power in establishments of television canons. Joyrich’s, Petro’s, and 
Brunsdon’s arguments are echoed in contemporary critics’ 
interrogations of the question of aesthetics on political grounds, 
stressing that quality TV emerges from a rhetorical distancing from 
feminised and classed television culture. Their intervention in television 
aesthetics theory brings attention to how gendered and classed power 
structures (both institutional and academic) operate in the canonisation 
of a category whose common defining point derives from critical 
evaluative judgement, and whose concentration on the aesthetic results 
in glossing over this practice’s extremely political nature.  
 
Gender and cultural value 
 
As discussed, a strand of television scholarship contends that the 
evolution of contemporary quality TV is embedded in gendered and 
classed understandings of cultural value. There is some academic 
consensus about the way quality TV makes use of female-targeted 
                                                          
7 I will engage with Joyrich’s concepts about the relationship between television, cultural value, and gender in 
the last section of this chapter. 
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soaps’ and melodramas’ narrational and character development 
heritage, at the same time also distancing itself discursively from these 
lesser-valued forms and foregrounding other narrative-generic 
techniques. Kackman (2008) also reminds us that discursive 
formulations of quality TV are carried out via ‘re-embracing the 
gendered hierarchies that made the medium an object of critical and 
popular scorn’, and sidestepping in the process feminist media 
criticism’s historic contribution to the emergence of television studies 
(ibid., see also Nygaard and Lagerwey 2016). But while in previous eras 
gendered hierarchies were primarily manifested through contrasting 
evaluations of different media (TV in general viewed as a feminine, thus 
despised, medium), now that TV has become eligible for aesthetic 
judgements, this differentiation continues within television, in the 
gendered cultural hierarchy between quality and ‘other’ programming.  
So far I have argued that the emergence of contemporary quality TV is 
founded upon a classed and gendered differentiation from ‘other’ TV, 
igniting a debate in television studies between scholars celebrating 
television’s aesthetic revolution, and those using the political analysis 
approaches of media and cultural studies to criticise its gendered and 
classed hierarchies (Zborowski 2016). In the following I combine the 
‘aesthetic’ and ‘political’ approaches to map the gendered hierarchy and 
to show how this works not just in the ‘quality’ versus ‘conventional’ 
opposition but also within the paradigm of contemporary quality TV. 
This differentiation follows from the convergence-era television 
industry’s economic incentives governed by increasingly fragmented 
audience targets. In this economy, quality TV’s appeal to urban, high-
income, educated viewers involves a gendered division of labour 
(among others); and the history of quality TV since the 1970s is founded 
upon differentiations between the feminine and masculine both in 
terms of target audiences, production practices, genre and textual 
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features, and public discourse. Examining this gendered opposition 
between two types of quality TV texts, I argue that gender politics 
govern the dualistic formation of a ‘masculine’ quality drama on the one 
hand, and a ‘feminine’, postfeminist, female-targeted quality television 
on the other.  
It is now a common understanding in television scholarship that default 
‘quality’ television links high aesthetic and production values with the 
exploration of white masculinities (Lagerwey, Leyda, and Negra 2016, 
Nygaard and Lagerwey 2016). Series that helped shape the quality 
canon in the last twenty years like The Sopranos, The Wire (2002-2008), 
24 (2001-2010), Breaking Bad (2008-2013), Lost (2004-2010), Mad Men 
(2007-2015), The Walking Dead (2010-), Game of Thrones (2011-), 
Boardwalk Empire (2010-2014), Deadwood and True Detective (2014-) 
share not only now obvious generic-aesthetic features (markers of their 
quality) but also a preference for concentrating on, and dissecting, 
disparate kinds of troubled masculinities. These programmes’ politics 
are marked by a multifaceted scrutiny of changing ideologies around 
society, family, and identity via stories of complex (anti)heroes (Lotz 
2014, Mittell 2015b). What is largely omitted from academic 
examinations of these programmes is an inquiry into how and why 
these cultural anxieties appear as a profoundly male experience linked 
to quality television’s genre hybridity and cinematic style. Lacking this 
investigation, inherent masculinity remains an assumed (whether 
celebrated or lamented) feature of quality drama’s novelty aesthetics.  
But the economy of convergence-era TV also produces a ‘feminine’ 
quality television canon, characterised by the use of female leads and by 
its close ideological connection with postfeminist cultural discourse. The 
emergence of postfeminist TV programming has its own extensive 
literature in feminist television and cultural theory, investigating its 
relationship to neoliberal consumer culture, to postfeminist gender 
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politics, and to American television history’s relationship with feminism 
among others. For instance, two Ur-texts of postfeminist television, Sex 
and the City (1998-2004) and Desperate Housewives (2004-2012) have 
both been objects of study in McCabe and Akass’ anthology series 
Reading Contemporary Television (2004 and 2006, respectively), whose 
selection of individual American TV programmes is based on the primary 
role they play in shaping contemporary television culture. Yet studies of 
millennial postfeminist television from the perspective of its specific 
relationship with quality TV discourses have been scarce. One exception 
is Diane Negra’s (2004) work on Sex and the City and on the ways the 
programme articulates the meanings of ‘quality’ in its address to female 
audiences and in its connections to postfeminist consumer culture. 
Negra’s argument that quality in Sex and the City’s case has to be 
understood in the series’ relationship to postfeminism means that, in a 
broader sense, quality becomes defined by the text’s treatment of 
gender politics, i.e. by its representation of contemporaneous concerns 
about the new female subject and by its ambiguous relationship to 
feminist/postfeminist politics. In other words, quality here is defined 
not so much as an aesthetic category but more as a political one: 
questions of aesthetics and narrative become articulated mostly 
through questions of gender politics.  
This observation can be extended to other female-led quality series 
emerging after Sex and the City’s trendsetting success, such as its short-
lived copycats The Lipstick Jungle (2008-2009) and Cashmere Mafia 
(2008) or the more lasting Desperate Housewives and Grey’s Anatomy 
(2005-): these programmes’ notion of quality is tied to their negotiation 
of issues of womanhood, tailored towards the target demographic’s 
assumed interests; and their cultural value hinges on whether their 
politics of representation transgress the boundaries of the gendered 
status quo. This becomes even more visible in the programmes’ 
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relationship to genre: postfeminist quality television’s concentration on 
the political, rather than the aesthetic, articulation of quality, implies 
that this type of television locates its expressive modes in the 
frameworks of melodrama and dramedy, since it is not that interested 
in generic-formal transgressions, and as such remains in the domain of 
‘women’s genres’. Thus, the soap opera’s televisual heritage is not only 
more visible (because less concealed aesthetically) but also means that 
the notion of quality is not primarily expressed through narrative-artistic 
invention. Consequently, this programming becomes culturally inferior 
in relation to the quality associated with masculine-coded television. In 
this setup, the idea of transgression is split along gendered lines 
between the aesthetic-formal and the political, the former having more 
cultural currency than the latter.  
The concentration on the new female subject’s representation in 
postfeminist quality television has spawned a number of female-
targeted series on premium cable that present various kinds of 
‘troubled’ white womanhood, such as Nurse Jackie (2009-2015), United 
States of Tara (2009-2011), Weeds (2005-2012), The L Word (2004-
2009), Enlightened (2011-2013), or The Big C (2010-2013). Produced for 
cable, these programmes are able to express more varied ideas than 
they would be on networks about subversions of traditional images of 
women (see Nygaard [2013] on cable channel Showtime’s ‘Ladies with 
Problems’ programming formula). But these subversions are tied to the 
half-hour dramedy form and revolve around the complexity of middle-
class white womanhood, their narratives beginning to complicate 
gendered ideas around the domestic and public arena. This 
programming taps into millennial discourses about the independent, 
empowered, and consequently complex, woman whose narrative 
centralises generically-aesthetically restricted explorations of this 
identity. Postfeminist quality TV’s roots in the explicitly political explains 
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why its limited representation practices, i.e. its focus on women fitting 
into particular social categories (housewife, career woman, mother), 
become crucial questions in their evaluations both in academia and in 
popular criticism. Notably, the male-focused quality drama’s protagonist 
is mostly identified via his profession (mafia leader, small-town sheriff, 
chemistry-teacher-turned-meth-cook), which in turn is associated with 
plot, genre, and transgressive aesthetics. His identity, unlike the 
postfeminist woman’s, becomes articulated through these artistic 
practices. In contrast, the postfeminist protagonist exists through her 
domestic and private identities, and this focus determines generic and 
aesthetic practices; consequently, the progressiveness, or lack thereof, 
in representation overrides aesthetic concerns. 
Because of postfeminist quality TV’s hierarchical relationship with 
masculine-coded TV, it is more useful to theorise the category as a 
subset of contemporary prestige drama rather than as its polar 
equivalent. As high production values and the targeting of select 
demographics are given features for both, the distinguishing factor 
between them becomes the specific methods employed in articulating 
cultural value. As we have seen, for masculine-coded programming this 
means a foregrounding of aesthetics, genre, and plot, while 
postfeminist quality TV defines it through the politics of characterisation 
of a culturally most recognisable female protagonist, rendering issues of 
genre, plotting, and aesthetics subordinate to characterisation 
practices. Further, the theorising of postfeminist quality TV as a 
subcategory of quality drama also makes sense in considering both 
categories’ textual-discursive modes of audience address. Male-centred 
quality drama is, despite its focus on ‘troubled’ masculinities, at the 
same time interested in attracting other-than-white-male audiences, as 
indicated by the trope of ‘strong’ female and minority supporting 
characters which the narratives of ensemble series tend to exhibit. The 
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appeal to a universal aesthetic value invites a de-gendered, non-
ideological appreciation of these forms, at the same time veiling the 
power dynamics inherent in their construction and evaluation. This 
universal quality is also linked to high-concept serialisation’s emergence 
on television, promising a contrast with ‘traditional’ TV’s ephemeral and 
episodic patchwork structure; and the appeal to the superiority of 
metanarrative assumes a lack of gendered cultural hierarchies. This 
programming offers accessability for a wide selection of social groups on 
account of its aesthetic value. Contrastingly, postfeminist programming 
primarily targets a gendered segment of these audiences, and the 
quality that it claims to have is understood in terms of its political 
address to this group.  
The inherent gendered split within current definitions of quality TV can 
be further illuminated through an historical examination. In the 
following I trace how the idea of quality television was constructed from 
the 1970s onwards (a period when industry vernacular started to rely 
heavily on the term for promotional purposes), and concentrate on how 
both the programmes and contemporaneous discourses invoked gender 
politics. By locating diachronic patterns in the ways the relationship 
between gender and quality TV is configured, I highlight the specific 
historic contexts in which this relationship shifts over time. 
 
‘Quality’ discourses in the network era 
 
The historical trajectory from the 1970s to the present of the discursive 
formation of ‘quality’ on television is a gradual shift from foregrounding 
a political meaning toward an aesthetic one. Key works of television 
historians like Jane Feuer et al. (1984), Lynne Joyrich (1988, 1996), 
Bonnie J. Dow (1996), and Julie D’Acci (1994), engaging with television’s 
relationship with gender, feminism, and cultural value in the period 
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between the 1970s and 1990s, emphasise television’s popular 
association with immediacy and with a suitability for (the illusion of) 
social-political realism. As Joyrich postulates about TV melodrama, this 
striving for, and illusion of, a close connection with the referential is 
linked with established narrative structures of scripted television and 
their low cultural value: ‘With no agreed transcendental value to be 
achieved, melodrama can offer no final closure, and thus its narratives – 
in both continuing serials and episodic series – are circular, repetitive, 
and unresolvable’ (1988, 140).  
In the history of television’s relationship with ‘quality’, 1970 is a seminal 
year, marking the debut of the workplace sitcom The Mary Tyler Moore 
Show (1970-1977) on CBS. Produced by the production company MTM, 
the programme proved a game changer both in the television industry’s 
relationship with its own popular reputation as low culture, and also in 
feminist politics’ relationship with its representations in popular culture 
(Feuer, Kerr, and Vahimagi 1984). The fact that this happened in the 
situation comedy genre shows that the idea of quality television in its 
meaning of political-social innovation was understood to be better 
suited for comedic forms; specifically, for a new type of comedy that 
does not just provide easy entertainment but has social consciousness. 
Therefore, the TV industry’s new directive of creating ‘quality’ by 
catching up with the era’s radical social-political upheavals (like the 
women’s liberation movement) was executed via a direct and calculated 
association between feminist politics and the sitcom form. Writing in 
the 1990s, Bonnie Dow noted that in television history, female-led 
dramas have always been a scarcity due to that format’s higher cultural 
regard; consequently, situation comedy ‘is the type of programming in 
which women are most often and most centrally represented and from 
which television’s most resonant feminist representations have 
emerged’ (Dow 1996, xviii; see also D’Acci 1994, 14 and 71; Rowe Karlyn 
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1995b, 97–99). ‘Quality’ becomes realised here in a genre that, due to 
its traditionally low-culture status8 (presented in a low-culture medium), 
has more freedom to be politically-socially subversive than others – 
further proving the point that television quality in this era is primarily 
associated with, and defined by, political rather than aesthetic 
meanings. 
In The Mary Tyler Moore Show, and in other female-led sitcoms that 
followed it throughout the seventies (Maude [1972-1978], Rhoda [1974-
1978], Phyllis [1975-1977], The Betty White Show [1977-1978]), the 
television industry began to develop models for how to capitalise on its 
popular associations with topicality in order to remedy its ‘low culture’ 
reputation. The feminist sitcom formula that dominated the era was an 
answer to the ‘social relevance’ mania characterising 1970s television, 
which all three major networks (CBS, NBC, ABC) utilised in order to 
reach the newly discovered quality demographic (Feuer 1984a, 4; D’Acci 
1994, 13–14; Dow 1996, 32). Competing with the MTM sitcom as a 
reformer of television narration, Norman Lear’s Tandem Enterprises 
launched its flagship sitcom All in the Family (1971-1979) on CBS. 
Through their competition, the two production companies transformed 
traditional sitcom form, and they also ‘represented a kind of brand 
differentiation within the same product line’ (Feuer 1984a, 8). As Kerr 
describes, ‘…much of The Mary Tyler Moore Show’s success has been 
attributed to its coincidence with the crisis of the nuclear family and the 
impact of the women’s movement, in much the same way that All in the 
Family has been associated with changing liberal attitudes toward race 
and racial equality’ (1984, 80). 
In the 1970s female-centred sitcom, MTM and CBS produced ‘quality’ 
comedy by directly associating it with the women’s liberation 
                                                          
8 For a detailed exploration on the relationship between cultural value and genres see Rowe Karlyn (1995b, 95–
115). 
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movement. Mary Richards (Mary Tyler Moore) represented the new 
female subject who earns a living, and is single, childless, and well-
educated. A female characterisation considered revolutionary for its 
time (ibid., 80-81), this was meant to appeal to white professional 
women audiences, an emerging target demographic for the culture 
industries. The female character’s innovation drives the idea of quality 
and provides the MTM sitcom’s backbone. That is, all other novelty 
features of form, such as the ensemble cast of colleagues, the 
workplace as main location, the emphasis on character rather than on 
situation, or the untypically fluid camera movements (ibid., 87-92), 
originate in the radicalism of the female lead’s gendered 
characterisation. In other words, television’s assumed ability to portray 
social issues and to engage with questions of social identity in a complex 
way provides the foundation of its 1970s configuration of quality (and 
popularity). And crucially, this quality is linked with television’s 
perceived femininity, with the idea that television, a signifier of female 
consumerism, may best draw on this femininity as a political capacity to 
re-define itself as innovative.9 An element of this is television’s 
perceived closeness with the (female or feminised) viewer: its domestic 
presence, in opposition with cinema’s perceived masculine distance and 
voyeurism, is utilised here as a positive trait (Joyrich 1988, 146; 1996, 
36–39).  
However, even this configuration of ‘feminine quality television’ via the 
MTM sitcom emerges in a dualistic opposition with other, ‘masculinist’, 
televisual features, manifested in the above mentioned Norman Lear 
sitcom. Lentz (2000) gives a detailed account of how the 
contemporaneous popular discourse set up the dualism between 
‘quality’ versus ‘relevance’ by highlighting the differences between 
MTM’s and Tandem’s comedy style. In this relationship, The Mary Tyler 
                                                          
9 For more on the television industry’s construction of the ‘women’s audience’ see D’Acci (1994, 63–73).  
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Moore Show becomes associated with middle-class whiteness, 
intellectualism, and ‘sexual modesty’ (ibid., 68), while All in the Family 
earns its reputation for political ‘relevance’: its established 
centralisation of racial issues situates it in ‘a discourse about the “real”, 
not the moral or polite. And reality is allowed to be shocking’ (ibid.). 
Thus, the opposition between ‘quality’ and ‘relevance’ also becomes an 
opposition between ‘feminist politics’ versus ‘racial politics’: ‘sexual 
modesty’ and white, middle-class femininity versus ‘sexual 
licentiousness’, ‘gritty realism’, and working class masculinity 
respectively. Here, the traditional dualism of a ‘feminine’ television and 
a ‘masculine’ cinema is projected onto 1970s television through these 
categories, while their assigned features render their cultural values 
oppositional along political lines, and also render their aesthetics 
subservient to these politics. In this connotation though, unlike in the TV 
versus cinema dualism, the MTM programme’s liberal feminism 
assumes higher quality than the Norman Lear sitcom’s ‘masculine 
realism’ and physicality (additionally, this dualism also keeps antiracist 
and gender politics safely separate in popular consciousness [ibid., 80]). 
Feuer (1984) discusses the differentiation between the MTM and the 
Lear sitcom similarly but in aesthetic terms. In its own way of re-
inventing the sitcom form, the former developed the character comedy: 
instead of the classic problem/solution narrative format, The Mary Tyler 
Moore Show and its successors foreground the protagonist’s 
psychological journey. Thus the situation becomes only a pretext for 
character study, which also results in a more nuanced televisual style. 
Further, because of the emphasis on character dynamics, discussions of 
political issues primarily focus on the personal dimensions of these 
problems. In contrast, the Lear comedy is based on situation: in order to 
present specific ‘social issues’, it ‘retains the simplistic, insult-ridden, 
joke machine apparatus to a far greater extent than did The Mary Tyler 
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Moore Show’ (Feuer 1984b, 35). Characters are less complex here and 
virtually ‘stick figures in a political allegory’ (ibid., 46), where each 
stands for an ideological-social type, including female stereotypes. The 
Lear comedy’s overtly political nature allows for less psychological 
depth and thus less opportunity for identification and sentimentality; it 
is also less interested in formal innovation, treating style as secondary 
to politics.  
In further scrutinising the MTM workplace comedy’s political novelty, 
Serafina Bathrick (1984) argues that it is ideologically significant that the 
showcasing of a new, liberated and complex, female character, happens 
while simultaneously pushing straightforward discussions of politics into 
the background. For Bathrick, ‘the presence in the workplace of the 
humane and accessible woman’ might be a political novelty but is also 
connected to the treatment of politics as ‘background’; therefore 
‘whether the TV newsroom as workplace marks a new environment for 
a new kind of women’s work remains to be considered’ (1984, 105). I 
want to carry Bathrick’s point further by considering the different 
ideological work the two types of comedies perform in transforming the 
traditional sitcom formula. By creating the workplace or character 
comedy, or ‘warmedy’ (Feuer 1984b, 43), The Mary Tyler Moore Show 
‘domesticates’ the workplace, and to a certain extent de-politicises it via 
its feminisation; while All in the Family’s ‘issue’ comedy brings (racial) 
politics into the domestic space and thus masculinises it by turning it 
into an arena of public debate. As such, the ‘masculine’ political-public 
and the ‘feminine’ personal-private contaminate each other in these 
two contrasting rearrangements of a traditional TV genre – but in the 
process they carry their gendered dimensions with them into the 
ideologically new form. 
In sum, television’s reflection of the ideological-cultural-economic 
changes of the 1960s and 1970s yielded a new understanding of quality 
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whose definition was primarily politically rooted: this definition was 
linked with quality TV’s ‘femininity’ as a political trait. However, this 
notion is further nuanced if examined in television’s contemporaneous 
context of the idea of the ‘political’: in the discursive-textual contrast 
with the Norman Lear sitcom, the feminine/feminist sitcom prefers 
character development and refined aesthetics to the latter’s direct 
political satire, masculinism, and lack of interest in formal innovation. 
Already in this period, an implicit polarisation is set up between a 
feminine and a masculine television; but the difference emerges as 
‘feminine’ TV’s superior value following from a foregrounded aesthetics 
that in turn is rooted in emphasising the personal within the political. 
This is in contrast with present era quality television’s configuration, 
which utilises the idea of aesthetic-formal innovation but connects it 
with, and embeds it in, a masculinised cultural tradition, thus concealing 
its gendered ideological work. ‘Feminine’ quality dramedy however 
continues to be defined based mainly on a politically subversive, but 
individualised characterisation practice (fostered by postfeminist 
discourse), and realised in the tried-and-true aesthetics of the half-hour 
comedy/dramedy. It was in the 1970s then when American television 
first tested out our contemporary notions of quality in terms of 
aesthetics, demographics, and the political – and following from 
television’s traditional ‘femininity’, it is only logical that this happened 
through forms, styles, and characterisation methods associated with the 
feminine. These experimentations and their formulas of success later 
became utilised in television’s gradual establishment of the more 
aestheticized, ‘masculine’, and decidedly more prestigious quality 
drama. 
The last few years of the 1970s and early 1980s saw the ‘feminine’ 
character comedy’s decline and the rise of the hour-long character 
drama. Shifts in political-cultural circumstances such as the three 
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networks’ new ‘Family Hour’ programming initiative and the 
Reagan/Bush era’s neoconservative political atmosphere, effected an 
institutional reluctance for experimenting with women’s portrayals  
(Kerr 1984, 85–87). Wary of presenting content that could be seen as in 
any way controversial, television brought back female representations 
deemed ‘traditional’, thus creating the truly contradictory situation in 
which ‘ratings were dominated by examples of what were known inside 
the industry as “T&A programming”, “candy-for-the-eyes” and “jiggle 
television”’ (ibid., 87). It was in this cultural atmosphere that MTM 
developed the hour-long dramas Lou Grant (1977-1982) and Hill Street 
Blues (1981-1987), both of which contributed to the establishment of 
post-network era quality drama. They concentrated primarily on male 
characters in professional environments, utilised masculine-associated 
genres and created their notion of quality in connotation with the 
cinematic-artistic. Hill Street Blues amalgamates the cop genre with 
documentarism, while Lou Grant’s inception was largely owing to the 
cultural impact of the film All the President’s Men (1976) – the series is 
set at a daily newspaper and follows an ensemble of investigative 
reporters chasing news stories of great political-social impact (Wicking 
1984, 167). Thus, the programme is imbued with ‘heavyweight social 
issues’ (ibid., 166) presented via innovative storytelling methods. 
Crucially though, these and other series’ several formal features 
originate in the 1970s MTM sitcom, such as the ensemble cast, the 
workplace as familial space, and the emphasis on characters’ 
psychological development.10 A crucial difference however is that 
innovations of the ‘feminine’ sitcom were primarily politically 
motivated: for example, the emphasis on character was a consequence 
of the effort to create identification points for a new type of protagonist 
(the female professional, the divorced woman, the single woman), and 
                                                          
10 They are also influenced by melodramatic and soap opera forms’ narrative and characterisation methods, 
evidenced for instance in the increased hybridisation of serial and episodic structure. 
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thereby to minimise her potential abrasiveness that could alienate 
audiences. When the hour-long quality drama emerges, no such 
motivation is behind it to facilitate its characterisation methods; rather, 
it utilises this style by simultaneously emptying it of its gendered 
political impetus, and incorporates it into other distinguishing markers 
of quality.  
In a telling example, while The Mary Tyler Moore Show is known for 
spawning a number of spin-offs and launching the careers of its 
ensemble cast, of these it was only the male character Lou Grant (Ed 
Asner) whose spin-off series was developed in the hour-long dramatic 
form. In fact, Lou Grant itself is the series through which MTM develops 
the ways in which topicality and issue-oriented storytelling work in a 
more ‘serious’ format. In other words, when MTM, in its quest for 
novelty programming, first ventures into experimenting with genres 
which have higher cultural prestige than the sitcom, it turns to 
masculine-coded cultural traditions – culminating later in Hill Street 
Blues becoming ‘the new paradigm for television’ in terms of innovative 
style and social criticism (Feuer 1984a, 26). Unsurprisingly, this series is 
frequently discussed today as being highly influential on the paradigm 
of post-network quality drama.11 Such a quest for aesthetic value does 
not necessitate political innovation in gender representations, and this 
aspect diminishes in the concept.12 Decentering the idea of radical 
female portrayals, the increasing masculinisation of quality TV also 
brings about a ‘feminism taken into account’ (McRobbie 2009) type 
treatment of women’s allocated spaces in ensemble casts. Dow shows 
that in the ‘professional serial drama’ form of the 1980s, ‘the influence 
                                                          
11 Producers of contemporary quality TV like The Wire, Deadwood, and House of Cards (2013-) analyse the series’ 
influence on their work in these terms in Ryan (2014). 
12 The best-known example for an exception that proves this rule is Cagney and Lacey (1981-1988), a drama that 
attempts to amalgamate the ‘tough’ cop genre with feminist politics, and strives for quality status through this. 
But the contemporaneous intense cultural anxieties around the female protagonists’ political ‘meaning’ 
demonstrate the unease with which foregrounded gender politics are accepted into genres associated with 
higher cultural value (D’Acci 1994). 
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of feminism in American culture is obvious’ but limited, naturalising the 
postfeminist paradigm via women professionals’ obligatory inclusion as 
supporting characters into masculine-coded forms of quality television 
(1996, 98).  
The historic shift in the discursive formation of ‘quality’, moving from 
the ‘feminine’ or liberal feminist sitcom toward the 
masculinist/aesthetically-driven quality drama can be best illuminated 
through Joyrich’s concept about discursive connections between 
television, postmodernism, consumerist culture, and femininity (1988 
and 1996). Joyrich states that academic cultural criticism historically 
configures television culture as the primary manifestation of late 
capitalist mass culture and postmodern chaos, associated with 
threatening the classic humanist ethos through the collapse of its 
traditional dualistic values and epistemologies, where this pluralism is 
profoundly gendered: 
Rather than the masculine spectator stimulated by the negativity 
inherent in modernist art, television creates an effeminate viewer, 
passive and gullible, in need of comfort and support. Within this 
discourse, TV’s mystification becomes almost a castration. (1996, 26) 
The contradiction in the popular and academic image of a ‘feminization 
lurking over all American culture’ (1988, 146) is that within the constant 
fear of mass culture’s destruction of traditional values such as ‘the 
distance between subject and object, active and passive, that upholds 
the masculine gaze and the primacy of the male subject’, resides these 
values’ continued high evaluation. Thus, postmodern culture is 
‘desperately trying to retrieve and maintain its traditional distinctions’, 
for instance by utilising the low-culture form of melodrama on TV as a 
privileged formula, ‘promising the certainty of clearly marked conflict 
and legible meaning even as it plays on the closeness associated with a 
feminine spectator-consumer’ (ibid., 147). In this way, postmodern 
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culture ‘decenters oppositions even as it attempts to resuscitate them’ 
(ibid.). 
Joyrich’s theorisation of the discursive tension between a feminising, 
infantilising, fragmented, consumerist television culture and a 
masculinist cultural tradition canonised as carrying great universal 
values, provides an explanation for the emergence of television’s own 
formation of an elitist, gendered idea of quality – a quality that carries 
associations between the seemingly non-televisual (because cinematic), 
and the masculine voyeuristic (see cable’s utilisation of sexualised 
graphic content). In this perspective, the longitudinal gravitation 
towards the masculine-coded quality drama’s cultural dominance seems 
almost an inevitability. In the mid-1990s, Joyrich already demonstrated 
how TV culture would attempt to ease the postmodern tension by 
introducing such features into its meanings; in the poignantly titled 
essay ‘Threats from within the Gates: Critical and Textual 
Hypermasculinity’ (1996), she shows how 1990s ‘action and crime 
dramas (...) attempt to deny television’s “feminine” connotations in 
order to construct a masculine spectator and achieve the status of 
“quality” television’ (ibid., 11). Today’s quality TV canon not only fulfils 
but brings to its logical next phase this possibility by establishing ideas 
of exceptionalism, authenticity, authorship, metanarrative, 
universalism, and other qualifiers of modernist artistry on cable 
television, all the while embedding them in a tradition of masculinity 
that it borrows from the higher valued medium of cinema. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Television, transgression, and cultural value 
 
This chapter examines the connection between cultural transgression 
and cultural value on television, specifically what I identify as a 
discursively gendered divide between ideals of aesthetic and political 
transgression. Quality television discourses cultivate the idea of 
‘edginess’, generally meaning aesthetic uniqueness and narrativisations 
of divisive themes. I argue that the programmes analysed in this thesis 
amalgamate these strategies of transgression by linking ‘novel’ 
treatments of form and narrative with ‘novel’ treatments of popular 
feminism. From this follows a need to examine closer how television 
associates the idea of cultural boundary-breaking with cultural value.  
Television scholarship agrees that the institutional and aesthetic 
paradigm shift that facilitated the emergence of today’s quality TV 
culture, is linked to HBO’s aggressive brand building in the 1990s 
(Edgerton and Jones 2009; Leverette, Ott, and Buckley 2008b; McCabe 
and Akass 2007b). HBO’s novel method of promoting its brand identity 
by embedding its original programming in discourses around 
exclusiveness, artistry, and explicit content has played a crucial role in 
establishing associations of some television with higher cultural value. In 
the first section of this chapter, I examine the gendered aspects of the 
subversively explicit on HBO. Since the politics of subversion cultivated 
by the company quickly gained currency in the industry, my discussion 
treats these politics as broadly characteristic of today’s culturally 
dominant quality TV paradigm. Considering that the HBO model’s 
artistic merits are associated with a taboo-breaking usage of explicit 
content, my focus will primarily be on how this is mobilised to evoke the 
aura of high cultural value, specifically in its relationship with taboos 
around the gendered body, social mores, and language. The second 
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section unpacks the meanings behind a legacy of ‘feminist 
transgressions’ on TV, both in an historical trajectory and also in the 
post-network paradigm of quality TV. The argument concentrates on 
the changing cultural understanding of the transgressively feminist and 
its links to shifting notions of quality. This section also builds its timeline 
around the cultural paradigm shift that HBO’s treatment of televisual 
quality has established, and thus outlines a before/after relationship of 
‘feminist’ transgressions with it.  
 
HBO’s ‘quality’ transgressions 
 
The previous chapter argued that HBO’s promotion of a motivated 
usage of explicit content served to emphasise its uniqueness in the 
1990s television landscape. McCabe and Akass (2007b) show that the 
eagerness with which producers of HBO’s flagship series link sexually 
explicit or violent content to authenticity implies an underlying unease 
with this content. This nervousness speaks more broadly to the cultural 
status of the explicit (especially if connected to the body and its 
boundaries) as in itself inherently suspicious in the hierarchies of taste. 
As genre theories of cinema have shown, genres defined by their 
centralisation of the physical and by an appeal to the viewer’s strong 
physical-emotional reaction, like pornography and horror, have 
historically been categorised as low culture (Williams 1991). HBO’s 
promotional treatment of the explicit emphasises this content’s artistic 
and/or narrative motivation, thus removing the notion of ‘just physical’ 
entertainment from its function to secure its programmes’ cultural 
prestige.  
However, it is not only the explicit content that gains cultural validation 
by its association with the artistic, but also the medium of television 
itself. Despite the assertion of its much-quoted slogan (‘It’s not TV. It’s 
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HBO.’), HBO remains closely attached to and dependent on television 
culture, or as Avi Santo dubs the cable network, it is ‘para-television’ 
(2008, 24–30). In this bartering around cultural prestige, two 
phenomena – television and representations of explicit content – that 
have both been evaluated in cultural history as pandering to the masses 
and thus denied judgements based on artistic merit, use each other in 
an effort to create a culturally validated mode of representation. The 
crucial difference between these realms however is their gendered 
cultural coding: as discussed, television has long been associated with 
feminising/emasculating, consumerist, and middle-to-lower-class 
culture; while the profane and its associations with bodily or linguistic 
transgressions are connected to lower-class masculinity and to the 
exclusion of the feminine/female subject, from pornography to Freudian 
theorisations of the ‘smut’ joke. Television’s popular understanding as a 
feminine phenomenon is linked historically to its assumed avoidance of 
excess, to its appeal to a middlebrow, bourgeois regime of taste that 
strictly regulates representations of the corporeal. The sexually 
excessive or violent is however in a reverse, but symbiotic relationship 
with the feminine: in Linda Williams’ words, ‘what may especially mark 
these body genres [pornography, gross-out horror, and melodrama] as 
low is the perception that the body of the spectator is caught up in an 
almost involuntarily mimicry of the emotion or sensation of the body on 
the screen along with the fact that the body displayed is female’ (1991, 
4; italics mine). In pornography and horror, the female body’s 
centralisation and its display of physical pleasure or pain causes these 
genres to be culturally associated with masculine viewing pleasures, and 
to be banned from middle-class tastes, especially from the feminine 
world of television. Williams’ third body genre, the melodrama, is of 
course not only exempt from this ban but permeates television as a 
female-targeted and feminine-coded form (Joyrich 1988), which speaks 
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to the differences in the cultural acceptability, function, and position of 
the bodily excesses these genres represent along gendered lines. HBO’s 
quality TV discursively replaces melodrama’s feminine-coded excess 
with the similarly low-culture, but masculine-coded excess of sex and 
violence, in the process lending cultural prestige to the latter modes of 
bodily transgressions. 
From its beginnings in the 1970s well into the mid-1990s, HBO’s 
programming and branding policies as cable channel relied primarily on 
an exclusivity emerging from the combination of television and 
profanity, two seemingly irreconcilable phenomena. Content that could 
only be broadcast in a cable environment, such as feature films without 
adverts and censorship, live sports events (mainly professional boxing), 
sex documentaries, and stand-up comedy with explicit language, 
dominated the cable network’s programming before it started to 
produce original series (Edgerton 2009). In this era, the exclusivity 
promised to subscribers did not yet include the idea of a specific higher 
aesthetic value but mostly meant the novelty of showing content on 
television that was understood to be anathema to its political economy. 
The notion of taboo-breaking has then been part of the cable network’s 
branding policy in most of its history; in its first twenty-odd years this 
was located in the cultural clash of a masculinised idea of the daringly 
explicit and of the feminine televisual. It was in the 1990s when HBO’s 
cultural politics relating to its originally produced programming started 
to build the notion of an ‘edgy’ aesthetic into the brand by heavily 
promoting it as a cross-pollination of art and profanity.13   
Additionally, the 1990s was also an era during which Western culture’s 
already brewing broad ideological-political transformations really 
                                                          
13 Scholarly literature describes HBO’s establishment of quality TV culture as a conscious business decision by the 
cable channel’s management in the mid-1990s, and specifically attributes it to then-chairman Chris Albrecht’s 
intervention. The marketing tagline ‘It’s Not TV. It’s HBO.’ was introduced in 1996 (McCabe and Akass 2007b, 84; 
Edgerton 2009, 8). 
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started to surface in the popular. In the process of spectacular ‘post‘-
ings of cultural-political struggles and ideologies, traditionally low 
cultural forms gained new meanings in a re-arrangement of dominant 
taste regimes. As feminist cultural critics contend, postfeminism and the 
postmodern brought about a new valorisation of the pornographic in a 
discourse of feminist empowerment and self-actualisation (Gill 2007, 
Levy 2006, Douglas 2010, McRobbie 2009). The pornographic and horror 
gradually acquired a higher position in the hierarchies of taste in the 
1990s, and were accepted into the mainstream as ironic and/or artistic. 
In this regard, HBO’s strategy of combining the explicit and the aesthetic 
can be understood as recognising and tapping into this cultural 
atmosphere, and as contributing to its proliferation in its own 
institutional context. The obvious parallel between postfeminism’s 
wider paradigm and HBO’s policy is that the infusion with the 
sexualised/pornographic transforms an initially feminine-coded 
phenomenon (the feminist movement and the derided medium of 
television respectively) into a culturally more decipherable one.  
In HBO’s treatment, both television and the profane undergo a cultural 
re-evaluation as realms of entertainment whose cultural function 
becomes distanced from mere entertainment. Since I argue that the 
critical evaluation of both TV and the profane hinges greatly on cultural 
re-combining rather than actual content, a question arises about the 
exact nature of content that in cultural consciousness is associated with 
breaking established taboos. Setting aside the issue of cultural re-
combining for now, i.e. the ‘shock’ factor of pairing the explicit with the 
televisual and the artistic, we can ask, what kinds of cultural boundaries 
is quality television understood to break thematically? My interest here 
is not in interpreting cultural products or separating theme and 
aesthetic treatment but to unpack connections between institutional 
cultivations of the gendered profane and the politics of cultural 
 70 
 
(academic and popular) validation. Considering the HBO-style quality 
text I suggest that content discursively linked with transgression due to 
its illicit connotations, is in fact aligned with already existing modes of 
representations of the ‘shocking’. Consequently, HBO’s treatment of the 
explicit as boundary-pushing is less interested in a political subversion of 
this particular tradition, and is in fact conventional in its localisations of 
the subversive moment. A scrutiny of the critical discourse around these 
programmes further confirms this suggestion. To illuminate this 
argument, I analyse two academic works that exemplify the process 
whereby the inherent gendered traditionalism of ‘edgy’ TV texts 
becomes rhetorically repressed.  
Marc Leverette’s (2008) study of HBO’s exceptional nature in the TV 
landscape due to its foregrounding of profanity asserts that the 
transgressive act lies in questioning the boundaries separating cultural 
categories. He discusses how HBO negotiates this boundary-crossing of 
othered or subcultural territories, using the example of George Carlin’s 
stand-up comedy (among other programming). First broadcast on HBO, 
Carlin’s comedy helped in the 1970s and 1980s popularise the world of 
stand-up, ‘as well as having a normalizing effect regarding profanity’ 
(ibid., 127). Leverette analyses Carlin’s now classic monologue about the 
‘seven dirty words that you cannot use on television’ (George Carlin - 7 
Dirty Words [Best Part] 2011), positing that Carlin’s method of socio-
linguistically dissecting swear words that are taboos for television on 
television fulfils the criterion of the absolute subversive. But Leverette’s 
argument, amplified with a demonstrative writing style that mixes 
academic language with expletives, leaves untouched the question of 
where exactly lies the political subversion beyond the act of using 
profane language where it traditionally does not belong. His argument 
overlooks that while Carlin’s monologue may break certain taboos (the 
contextually classed nature of profane and proper language), it does not 
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upset more deep-seated ones linked with sexualised power relations. 
For instance, discussing a sequence about the word ‘cocksucker’s 
legitimacy, Leverette writes: ‘for Carlin, the real danger of puritanical 
linguistic relativism can be seen here as he asks how did cocksucker 
come to mean “a bad man,” when it’s really “a good woman. How did 
they do that?”’ (ibid., 130). While he deems this bit of the monologue 
characteristic enough to merit specific mention for its ridiculing of 
classist puritanism, unmentioned goes the misogyny and homophobia 
within the historic shifts in the word’s derogatory function and in 
Carlin’s rhetoric. This, considering that both Carlin’s humour and 
Leverette’s analysis lie in the socio-linguistic aspect, is revealing. The 
monologue is of course a product of its time, meaning that this act of 
boundary-crossing had its own contemporaneous cultural regulations, 
but a contemporary scrutiny could presumably engage with locating 
these. It is striking for instance that Carlin’s wording imagines the 
ridiculed middlebrow, proper tastes as thoroughly female: the 
bourgeois society that deems foul language unacceptable is populated 
in his jokes with bishop’s wives, mothers, and prim ladies in accordance 
with television’s gendered associations. As such, when Carlin brings his 
seven dirty words into television, the overtly classed boundaries of taste 
that he oversteps are implicitly but profoundly gendered. Here, 
Leverette’s statement that HBO ‘sells a subculture’ (ibid., 125) becomes 
problematic for its lack of enquiry into where exactly the political 
subversion of bringing the subcultural out of its marginalised home lies. 
After all, the subcultural art that Leverette cites, exemplified in Jean 
Genet’s ‘style as revolt, style as refusal, crime as art’ (ibid.), is motivated 
by concrete social otherness and is inextricably connected with political 
emancipation. Leverette’s omission is all the more conspicuous here 
since the next section of his essay examines HBO’s broadcasting 
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practices in regard to boxing matches, and scrutinises the raced and 
sexualised mediation politics of spectator sports.  
A similarly conspicuous absence of enquiry into the precise nature of 
transgression politics characterises Amanda Lotz’s analysis of the male-
centred quality programme in her book Cable Guys (2014). This work 
endeavours to account for the increased interest of a set of prestige TV 
texts in portraying problematic masculinities. Lotz finds that 
programmes like Sons of Anarchy (2008-2014), Breaking Bad, Entourage 
(2004-2011) or The Shield (2002-2008) complicate the patriarchal 
gender scripts of earlier television by depicting male characters as 
struggling with contradictions between social expectations of 
hegemonic masculinity and individual experience. She explains this 
phenomenon as owing to contemporary ‘negotiations among aspects of 
patriarchal and feminist masculinities’ in Western culture (2014, 38), 
influenced by a post-second-wave feminist consciousness in men’s 
portrayals on television. As such, Lotz locates these texts’ transgressive 
moment in their gender politics, i.e. their characterisation practices of 
complicated men. She does not bring the boundaries crossed into direct 
connection with the popularisation of profanity like Leverette; similarly, 
the analysis does not interrogate the interplay between the depictions 
of these masculinities, and aesthetic-narrative conventions or issues of 
cultural value on TV. The notion of boundary-crossing is limited to 
institutional differences between cable and network television for Lotz: 
the former encourages ‘edgier’ characterisation practices while the 
latter has more reactionary politics, ‘erect[ing] a big tent that welcomes 
heterogeneous audiences with content unlikely to easily offend’ (ibid., 
61). Because Lotz’s focus does not go much beyond an association of 
cable television with edginess, it unavoidably meets with obstacles in 
accounting for the cultural anxieties around masculinity that these 
programmes signal:  
 73 
 
Interesting, and still unexplainable in my mind, is the impetus that 
stimulates stories about men’s struggles. Some sort of catalysing 
event remains elusive, so that these preponderant themes and 
stories of struggle seem instead to be an organic bubbling to the 
surface of largely unconsidered and unspoken challenges for men. 
(Ibid., 81) 
Omitting the enquiry into the relationship between cultural hierarchies, 
gender, and aesthetics, Lotz’s analysis cannot account for the existence 
and construction of these progressively complicated masculinities. In 
another example, her textual analysis of Sons of Anarchy aims to 
demonstrate how the programme’s gender politics problematise main 
protagonist Jax’s (Charlie Hunnam) position in a setting portrayed as 
profoundly patriarchal (an outlaw motorcycle club). The series’ narrative 
tensions revolve around Jax’s ongoing struggles with this world’s 
expectations of him as patriarchal leader, a position that clashes with 
his post-second-wave feminist characterisation as sensitive family man 
(ibid., 107-110). Crucially, Lotz notes that the series deploys a 
‘Shakespearean’ plot in its premise of a power struggle between Jax, 
only son of the club’s deceased founder John, and Clay (Ron Perlman) 
who is responsible for John’s demise and took over the club’s 
presidency, also marrying Jax’s mother (Katie Segal), a Lady Macbeth-
like figure. The Hamlet and Macbeth narratives have an established 
place in Western storytelling, and Hamlet especially has become a 
shorthand reference in modern cultural history for updating the Oedipal 
narrative. The issue of patriarchal storytelling traditions has been a 
staple of feminist cultural theory, which itself has partly been developed 
within the frameworks of psychoanalysis (Rowe Karlyn 1995a, Bronfen 
1996). Considering that Sons of Anarchy‘s premise self-referentially 
invokes the Hamlet story, and that Lotz is also aware of this, the analysis 
of the series’ gender dynamics from a feminist perspective would 
require an investigation of how it negotiates the conspicuously Oedipal 
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plotting techniques with its main protagonist’s characterisation, 
understood as struggling with different – retrograde and progressive – 
models of masculinities.  
Leverette’s inquiry ties the profane’s transgressive use to the 
interaction between two culturally incongruous realms of 
entertainment without considering the underlying gendered aspect. 
Lotz foregrounds gender (masculinities) in locating the progressive 
elements of ‘edgy’ programmes, neglecting to examine further this 
aspect’s relationship with generic and narrative conventions and their 
cultural positioning. Thus, questions such as how and why these 
transgressions develop in this particular era in this particular cluster of 
texts remain ‘unexplainable’. Both authors take the subversive moment 
at face value as it operates within culturally already sanctioned texts.  
Nonetheless, the issue of cultural boundary-crossing features as an 
essential concern within examinations of quality TV’s cultural functions, 
and is theorised as constitutive of its established position in television’s 
value hierarchies. This happens in concert with strategies of the industry 
and media discourse that configure the transgressive moment as that 
which combines explicit content (i.e. that which would be censored on 
network TV) with ‘edgy’ storytelling and characterisation techniques 
(also incompatible with network TV). Since this transgression’s 
definition hinges so fundamentally on a competitive comparison with 
network TV (Nygaard and Lagerwey 2016), it eclipses questions about 
the political-social nature of such a breach of cultural boundaries, a 
neglect that also influences academic investigations of the quality text. 
This shift in emphasis occurs because in its history, ‘mass’ TV has been 
figured as more adept at focusing on political subversions rather than 
aesthetic ones (Feuer, Kerr, and Vahimagi 1984; Ott 2008). 
Consequently, this facet of network TV does not feature with the same 
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weight in the cable context, or is indeed side-lined in the evaluation of 
its subversive aspects.  
It was due to the cross-cultural trajectory in configurations of 
transgression that HBO was faced with challenges in the late 2000s in its 
efforts to safeguard its reputation as the ‘edgiest’ among its 
competitors. Upon other cable and broadcast channels’ rapid adoption 
of the ‘quality TV’ formula, and after the buzz around its brand-defining 
flagship series had abated, HBO had difficulties for some years in finding 
the next trendsetting programmes that would set it apart in the pool of 
variations on the quality TV model (Edgerton 2009, 14–17; Leverette, 
Ott, and Buckley 2008a, 6–7). This paradigm’s impact also had a 
normalising effect on what counts as taboo and profane (Leverette 
2008, 132). In this cultural atmosphere, HBO continued the ‘courting 
controversy’ policy via even more accentuated usage of violent and 
sexually explicit content in programmes such as Game of Thrones and 
True Detective. Media reception of the former series’ explicit content 
problematised its reliance on narratives of gendered violence (Jones 
2014, Sepinwall 2014), lamenting that the channel’s ‘pushing the 
envelope’ strategy is tied to patriarchal storytelling traditions. However, 
critical discourse also notes that Game of Thrones endorses the trope of 
‘strong female characters’, whose narrative dominance in the 
programme’s sixth season effected critical and fan popularity (Marsh 
2016, Cuen 2016). These two aspects of the programme, coming across 
as a trade-off – emphasis on archetypal ‘strong women’ in exchange for 
gratuitous nudity and sexual violence – constitute the series’ notoriety 
in popular consciousness as ambiguously negotiating its gender politics. 
HBO capitalises precisely on this ambiguity that taps into a cultural 
unease with intensified gender discourse, but its strategies of boundary-
crossing around the gendered corporeal are nonetheless familiar from 
cinema and art history.  
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Feminist transgressions 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in the network era the 
television industry constructed its programming’s cultural value by 
drawing on a political rhetoric for which the medium was deemed an 
ideal venue. This logic produced discourses of ‘quality’ and ‘relevance’ in 
the 1970s, surrounding the MTM and Tandem sitcom respectively (Lentz 
2000). Thus from this period onward, the term quality TV was 
associated with liberal TV, and not necessarily with excessive aesthetics 
or high production values. The subversion of culturally dominant 
representations meant seeking out themes that counted as progressive 
in the era, and embedding them in emphatically politicised narrative 
contexts. In accordance with television’s reputation as being a ‘verbal’ 
rather than ‘visual’ medium, transgression was linked to politicised 
narrative and dialogue. Stories about Mary Richards asking for a raise, 
about Rhoda’s (Valerie Harper) divorce, about Archie Bunker’s (Carroll 
O’Connor) jovially old-fashioned racism, or later about liberal feminist 
Julia Sugarbaker’s (Dixie Carter) righteous indignation over topical social 
issues in Designing Women (1986-1993), were not just occasional jokes 
within otherwise ‘harmless’ plots of sitcoms, but were essential to 
narrative structures designed to both represent and initiate social 
debate.  
Further, the foregrounded alliance with ‘women’s lib’ concerns was due 
to the industry’s discovery of upscale female audiences. As discussed, 
the institutional term ‘quality’ denoted initially these audiences, rather 
than content appealing to their tastes. The notion of political 
progressiveness as a consequence of the industry’s targeting of a 
‘quality’ audience has arguably remained a constitutive element of any 
quality programming until today. However, as Santo argues (2008, 31), 
the post-network strategy of re-inventing the moniker was to highlight 
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the idea of quality content which was originally the critical discourse’s 
creation rather than the industry’s. But more than just a strategic 
mixture of targeting quality audiences and producing quality content, 
the post-network promotion of quality foregrounds the latter: by 
drawing on a paternalistic tradition of cultural value (authorship 
discourse, ‘cinematic’ aesthetics, genre hybridity, serialised narrative, 
explicit content), it transplants the idea of the ‘politically progressive’ 
into this masculinised context while in the process obscuring its initial 
function and its gendered origins. 
The same trajectory is evident in the shift that occurs in the connection 
between genre and quality. The ‘politically transgressive’ idea of quality 
was established in the 1970s liberal feminist and female-led sitcom 
which, along with melodrama, is historically viewed as the form most 
closely allied with political feminist content due to the MTM formula’s 
cultural influence. But the notion of low cultural value is also part of 
sitcom’s working mechanism, restricting its potential to upset the status 
quo within the constraints of its expressive modes. The long-standing 
wisdom that television, and within that, the sitcom particularly is the 
exceptional venue where women’s issues can be addressed best, brings 
to the fore the connections between both television’s and (some) 
comedy’s associations with the feminine and with a low cultural status. 
In this perspective, it is no coincidence that the post-network ideal of 
quality TV has been established within the quality drama framework 
(Thompson 1997, 17; Feuer 2007); and that the emergence of this 
subcategory historically is a slow generic shift between the 1970s and 
the late 1990s from the female-led half-hour comedy towards the male-
led hour-long drama. 
Thus, the notion that television and the sitcom have traditionally been 
the primary sites on which politically transgressive, and especially 
feminist, concerns can be negotiated, was due to the conjunction of two 
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factors: one is related to the lowly position these have occupied in 
cultural consciousness. Thanks to this, the medium had relative freedom 
to increase its reputation by pairing up its most ubiquitous form with 
politically influenced narration. But visually and/or linguistically explicit 
content was banned from network-era television. This leads to the 
second factor contributing to the ‘political’ notion of transgression in 
this time: since institutional censorship did not allow for expressing 
transgression via explicit content, the ‘quality’ discourse hyped at the 
time preferred an association with white, middle-class respectability 
(Lentz 2000). Maintaining its strictly regulated narrative and generic 
norms, television distanced itself from its bad reputation as ‘tasteless’ 
entertainment via a strategic association between TV as feminine 
object, political progression, and respectability. The institutional 
restriction was thereby treated not as a limitation but as a political 
asset, where television shuns profanity to express feminine and feminist 
transgression. This configuration of the transgressive differentiates 
network era ‘feminist’ TV from the Bakhtinian concept of the 
carnivalesque, which locates its political transgressions in the overtly 
corporeal associated with low cultural, mass tastes (Rowe Karlyn 
1995b). Of course network era feminist TV is still very much ‘mass TV’, 
i.e. it is not exclusively available or subcultural in its aesthetics and 
target audiences. It nonetheless negotiates within its framework an 
ideal of quality that, due to its institutional-cultural context, creates its 
definition in an emphatic elimination of ‘physical’ transgressions, 
contrasting ‘politics’ with them. This facet of network-era feminist TV 
also reflects the historically problematic relationship of feminism with 
body politics, as demonstrated by the ‘sex wars’ of modern feminist 
history and the debated question of embodied representations of 
feminism until today. Lentz’s discussion of the sitcom Maude provides 
another example for this, here in the specifically raced contrast 
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between middle-class housewife Maude’s (Bea Arthur) white liberal 
feminism and her black housekeeper Florida’s (Esther Rolle) lack of 
interest in gender politics (2000, 69–78). The series construes these 
ideological differences in relation to the two women’s different 
relationship with body and sexuality as raced subjects (Maude’s 
prudishness versus Florida’s sexual excess), since it explicitly 
understands this relationship to be crucial for their relationship with 
feminism (ibid.). 
It is partly due to network TV’s elimination/regulation of the physically 
excessive, and this elimination’s centrality in the definition of a ‘feminist 
quality’ on 1970s TV, that later expressions of the feminist are conveyed 
increasingly around transgressions of the body. Rowe’s (1995b) seminal 
concept of the unruly woman shows that feminism is expressed in 
cultural history as an excess, a breaking of societal rules pertaining to 
expectations of dominant modes of femininity. Her analysis of cinematic 
examples and of sitcom star Roseanne Arnold implies that these 
feminist excesses overstep the boundaries not only of the specific era’s 
mandatory femininities but also, from the 1970s onwards, its 
expectations of feminist politics. As feminism has since the late 1960s 
become embedded in popular culture’s constructions of gender to 
varying extents, those aspects of feminism that are most amenable to 
these constructions become period-specific features of an ideal 
femininity, producing perpetually changing contradictions in gender 
expectations. Thus, Rowe’s unruly woman subverts not only an ideal 
femininity but with it, these dominant modes of feminism. It is owing to 
this that Roseanne’s feminist unruliness is located in the excessive body 
and voice. In it converges a subversion of, on one hand, the rule of slim 
body, pretty face, soft voice – traditional embodiments of femininity – 
and, on the other, the sitcom feminism that dominated the 1970s and 
became the epitome of popular feminism for the period.  
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Roseanne’s unruliness then goes against the policing of the body, 
including the policing of its feminism. While both the 1970s feminist 
sitcom and Arnold’s comedy persona defy a hegemonic sexualisation of 
the female body, the former creates this through a notion of middle-
class purity, in accordance with TV’s institutional boundaries and with 
second-wave feminism’s association with white middle-class 
housewives and professional women in popular imagination. The sitcom 
Roseanne (1988-1997) and Arnold’s celebrity persona however 
transgress these representational boundaries via focalising the 
‘unattractive’ and classed body. This aims to disrupt in part the 1980s 
‘backlash’ era’s dominant modes of femininity (Faludi 1991), but also an 
historic feminism constructed as middle-class, respectable, and all-
around feminine (Rowe Karlyn 1995b, 54). Following from their 
respective eras’ different constructions of femininity and feminism, 
1970s feminist sitcoms and Roseanne express body politics that 
respectively operate as an elimination of the female body and as a 
naturalisation of it (the idea of ‘what real women look like’). These 
strategies are also governed by their respective relationships with 
expectations of cultural value: the MTM sitcom’s ‘purity’ constitutes an 
asset for the quality label, while Roseanne expresses political 
transgression by forming an alliance with traditions of the 
carnivalesque. Rather than striving for a higher position in hierarchies of 
taste, this transgression attaches itself to the lower-rung areas of 
popular culture both in the excessive female body’s centralisation and in 
its political meanings, expressed through the critically dismissed but 
popular domestic sitcom form.  
Cable drama’s emergence and the cultural transitions of the 1990s (the 
growing influence of postfeminism) both contribute to a transformation 
of the meanings of ‘feminist’ unruliness. Cable’s institutional sanctioning 
of explicit content as part of the artistic transgression of televisual 
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aesthetics accommodates the representation of an excessive 
overstepping of bodily boundaries. But this new possibility emerges in a 
cultural atmosphere that valorises the sexualised female body whether 
in the context of empowerment, consumption, or high art. Since 
postfeminist discourse insists that it emblematises political (i.e. 
feminist) progression, its foregrounding of the female body – a site on 
which various social anxieties can be negotiated – fits with quality TV’s 
relationship to explicit representations of sexuality and violence as 
subversive not just in an artistic, but also in a political sense. This 
combination leads to postfeminist popular culture’s heightened 
contradictions around the female body and also to its contradictory 
critical readings especially in the context of quality TV. 
The postfeminist quality comedy/dramedy, constructed as a 
subcategory of quality TV specifically targeted at female audiences and 
epitomised by Sex and the City, speaks to the newly found political 
freedom in expressing female sexuality. As such, it inverts Rowe’s notion 
of unruly feminism, which is excessive in pushing the boundaries of the 
‘acceptable’ female body: it is not the boundaries of what constitutes an 
attractive female body that become exposed but the ideal of sexual 
respectability that the 1970s sitcom cultivated. The extent to which the 
feminist unruliness Rowe theorises can be portrayed visually, and can 
carry cultural value becomes clear here: in ‘mass’ TV, Roseanne’s 
feminism involves both bodily excess and unruly behaviour (sharp wit, 
sexual appetite) in domestic sitcom’s confines. In the postfeminist 
quality dramedy, the freedom of visual transgression does not translate 
this into politically excessive explicit visuals: the bodies on screen and 
what they do remain anchored to dominant ideals of beauty and to the 
postfeminist paradigm of a classed (sexual) empowerment, and in this 
aspect show a closer relationship with the MTM era sitcom. Unlike the 
MTM sitcom however, the quality moniker is not achieved through 
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eliminating the female body as sexual object/subject but through its 
centralisation, as consequence of the visually explicit’s upward travel in 
cultural hierarchies.  
Thus, postfeminist quality comedy/dramedy draws on both traditions of 
TV feminism: when utilising the possibilities of the explicit, it borrows 
from Roseanne’s body politics in the act of turning the focus on it; but 
its expressions of ‘sexual liberation’ are tied to the dictates of the 
narrowly classed, raced, and bodily policed postfeminist ethos. 
Postfeminism’s tight link between sexual liberation and individualised 
consumption culture also constitutes a pivotal difference from earlier TV 
feminisms: it forecloses a directly ‘political’ rhetoric around women’s 
space in the public sphere and structural oppressions since it locates its 
feminism in the intimate private. McCabe and Akass posit that leading 
women of the HBO-type quality drama and of the half-hour dramedy 
like Sex and the City convey a ‘female sexuality and erotic desire [that] 
has rarely been represented in such complex ways’ (2009, 308), and that 
this representation is directly linked to ‘feminism’s “sex wars”’ (ibid.). By 
speaking to this particular strand of feminist debate, this 
characterisation’s sheer volume and cultural prestige also aids in 
carrying its importance over into a widely accepted understanding of 
feminism. 
While not striving for an overtly politicised-public feminism like the 
‘feminist’ sitcom, postfeminist quality dramedy still locates its 
transgression in its political value – that of sexual liberation which the 
explicit content means to underline – and this forms the basis of its 
quality moniker. Since it does not focalise a radical subversion of 
televisual aesthetics, genre, and narrative, this subcategory does not 
produce such a transformation of generic traditions as the quality 
drama. Consequently, television’s continued alliance with feminist 
politics remains anchored to the half-hour comedy/dramedy and its 
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narrative traditions. This also keeps the form’s relative position in the 
hierarchies of taste unchanged, even in an elite, critically acclaimed area 
of television. As noted, premium cable channel Showtime cornered the 
market of female-targeted quality dramedy with its ‘Ladies with 
Problems’ programming brand in the mid-2000s (Lawson 2010, Fallon 
2010). In this gendered division of institutional branding policies, the 
quality category’s generic hierarchies retain their fixity, presupposing 
their constructions of the transgressive aspect.  
Tellingly, postfeminist quality TV fits more easily into the institutional 
and aesthetic traditions of network TV than prestige drama. For 
example, while Sex and the City has fared well in network syndication 
with the raunchiest bits censored, advertisers have been reluctant to 
sponsor The Sopranos, posing a problem to broadcasting the series on 
network channels (Santo 2008, 36; Simon 2009, 203). Further, HBO did 
not capitalise on the trendsetting success of Sex and the City by 
producing more similar programming; in fact, the series’ cultural 
importance can be measured in the way it influenced the emergence of 
these on other channels like Showtime and network television. In the 
company’s paternalistic branding philosophy, the half-hour women’s 
comedy/dramedy has little transgressive value beyond what Sex and the 
City already provided politically and in securing an audience. This 
category is quite openly connected to ‘mass’ TV, both in its feminine 
subject matter and its generic connotations; in contrast, quality drama 
provides more potential for exploiting those aspects of the 
aesthetically/graphically transgressive that distinguish HBO from regular 
TV.14   
 
                                                          
14 Nygaard (2013) shows that HBO’s commissioning of the series Girls was governed by the desire to corner a 
female audience that had turned away from HBO after Sex and the City had ended. Her examination of 
discourses around the series shows that these are nonetheless embedded in the channel’s articulation of quality 
on paternalistic-masculinist terms. 
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Contemporary ‘feminist quality TV’  
 
The emergence of a programming strategy in the mid-2000s governed 
by the conjunction of quality TV aesthetics and an overtly political 
‘feminist’ rhetoric has to be understood in both the institutional context 
and that of postfeminist popular culture more broadly. In the cultural 
work performed by the series discussed in this thesis (but also several 
others especially after 2010), the television industry’s efforts to 
renegotiate the terms on which it articulates the ‘quality’ moniker can 
be detected. Further, Lagerwey, Leyda, and Negra (2016) posit that the 
proliferation of the ‘strong female protagonist’ in 2010s quality 
television derives from a recessionary cultural insistence on female 
resilience in a new economic-political regime of precarity. The authors 
concentrate on the sociopolitical context of women’s representations in 
prestige television, professedly setting aside issues of discursive 
negotiations of televisual aesthetics and cultural value – while my 
interest lies in combining these approaches. It is notable for instance 
that it was network television where this subcategory of quality shows 
emerged in the mid-to-late 2000s, such as 30 Rock and The Good Wife 
(Nygaard and Lagerwey 2016). These series navigate censorial 
constraints by establishing a ‘smart’ aesthetics and narration, combined 
with a politicised gender discourse that dialogues with the postfeminist 
legacy, and invokes race, class, and body politics. While this can be seen 
as a response to a recessionary cultural atmosphere, 30 Rock, as 
mentioned, debuted two years before the economic crisis, and is 
attributed in journalistic discourse with facilitating the popularity of 
female-led political quality comedy (Chaney 2013).  
Crucially, 30 Rock’s pilot episode betrays an aspiration to be seen as 
‘talking back’ to contemporaneous televisual paradigms, both in terms 
of the quality trend and gender politics. In an oft-quoted dialogue, Liz 
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Lemon describes the NBC variety show of which she is head writer as 
‘It’s not HBO. It’s TV’ in a retort to stand-up star Tracy’s (Tracy Morgan) 
insistence that he wants to do HBO-style explicit comedy on the show. 
This line is the epigraph to Leverette et al.’s introduction to their edited 
book on HBO (2008a, 1), intended to demonstrate the premium cable 
channel’s cultural relevance and exceptionality. But it also illuminates 
30 Rock’s and with it, NBC’s ambition to stand out against the cable 
competition by defying its strategy of foregrounding ‘raw’ content. 30 
Rock, Parks, and The Good Wife all tap into the ‘quality’ discourse by 
positioning themselves both contextually and diegetically as not only 
fulfilling the criteria of a quality show, but expanding its possibilities via 
‘smart’-ness and complexity that negotiates the cultural hierarchy 
between cable and network television. While not a network but an 
online programme, Orange similarly represents for Netflix a challenge to 
cable television’s (especially HBO’S) cultural dominance, as will be 
shown in the individual analysis. 
The institutional-aesthetic ‘talking back’ strategy becomes linked with a 
similar ‘talking back’ to postfeminist television’s gender politics in the 
four series’ cultural positioning. The invocation of politicised discourse 
around gender reminiscent of the network era’s feminist sitcom 
operates in a number of series that also assume the quality signifier, 
both on cable and on online streaming platforms (Netflix, Amazon). This 
has worked as a range of generic-aesthetic recombinings governed by 
efforts at political transgression to stand out in the competition (e.g. 
Transparent, Outlander, Top of the Lake, Orange, Girls etc.). This 
emphatically political address that speaks to a contemporary 
reinvigorated and contested popular feminism (see Chapter 1) provides 
these programmes’ narrative tensions, and, most importantly, ensures 
that they will be discussed in the context of quality television. This 
programming aspires to ‘narrative complexity’ (Mittell 2006) via the 
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political complexity of contemporary feminisms, channelling its tensions 
through the narrative-aesthetic models of quality TV.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Case studies I – Comedies 
 
1. The ‘quality’ comedy and gender 
 
In contemporary television culture, the ‘quality’ sitcom is an especially 
curious phenomenon. According to its theorists, sitcom’s prominence in 
American television history is due to its suitability to reflect on the ever-
changing social environment, which makes it ‘an enduring sociodramatic 
model that has helped “explain” American society to itself’ (Hamamoto 
1991, 153). Mills links the form’s popularity with its lowly position in the 
cultural hierarchy to suggest that precisely this provides it with the 
potential of progressively challenging social structures (2005, 153–54); 
an argument akin to the Bakhtinian theorisation of the medieval 
carnival’s social function as contained disruption of power relations. For 
Mills and Hamamoto, the sitcom’s ideological power lies in its 
domesticity and familiarity, and its embeddedness in conventional 
modes of television production and consumption (Hamamoto ibid.; 
Mills 2005, 152).  
If quality television is governed by a discursive distancing from television 
traditions in terms of audience address and aesthetics in a transitory 
media environment, then quality comedy’s formation involves an 
especially distinct rupture from generic conventions, considering how 
deeply the traditional sitcom form is entrenched within American 
cultural consciousness. Mills (2009) stresses  the struggle for cultural 
distinctions and classed hierarchies of taste per Bourdieu as the 
ideological motif underlying quality comedy’s development: ‘It’s hard to 
argue that newer forms of sitcom are funnier than traditional ones; the 
fact that certain audiences might find them so can then instead be 
understood as indicative of categorised responses and preferences 
 88 
 
which are likely to correlate with social distinctions’ (ibid., 134). The 
departure from the original sitcom’s conventions however cannot be as 
extreme as to render the form unintelligible; the ‘comedy of distinction’, 
as Mills terms it, is thus ‘sitcom repositioning itself in order to protect its 
future by denying its links to the past’ (ibid., 135). This repositioning is 
manifested mostly in aesthetic details for Mills; otherwise the quality 
comedy, if subjected to semiotic analysis, exhibits very similar working 
mechanisms to its predecessors in respect to its narrative and 
expressive strategies.  
The notion of a ‘comedy of distinction’ is hardly a new phenomenon; as 
shown in Chapter 2, The Mary Tyler Moore Show also discursively 
distinguished itself from other sitcom fare by appealing to a certain 
ideal of quality. Neale and Krutnik note that this went as far as 
producers refusing to call it a sitcom at all, preferring the term 
‘character comedy’ or ‘warmedy’ (1990, 236). Similarly, M*A*S*H’s 
(1972-1983) mixture of the comic mode with the dramatic indicates its 
self-conscious dissociation from the ‘triviality’ of domestic sitcom, in 
accordance with the serious theme of war and medical work (Tasker 
2009, 133–34). Echoing this, Neale and Krutnik quote Crowther and 
Pinfold’s academic assessment in which they state, ‘to describe  
M*A*S*H as a situation comedy is more than a mite inaccurate’ (1990, 
236–37). These efforts to attribute higher cultural value to these 
comedies were then based on their apparent move away from a ‘simply’ 
comic mode towards more psychological, sentimental, serious, and thus 
dramatic, storytelling. This demonstrates the hierarchical relationship 
between the ‘serious’ and ‘comic’: as Mills argues, the serious mode is 
‘not only prioritised, but normalised’ (2005, 22) in Western cultures as a 
default mode of representation; the comic is a deviance from that norm 
and needs to be clearly signalled.   
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The contemporary ‘comedy of distinction’ however differs from these 
earlier examples as it does not rely so much on a distinction from the 
comedy mode but, like quality drama, it establishes artistic-aesthetic 
significance. By foregrounding aesthetic superiority to its immediate 
cultural environment, it does not emphasise a move away from the 
comic mode towards ‘seriousness’. Further, the idea of sitcom’s political 
relevance and progressive power due to its wide audience reach 
becomes blurred in its discursive evaluation. For instance, quality 
comedies like Scrubs (2001-2010) or Arrested Development (2003-) 
clearly operate in the comic mode, and their academic evaluations 
stress their aesthetic-narrative novelties within this paradigm (Mills 
2009, Vermeulen and Whitfield 2013). Similarly, Mittell (2006) examines 
the quality comedy for the ways it represents the narrative complexity 
of quality television, which does not involve a hybridisation of the 
dramatic and comic.15 
If the contemporary quality comedy is in general characterised by a 
‘cultural distinction’, i.e. by a denial of its low cultural legacy, then the 
comedy series that I analyse exhibit a more ambiguous position in their 
discursive formulation of ‘quality’. Both 30 Rock and Parks fit into Mills’ 
concept of the contemporary quality comedy in aesthetic-generic and 
discursive terms, but this distinction becomes complicated by both 
series’ open invocation of a specific historic legacy, namely that of 
network-era feminist sitcoms. This is quite obvious in 30 Rock’s case, 
whose very premise hinges on the viewers’ appreciation of its inter- and 
metatextual nature as show-within-a-show backstage comedy. The 
series positions itself from its beginning as network-era feminist 
sitcom’s successor (a much-noted example is the musical cue 
introducing Liz Lemon in the pilot episode, which tweaks The Mary Tyler 
Moore Show’s familiar credit sequence [Mizejewski 2014, 75]), and 
                                                          
15 This is clearly different from female-targeted dramedy’s genre hybridity, signalling the underlying connection 
between gendered address and quality TV’s modes of generic innovation.  
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name-checked throughout its run most of its prominent earlier 
representatives. While Parks is not this explicit about its historic 
positioning, its dominant strategy of modelling storylines after topical 
political-social events, and its social commentary on gender in the 
workplace comedy framework, demonstrate its efforts to emulate the 
female-centred network sitcom tradition.  
Two opposing forces operate in the establishment of these two sitcoms’ 
cultural status then. On the one hand, they use the female-led network 
comedy’s heritage as legitimising historic reference which, at least for 
30 Rock, is a constitutive element of the narrative. On the other, the 
contemporary quality comedy’s aesthetics also work as reassurance that 
the series represent a departure from earlier eras of comedy and their 
characteristic gender scripts. This operates most explicitly via the self-
conscious satiric-parodic mode’s prominence which signifies the 
development both aesthetically and politically from the predecessors.16 
The ambiguity that works here between legitimation and departure 
emerges because of the two series’ gender politics: the negotiated 
referentiality which they self-consciously highlight to create a ‘comedy 
of distinction’ also ensures that an emphatically politicised, feminist TV 
tradition is continued. In other words, unlike other contemporary 
comedies frequently analysed as examples of the comedy of distinction 
(Arrested Development, Curb Your Enthusiasm, The Office [2005-2013], 
Scrubs etc.), the feminist quality comedy relies just as much on a 
gendered political heritage for the establishment of its place in this 
hierarchy as it does on its aesthetic markers. 
This picture becomes further nuanced when examining these sitcoms in 
relation to the immediate predecessor of female-centred quality TV, the 
millennial postfeminist dramedy. The ways in which this subcategory 
                                                          
16 However, since the historic referents of quality comedy, like The Mary Taylor Moore Show, were themselves 
characterised by self-reflexivity as a marker of sophistication (Thompson 1997, 50; Feuer 1984b, 44), this can also 
be seen as a call-back to earlier quality TV. 
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links the quality moniker with genre hybridity, a gendered address, and 
feminist/postfeminist politics has been a central issue for feminist 
media scholarship (Negra 2004, Arthurs 2007, McCabe and Akass 2004). 
While this remains a contested territory of media theory due to 
differences in the evaluation of postfeminism’s ideological work, for my 
purposes this scholarship is useful for contrasting the postfeminist 
quality dramedy’s generic traits with those of 30 Rock and Parks, a 
difference speaking to the two series’ gender politics. As ‘comedies of 
distinction’, they distance themselves from the postfeminist dramedy in 
a less ambiguous fashion than they do from the feminist sitcom 
heritage. Whether the genealogy is admitted or not – for 30 Rock it is, 
since Sex and the City is a prominent reference throughout – it works 
both paratextually and textually not simply as a tradition continued but 
emphatically as a tradition critiqued or even refused.  
The generic distancing at work here is crucial as it determines all others. 
The half-hour dramedy, just like other formats in the quality category, 
integrates a number of generic features in order to allow for multilateral 
practices of audience address and interpretation; put simply, the 
ambiguity of meanings and narrative modes contributes to the ‘quality’ 
label. Most obvious here is postfeminist dramedy’s reliance on cinema’s 
romantic comedy as generic reference, mixed with the melodramatic 
mode, both of which centralise the domestic arenas of romance and 
sexuality (Arthurs 2007). However, while the romance narrative is part 
of the two examined comedies’ storytelling methods, it does not feature 
with such weight here as to determine or alter the programmes’ generic 
categorisations. The genre descriptions of the shows on popular online 
databases underscore this. Sex and the City, and most Showtime 
dramedies, are categorised by IMDb and Wikipedia as comedy/romance 
or comedy/drama. In contrast, the sites variably describe 30 Rock and 
Parks as comedy, sitcom/satire, and sitcom/mockumentary/political 
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satire.17 Genre hybridity is evident in all three cases but it is only the 
latter two that are still firmly positioned in the comic mode. This generic 
distinction becomes especially apparent when considering that in 
contemporary television, the establishment of a gendered, i.e. 
feminised, ‘quality’ brand has been founded on the fusion of domestic 
melodrama and comedy. That the studied comedies render this 
categorisation inferior to parody/satire speaks to their ambition to be 
included in the quality brand via a different route.  
Satire and parody have historically been considered as comedies of 
higher value than ‘average’ representatives of the genre. King (2002, 93) 
and Mills (2005, 20) both note that this has to do with these forms’ 
presumed closer proximity to ‘serious’ modes of storytelling via their 
‘statements about other forms or social events, (…) while “simpler” fare, 
such as romantic or gross-out comedies, are deemed interesting only 
inasmuch as they somehow entertain the masses’ (ibid.). Romantic and 
gross-out comedies’ centralisation of sexual politics and the corporeal 
account for this classed and gendered cultural disdain, while satire and 
parody, regarded as more ‘cerebral’ manifestations of humour, are held 
in higher esteem. This difference is revealing for the distinction 
operating between the postfeminist dramedy and the examined 
comedies. 30 Rock and Parks assert a closer proximity to more 
prestigious categories of comedy, embedded in a heritage of masculine-
coded modes of expression. The notion of a ‘feminine’ or women’s 
comedy is historically represented in the romantic comedy framework 
(Rowe Karlyn 1995a); further, gender-centred, or even ‘feminist’, satire 
and parody has no established history in cinema or TV (bar for the 1970s 
female-centred sitcom which displays some of these characteristics but 
                                                          
17 See ‘Sex and the City’, IMDb, accessed 25 July 2016, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0159206/?ref_=nv_sr_1; 
‘Sex and the City’, Wikipedia, accessed 25 July 2016, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex_and_the_City; ’30 Rock’,  
IMDb, accessed 25 July 2016, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0496424/?ref_=nv_sr_1; ’30 Rock, Wikipedia, 
accessed 25 July 2016, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_Rock; ‘Parks and Recreation’, IMDb, accessed 25 July 
2016, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1266020/?ref_=nv_sr_1; ‘Parks and Recreation’, Wikipedia, accessed 25 July 
2016, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parks_and_Recreation.   
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this does not affect its generic labelling). Unsurprisingly, analytical 
overviews of comedy pay little attention to the issue of political comedy 
from a gender perspective (and other issues of political representation).  
Rather, questions of gender and representation usually form a separate 
entry or chapter, divorced from the genre’s other features (King 2002, 
Clayton 2007, Dale 2000). The two examined comedies’ positioning in 
the realms of satire and parody of gender relationships, and their 
discursive categorisation as quality TV on this basis lays bare the lack of 
such a relationship in comedy history.18 
While the comedies in focus ‘earn’ their quality moniker via an appeal to 
more prestigious modes of comedy, they at the same time divorce 
themselves from the heritage of romantic comedy as the established 
platform on which progressive gender representations tend to be 
expressed (Rowe 1995a). In Rowe’s concept, the commonplace notion 
that tragedy is a masculine form and (romantic) comedy is where 
women’s stories are mostly told, speaks to the cultural value allocated 
to female transgression. If the notion of the ‘heroic woman’ is an 
impossible sign in tragedy, her story is best fit within the boundaries of 
heterosexual love, motherhood, and loneliness, i.e. in the 
domestic/private sphere, and confined to the romance narrative (ibid., 
42). Contrasted with this concept, 30 Rock and Parks enact a gender 
inversion by their premise which neglects the romance framework, and 
relies on the heritage of comedian comedy by putting a female comedy 
persona in the centre of action, itself taking place in the public-
professional sphere.  
The concept of comedian comedy (Seidman 1981) as a prominent 
subcategory of Hollywood comedy has become widely used in comedy 
theory. The central persona in comedian comedy is an ‘anomalous and 
                                                          
18  Female-centred satires of gender have since become popular on American television, with programmes like 
Broad City, Inside Amy Schumer (2013-), or Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt. 
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privileged figure’ (Neale and Krutnik 1990, 105), in conflict with the 
‘real’ world by continually breaking its rules and stepping outside its 
boundaries. His disruptive nature provides fodder for comedy but is also 
contained via the narrative conflict’s resolution. As such, comedian 
comedy offers itself for an ideological reading in which ‘cultural 
oppositions are at stake – non-conformity, eccentricity, sexual 
difference, the lack of fit between individual characteristics and desires 
and institutional norms and requirements’ (ibid., 106-107). Neale and 
Krutnik also observe that comedian comedies of sexual difference exist 
in romantic comedy’s narrative framework; here the comedian’s 
performance does not feature with such prominence as in classic, male-
led comedian comedies. King (2002) similarly notes that there is a 
tension between comic performance and narrative in comedian 
comedy, and the integration of the two accentuates the former: ‘[t]he 
comedian is taken into a fictional universe; or, rather, a fictional 
universe is built around the comedian’ (ibid., 33) to accommodate his 
specific skills. Rowe emphasises that comedian comedy is inherently 
male-centred in that female performers are missing from its historic 
canon, which has much to do with the form’s centralisation of comic 
performance and comic body at the expense of narrative (1995a, 45-
46). Thus, the two analysed comedies’ reliance on their star performers’ 
comedian comedy in the workplace sitcom and satire frameworks, while 
not unprecedented, is an anomaly in the canon. Its importance for 
negotiating gender in comedy can be unpacked further in light of the 
postfeminist romantic comedy’s ideological work.   
If romantic comedy is the main vehicle via which popular culture 
negotiates gender inversions, this also implies that it is the main channel 
through which feminist concepts are inserted into popular narratives. 
Put bluntly, popular feminism ‘happens’ mainly via the romantic 
comedy. Theorists of the postfeminist romantic comedy stress that 
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while the genre continues to be the prominent storytelling framework 
for negotiating feminism and sexual politics, postfeminism puts a 
conservative spin on its articulation. Bowler (2013), Negra (2004), and 
Tasker (2011) agree that the genre expresses a deep-seated 
ambivalence about changing gender scripts and feminism’s role in this. 
For Tasker, aesthetic tools like an ironic and playful tone help ‘enact a 
knowingness that ingeniously recommends conservative gender paths’ 
(ibid., 70). Bowler’s account shows that the open discussion of sexual 
subjectivity typical of post-millennial iterations of the genre betrays an 
underlying discomfort with female sexual agency (2013, 188). Negra’s 
concept of the ‘retreatist romcom’ similarly demonstrates that 
postfeminism’s ambivalence about feminism’s cultural work is enacted 
in narratives which pit women’s professional empowerment and 
personal (romantic) success against each other (2004). The 
contemporary romantic comedy is then still the battleground on which 
gender roles are being contested, but in contrast with Rowe’s earlier 
concept, gender inversions and transgressive rearticulations of female 
agency give way to the rhetorical dualism of a ‘dated’ feminism and 
postfeminist logic as ‘oppositional forces grappling with each other for 
authentication’ (Bowler 2013, 187).  
The ‘feminist’ quality comedy’s rejection of the postfeminist 
romcom/dramedy format can be understood as rejecting a historic 
dependence on the narrative of heterosexual romance as carrier of 
gender politics. This departure is partly useful for ensuring a higher 
place in quality television’s hierarchies for its novelty component, 
combining the female comedian’s centrality and the satirical-parodistic 
mode. The fact that it still carries the centralisation of gender politics is 
crucial to its critical evaluations. Both comedies are concerned with 
emphasising the female point-of-view and the ideological struggle 
between feminism and postfeminism in their narratives, while operating 
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in the hybrid genres of ensemble workplace comedy, mockumentary, 
comedian comedy, and political satire. This also means that the shift 
towards historically more prestigious and male-coded forms of comedy 
does not presuppose its ‘masculinisation’ where the presumed gender 
inversion fulfils the requirement of symbolic progression. The 
centralisation of politically motivated themes around gender within 
these generic frameworks results in simultaneously re-positioning 
gender politics’ cultural relevance, including the postfeminism-feminism 
dualism, from the domestic and intimate arena towards the public and 
politicised.  
These two comedies strive to elevate the position of gender politics and 
feminism in the hierarchy of television’s popular genres and thus in 
cultural consciousness. That this attempt requires a simultaneous 
criticism and ridiculing of earlier, established forms of dramatising 
gender politics highlights the very precarious position of this discourse 
in popular media. The balancing of the plot and various aesthetic 
methods ensuring they are not read as romance but rather as self-
conscious distancing throws the supposed feminist intent somewhat 
into question – the distancing can be interpreted as a lampooning of 
and hostility towards a specifically feminine-coded tradition of popular 
entertainment, namely romantic comedy and postfeminist TV dramedy. 
 
1.A 30 Rock 
 
That this programme aspires to be a platform for a self-conscious 
discussion of gender politics operating in American society and 
specifically in show business, becomes evident from the pilot episode. 
The pilot also acknowledges the show’s own stake in breaking away 
from associations with the derided traditions of feminine 
entertainment. The show-within-the-show premise as narrative device 
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allows for this transparent self-referentiality, which 30 Rock turns into a 
license for multithreaded cultural criticism. In one of the first scenes of 
the pilot, Kenneth the NBC page describes the fictional variety show 
called The Girlie Show as ‘a real laydees’ show for laydees’ to visitors on 
the NBC studio tour, and thus to the TV audience. In this moment, Liz 
Lemon steps out of the lift in front of the group, and Kenneth proudly 
presents her as the show’s head writer. Cut to an unimpressed kid 
releasing a loud burp (‘Pilot’). That network television generally, but 
especially female-targeted programming, is by definition the opposite of 
prestigious is repeatedly articulated throughout the series. In a 
subsequent scene, the newly-appointed NBC executive Jack Donaghy 
(Alec Baldwin) analyses the show’s ratings in this vein to an indignant 
Liz, but now translating the gendered derision into demographic terms: 
according to a report, the show’s current stars are ‘popular with women 
and older gays (…) but you’re missing men between 18 and 49’. Liz’s 
response: ‘I’m not missing them, they’re just not there’. Jack’s 
insistence that this is something to be fixed is questioned by a sarcastic 
Liz: ‘So your job is, you take things that are already working and you fix 
them’. Television’s cultural position as source of feminine pleasures 
needs fixing in the quality era, and the show’s commentary on the 
gendered tensions of this process works as acknowledgement of its own 
establishment of the quality moniker. Donaghy’s energetic entrance into 
his own office (kicking down a door), upsetting with his 
hypermasculinity the equilibrium of a hitherto well-functioning feminine 
space, can be juxtaposed with the programme’s own production history. 
Baldwin’s attachment to the project, and his celebrity persona as 
established film actor with a difficult personality, contributed to NBC 
picking up 30 Rock, and Fey often stresses how vital his presence was 
for the series’ survival (e.g. Fey 2011, 172). Indeed, over the years, 
Baldwin’s occasional announcements of leaving the production were 
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followed by TV critics’ assertions that his presence or absence was 
closely tied the fate of the already ratings-challenged programme 
(Carter 2011, Crider n/d). Its male star’s dominant masculinity 
profoundly impacts both the fiction and the show’s political economy 
itself, underpinning 30 Rock’s status in the quality brand. But if the 
establishment of quality status requires a certain degree of 
masculinisation in the television business, then 30 Rock does it by 
making this condition its storytelling premise, presented as a central and 
contentious issue. 
Another factor in 30 Rock’s assessment by TV critics as prestige comedy 
is its self-referential cultural commentary, in itself hardly a novelty in 
television. The historic connection with The Mary Tyler Moore Show 
that both the text and critics confirm is based partly on that earlier 
series’ similarly self-referential nature, combined with the narrative 
premise that centralises a single working woman in a television 
programme’s production team. Self-referentiality and intertextuality 
played a crucial role in the quality category’s design in the 1970s, 
established when MTM pioneered its new type of sitcom (Feuer 1984a, 
Thompson 1997). Thompson describes this aptitude for intertextuality 
as the ‘quality factory’ MTM’s signature tool to assert the artistic 
superiority of the company’s programmes (ibid., 82-83). Following an 
itemisation of the web of elaborate intertextual references in the 
hospital drama St. Elsewhere (1982-88), Thompson explains their 
function as a way to secure the aesthetic legitimacy of television culture 
and history (ibid., 89). Feuer similarly describes cultural legitimation via 
postmodern self-consciousness as part and parcel of MTM’s quality 
brand. She argues that beyond legitimation, this tool can also fulfil 
deconstructive purposes to critique the medium’s genres and styles 
(1984, 44); a method whose potential subversion is dubious considering 
 99 
 
that for its target audiences ‘presumably it’s OK (…) to hate TV’ anyway 
(ibid., 50). 
In these accounts then, broadcast quality TV’s self-referential history 
has a double-edged function: it is used to assert the exceptionality of 
the given programme while at the same time insisting that there exists a 
television tradition competing with more prestigious art forms, and the 
viewer is rewarded for (and by) recognising this history; in short, for 
being ‘teleliterate’ (Bianculli 2000). Teleliteracy then claims a cultural 
presence and is awarded a certain prestige. It is important to note that 
both Feuer and Thompson describe this feature of the 1970s-1980s 
quality programme as initially used only for reinforcing audiences’ 
recognition of television as potentially ‘smart’ art form; intertextuality 
was not yet used for political satire and overt institutional criticism, 
since TV was still busy establishing its higher position in culture. 
According to Feuer, it happened only sporadically, in programmes like 
Buffalo Bill (1983-1984), that this style was taken beyond mere self-
referentiality to satirise television as an institution (1984, 52–53), 
developed further in cable programming such as The Larry Sanders 
Show (1992-1998) and Curb Your Enthusiasm. Further, Thompson 
describes early MTM programmes’ formula of parody and self-mockery 
as pitting the protagonist’s (like Mary Richards) competence and 
powerlessness against the institutional environment’s incompetence 
(1997, 50). In contrast, 30 Rock’s and many other contemporary TV 
comedies’ satire depicts the central character as not more competent 
than those surrounding her. While, as Feuer asserts, The Mary Tyler 
Moore Show lacks real satirical bite because this would clash with its 
aspiration to present an overall sympathetic central character (1984, 43-
44), 30 Rock uses Liz Lemon for cultural criticism and satire just as much 
as any others around her.  
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The Mary Tyler Moore Show exhibits a split between ‘warmedy’ and 
political satire as two irreconcilable styles, which has to do with its 
foregrounded gender politics. Feuer theorises character comedy as the 
method that carries the (for its time) progressive feminist message by 
depicting an independent, smart, professional woman exhibiting depth 
of character (which elicits in the audience ‘empathetic laughter’ [ibid., 
37]). For Bathrick (1984), this format pushes politics into the 
background to defend the primacy of individual characters as the basis 
for comedy. The mockery of television does not affect this 
characterisation, and is separated from the former theme: Mary 
Richards is not responsible for the awfulness of the news show, and has 
an uninfluential job at the TV station. In contrast, 30 Rock’s treatment of 
network television as low art form is connected to its gendered nature 
and to the female protagonist’ middle-management position as head 
writer, all working towards an overarching political satire. Intertextual 
satire as a tool ensuring the series’ quality status presumes the 
gendering of this feature; quality aesthetics (intertextuality, satire, and 
parody) and the protagonist’s gendered subjectivity (as creative 
labourer, avid consumer of mediocre television, and single woman) 
mutually reinforce each other.  
The difference between the blueprint series and the successor is further 
underlined by their disparate gendering of workplace comedy: The Mary 
Tyler Moore Show transplants domestic sitcom’s gender politics by 
presenting the television studio as a masculine workplace which 
becomes feminised and familial via Mary’s nurturing, accessible 
presence (Bathrick 1984, 105). 30 Rock’s pilot presents broadcast 
television as a medium serving feminine pleasures, whose balance 
becomes brutally disturbed by alpha male Jack’s entrance and his 
insistence upon adding the black movie star Tracy Jordan to the cast of 
The Girlie Show, and to rename it TGS with Tracy Jordan. The 
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raunchiness of Tracy’s comedy act is intended to complete the fictional 
sketch show and the workplace family with a raced masculinity. In a 
further difference with Mary Richards, while Lemon’s role in the 
ensemble dynamic is that of the ‘workplace mother’, this is not an 
implicitly acted out ideological characteristic (to be noticed by media 
scholars) but an established trope of ensemble television to be openly 
mocked by the text, and thus informing the satire. For instance, in the 
episode ‘Khonani’, Liz gets upset with her staff upon noticing that they 
exclude her from their social activities; the conflict resolution comes 
when one of them explains to her: ‘If this is a family, that makes you the 
mom; and you don’t wanna go out drinking with your mom.’ 
It is now a truism surrounding the series’ production history and its 
assessments that Fey conceived it with the intent to explore issues of 
gender, race, and class. The comic premise stems from the social 
positions of the main protagonists’ triumvirate: conservative 
businessman Jack Donaghy, comedy writer Liz Lemon, and black ‘rags-
to-riches’ comedy star Tracy Jordan. As Fey writes in her memoir 
Bossypants, this setup allows for showcasing their ideological 
differences ‘about any topic that came up — race, gender, politics, 
workplace ethics, money, sex, women’s basketball — and they would 
agree and disagree in endless combinations’ (2011, 170–71). In other 
words, the narrative tensions providing the programme’s episodic 
conceit are grounded in an ‘issue-based’ premise. Fey also often states 
that the series’ social satire aims to show a multiplicity of perspectives, 
where Liz’s centrality, representing middle-class white femininity and 
feminism, is balanced out with other points of view (Anon. 2007).19 This 
evokes discourses of contemporary feminism around intersectionality 
which associate popular feminism with privileged womanhood; but the 
                                                          
19 Fey has also stated publicly the Norman Lear sitcom’s ideological influence on her comedy’s ‘issue’-based 
approach and on its preference for contrasting a variety of character perspectives (Tina Fey Receives 2016 Lew 
Klein Excellence in the Media Award 2016).  
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addressing of a variety of points of view also fits with broadcast 
television’s imperative to cater for a wide selection of audience tastes 
and subjectivities. This is a typical feature of network ‘quality’ television, 
which utilises this economic necessity to promote political correctness 
by subjecting a moral issue in individual episodes to a variety of 
discussions (Thompson 1997, 171–72). 30 Rock links the multiple-points-
of-view feature to popular feminist politics, which informs the quality 
moniker in overdetermined ways: these include the centralisation of 
female subjectivity, the text’s frequent dramatisations of gender issues, 
Fey’s star text as cerebral feminist and first female head writer on 
Saturday Night Live (SNL, 1975-), and, connected to this, a heavily 
promoted ‘female authorship’ discourse. Even though the multiple 
perspectives are filtered through the same parodic and satirical 
aesthetic, the comedy of Liz Lemon’s ‘failed femininity’ and feminism 
(Mizejewski 2014, 26) exists in a primus inter pares position to other 
perspectives, and facilitates the narrative. 
The promotion of ‘female authorship’ is a feature that further 
establishes the series’ quality credentials on at least two levels. First, in 
media discourses it accounts for its exceptional nature; as such, it 
speaks to the quality TV brand’s requirement of novelty which here is 
achieved by the ‘author’s gender. Second, this ‘femininity’ affects the 
series’ position in the history of female-led comedy: while 30 Rock 
fashions its relationship to network-era feminist sitcom as a reverent 
one, it expresses critical commentary on the postfeminist dramedy and 
its reliance on romance narrative with the help of the ‘female 
authorship’ context.  
In the first instance, both Fey and media discourses contribute to 30 
Rock’s dominant understanding as stemming mostly from its singular 
creator’s mind. While also emphasising in Bossypants the contributions 
of other writers and showrunner Robert Carlock, Fey often refers to the 
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series as her ‘baby’, a phrase providing a juxtaposition between 
motherhood and creative labour, and sending up an array of jokes and 
puns. For example, her account of 30 Rock‘s production history runs 
parallel with that of her first daughter’s birth: ‘In September, my 
daughter was born. (For the record: epidural, vaginal delivery, did not 
poop on the table.)’ (2011, 172) Several pages later: ‘In March, the first 
season of 30 Rock was complete. (For the record: no epidural, group 
vaginal delivery, did not poop on the table.)’ (ibid. 194) Motherhood 
and childrearing are the primary metaphors to relate the experience of 
being a television producer, and even to link this to network quality 
television’s reputation as sophisticated but unrecognised entertainment 
in an affectionate tone: 
30 Rock is the perfect symbol for the pro-life movement in America. 
Here’s this little show that no one thought would make it. (…)  
As the mother of this now five-year-old show, would I still rather 
have a big, strong Two and a Half Men than our sickly little program? 
No, I would not, because I love my weird little show. (Ibid., 194) 
Similarly, the book dedicates a chapter to relating the story of a busy 
Saturday on which Fey juggled three major responsibilities: guest 
starring on SNL, filming a special scene of 30 Rock with Oprah Winfrey, 
and organizing a birthday party for her daughter; and ‘each of these 
events was equally important in my life’ (ibid., 202). Thus, the 
authorship discourse so crucial for establishing the ‘quality’ reputation 
of TV programmes and which creates a paternalistic understanding 
around most art forms, becomes literally maternalised and thus 
privatised here, at the same time also feeding into Fey’s star persona 
that itself negotiates a precarious balance between feminist and 
postfeminist understandings.20  
                                                          
20 I develop my argument around this negotiation in the next section. On Fey’s gendered celebrity see Mizejewski 
(2014, 67-75), Lauzen (2014), and Patterson (2012). It is worth noting that Fey habitually discusses motherhood 
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Authorship discourse also informs 30 Rock‘s relationship to its direct 
thematic predecessor (a genealogy stemming from the series’ gender 
politics), the postfeminist dramedy. Sex and the City is a constant 
reference as legacy to be parodied, criticized, and overcome, a 
relationship that influences the whole tone of the series. The ‘single 
career woman living in New York’ premise sends up this connection 
from the outset. The parody works to ideological ends to reassert that 
this show is about the sexual-romantic explorations of its heroine only 
insofar as it refuses the expectations of that postfeminist premise. Often 
confirming in interviews that Liz is a parody of Carrie Bradshaw (Sarah 
Jessica Parker), Fey describes the major differences between the two 
characters as those between sex drives (Nerdist with Tina Fey 2012) and 
the relationship to work (Brown 2009). The latter helps shift the 
programme’s genre towards the workplace comedy from domestic 
comedy, and the former affects its tone, highlighting the parodic and 
satirical rather than melodramatic. Both media discourses and Fey 
articulate this characterisation method as expressing a more ‘realistic’ 
kind of womanhood than that which the postfeminist heroine 
represents (ibid., Griffin 2010). Here then, Lemon’s disinterest in 
sexuality, her commitment to work, her obsession with food, and all 
other exaggerated characteristics providing the basis for comedy, also 
become points of identification (she is a ‘role model’). Griffin contrasts 
Liz Lemon with Carrie in this vein: ‘[w]e wanted to be Carrie; Liz Lemon 
is who we feel like in comparison (…). We love her because she’s one of 
us, but we love her even more because she’s even grosser, weirder and 
more awkward than we are’ (ibid.). The text offers up this distancing 
from ‘fantasy’ towards ‘realism’ quite openly at the outset: in a scene in 
the first season, Lemon, her friend Jenna (Jane Krakowski), and Jack’s 
girlfriend Phoebe (Emily Mortimer) chat in a restaurant about 
                                                                                                                                                   
(whether literal or authorly) in a sarcastic tone similar to this quote, betraying an effort to strip it from 
sanctimonious–idealised associations by highlighting its abject aspects. 
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boyfriends, and Jenna remarks: ‘How Sex and the City are we? I’m 
Samantha, you [Phoebe] are Charlotte, and you [Liz] are the lady at 
home who watches it’ (‘Cleveland’). 
The satirical treatment of Sex and the City also moves 30 Rock’s genre 
towards comedian comedy, a feature becoming more prominent after 
the first season. Fey and showrunner Robert Carlock note in a panel 
discussion that they changed the series’ tone after season one to this 
effect. During the discussion, Fey first evaluates the female characters’ 
early features as ‘too typical’ of contemporaneous TV, and, tellingly, as a 
‘waste of Jane [Krakowski’s] talents’ as a comedian with a knack for the 
absurd. Referring to a scene in the season one episode ‘The Baby Show’ 
in which Liz and Jenna talk over a cake about ‘boys ‘n stuff’, Carlock 
disparagingly comments that the realistically filmed and joke-free scene 
is ‘boring and this is not our show, and not what these characters should 
be doing’ – at least evaluated from the perspective of the ultimately 
absurd and cartoonesque style of 30 Rock (Tina Fey on Paley Center 
2013).  
Indeed, while themes and storylines typical of the postfeminist dramedy 
about single women permeate Lemon’s narrative, this becomes a trope 
to be parodied, in the process aligning it more with comedian comedy. If 
the comedian comedy’s ideological importance is ‘a celebration of the 
individual in opposition to restrictive social or collective institutions’ 
(King 2002, 42) by centralising an every(wo)man character not fitting 
into the boundaries of these institutions, then Lemon’s shifting 
positioning as comic heroine in a multiplicity of narratives reinforces this 
ideological work both inside and outside of the text. The ideological-
generic convention opposed in this setup is the postfeminist romance 
narrative’s dominance for female comedians. The flexibility of comic 
actions and plots in which Lemon is variously a straight (wo)man, a 
buffoon, a comic foil etc. helps maintain comedian comedy’s integration 
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between narrative and comedian: the fictional universe is built around 
the comedian and not the other way around (i.e. the comic actress is 
not integrated into a romance narrative), and Fey’s comic skills are 
mined for laughs as motivators of plot. One aspect of this is the 
romantic heroine’s, and her narratives’, ridicule, and the parody 
integrates the two (comic performance and romcom conventions) in 
Lemon’s figure.  
Such ridiculing is best exemplified by the episode ‘Stride of Pride’, 
whose Lemon plot is based on a Sex and the City parody. Following a 
recent ‘sexual awakening’, she unsuccessfully tries to find some women 
at work to have brunch with Sex and the City style, i.e. by discussing 
their sex life over cocktails. The last scene is an explicit reference to the 
style and tone of the earlier series. In a setup atypical of 30 Rock’s usual 
imagery and tone, Lemon is reclining on her bed with a prettified hairdo 
and wearing a pink tutu á la Carrie Bradshaw (Figure 4.1), typing into 
her MacBook the moral and emotional lesson of the episode for each 
storyline. The image of the computer screen fills the TV screen, while 
we also hear Lemon’s uncharacteristically high-pitched voiceover as she 
is writing down her musings about interpersonal relationships in the 
style of Carrie’s tortuous closed-ended questions. At the end of the long 
monologue she concludes: ‘I guess what I’m saying is… I need to modify 
my Zappos order so please email me back at your earliest convenience.’ 
Having finished typing, she closes the computer, falls off the bed with a 
thud, and the episode ends (Figure 4.2).  
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
The episode parodies the postfeminist dramedy’s trope of offering 
observations about gender relations via protagonist voiceover that pulls 
each storyline into one generalised life lesson. This also entails 
mimicking and making fun of Sex and the City’s configuration of fictional 
female (feminised) authorship as privileged site of status in the romance 
genre. The female comedian is central to the parody in that it is 
structured around her comic performance. This centrality also dialogues 
with the episode’s other storyline in which Tracy questions the 
funniness of female comedians, claiming that even a monkey in a suit is 
funnier than any woman. When Lemon and Jenna get back at him by 
performing a sketch to great success, we only see a montage of this (so 
whether the sketch is funny or not is beside the point) accompanied by 
an extradiegetic song with the following lyrics: ‘This sketch is hilarious 
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take it from me/ Women are funny we can all agree:/ Carol Burnett, 
Lucille Ball –/ No, we’re not gonna do it, it’s beneath us all/ ’Cause we 
don’t need to prove it to you’. While 30 Rock makes great efforts to 
show that the comedy Fey performs is multifaceted (and ‘we don’t need 
to prove it to you’), it also has high stakes in a frequent evocative 
distancing from the melodramatically inclined postfeminist romance 
which relies less on comedian comedy and more on a conflict/closure-
oriented romance narrative. In short, it aspires to prove that its heroine 
is funny by positing what she is not: a postfeminist romance heroine. 
Authorship discourse feeds heavily into this shift from romance 
narrative towards comedian comedy; Fey tends to emphasise her 
inclination towards physical comedy in terms that speak to the binary 
categorisations of female comedians on the pretty versus funny axis 
(Mizejewski 2014). In interviews, she expresses this as a disinterest in 
filming romantic or sex scenes: to an interviewer’s suggestion that 
Lemon is the female Homer Simpson she replies that a lot of criticism 
about the comic exaggerations of the character concerns Lemon’s 
unease with sex, on which she comments: ‘I wanted to write her that 
way because I didn’t want to film those scenes. I wanted to be able to 
have a show where I didn’t have to be cute and I didn’t have to sit on 
top of anyone in a bra – that was important to me as a writer-
performer. I liked it because it was not something I had seen before 
that’ (Nerdist with Tina Fey 2012, see also Baldwin 2015). In short, 
comedian comedy overtakes 30 Rock due to its central comedian’s 
gendered authorship and influence. In this discourse, the series’ 
universe is bent towards the preferences of its author-star who 
recognises that as female comedy performer, her options to do comedy 
are closely tied to the traditions of the postfeminist romance that 
centralises women as sexual subjects, but opts to steer away from its 
narratives and aesthetics by parodying them. 
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30 Rock’s generic establishment as quality comedy then relies heavily on 
postfeminist dramedy’s parodic and satirical treatment, connected to 
the discourse of gendered authorship around its comic star. As 
Mizejewski writes, ‘[a]s a metafiction, television about television, 30 
Rock is especially self-conscious about media representations of 
women’, which become central to ‘[t]he intense and unusual 
referentiality‘ of the series (2014, 67). The precise ways in which parody 
and/or satire are used have implications for the series’ cultural work as 
ideological criticism, and thus it is important to examine to what extent 
30 Rock can be evaluated as a text expressing critique about the generic 
predecessor. King (2002) pinpoints the difference between parody and 
satire as a difference in targets. Parody tends to target aesthetic or 
formal conventions (ibid., 107-109), undermining these conventions but 
also ‘pay[ing] an effective form of tribute to the originals’, since ‘to 
become a target of parody is to have achieved a certain status’ (ibid., 
112), namely the status of being culturally relevant. In these terms, 30 
Rock’s treatment of Sex and the City can be seen on a par with its 
treatment of other cinema and television texts. The series lampoons a 
wide array of media products, where the parody works not just as comic 
referencing of styles and aesthetics but as a template for plotting; i.e. 
the conflicts and resolutions are taken from the source text but 
incorporated into a different cultural setting, and the comedy stems 
from this discrepancy. Throughout its run, the programme worked films, 
series, and high cultural texts both obscure and popular into its 
narrative fabric, such as Amadeus (1985), Mamma Mia! (2008), Harry 
and the Hendersons (1987), Night Court (1984-1992), Friends (1994-
2004), Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory (1971), The Dark Knight 
(2008), or Macbeth. These references work similarly to St. Elsewhere’s 
intertextuality per Thompson’s discussion: the quality TV text 
establishes its knowingness and positions itself in popular media history, 
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although 30 Rock’s usage of these sources extends name-dropping via 
instances of complete repurposing of plot (e.g. the episode ‘Succession’s 
narrative recycles and parodies the plot of Amadeus). This type of 
transparency then speaks to the series’ intent to pay playful homage, 
and its aim stays at that level; style and narrative are re-appropriated as 
reassurance that 30 Rock knows its media history and inserts itself into 
it. In this feature it is similar to a number of other earlier and 
contemporaneous programmes, such as Community (2009-2015).  
If satire is ‘a form of comedy that also widens the scope for 
social/political criticism’ (King 2002, 94), then satire is not aspired to in 
these homages. Satire as the aesthetic expression of criticism of social-
political circumstances does however exist on 30 Rock in relation to a 
wide variety of issues, most prominently relating to feminism, 
postfeminism, race relations, sexism, corporate capitalism, nation, show 
business, and so on. However, it is mainly in the case of postfeminist 
dramedy where the series uses parody and satire as an effective 
mixture, corresponding to King’s concept. Overarching aesthetic parody 
is here used for political ends, i.e. to satirise the fiction of postfeminist 
womanhood. In other words, the fiction mobilises satire here through 
the parody of a specific televisual form, which speaks to the targeted 
notion’s (postfeminist femininity’s) rootedness in media fiction. In its 
ultimate purpose, it achieves specific ideological parody-satire as the 
grounds on which to articulate the female protagonist’s comic persona.  
The other instance where a similar mixture of parody and satire is 
prominent is the treatment of broadcast television as low cultural 
entertainment; in particular, 30 Rock is renowned for its invention of 
fictional programmes that ridicule and criticise broadcast TV’s political 
economy and aesthetics. Some of these shows are only mentioned 
throughout the series, others are also shown in brief scenes or even 
provide the premise of whole storylines; a selection of them includes 
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reality shows, game shows, and scripted series such as MILF Island, 
Queen of Jordan, Are You Smarter than a Dog, America’s Kidz Got 
Singing and Bitch Hunter, or the female-targeted Lifetime TV movies 
titled A Dog Took My Face and Gave Me a Better Face to Change the 
World: The Celeste Cunningham Story and Kidnapped by Danger: The 
Avery Jessup Story. The fact that precisely these two areas, postfeminist 
womanhood and broadcast television, provide the primary basis for 
simultaneous parody and satire speaks to the overdetermined 
connection between them: the heroine’s establishment as comic figure 
and the female comedy performer’s establishment as ‘author’ of her 
comedy hinges on their ideological distancing from a gendered media 
tradition, just as network quality television’s configuration hinges on a 
critical distancing from its immediate surroundings. Gender politics 
(feminism) and the recognition as quality television are inseparable 
stakes of representation for 30 Rock, ultimately determining the 
programme’s tone and genre. 
 
1.B Parks and Recreation 
 
Critical reception established a comparative/competitive relationship 
between Parks and 30 Rock throughout their runs due to the shared 
career background of their central female stars as SNL alumni, and 
various other factors related to the series’ genres and gender politics. 
While this discursive connection is an important referent for my own 
analysis as well, first I want to engage with a similarity that has not been 
a centre of critical focus but is an appropriate starting point to unpack 
Parks’ reputation as quality comedy. This concerns an aspect of the 
series’ production history, namely its tonal ‘rebooting’ between seasons 
one and two. This, like 30 Rock’s, was reportedly the production team’s 
conscious effort to course-correct in establishing the show’s character 
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(Baysinger 2015). In 30 Rock’s case, the change of tone and pace during 
the first two seasons was a strategic choice to shake off the air of 
postfeminist romance in order to develop a comedy foregrounding 
absurdist satire, thus elevating its reputation. Parks also underwent 
such a change, and its transformation is similarly to do with the 
relationship between generic conventions and gendered assumptions, 
with contextually different results. This is rooted in its specific 
production background: the series had from its conception struggled 
with the dubious reputation of being a spin-off of the American version 
of the British mockumentary The Office (2001-2003), and protagonist 
Leslie Knope (Amy Poehler) being little more than a female Michael 
Scott (Steve Carrell), the American Office’s central character. 
Consequently, the production team was concerned to find a way out of 
the predecessor’s shadow.  
Variety critic Brian Lowry’s dismissive review of the first season (2009) is 
instructive of the way in which the programme was seen as 
problematically aping the Office template, and offers insight into which 
aspects appeared to be in need of revision. For Lowry, not only does the 
first season ‘feel(…) like that established program in drag’ (ibid.), it also 
fails to use the mockumentary format to express something original, 
which in his suggestion would be achieved by adding some ‘political 
bite’ (ibid.). The main reasons for Parks’ failure as quality comedy are 
grounded here in two aspects: first, it does not use the mockumentary 
format for political satire and commentary to a required extent (i.e. to 
make it unique and different from The Office), and second, it does not 
make us ‘care about Leslie’s quest’ (ibid.). These two criticisms are 
fundamentally interconnected for Lowry, suggesting that a ‘feminised’ 
version of The Office, being solely a vehicle for Amy Poehler’s comic 
persona, does not carry enough cultural value in itself, and the way to 
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remedy it is by amping up the ‘political commentary’ aspect. The show’s 
second season reboot took care of precisely these two perceived issues. 
These two aspects are also the elements of the series that later became 
attributed to its ground-breaking and ‘smart’ nature (‘TV’s smartest 
comedy’ according to Entertainment Weekly [Frucci 2011]). They also 
account for its cross-sectional position in media commentary that 
frequently uses The Office and 30 Rock as immediate cultural 
references/templates for Parks. In the following I examine how the 
amalgamation of these two factors, i.e. the mockumentary tradition as 
political commentary and the female protagonist’s character comedy 
were adapted to establish the series’ ‘quality’ descriptor, resulting in a 
‘comedy of super niceness’ (Paskin 2011) that incorporates popular 
feminist political satire.  
The mockumentary or comedy vérité (Mills 2004) tradition as generic 
reference had determined the series’ cultural position as embedded in 
the ‘quality comedy’ discourse from its inception; additionally, it was co-
produced by Greg Daniels, creator of the American Office. These factors 
explain the imperative to remove the ‘copycat’ label from its reputation 
and to find the novelty element in its concept. Academic literature on 
mockumentary’s cultural work shows that the hybridisation of 
documentary and fictional forms in post-network TV is a representative 
example of attempts to reconfigure the sitcom tradition and create a 
‘comedy of distinction’. For Mills (2004), this mixture of the serious 
(documentary) and comic (fiction) aims to shake off the stigma of TV 
comedy as being ‘mere entertainment’, and the British comedy vérité 
does this by reengaging with television’s ‘active social role (…) which 
sitcom has traditionally been criticized for abandoning’ (ibid., 78). The 
British Office and other mockumentaries use the documentary form for 
comic intent, in which the humour stems from exposing the self-
deception and inauthenticity of the camera’s objects (ibid., 74). The 
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question of veracity, or rather of the (im)possibility of capturing the 
‘truth’, is at the core of mockumentary discourse, and for its analysts 
like Mills, Hight (2010), or Middleton (2014), this function provides the 
possibility of social satire designed to elevate it above the level of 
‘average’ comedy. Hight and Middleton both engage in a comparative 
analysis of the British original and the American remake of The Office as 
blueprints for the form’s popularisation. They highlight that the 
Americanisation involved a ‘toning down of the satirical bite of the 
original’ (Hight 2010, 284) via ‘an affectively charged representation of 
the workplace as a space of individual and interpersonal happiness and 
fulfilment’ (Middleton 2014, 142). Middleton shows how the British 
original’s aesthetics expose the corporate work environment’s ‘cruel 
optimism’ (Berlant 2011) in the everyman character Tim (Martin 
Freeman) and his forever deterred fulfilment of fantasies of a better life 
(Middleton 2014, 147-148). The series for Middleton is a satire of the 
post-Fordist white collar work experience, and, as paradigm of ‘cringe 
comedy’, it uses the faux documentary setup (the blurring between 
‘real’ and ‘unreal’) to create an increasing discomfort in the viewer: 
‘[w]e cringe in part because of the feeling that there is nothing we can 
look away to’ (ibid., 147, italics in original). 
The Office’s cultural value is then dependant on its satire of 21st century 
Western societies’ labour relations, conveyed through a comedy of 
awkwardness that in its bleak world view and gritty realism is often hard 
to experience as comedy – Middleton quotes Berlant who calls the 
series a ‘situation tragedy’ (ibid., 154). Middleton sees this defining 
‘cringe’ aspect of the British Office as its aesthetic and ideological 
strength, especially in comparison with the American version. For him, 
the remake and Michael Scott’s ‘psychologically developed’ (ibid., 156) 
character that becomes more and more sympathetic, ‘alters the effects 
of the British version’ to ‘defuse the awkwardness and mediate the 
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show’s critical potential with conventional forms of narrative pleasure 
and viewer identification with characters’ (ibid., 160).  
Hight further develops the evaluation of mockumentary’s satirical 
potential via his analysis of HBO’s The Comeback (2005-), seen as 
another pinnacle of self-reflexive and satirical mockumentaries (Hight 
2010, 274-278). This series for him does to the world of show business, 
celebrity culture, and popular television formats (the sitcom and the 
reality show) what the British Office does to the corporate work 
environment. The mockumentary’s use lays bare the uncomfortable 
discrepancies between the individual’s performance of identity in social 
spaces and the petty desperation these performances conceal. The 
embarrassing and humiliating situations into which David Brent (Ricky 
Gervais) and Valerie Cherish (Lisa Kudrow), central characters of The 
Office and The Comeback respectively, get themselves, serve as scathing 
critiques of the social environment. The Comeback however expresses 
this perhaps even more brutally, since it frequently configures the 
exposure of Valerie’s indignity as gendered victimhood in Hollywood 
show business – an aspect with which Hight does not engage. While 
Brent is exposed as the ultimate workplace bully (against whom Tim is 
offered as relatable point of identification), Cherish is the victim of the 
TV industry’s systemic bullying, a situation for which she is partially 
responsible as an aging sitcom actress with delusional hopes of a 
successful comeback. The ‘cringe’, i.e. the viewer’s urge to look away, 
comes from slightly different impulses: in Brent’s case, it is our 
discomfort with having to follow around this horrible man, an affect 
reinforced by supporting characters’ frequent side glances at the 
camera, establishing this muted mode of sympathetic connection with 
the viewer (Mills 2004, 69; Middleton 2014, 150). No such methods are 
evident in The Comeback, the viewer is left alone with her unease and 
without a sympathetic reference figure to connect with; and this results 
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in Cherish’s even deeper isolation – both within the diegesis and 
between viewer and text – as debased casualty of the Hollywood 
machinery.  
Hight notes that The Comeback was a flop for HBO, never garnering a 
solid audience base during its initial run, and he attributes this to its 
relatively rare format in American sitcom conventions (2010, 278). 
While this may account partly for its failure, this in itself is hardly a 
convincing explanation, since at the time of its broadcast, there had 
been many other ‘experimental’ – and economically viable – formats 
and aesthetics prominent in the quality TV discourse. I contend that the 
series’ treatment of the female protagonist within the mockumentary 
format explains much of its initial obscurity. A programme whose 
cultural work lies in laying bare the repeated and specifically gendered 
humiliations of its central female star without even a hint of retaliation, 
let alone any affective connection to the viewer, was not a welcome 
sight, even in the name of acerbic cultural criticism, for prestige 
television in the mid-2000s – a time when female-centred programming 
operated by and large under the imperative of postfeminist 
empowerment rhetoric.21  
The examination of the mockumentary context via these series returns 
me to my point that Parks’ second season reboot was determined by 
factors that lie in a cross-section of American modes of representing 
identity in the mockumentary sitcom format on the one hand, and the 
expectations of representing female identity on the other. Middleton’s 
and Hight’s implied critique of the American Office for its relative lack of 
social criticism – turning the story into a sentimental one about the 
workplace family – while acknowledging cultural differences, omits to 
consider the American workplace sitcom tradition into which the British 
                                                          
21 With the popularisation of female-centred comedy, this trend has somewhat turned around in the 2010s with 
series like Veep; HBO’s recommissioning of a second season of The Comeback in 2014 speaks to this cultural shift. 
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series was transplanted. This tradition, which The Office was concerned 
to update, has specific female-centred origins. The American Office‘s 
novelty aspect was precisely the ‘sharpening up’ of this heritage, and in 
this context, the mockumentary aesthetics do help the programme 
appear more critical of workplace relations than previous fare by 
exposing the male boss as a slightly racist/sexist buffoon. Leslie Knope’s 
presentation in Parks‘ first season follows a similar path, exposing the 
middle-management boss as delusional, bureaucratic, racist, and 
inappropriately enthusiastic about her work in local government.22 
However, this female protagonist’s characterisation also evokes The 
Comeback‘s humiliation techniques in that it has a specifically gendered 
edge, where Leslie’s failures as civil servant are interconnected with her 
failures as single career woman. 
If the male boss’s (however slightly) critical characterisation via the 
mockumentary format ensures the American Office‘s novelty, that 
template’s feminisation was seen as a problematic way to establish 
Parks‘ prestige. Crucially, this was not only because the embarrassment 
narratives follow the Office template too closely in season one but also 
because this method sits uncomfortably with female-centred media 
texts’ aspirational rhetoric. The first season’s humour lies primarily in 
contrasting Leslie’s aspirationalism about public service against the grim 
reality, and works to expose the ineffectiveness of public institutions via 
the ineffectiveness of Leslie’s efforts. But this is achieved by humiliation 
techniques that target her character both in her professional position 
and in her private life: for instance, she has an imagined romantic 
history with cynical city planner Mark Brendanawicz (Paul Schneider), a 
character who inexplicably but tellingly disappeared after season two. 
This characterisation seems to deflect from the political commentary 
                                                          
22 In this perspective, the first season version of Leslie Knope is also more similar to 30 Rock’s portrayal of Liz 
Lemon, and to that comedy’s cynical humour, than her post-reboot character. 
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aspect (see Lowry’s lament about the lack of ‘political bite’), a problem 
never really a reference point for the American Office for journalists. 
Dramatising ‘bigger issues’ became a priority only after the first season’s 
critical failure: producer Dan Goor highlights that the programme’s first 
real ‘issue’ storyline occurred precisely in the second season’s first 
episode (Snierson 2013). 
The Office template’s feminisation then carries within itself the 
potential political critique’s specific individualisation/privatisation – i.e. 
the story relies too heavily on the career woman’s ridiculing –, which, as 
we have similarly seen in the case of The Comeback, was an ambiguous 
and unpopular characterisation technique for satirical comedy. The way 
to turn this around for the second season was to tap into popular 
feminist themes about women’s struggles at the workplace, 
institutionalised sexism, female solidarity, and successful women as role 
models. The humour came now from contrasting Leslie’s feminist 
aspirationalism, shifted from delusional to justified, with the political 
critique of American public institutions that inhibit her ambitions. This 
aspect soon became the ground on which to celebrate the series, 
witnessed in a number of glowing reviews (Escobedo Shepherd 2015, 
Trantham 2015, Ryan 2015). However, since the aspirational (or ‘can-
do’) feminist discourse provides the social criticism’s foundation in this 
new configuration, the series contradictorily ends up endorsing the 
effectivity of public institutions, accumulated in Leslie’s career success. 
Nonetheless, this still accounts for the series’ achievements for critics, 
at least in terms of quality if not ratings, implied for instance in Alan 
Sepinwall’s (2015a) estimation written at the time of the final episode’s 
broadcasting. This review is especially representative for its associations 
between the show’s cultural value, political utopianism, and rhetoric of 
female empowerment as both professional achievement and successful 
maternity: starting out as ‘delusional’ in her political ambitions, Leslie 
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proved ‘prophetic’ in ending up as a ‘super woman’: ‘an influential 
federal official (…), and as a wife and mom with a small army of adoring 
friends’ (ibid.). Even the programme’s economic struggle becomes a 
point of praise: ‘the show’s ability to last seven seasons despite 
middling-to-awful ratings is a Knope-ian feat in and of itself’ (ibid.). 
Sepinwall concludes thus: ‘[i]n the end, it is one of the best comedies TV 
has ever seen, and one that stands out from so much [sic] of the great 
shows of this new Golden Age of Television because (…) its default 
philosophy was one of optimism at a time when even the best comedies 
today tend towards ironic detachment’ (ibid.). His last point about the 
series’ joyful tone connects feminist discourses (Leslie as superwoman 
and maternal figure) with its optimism or ‘super niceness’ (Paskin 2011), 
configuring ‘optimism’ as feminist virtue that elevates Parks‘ cultural 
value.  
Sepinwall’s celebration also illuminates a prominent difference of the 
series from mockumentary’s earlier iterations: while Lowry lamented 
the missed opportunity to use mockumentary for real political critique, 
the praise here, and virtually all other accounts, barely ever mentions 
mockumentary as reference point for the show’s quality, or if they do 
so, it is in a dismissive tone. The ‘cruel’s disappearance from the series’ 
‘optimism’ becomes its virtue because it is replaced by a rhetoric of 
female empowerment, carrying with itself its own mode of social 
commentary. The mockumentary discourse’s significance became 
concomitantly muted throughout Parks’ run, including the format’s 
working mechanism as highlighting character critique and, through it, 
critique of institutions and social-cultural conditions. Mockumentary 
tradition becomes here a remnant of the series’ rootedness in the 
quality discourse, a generic-aesthetic signifier of cultural value. 
Specifically, it becomes adapted for the utopian optimism that 
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permeates Parks’ world, originating in the comic heroine’s feminist 
aspirationalism and transforming the whole fictional universe.  
Consider a scene in the pilot episode, in which Leslie shoos off a 
homeless man (Jon Daly) of a playground slide. The mockumentary 
format is used here to mock Leslie’s work ethic as pointless effort to 
change things in small-town America via a bureaucratic approach. 
Producer Mike Schur mentions in an interview that the series’ finale 
gives us an easy-to-miss glimpse into how that man’s life turned out 
later: when Leslie and the gang are asked to do one last Parks and 
Recreation job to get a broken playground swing fixed, the well-dressed 
ordinary citizen making this request is played by the same actor as the 
homeless man in the pilot (‘One Last Ride’). Schur underlines this twist’s 
significance: ‘I liked the (tacit) implication that somehow Leslie pushing 
a miserable drunk out of that slide in the cold light of morning was a low 
point for him, and that he cleaned himself up and turned his life around 
and was now a productive member of society. That's got a nice 
Dickensian flavor to it, I think’ (Sepinwall 2015b).23 While the mocking of 
public service, local politics, and small-town life and its inhabitants 
continue to be an important aspect of the series, this becomes framed 
in an affective mode reinforced by the utopian ‘niceness’ with which 
Leslie and her team are portrayed,24 and is ultimately embedded in 
American political discourse around patriotic meritocracy. The 
Entertainment Weekly critic’s celebratory review of the finale explicitly 
stresses this aspect: ‘[i]n Leslie Hope and ragtag band of proximity 
workplace acquaintances, we are left with a portrait of — to borrow 
                                                          
23 Such a use of narrative memory as symptomatic method of quality TV’s serialisation practices, and Schur’s use 
of the word ’Dickensian’ (also frequently applied to cable dramas like The Sopranos [Newman and Levine 2012] 
and The Wire [Williams 2014]) provide further evidence for the efforts to position the series as quality TV. Thus, 
the two strands of rhetoric around aspirational feminism and quality TV converge in the homeless man’s story on 
Parks. 
24 Although Parks still uses the ’cruel comedy’ aspect in Jerry/Garry/Larry/Terry’s (Jim O’Heir) figure, 
hyperbolically focusing onto the cruelty with which the others handle him. This is however present, again, as 
remnant of the mockumentary tradition, here operating only within the diegesis, and carefully offset with 
Jerry/Garry/Larry/Terry’s happy private life and general bonhomie portrayed in an equally hyperbolic fashion. 
Further, the character’s constant mockery serves to reinforce the ‘niceness’ of the rest of the narrative. 
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some words our president spoke shortly before Parks premiered — “a 
new spirit of patriotism, of responsibility, where each of us resolves to 
pitch in and work harder and look after not only ourselves but each 
other”’ (Jensen 2015).  
Thus, both the text and its reviews dismiss the connection between the 
mockumentary format and the political importance of ‘cringe comedy’. 
The series’ cultural work emerges as an optimism that is assigned 
significance in its perceived uniqueness in contemporary quality 
television. Paskin’s (2011) review especially sets up this contrast 
between ‘cringe’ comedy and Parks: 
This comedy of discomfort, still in its most perfect form in the British 
version of The Office, is such a staple of the Thursday night sitcom 
experience (…) that when things start to go haywire on Parks and 
Recreation, sometimes we instinctively reach for a pillow, even 
though Parks no longer causes cringing. It has abandoned mining the 
uncomfortable for laughs, in order to explore the comedic potential 
of super nice people. 
If deep down inside, under the endemic disgruntlement of The Office 
or endemic egomania of 30 Rock, most sitcom characters are ‘good 
people,’ on Parks there's no deep down inside about it. (Ibid.) 
Paskin’s praise, based on Parks‘ difference from today’s quality 
comedies, is itself in contrast with academic literature’s positioning of 
the series, which evaluates it as on a par with its contemporaries. 
Newman and Levine (2012) assess the quality comedy, similar to Mills 
(2009), as discursively and textually moving away from the 
‘conservative’ sitcom tradition, and classify Parks among the type of 
comedies that operate with this aesthetic and political dissociation 
(Newman and Levine 2012, 59-79). As noted, they consider the 
historical establishment of cultural hierarchies as influenced by a 
gendered progress narrative, i.e. as ‘a shift away from the feminized 
 122 
 
past and toward a more masculinized future’ (ibid., 11). In television 
comedy’s case, this shift works between the old-fashioned, multi-
camera soundstage sitcom and the new, cinematised single-camera 
comedy. The latter  
is invested with value by differing from a past ideal of television, one 
associated with the period before convergence (…). By relegating this 
kind of show to the past, or to the realm of the juvenile, feminine, or 
passé, the culture of television’s legitimation seeks a new identity for 
the medium. (Ibid., 79)  
Since Newman and Levine mention both Parks and 30 Rock as 
representative examples of this process of cultural legitimation, it would 
follow that the series and the discourses in which they are embedded, 
perform similar cultural work, including the aspect of ‘de-feminisation’. 
However, I argue that these series’ legitimation processes are 
fundamentally different from those other comedies of the convergence 
era that Newman and Levine cite, in that the distancing is entangled 
with a strategic association with the 1970s female-centred MTM sitcom. 
But while for 30 Rock this is rooted primarily in the sarcastic evocation 
of some narrative elements and politics (The Mary Tyler Moore Show as 
predecessor in its setting, narrative premise, and the career woman’s 
centralisation), for Parks the connection is more ideological and involves 
matters of tone and characterisation.  
Consider the generic descriptors by critics: ‘comedy of niceness’ (Parks) 
and ‘warmedy’ (the MTM sitcom). The latter means for Feuer (1984b) a 
foregrounding of empathetic character development for the 1970s 
‘independent woman’ who struggles against the social conventions of 
her time. As discussed, the ‘quality’ of the MTM comedy needed a 
competitive contrast with contemporaneous sitcoms for its 
establishment, evident in the hierarchical evaluations of the Norman 
Lear and the MTM sitcom. Evoking a similar dichotomy, Parks’ critical 
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evaluation often configures it as different from, and more progressive 
than, 30 Rock’s, as seen in the above quote from Paskin. This 
competitive differentiation – witnessed in a number of reviews – singles 
out Parks on the basis of its feminist optimism atypical of today’s ‘dark’ 
quality comedy, and invokes the past, as in a later paragraph of Paskin’s 
review: ‘If championing good old fashion [sic] niceness makes Parks a 
throwback to a simpler sitcom era, it hasn’t made it any less funny’ 
(Paskin 2011). The remark displays a concern to praise the programme 
via an ambiguous negotiation of the past that works both as distancing 
and legitimation. The production team is similarly keen to emphasise 
this connection: Poehler’s remark at a panel discussion that she sees 
Leslie and Ron’s (Nick Offerman) relationship as akin to that of The Mary 
Tyler Moore Show’s Mary Richards and Lou Grant (Friedlander 2014) is 
representative. The Variety article reporting the comment is titled 
‘Parks and Recreation’s Hidden Political Commentary’, and refers to 
Poehler’s and Mike Schur’s comments about the character dynamic 
between Leslie and Ron as that between the mum and dad of the 
workplace family. As Schur puts this in political terms, ‘when people 
want a dad they vote Republican and when they want a mum they vote 
Democrat’ ('Parks and Recreation' - Amy Poehler and Michael Schur on 
Leslie and Ron 2014).  
Ultimately then, it is Parks, and not the American Office, that can be 
considered the logical completion of the British Office‘s 
Americanisation, in that it becomes fitted into the female-centred 
workplace comedy tradition with its rhetoric of female empowerment. 
This involves a complete reversal of ‘cruel’ mockumentary’s ideology, 
but the ‘old-fashioned’ – antiquated, passé, feminine – niceness into 
which it is transformed, retains its quality descriptor by mining 
contemporary feminist concerns for political satire. The Leslie-Ron 
dynamic corresponds to the pairing of Jack and Liz on 30 Rock as 
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configurations of gendered social-political commentary, and in both 
cases this is founded on feminist politics’ invocation, at the same time 
allowing for a discursive connection with a specific chapter of American 
television’s past as legacy. But Parks’ ‘niceness’ works to reconcile the 
‘warm’ character comedy of the past and today’s mode of feminist 
political satire, a reconciliation always treated ambiguously on 30 Rock. 
The utopianism in which this results overwhelms the comedy to the 
extent that by the seventh season it even impacts the genre, creating an 
actual utopian science fiction witnessed in the three-year time jump and 
the flash-forwards to a utopian future. The connection between Leslie’s 
feminist enthusiasm and American society’s general well-being 
ultimately become indistinguishable and overdetermined; if ‘feminists 
love a utopia’ (Shapiro Sanders 2007), then Parks certainly gives us one. 
If reviewers praise Parks’ singularity in its difference from 30 Rock’s 
mode of social criticism, then this speaks to the ambiguous evaluations 
of their alliances with contemporary popular feminisms, and 
consequently to the debated cultural status of these feminisms. Here 
the question of postfeminist discourses comes into play, informing the 
ways in which the two comedies invoke feminism. I address this issue in 
the next section, also engaging with Fey’s and Poehler’s star texts that 
foreground the ‘feminist’ in their ‘transgressive’ enactment of women’s 
comedy. This section thus also asks how these personas relate to their 
positioning as comic heroines in sitcoms whose quality descriptors rely 
on associations with feminism. 
 
2. Negotiating postfeminism  
 
As argued, both the comedies and their journalistic evaluations 
attribute great importance to the female protagonists’ representational 
politics. The discursive significance of these gender politics has a 
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determining effect on the series’ generic configurations and modes of 
comedy, which are then ultimately brought to bear on their cultural 
value. Representational politics are of course a pivotal question for 
media criticism, which also highlights these politics with more urgency 
in respect to media products whose cultural importance is located in 
their centralisation of marginalised social identities and subjectivities. In 
these instances, methods of representation effectively determine 
judgements of quality. In recessionary discourses about the quality TV 
moniker, both media producers and critics grant special attention to the 
ways television texts deal with social identity marking out marginalised 
communities (gender, sexuality, race, age etc.). Political relevance and 
an appeal to ‘diversity’ once again becomes a basis on which the TV 
industry conceives its ‘quality’ products and caters towards target 
audiences, in some ways similar to the state of affairs in the 1970s. Both 
trade press and producers acknowledge and circulate the ‘diversity’ 
trend as a negotiation of representational progress, aesthetic 
achievement, and the industry’s economic imperatives in the ‘Peak TV’ 
era to supply novel content compartmentalised by audience 
segmentation (VanDerWerff 2015a, Ryan 2016a, Morris and Poniewozik 
2016).  
The intense attention paid to, and the cultural-economic investment in, 
the politics of representation also explains the debates surrounding the 
central female characters of 30 Rock and Parks – two network comedies 
that garnered media attention for their initially rare method of situating 
their female protagonists in workplace settings and situations, while 
also mining the female comics’ talents outside the romance framework 
and instead in comedian comedy and satire. For a while, feminist and 
other TV critics devoted think pieces to the question of whether Liz 
Lemon or Leslie Knope was the better feminist role model (e.g. Dailey 
2010, Brooks Olsen 2015). The verdict in these evaluations usually 
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declared Knope the winner with her unrelenting feminist 
aspirationalism dismantling institutional barriers; whereas Lemon 
became gradually seen as failing the feminist promise for which the first 
few seasons of 30 Rock supposedly laid the ground, due to her 
grotesque-childish portrayal (a representative think piece title: ‘The 
Incredible Shrinking Liz Lemon: From Woman to Little Girl’ [Holmes 
2012]). Mizejewski’s analysis of Fey and 30 Rock investigates the 
‘backlash’ the series and its star increasingly suffered by the early 2010s 
(2014, 75-85), with one of the critics derisively dubbing the series’ 
questionable gender politics ‘Liz Lemonism’ (Dailey 2010). Mizejewski 
notes that these evaluations habitually conflate the fictional character 
with the comedian, and also that ‘the mixed signals around Fey – the 
longing for and nervousness about feminism in popular culture – are 
demonstrated in the high stakes of the looks of this perfect feminist 
idol, given multiple cultural pressures to picture her as nonthreatening, 
mainstream, and even glamorous’ (2014, 84). A similar dynamic is 
evident in the journalistic fascination with the comparison/contrast of 
the feminisms operating in 30 Rock and Parks, and in the impetus to 
establish a competitive relationship between the two protagonists 
based on their dramatised relationship with feminist representation.  
Yet tellingly, while in the Lemon/Fey backlash the star text and the 
fictional character work to mutually explain each other for critics, the 
Lemon versus Knope feminism contest does not (or rarely) provide 
opportunities to invoke the – by this time widely circulated – friendship 
narrative between the two comedians.25 Popular press accounts 
describe this friendship only in terms of cooperation, female solidarity 
in a male-dominated profession, and an appreciation of different comic 
talents informing their double act performances (Fox 2015). They do not 
discuss this in the way they do the fictional characters, i.e. via 
                                                          
25 Elsewhere I discuss the brief history and characteristics of this friendship narrative; see Havas (2017). 
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competitive comparisons of their enactments of feminist politics. This 
specific lack of attention is all the more significant, for contemporary 
popular cultural discourses about feminism regularly pit female 
celebrities against one another based on their articulations, refusals, 
and presumed disparate understandings of feminist politics (a discourse 
that Poehler has been known to criticise [Duberman 2014]). This 
discrepancy then speaks to the importance lent to the feminism enacted 
on the quality series. In other words, the competitive evaluations of 
Fey’s and Poehler’s feminisms become shifted and concentrated onto 
their respective programmes, bearing the responsibility of ‘progressive’ 
representations of women, and leaving the connection between their 
star texts intact. The ‘feud’ between the two fictional characters, 
created entirely in popular journalism but not supported by the two 
series’ promotional strategies or production teams (let alone by the two 
comedians), generally signals the perennial struggle to control 
feminism’s meanings in media discourses (Banet-Weiser 2015), which 
here governs the tone of the comparative criticism levelled at the two 
texts. But more importantly for my argument, it also demonstrates the 
nervousness in a postfeminist cultural environment surrounding the 
gender politics of female-centred TV texts that situate themselves in the 
quality discourse for both their aesthetic and representational features. 
The high stakes invested in the programmes’ gender politics then speak 
to the link between the quality discourse and the postfeminist ethos 
operating in women’s popular cultural representations. Aspects of 
‘quality’ postfeminist television’s development correspond to the 
overlapping logic inherent in these two paradigms. First, ‘exclusivity’ in 
class terms is a constitutive component in the establishment of both; 
quality TV’s imperative to target upmarket audiences and 
postfeminism’s insistence on an empowerment narrative for privileged 
white femininities produces the ‘quality postfeminism’ that feminist 
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media scholars have described and interrogated. Second, if television’s 
cultural strength has historically been configured as an immediacy in 
dramatising social issues, it primarily does so via individualising and 
privatising them in quality television’s serial narrative (see for instance 
Creeber’s [2004, 116] interpretation of the millennial ‘soap drama’s 
cultural work in these terms). This heritage is particularly suitable for 
the postfeminist mode of re-inscribing the political project of feminism 
onto the private spheres of sexuality and romance, motherhood, 
‘choice’ feminism etc. Thirdly, both paradigms’ cultural work and 
successful integration into cultural consciousness hinges on declaring 
their respective historic backgrounds overcome, at the same time 
obscuring their dependence on this legacy for their existence. 
McRobbie’s description of postfeminism as ‘feminism taken into 
account’ can be paralleled with HBO’s ‘It’s not TV’ slogan for the way 
they both necessarily contain the term they allegedly leave behind.  
Considering these features that make the two phenomena such perfect 
bedfellows, the idea of a ‘feminist quality TV’ seems an inherent 
contradiction in terms. This contradiction partly accounts for the two 
comedies’ uneasy cultural position, mostly expressed in the debates 
surrounding their feminisms, and located for instance in the criticism 
that a programme centralising privileged white femininities is already 
problematic in its appeal to feminist politics. Further, the way in which 
the ‘comedy of distinction’ operates for 30 Rock, meaning an intense 
preoccupation with its own past and present, also speaks to this unease. 
Consequently, the series’ explicitness about this ‘distinction’ cannot be 
interpreted without considering the importance it ascribes to its 
genderedness, an interconnection rarely analysed by the series’ popular 
and academic criticisms (i.e. it is either discussed as a ‘quality series’ or 
a feminist/gendered one). Kenneth’s words to Lemon quoted in the 
Introduction make explicit how 30 Rock plays on its own problematic 
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efforts to produce aesthetically superior comedy on network television 
that centralises and politicises female subjectivity. The comedy 
framework capitalises on these contradictions as a genre operating to 
expose and contain the anxieties inherent within cultural phenomena 
(which in this case means the series’ very existence). The fact that 
‘feminist quality comedy’ creates such cultural anxieties signals the 
precarious position of efforts to politicise issues of gender in ‘non-
feminine’ subgenres of television.26 
The contradictory position that the two series occupy in the quality 
comedy model due to their ‘feminist’ moniker provides a concept to 
account for their generic transformations. I demonstrated in the 
previous section that the generic configurations and shifts in tone were 
direct consequences of the female comedian’s centralisation in the 
narrative. I argue that these trajectories result in ‘extreme’ generic 
hybrids in ‘quality’ comedy’s broader televisual environment. 30 Rock 
thematises the complexities of (post)feminist womanhood by situating 
it in an increasingly cartoonesque and disillusioned satire, expressing 
this pessimism in an over-the-top absurdist framework, the trait for 
which it is celebrated as exceptional in TV criticism (the series is an 
‘apocalyptic view of the TV industry’ for Emily Nussbaum [2012a]).27 
While Parks obviously employs a different tone, mobilising an optimistic 
mode of comedy, this leads it similarly outside the realms of ‘realistic’ 
genre traditions all the way to utopian science fiction (an especially 
‘extreme’ leap, considering the programme’s mockumentary/comedy 
vérité origins). The final season’s time jump and flash forwards, as 
                                                          
26 This precariousness probably also explains why 30 Rock, in its zealous name-checking of its female-centred and 
other predecessors, completely neglects referencing Roseanne. This series’ alignment with a working-class 
feminism in domestic sitcom form, and Roseanne Arnold’s comedy of excess both exclude them from the history 
of female-centred quality comedy. 
27 Jeremy Butler’s (2010) discussion of ‘quality’ comedy’s aesthetic-stylistic features draws up a schema termed 
‘televisual continuum’ between the extremes of ‘stylistically utilitarian’ and ‘stylistically exhibitionistic’ comedy. 
He sees the animated series as the ultimate fulfilment of the exhibitionistic style for its capacity to ‘contain 
visuals impossible to generate with camera and actors’ (ibid., 216), and places 30 Rock close to this pole. In this 
light, 30 Rock’s frequent descriptions as cartoonesque, and Liz Lemon’s comparisons with Homer Simpson reveal 
its discursive associations with ‘extremely’ stylised television, even within the quality television context. 
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described, signify the ultimate and – from a storytelling perspective – 
logical endpoint to articulate an aspirational feminist politics, and these 
plot devices have been treated by critics, just like in 30 Rock‘s case, as 
pivotal elements of the comedy’s exceptionalism.  
Both comedies then narrativise their distinct takes on gender politics in 
forms that help them stand out in the cohort of post-network comedy, 
and even more noticeably, they both mobilise their respective generic 
hybrids (utopian sci-fi and absurdist satire) in ways that offer the 
possibility to interpret them in the terms of the parabolic. Granted, 
American fictional television’s tradition of focusing on small 
communities, established within well-defined identity boundaries, may 
generally offer up such interpretations. But 30 Rock and Parks directly 
invite an understanding of their narratives as corresponding to events 
and conditions of the American ‘reality’ in the framework of the 
parable, allegory, or morality tale. In both, the trope of the small 
workplace community standing in for American society operates as a 
politicised space where contained experiments with gender, race, class, 
etc. relations are carried out. Examples of this are numerous and apply 
both to singular episodes and larger narrative arcs of the programmes.  
For instance, the 30 Rock episode ‘Believe in the Stars’ metatextually 
employs the possibility by utilising Tracy’s and Jenna’s characters as 
‘the’ black star and ‘the’ woman star of the fictional variety show, to 
satirise the journalistic question of ‘who has it worse in America, black 
men or women’ (the corresponding social event at the time of the 
episode’s broadcast was Hillary Clinton’s and Barack Obama’s 
competition in the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries). When the 
two start a ‘social experiment’ to prove their points by dressing up as 
the other (i.e. a white woman and a black man), not only does the story 
make its own function as ‘social parable’ explicit, it also turns into a 
whistle stop tour of what demographics the main characters represent, 
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or what they think they represent, reflected in their dialogue (e.g. Jack 
considers Kenneth not a white man but, ‘socioeconomically speaking, an 
inner-city Latina’). Liz invites Oprah Winfrey, whom she thinks she met 
earlier on a plane, to mediate. The denouement in which it is a chirpy 
black teenage girl named Pam (Raven Goodwin) who arrives instead of 
Oprah, not only lampoons Liz’s unwitting racism (she mistook Pam for 
Oprah while on a sedative), but also satirises the ways social discourses 
about race and gender ignore non-white femininities, unless mobilised 
to ‘fix’ the perceived issues of more visible social groups. (At the 
episode’s end, Liz praises Pam’s mediating skills to Jack, and he advises 
her thus: ‘Be a white man. Take credit.’) The parable makes statements 
about each character’s social standing, using them as representatives of 
their culturally defined social groups. The premise and narrative 
strategy are a result of efforts to integrate contemporary concerns of 
feminism into today’s quality comedy, and ends up being the 
hyperbolically metafictional, cartoonesque, self-obsessed, absurd, 
apocalyptic etc. comedy for which 30 Rock is known. Put another way, 
the incorporation of gender politics’ scrutiny into the comedy appears 
to call for the frantic-sarcastic style, mandated with carrying the 
meanings it struggles to articulate.   
Similarly, in Parks the municipal government setting functions as 
insulated environment standing in for representative groups of 
American society, and as such it is also a segment of labour relations 
where – like the cultural industries for 30 Rock – a socio-politically 
visible area of American society can be observed in operation, although 
this is offset with this community’s provinciality. While for Jeffrey 
Sconce (2009) this provinciality effects a derisive mode of comedy, his 
description applies largely to the first season, and loses its relevance 
once the tonal shift described in the previous section takes place and 
overwrites the narrative. The extent to which the series distances itself 
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after season two from this ‘condescending’ (ibid.) humour hinges on its 
alliance with feminist satire, a strategy that at the same time also 
ensures that the narrative no longer operates as representing only a 
provincial and ridiculed type of government and its gender relations, but 
as one that applies to social-political conditions more broadly. For 
instance, the episode ‘Filibuster’ takes its main plot from nationally 
known political events, namely Texan Senator Wendy Davis’ headline-
making 11-hour filibuster in 2013 to block the voting on a Senate Bill 
aimed to restrict abortion rights in the state. The episode satirises the 
misogyny of the Pawnee City Council’s members when Leslie Knope 
similarly attempts to block a vote, sporting a pair of roller skates that 
allude to Davis’s famous pink sneakers. This episode also integrates into 
this plot a controversial voter ID law proposed in Texas in 2011, 
considered by its critics discriminatory against low-income and minority 
voters. The proposed bill that Leslie filibusters in Parks would revoke 
voting rights from non-Pawnee citizens, and is tailored against 
Eagletonians (a more affluent town previously merged with Pawnee) 
who oppose Leslie’s council membership. The story thus turns into a 
dilemma for Leslie between a democratic, i.e. morally right choice 
(blocking the vote on an undemocratic bill) and one that would benefit 
her career (letting Eagletonians lose their voting rights to save her seat). 
This is a dilemma frequently presented in the series as central to Leslie’s 
politics, complicating the meaning of her feminist ambition and energy. 
The convolutedly politicised plot comes to dominate the series in a way 
that is both connected to specific feminist concerns and to identity 
politics (of the feminist as political figure), and also goes on to define 
the insulated ‘lab experiment’ nature of its meaning-making, 
culminating in the series finale’s utopian vision. 
In sum, if the generic and tonal characteristics of the two programmes 
gain their reputation as exceptional or extreme in their realisation of 
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their female protagonists’ stories, then this cannot be understood 
without the cultural context of postfeminism in which these stories are 
articulated. Both series function as isolated efforts to integrate a ‘public’ 
(as opposed to ‘privatised’) idea of gender politics with quality 
television’s aesthetic and representational features, and this choice 
leads them to ‘unreal’ territories of genre and modes of comedy.  
 
2.A 30 Rock 
 
This series’ pilot episode, as discussed, makes explicit claims about the 
relationship between network television’s cultural status as feminised 
source of viewing pleasures and the ways masculinised ideals of value 
become integrated into this, thereby situating itself in quality TV 
discourse and foregrounding the relevance of gender. The pilot also 
makes clear that its primary perspective will be that of the ‘single career 
woman’ as both target audience and producer of network TV’s derided 
content. Ensuring that the viewer understands what kind of femininity 
Liz represents, the pilot has Jack describe her in a condescending mini-
lecture, a quote that has ever since functioned as Lemon’s sleight-of-
hand profile for critics. To Liz’s remark ‘I don’t cook much’, Donaghy 
replies: 
Sure, I got you. New York third-wave feminist, college-educated, 
single-and-pretending-to-be-happy-about-it, overscheduled, 
undersexed, you buy any magazine that says ‘healthy body image’ on 
the cover, and every two years you take up knitting for... a week? 
We get a handy user manual here for Liz’s character as conveyed by the 
conservative-patriarchal older male boss. The description is a 
recognisable type of womanhood originating in second-wave feminism’s 
popular image, now a staple of postfeminist media culture: the self-
absorbed, self-described feminist successor of the urban empowered 
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career girl, an image popularised by Sex and the City and its ilk. 
Nussbaum’s (2012a) praise of Lemon and Fey, defending them against 
the discussed backlash, treats this monologue as ‘nailing’ Liz ‘on sight’. 
Rebecca Traister (2010) also uses this quote to defend Fey against the 
backlash, arguing that her self-deprecating comedy involves lampooning 
her own comic persona and star text in relation to popular feminism. 
Mizejewski’s academic analysis refers to this description as well, 
specifically the ‘third-wave feminist’ moniker, to demonstrate that 
Lemon functions both as caricature of the ‘sourpuss’ workaholic 
feminist, and as criticism of corporate culture’s institutionalised sexism 
(2014, 66).  
While these assessments usefully point out how the programme 
articulates Lemon’s social identity, I argue that its understanding is 
incomplete without considering the next lines of dialogue. To producer 
Pete Hornberger’s (Scott Adsit) enquiry about how he came up with 
such a ‘dead-on’ reading of Liz, Jack replies: ‘Years and years of market 
research’. This implies that Lemon’s categorisation as prime example of 
postfeminist womanhood follows from the network executive’s 
experience with studying audiences and consumers – Jack’s job title is 
‘Vice President of East Coast Television and Microwave Oven 
Programming’. The dialogue connects Lemon’s ‘dead-on’ description to 
corporate capitalism’s strategies of establishing and catering to a society 
of consumer citizens (the series often mocks, and demonstrates the 
meanings of, corporate terminology like ‘vertical integration’), of which 
the postfeminist/feminist single woman is a prominent representative. 
Lemon is not only a caricature of this woman, but is conceived as a 
construct of the capitalist culture industries. Thus the series admits at its 
beginning that if Lemon is to be read as the postfeminist/failed feminist, 
then she is created by and through the culture industries; in short, she is 
media fiction. Whether Jack ‘nails’ Liz’s character or not is not the 
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concern of this dialogue but rather the blurring of her identity that it 
causes: she can simultaneously function as a potential (although 
progressively failing) ‘role model’, i.e. another example of a ‘strong’ 
female protagonist; second, as a caricature of (post)feminist 
womanhood (explaining why her critics feel let down by her portrayal in 
later seasons). Thirdly, she functions as open admission that even this 
caricature of the postfeminist woman is a creation of Western 
consumer culture. The text makes clear its struggle here with its 
embeddedness in the postfeminist context by the character’s 
overdetermined nature, and makes this struggle the programme’s 
starting point. In this, the female protagonist’s treatment as multiply 
transparent and shifting figure – also always inevitably projected onto 
Fey’s star text as comic alter ego – betrays an effort to comment on the 
portrayal it produces. As I will show, Fey’s already established 
reputation as observer of gender and other social relations also feeds 
into this interpretation of social commentary accumulated in Lemon’s 
figure.  
Linda Mizejewski’s (2014) analysis of 30 Rock and Fey, to date the most 
thorough academic investigation of the gender politics of both, offers 
insight into the intricacies of the series’ thick web of commentary on the 
relationship between the media industries, corporate capitalism, nation, 
identity, body politics and so on. As discussed, race relations and the 
ambiguous dynamic of feminism and postfeminism take a prominent 
place in the satirical treatment of these categories. One of Mizejewski’s 
primary arguments is that the series is hardly a straightforward feminist 
text, precisely because of its observational character: ‘30 Rock is not a 
feminist text but rather one that explores the unruly ways feminist 
ideals actually play out in institutions and in popular culture’ (2014, 26-
27). Interrogating the development of Fey’s comedian persona as brainy 
satirist of gender relations which lead to her reputation as a feminist, 
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Mizejewski also engages with how this persona became complicated in 
its ‘cover girl’ iteration once Fey garnered overnight popularity and 
media interest during the 2008 presidential campaign with her 
impersonations of Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin. 
Mizejewski’s overview of Fey’s comedy and star text emphasises that 
both involve a consistent and wide-ranging mode of observational 
humour. She describes this facet of Fey’s comedy as the defining feature 
of her career, with Mean Girls (the 2004 film whose script she wrote) 
being praised by critics as a ‘sociological’ take on ‘girl world’, or with her 
Weekend Update news anchor persona on SNL as no-nonsense feminist 
making acidic jokes about institutionalised sexism and misogyny. 
Mizejewski considers Fey’s pre-30 Rock comedy significant because it 
discusses gender in a way that positions the comedian as an outsider to 
the social relations on which she comments – even to her own celebrity.  
Indeed, Fey’s persona as more of a writer-observer rather than an actor-
performer of gender relations has been part of her celebrity from the 
beginnings of her media presence. An early article profile has Amy 
Poehler describe her thus: ‘She’s not the first girl to belly-flop into the 
pool at the pool party. She watches everybody else’s flops and then 
writes a play about it’ (Heffernan 2003). But if the strength of Fey’s 
comedy is rooted in its observational humour, then this becomes 
ambiguous in its interpretation as feminist once her own star text gets 
involved via Lemon’s satirical-sarcastic portrayal. Mizejewski’s 
reluctance to designate 30 Rock with the ‘feminist’ moniker is linked to 
the series’ sarcastic tone concentrated onto Lemon’s, i.e. Fey’s alter 
ego’s, position in the show’s fictional world: 
Far from claiming 30 Rock as a feminist text, my primary argument 
here is that it does a different kind of cultural work than expected [by 
journalists critiquing Lemon’s portrayal as failed feminist] in 
representing a feminist TV writer complicit in profit-driven, sexist, 
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mainstream media and in exploring the messy ways feminist ideals 
play out in institutions and popular culture. (…) Significantly, Liz 
Lemon is a liminal figure in relation to corporate and cultural power 
as well as to feminism, and 30 Rock’s comedy draws from both 
corporate and feminist politics. (Ibid., 77) 
Liminality and outsider-ness describe both comedian and fictional 
character in relation to feminism for Mizejewski, and implied in this is 
that precisely the scrutinising take on Liz and feminism is what impedes 
the series’ classification as feminist television. Paradoxically then, the 
trait through which Fey’s popular image was established as Hollywood’s 
token feminist, namely the position of outsider-observer and astute 
satirist of gender relations, works against this moniker when the object 
of scrutiny becomes the cultural state-of-affairs of feminism and 
postfeminism, projected onto an alter-ego figure performed by the 
‘token feminist’ comedian. 
If 30 Rock is problematic in the way it can (or cannot) be declared a 
‘straightforward’ feminist text, then this is due to Liz’s portrayal as both 
representative, consumer, and producer of images of postfeminist 
womanhood, also always carrying the extratextual understanding that 
she is Fey’s fictional version. As shown, the series not only 
acknowledges this portrayal but foregrounds it as its storytelling 
premise to be interrogated and lampooned. ‘Feminist’ or not, in this 
feature the series nonetheless evokes feminist theorists’ positions 
regarding postfeminism’s inseparable connection to neoliberal 
ideologies of individualisation and consumer citizenship. McRobbie 
(2009, 2011) scrutinises the ways in which neoliberal governments, 
colluding with popular media, assign to affluent young women a crucial 
social role as ideal subjects of what she terms ‘the new sexual contract’. 
She discusses this as an ethos that ties women’s economic power to the 
‘freedom to consume’, fuelling the expansion of the fashion-beauty 
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industry under the aegis of consumer citizenship, and discouraging 
political participation (2011, 182). As Gill and Scharff suggest, 
‘neoliberalism is always already gendered, and (...) women are 
constructed as its ideal subjects’ (2011, 7 quoted in Wilkes 2015, 26).  
As noted, Lemon’s portrayal, and the intricate matrix of workplace and 
domestic relations in 30 Rock, insist that neoliberal-postfeminist 
capitalism and media culture ‘is already gendered’ and targets 
female/feminised social subjects. Further, it mines the opportunities for 
satire in the individualisation politics inherent to this paradigm, 
evidenced in the constant clashes between Liz’s uninformed and 
entitled ‘social consciousness’ feminism and her environment’s efforts 
to stifle her politics. Mizejewski offers a detailed analysis of the episode 
‘Brooklyn Without Limits’ that (like many others) thematises this 
tension, noting that while the series satirises ‘both feminist hypocrisy 
and postfeminist bourgeois angst’, there is also ‘a privileged, middle-
class politics looming under the surface of 30 Rock’s comedy as its 
perimeter in imagining social change’ (2014, 84). The episode makes fun 
of Liz’s social consciousness as she proudly buys a pair of jeans from a 
company that she thinks is an independent fair trade business and not 
part of an ugly corporation, until Jack enlightens her that it is owned by 
Halliburton and exploits Vietnamese workers. Since a major draw for Liz 
was that this pair of jeans was the only kind her backside has ever 
looked good in, and she now has to go back to unflattering clothes that 
accommodate her politics, the episode narrativises the conflict between 
a secretly self-centred feminist social consciousness and corporate 
capitalism as concentrated onto Lemon’s body. Mizejewski posits that 
while this storyline is sharp (and quite dark) in mocking both Liz’s 
political consciousness and Jack’s defense of global capitalism, it also 
unwittingly exposes its own blind spots regarding its treatment of 
feminist politics since it ‘does not acknowledge (…) the limitations of 
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Liz’s liberalism’. It centralises ‘a personal choice about her looks, money, 
and commodities’ instead of actual political activism against 
corporations, thus ‘accept[ing] personal power as the only viable kind of 
agency’ (ibid., 85).  
For Mizejewski, this personalisation of social issues is the real ‘Liz 
Lemonism’, i.e. the fault in 30 Rock‘s gender politics. I argue however, 
that if Lemon is a caricature of the ‘ideal subject’ of postfeminist and 
neoliberal cultural politics (proposed in the pilot episode), then the 
episode’s and the whole programme’s insistence that the uninformed 
liberal feminist inevitably buys into the rhetoric of self-work and a short-
sighted concern with commodities, makes perfect sense. Importantly, 
the series’ trajectory stresses the process in which Liz increasingly 
conflates the political with the personal, gradually short-changing her 
‘bleeding-heart’, issue-oriented feminist intentions for a concentration 
on individual concerns. To wit, a three-episode arc at the beginning of 
the second series offers a detailed scrutiny of this process, dramatising 
it as a struggle between Liz and her environment. The serialised plot of 
these episodes revolves around Jenna’s body issues: during the show’s 
summer hiatus, she gained enough weight to be deemed unpresentable 
on television, a narrative conflict thematising the media industry’s sexist 
treatment of female performers: ‘She needs to lose thirty pounds or 
gain sixty. Anything in between has no place in television’, says the 
slightly overweight Jack (‘SeinfeldVision’). The next episode deals with 
the weight gain’s consequences for Jenna’s stardom and with Liz’s and 
Jack’s opinions on it, representing the liberal feminist’s and the sexist 
capitalist’s stances respectively (‘Jack Gets in the Game’). Liz initially 
insists that they ignore Jenna’s changed body and continue to treat her 
as the pretty girl of the show. As she consoles Jenna, Jack pops up from 
the background, and the massaging of Jenna’s self-esteem turns into an 
‘issue’ debate between the two leads: 
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Liz: How come men can be heavy and be respected like James 
Gandolfini or Fat Albert? You know it’s a double standard and 
America needs to get over its body image madness. 
Jack: Oh come on, what are we, back in college, freshmen year? Let’s 
go to the common room and talk about apartheid.  
Liz: Well OK. I’m sorry if I care about making the world a better place. 
Jack: You should be. It’s a complete waste of time and prevents you 
from dealing with THIS (gestures at Lemon’s body). 
Liz: Excuse me, what about THIS do I have to deal with?  
Jack: How’s your love life going?  
Liz: I... believe that love comes to you when you’re not looking for it. 
Jack: Did you return that wedding dress that you bought?  
Liz: I’m gonna sell it online but my Internet is being weird. 
Jack: How about the furniture for your home office, have you even 
set that up yet? (A smash cut shows a stack of unopened Ikea boxes 
sitting in Lemon’s home.) 
Liz: I’m not making excuses Jack but THIS (gestures at her body) is 
taken care of. (Yelps and touches her cheek.) Nerds! I missed a dentist 
appointment this morning! 
The episode sets here up the stakes around which the comedy about 
the fat and ridiculed female body revolves: while pointing out the 
obvious feminist stance, articulated by Liz as social-cultural issue, it also 
shows that her feminism is easily steered away by corporate 
capitalism’s local representative into a personal, self-absorbed identity 
politics. Crucially, Donaghy’s manipulative change of subject from an 
interest in the issue’s social relevance towards Liz’s own romantic and 
private life, culminates in a punchline that configures Liz’s body as the 
main problem. The body that becomes centralised here however is not 
the ‘THIS’ that both gesture towards emphatically. Shifting from the 
sexualised connotation inscribed onto the female body (love life, 
marriage), the scene finally locates the comedy in the decidedly unsexy 
notion of Liz’s toothache. The scene’s trajectory starts with a 
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verbalisation of the feminist concerns at stake, followed by their 
highjacking by the powers-that-be into the language of postfeminism, 
which the comedy again thwarts such that the focus on the female body 
highlights a dualism between Liz’s sexual(ised) and comically failing 
body.  
A later scene reprises the same arc in which Liz’s hyperbolic interest in 
Jenna’s body image problem as feminist issue becomes ridiculed and 
turned back against her as rooted in her unhappy personal life, 
culminating in the physical comedy of Liz’s disintegrating body. Jenna 
and Liz decide to ignore the weight issue on the show; Jenna out of 
vanity, Liz out to prove the feminist point, and still adamant that the TV 
industry needs a lesson in social consciousness. Again, a male voice 
distracts them in the scene as staff writer Frank (Judah Friedlander) 
enters and suggests a ‘fat Jenna’ character with the catchphrase ‘Me 
want food’. Lemon refuses: 
Liz: We are gonna dare America to change their own attitudes about 
body image.  
Frank: Why do you have to make everything into an issue? Don’t you 
have things to do with your own life? 
Liz: At least I don’t live with my mum. (Yelps, touches her cheek.) 
Frank: Hey my mum is cool. 
Liz: I got my life together OK? (A tooth falls out of her mouth onto the 
desk.) 
In repeating the themes addressed in the earlier scene, the narrative 
offers up Liz not simply as an already ‘failed feminist’, but as template of 
the uninformed one on whom the postfeminist and capitalist project 
have been doing their work. Still at the beginning of Jack’s mentorship – 
a central theme of the whole of the series – Liz here retains her interest 
in ‘making the world a better place’, a mantra later replaced, via Jack’s 
influence, with the one ‘Get out there and get yours’ (‘Kidney Now!’). If 
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Liz ‘constantly compromis[es] her ideals as the cost of working for a 
national network, becoming “schooled and seduced” into sleazy 
network thinking’ (Mizejewski 2014, 76), then this process also 
prominently entails the gradual abandoning of the feminist project as 
her ideal. The ‘observational’ comedy at work here uses the spaces and 
communities of privilege not to inherently confirm a postfeminist and 
post-race ethos but to complicate and lay bare their working 
mechanisms. Traister (2010) argues that the Fey backlash signals an 
uneasy relationship between feminism and comedy, noting that Fey ‘is a 
professional comedian’ and ‘not a professional feminist’. Mizejewski’s 
academic examination, as noted, is also reluctant to link the series’ 
cultural work to feminism, following a similar logic in which a comedy 
about feminism and postfeminism forecloses such a direct connection.  
Entangled in this uneasy connection between comedy and feminism is 
the metatextual authorship discourse around Fey as producer and 
performer of ‘quality’ comedy, intensified by using the Lemon figure as 
fictional Doppelgänger. In comedian comedy’s history, the idea that the 
comic persona is a thinly veiled alter ego of the comedian is a familiar 
staple, and in television, this has organically merged with the 
establishment of ‘quality’ comedy. A number of prominent TV comedies 
have built their worlds around this alter ego both in the network and 
post-network eras (their titles often bearing the comedian’s first or last 
name), in some cases using this transparency to create metacomedy 
about the television business (e.g. Curb Your Enthusiasm, The 
Comeback). The authorship discourse around quality drama, which is 
concerned to ‘explain’ the TV text with the ‘author’s’ personality and art 
(Martin 2013), has in this way been prominent in television comedy’s 
history as well, regardless of its assigned cultural value. Moreover, while 
comedian comedy and sitcoms about/by a comic performer have 
primarily been a male domain (Mills 2005), there have been instances of 
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female-centred metatextual comedian comedies on television, like 
Roseanne, Ellen (1994-1998), Cybill (1995-1998), or Fat Actress (2005). 
These programmes’ cultural significance has been located in the ways 
they upset the gendered codes of decorum for the female performer as 
subject/object of humour. 30 Rock combines these distinct traditions: 
on the one hand, it uses the ‘female comic performer as alter ego’ 
framework, also being a metatextual comedy about the TV industry. On 
the other, in casting the female performer as writer of comedy, and with 
Fey’s initial star persona being that of the comedy writer as opposed to 
performer, it upsets the parallel traditions of male comedian comedy as 
revered definition of authorship (Jerry Seinfeld, Larry David, Louis C.K. 
etc.) and of female-centred comedian comedy that has until recently 
largely been understood as outside the quality discourse and/or about 
the female performer (Roseanne Arnold, Ellen DeGeneres, Kirstie Alley, 
or Lisa Kudrow in The Comeback).  
The metacomedy about television, female authorship, and feminism via 
which 30 Rock inserts itself into the quality discourse is as such 
unprecedented and creates multiple issues which it is concerned to 
perpetually negotiate. Fey’s author persona as writer-performer-
producer of her own ‘comedy writer’ alter ego, located in quality 
discourse, seems to be yet another ‘impossible sign’ – and part of this 
impossibility is the comedy’s concentration on feminism/postfeminism 
as its dominant object of satire.  
Fey’s next project after 30 Rock, the Netflix comedy Unbreakable Kimmy 
Schmidt, lacks both the ‘comic alter ego’ aspect and a meta-satire of 
feminism, with Fey being mainly involved in a writer-producer capacity. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, this series has been more unequivocally 
embraced by critics as feminist text in its gender politics. This suggests 
that a centralised mockery of feminism/postfeminism in Fey’s comedy is 
tied to her self-centralisation as comic performer – bringing into play 
 144 
 
the common wisdom that women’s comedy relies greatly on self-
deprecation (Mills 2005, 112), a characteristic dominant for analysts of 
Fey’s humour. The ways in which woman comedians (ab)use the social 
convention of self-mockery to lay bare unequal gender relations has 
been an object of scrutiny for feminist scholars (Rowe Karlyn 1995b, 
Arthurs 1999). Again, Fey’s ‘authored’ comedy in 30 Rock resists a stable 
positioning in this context, an instability due to its centralisation of 
feminist politics as channelled through the female comedian’s self-
mockery and as agent of the ‘quality’ status. ‘Feminising’ articulations of 
her author persona, like the maternalisation shown in the previous 
section, work to mitigate the cultural unease this instability causes.  
The above considerations do not serve to take a stand in the question of 
30 Rock’s and Fey’s feminism or postfeminism. Rather, my concern has 
been to show that both text and comedian consistently keep upsetting 
the discursive assumptions about the popular cultural presence of 
these. Because this instability of meaning is so prominent in the series 
and the comic’s star text, and because both betray an intent to politicise 
these meanings, integrated into the quality comedy’s modes of 
expression, 30 Rock’s significance as media text is located best as 
signalling the (rather cynically envisaged) process of the recent 
‘rebooting’ of feminist discourses, intensified in post-recessionary 
media culture. Sarah Banet-Weiser’s (2015) study shows how this 
renewed focus on feminist politics also continues to involve popular 
culture’s efforts to allocate a narrowed-down meaning to the word. For 
Banet-Weiser this phenomenon misappropriates feminism’s project of 
‘ambiguity’, i.e. its concern to interrogate and denaturalise assumptions 
about gender and about its own meanings via sustained debate. As the 
above discussion of 30 Rock and of Fey’s writer-performer persona 
shows, one thing (perhaps the only thing) can be stated about both with 
absolute certainty: they trade in this ambiguity. 
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2.B Parks and Recreation 
 
While Fey’s reputation in terms of her gender politics shifted in feminist 
media from ‘arbiter of feminism’ to ‘questionable ally’ due to 30 Rock’s 
cultural work and her celebrity’s popularisation, Amy Poehler’s star text 
travelled in almost the opposite direction: the TV series designed to be 
her first central comic role also established her feminist image. The two 
comics’ different creative backgrounds partly account for this disparate 
route: Fey’s persona as writer-author determined her evaluations from 
the beginning of her career, while Poehler was never associated with 
authorship in a similar way. She first garnered renown as a versatile 
sketch performer on SNL, a role dominating her early star text. As her 
star vehicle, Parks served to articulate this versatility of performance as 
a feminist trait, affecting both the career woman’s political 
empowerment narrative and the series’ critique of institutions. I 
showed above how this element of the text eventually governs its genre 
and reverses mockumentary’s cultural work, mobilising the idea of a 
‘utopian’ or aspirational feminism to the degree that it steers the 
‘realist’ fiction towards actual utopian science fiction.  
Performance is a key term for comedy, and scholarship describes the 
ways in which the mockumentary/comedy vérité form upsets its 
conventions to produce contemporary ‘quality’ comedy (Thompson 
2007, Hight 2010, Middleton 2014, Mills 2004). A basic tenet of sitcom 
theory is that the form traditionally foregrounds comic performance as 
a method of distinguishing it from more serious and ‘realistic’ forms. 
Mills writes: ‘”sitcom naturalism” is based on audiences “suspending 
disbelief in return for pleasure”, in which the laughter track, the 
theatrical shooting style and the displayed performance clearly 
demonstrate sitcom’s artificial status and its clear, precise, single-
minded aim: to make you laugh’ (Mills 2004, 67). The mockumentary 
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aesthetic however, hybridising the factual and fictive form, questions 
both documentary’s claim to authenticity, ‘whose veracity rests on the 
assumption that there is a lack of performance’ (ibid., 73), and also the 
tenability of traditional sitcom’s ‘displayed’ performance style (ibid., 72-
74) via exposing the inauthenticity of both kinds of performance. Parks 
reverses this process, even while retaining mockumentary’s basic 
aesthetics. This speaks to the importance of the mobilisation of a 
politicised, and ‘directly’ employed feminist rhetoric for the 
establishment of the series’ quality moniker.  
The extent to which ‘feminist’ intent overturns mockumentary’s efforts 
to ridicule ‘fake’ performances (of the self and of traditional comedy), 
can be demonstrated in the difference between the ways Parks utilises 
Poehler’s comic talent and, for instance, the British Office’s or The 
Comeback’s commentary on comedy performance via David Brent’s and 
Valerie Cherish’s ‘displayed’ performances. The latter two enact ‘cringe 
comedy’, laying bare the characters’ stupidity and self-delusion, which 
extends to their own (erroneous) perception of their environment’s 
appreciation of their humorous performance – the viewer is invited to 
‘laugh(...) at and not with’ them (ibid., 73). At the same time, Ricky 
Gervais’ and Lisa Kudrow’s performances of this self-delusion are not 
‘displayed’, at least not in traditional sitcom’s terms. Parks gradually 
inverts this strategy; while Leslie’s self-deception is similarly a source of 
comedy in the first season, the programme increasingly foregrounds 
Poehler’s comic skills without the effect of a diegetic inauthenticity. The 
difference comes to the fore clearly in the repeatedly used method of 
jump-cut monologues which became the series’ signature feature, and 
the first of which appears in the pilot. In this, we see a montage of Leslie 
asking Ron in different ways to allow her to form a committee (‘Pilot’). 
The scene was reportedly not pre-written (Raymond 2013), signalling 
that Poehler’s improvisational talents were strategically incorporated 
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into the programme’s aesthetic. At the same time, the frequent usage 
of jump-cuts is explained as coincidentally emerging: the editor of the 
third episode ‘The Reporter’ was apparently unable to decide what to 
edit out from a scene involving a similar series of Poehler’s 
improvisations, and ended up keeping all of them, leading to the jump-
cut solution (ibid.). In these montages, we are simultaneously invited to 
laugh at Leslie’s delusional enthusiasm as part of the narrative, but also 
to appreciate, extradiegetically, Poehler’s improvisational talent. The 
improvisational ‘feel’ is in accordance with mockumentary’s aesthetic 
tradition, but becomes a dominant feature of Parks. Even more 
importantly, it becomes habitually employed to signify commentary on 
gender relations. 
For instance, one of the most celebrated jump-cuts occurs in the 
episode ‘The Hunting Trip’, in which Leslie takes the blame for 
accidentally shooting Ron in the back of his head on a hunting trip. She 
gives a statement to a park ranger whose attitude betrays a sexist 
assumption about the accident’s circumstances. Through the 
combination of Poehler’s performance and the jump-cut technique, we 
first register Leslie’s growing exasperation at the ranger’s patronising 
condescendence in demanding an explanation, then her resolve to get 
out of the situation by performing a series of ‘typical’ feminine 
responses with which he feels more comfortable than with her real 
voice and with a ‘non-gendered’ explanation. Leslie’s utterances 
become more and more hyperbolically ridiculous and turn into a 
satirical parody of paternalistic notions of womanhood via Poehler’s 
exaggerated performance in the jump-cut montage. The improvised 
bits, including ‘I cared too much I guess’, ‘I was thinking with my lady 
parts’, ‘I thought there was gonna be chocolate’, ‘I’m wearing a new bra, 
and it closes in the front, so it popped open and it threw me off’, ‘All I 
wanna do is have babies’, ‘I’m just like, going through a thing right now’, 
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‘This would not happen if I had a penis’, ‘I'm good at tolerating pain, I'm 
bad at math, and I'm stupid’ etc. telegraph the ridiculousness of the 
ranger’s sexism. Performance works on two levels here: one within the 
diegesis, with Leslie acting out a series of ‘inauthentic’ femininities for 
the ranger’s benefit, simultaneously reaffirming her own authenticity of 
self in the contrast; and also as Poehler’s displayed comic performance. 
Thus, performance in this scene is not meant to expose the diegetic 
comic performer’s delusion (as with Brent or Cherish) but a supporting 
character’s misogynistic self-delusion who represents paternalistic male 
authority. (Whereas in The Office or The Comeback, it is usually the 
supporting characters through whom the text signals to the audience 
the protagonist’s ridiculousness.) This scene is included in Vulture’s list 
of the programme’s best jump-cut montages, ranking number two 
(Raymond 2013), with an introduction that lauds it for authentic or 
‘subtle’ feminism, articulated through the mockumentary’s method of 
exposing the contradictions in documentary’s claims to authenticity of 
performance. The political feminist intent here overwrites the genre’s 
ideological intent, and the ‘authenticity’ of feminism is re-confirmed via 
Leslie’s own authenticity as aspirational feminist public figure. This 
authenticity emerges in a contrast with her environment’s (here the 
ranger’s) consistent efforts to sabotage it: we laugh with her, not at her 
– at him. The display of the female comedian’s skilled performance 
establishes this ideological reversal of aesthetic means. 
Critics then embraced both the programme’s and Leslie’s ‘authentic’ 
feminism as markers of a quality television that pedagogically 
problematises gender relations. Further, unlike in 30 Rock‘s and Fey’s 
case, media reception willingly reconciled the discrepancy/similarity 
between fictional character and comedian since Poehler’s celebrity was 
increasingly governed by a performance of a similarly straightforward, 
argumentative, and optimistic feminist attitude. Poehler’s various 
 149 
 
confirmations of a feminist identity, her affiliation with feminist 
organisations, and her founding of the website and web series Smart 
Girls at the Party, an ‘empowering’ platform for teenage girls (Kleeman 
2014), supported this perception. Similarly, her autobiography Yes 
Please (2014) betrays an effort to further participate in contemporary 
discourses about an aspirational-optimistic feminism, in its rhetoric 
echoing the series’ and the fictional character’s assertive-yet-accessible 
feminist reputation. The animated Pixar film Inside Out (2015) also 
capitalised on this by casting Poehler as voice of the personified 
emotion Joy. These articulations of her star text in relation to popular 
feminism are considerably easier to make sense of for popular media 
discourses than Fey’s less directly mediated and strategically 
problematic/problematising gender politics.  
Yet Poehler’s and the series’ promotion of an aspirational feminism, 
foregrounding optimism, pugnacious female ambition, self-work, and 
solidarity, also opens itself up to criticisms of a blindness to class and 
racial privilege. Indeed, just as her memoir/advice book has been 
embraced as feminist (Rodriguez 2014) and complicating the messages 
of recent career advice books for women like Sheryl Sandberg’s Lean In 
(Sandberg 2013, for a comparative criticism see Yabroff 2014), it has 
also been accused of ignoring social inequalities. Rodrigues (2014) 
writes, ‘the white-lady memoir, as informed by white liberal feminism, is 
complicit in a stagnant form of popularized non-politics that emphasizes 
non-confrontation, positivity, and individualism’. Diane Negra’s (2014) 
academic account similarly shows this to be a dominant feature of 
recent female-authored celebrity memoirs, including Fey’s Bossypants. 
For both critics, this rhetoric makes such texts unacknowledged allies to 
recessionary postfeminist-neoliberal corporate culture, and, ultimately, 
a ‘neo-patriarchal’ genre (ibid., 284). Negra argues that this literature 
‘exhibits intense approbation for female entrepreneurialism in a 
 150 
 
neoliberal cultural environment and a postfeminist celebration of the 
self’ (ibid., 278). 
While Negra’s assessment of celebrity memoirs does not include Yes 
Please, its position parallels Rodrigues’ criticism of the book. Debates 
around this literature demonstrate once again the inevitably 
problematic nature of claims to a feminist politics in a postfeminist 
cultural environment. What Yabroff (2014) sees as Poehler’s active 
resistance to Sandberg-type feminine careerism, instead promoting 
female solidarity and individualism as summarised in the book’s 
recurring mantra, ‘Good for you, not for me’, Rodrigues refuses as a sign 
of postfeminist privilege for neglecting unequal social, political, and 
economic circumstances. The issues expressed around the ‘choice’ 
feminism of Yes Please loom large for Parks; yet the series has not been 
subject to such critical treatment by feminists as Poehler’s book. 
Framed in the competitive comparison with Fey and 30 Rock, the 
programme has been overwhelmingly embraced as the signature 
feminist TV text of the early 2010s. 
A crucial element of the programme’s celebration as feminist quality TV 
in its reception is its persistent portrayal of local government’s 
institutional sexism as a hurdle the heroine needs to overcome. A classic 
structuralist reading shows the series in this light: the overarching 
(grand) narrative frames feminist aspirationalism as motivation of the 
protagonist’s quest where different iterations of the anti-feminist social 
environment stand for the villainous other; the heroine has her helpers 
and community, and she occasionally suffers failures in her mission, 
which, as stated in the pilot, is to become the first female president. 
That this ambition is initially presented as delusional but is later 
validated as deserved reaffirms the shift in the storytelling technique 
toward the grand narrative. This more or less linear narrative structure, 
couched in quality TV’s serialisation (Creeber 2004), locates viewing 
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pleasure in the sustained tension between ‘realism’ (mockumentary 
aesthetics and stories of Leslie’s failures) and fantasy/utopia. The series’ 
ending leaves open the question the pilot episode posed and the grand 
narrative has at stake: we never find out whether Leslie became 
president. The story then preserves this tension between ‘realism’ and 
utopia even for the denouement, but the intense focus on the question 
(via withholding information) shows the significance lent to the issue of 
utopia, here equated with a female presidency, itself signalling in the 
American cultural imagination the ultimate realisation of women’s 
subversion of patriarchal public institutions. The ultimate utopia is left 
ambiguous to draw attention to its political significance. 
The grand narrative of the quest for utopia in the framework of quality 
television, providing viewing satisfaction simultaneously from narrative 
resolution and ambiguity, aligns itself with some current strands of 
feminist theory. Lisa Shapiro Sanders’ (2007) position on utopian 
thinking’s potential in debates over feminism’s multiple iterations is 
instructive. She defends second-wave feminism’s utopianism against 
arguments that see it as dated and static in its historically universalising 
and essentialist tendencies (ibid., 3-4). Instead, she locates utopia’s 
usefulness for contemporary feminism in ‘the productive expression 
and negotiation of conflict (…) envisioning social change that 
emphasises the transformative over the perfected vision’ (ibid., 12). 
Fictional narratives being prominent grounds on which cultural struggles 
are affectively negotiated, and television’s narrative economy allowing 
for presenting such struggles without necessarily resolving them, they 
provide the series with the opportunity to present a feminist utopianism 
similar to Shapiro Sanders’ concept. The collaborative negotiation she 
calls for is useful for thinking about both Parks‘ and 30 Rock’s textual 
features and also the intense media promotion of Fey’s and Poehler’s 
friendship. Further, both series position themselves in a reverential 
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relation to ‘feminist’ predecessors (the ‘utopian past’ [ibid.] of the MTM 
era female-led sitcom), and both comedians are celebrated as 
successors of the network era’s feminist/female comedians, thus 
resisting somewhat quality comedy’s initiative of denying the past, and 
the generationalist tendencies of postfeminism. The two comedies 
trade in different invocations of gender politics and feminism, stemming 
from the female leads’ disparate creative backgrounds and star texts 
affecting the programmes’ narrative and generic traits. 30 Rock critiques 
the contemporary ‘reality’ of a feminism-influenced and privileged 
urban environment in an increasingly surreal and cartoonesque tone,28 
while Parks imagines an ’ideal’ feminism’s triumph on both a rural and 
national political level. In this sense it overturns the ‘apocalyptic’ state 
that the other programme presents, while situating this fantasy in a 
televisual form known for its play with aesthetic codes of realism. For 
the two programmes then, the ‘reality’ and ‘fantasy’ of feminism are in 
reverse connection with the ‘realism’ and ‘fantasy’ of genre and 
aesthetics: 30 Rock creates a ‘reality’ of feminism in a non-realist 
aesthetic, while Parks presents a ‘fantasy’ of feminism in a realist 
aesthetic. Questions about whether these disparate approaches are in 
conflict, and which is more progressive, are turned into crucial issues at 
stake in their evaluations in (feminist) popular reception; yet Fey’s and 
Poehler’s carefully publicised friendship narrative and their frequent 
pairing as comic double act struggle to neutralize these.  
Both the comedies’ and the comedians’ cultural positions are formed 
then in resistances to popular reception’s imperative for monolithic and 
competitive appraisals of a centralised feminism, itself entangled in 
contemporary debates around ambiguity, cultural difference, and 
negotiation of conflict. In the analysis of these cultural struggles around 
                                                          
28 Although the series plays with the idea of feminist utopia in its epilogue: set in a distant, cartoonesque future, 
the last episode’s tag shows a dialogue between immortal NBC chairman Kenneth, and Liz’s great-great-
granddaughter, a black writer who pitches and sells Liz Lemon’s life story to him (‘Last Lunch’). The sitcom we 
watched was in itself the product of a utopian feminist future. 
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the two series, I frequently referred to the issue of the female 
comedian’s performance; indeed, the question of the female body’s 
involvement in comedy and parodies of femininity carries heightened 
stakes for judgements over the programmes’ achievements. The next 
section investigates this relationship.  
 
3. Body politics and the ‘quality’ comedy 
 
The structuring concept of Mizejewski’s (2014) book about 
contemporary female comedians is encapsulated in its title, 
Pretty/funny: that is, women’s comedy tends to be rooted and 
evaluated in the comedian’s relationship to her body as sexual(ised) 
object. For Bridget Boyle (2015), the female body is involved in a 
gendered performance via its visual presence even ‘before the gag’. As 
Boyle argues, cultural anxieties around women’s physical comedy stem 
from two kinds of associations: one is linked to the maternal body (too 
‘sacred’ to be funny), and the other to the ‘performance of beauty’ 
(ibid., 80-83). The latter echoes Mizejewski’s argument: the cultural 
paradigm bluntly described as ‘you are either pretty or funny’ governs 
women’s culturally sanctioned relationship to humour, and women’s 
comedy tends to be borne out of the pretty/funny paradigm’s 
transgressive treatment. This dynamic harks back to various other 
Western beliefs about femininity as constructed in the hierarchal 
opposition of male/female: Mizejewski also briefly refers to the 
mind/body dichotomy, but the virgin/whore duality similarly signals her 
fixedness to an (extreme lack or excess of) physical-as-sexual existence. 
Rowe’s (1995b) influential work on women’s comedy shows why the 
transgression of these paradigms (‘unruliness’) occurs so poignantly in 
comedy, given that the genre is a primary outlet of cultural anxieties 
about human physicality. That women’s presence is similarly 
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pronounced in other ‘body’ genres like horror or pornography speaks to 
the female body’s cultural significance as sexual sign (Williams 1991); 
and the ‘unfunny’ imperatives of these forms explain why female 
protagonists have historically been more crucial to them than to 
comedy.  
For Mills, ‘[i]n comedy, the body becomes vital to performance and 
characters are often constructed so as to be aware of their own 
physicality’ (2005, 86). This can account for female performers’ more 
pronounced presence in forms that rely on an emphasised physical 
performance and which are, consequently, seen as less valuable forms 
than others in cultural hierarchies. Comedy’s transgressive and 
empowering possibilities for socially powerless groups stem from its low 
cultural status as a genre foregrounding physical performance. Further, 
comedy’s signifying processes operate from an assumed common 
knowledge of social stereotypes, whether confirming or upsetting them; 
as such, women’s displayed comic performance inevitably invites special 
attention to its relation to sexuality (ibid., 82).  
Nonetheless, as histories of physical comedy, specifically of slapstick, 
attest, the genre has developed both on film and television centralising 
male comedians (see Boyle [2013] for these histories). According to this 
scholarship, the body’s inscription with specific meanings in its 
confrontations with the outside world has existentialist connotations, 
expressing a struggle between the body/spirit split that originates in 
Christian thought. Alan Dale’s account (2000) is indicative:  
...slapstick is a fundamental, universal, and eternal response to the 
fact that life is physical. (…) 
The word ‘existential’ sounds too tony for slapstick but indicates its 
prevalence in our experience. (Ibid., 11) 
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Boyle (2013) terms this notion of the comic Everyman’s universality ‘the 
neutral fallacy’. Complicating Dale’s definition of the slapstick gag as a 
‘physical assault on, or collapse of, the hero’s dignity’ (2000, 3), Boyle 
points out that ‘this hypothesis presumes that “dignity” can be located 
and fixed outside of gender, which feminist theory contests’ (Boyle 
2013, 91). Indeed, in Dale’s considerations, slapstick’s Everyman is 
gendered only in the ways in which his exasperation over the 
body/mind split includes a failed connection to his love interest (2000, 
14). Both Dale and Alex Clayton (2007) explain women’s historic 
marginalisation in comedy as rooted in the conflict between the hero’s 
lack of dignity and women’s cultural position. If the slapstick body is 
characterised by a ‘comic dualism’ (ibid., 146) as ‘at once an object 
within the world (...) and a subject acting on the world’ then the 
undignified moves and physical assaults involved (clumsiness, acrobatic 
contortions) are at odds with ‘the dominant ideal of female beauty in 
patriarchal society’ (ibid.). In short, the extreme physicality dominating 
slapstick seems unfit to express humour when its subject/object is the 
fragile, precious etc. female body (ibid., 148).  
Theorists of slapstick regularly note the cultural contradiction around 
women’s physical comedy, also devoting much praise to the few 
slapstick comedies centralising female comedians for the ways they 
subvert this. If the slapstick hero is a ‘martyr’ of his physical constraints 
(Dale 2000), then the slapstick heroine’s martyrdom is located in her 
sexuality, a notion also connected to the fact that female comedians 
have traditionally been most visible in romantic and screwball 
comedies. Because the female performer is already located in a specific 
physical existence, her comedy forecloses expressing the existential, 
universal, fundamental, etc. conundrum of the body/mind dualism that 
the male comic’s body offers. Rather, her comedy works as a struggle 
against her inferior position as sexualised object, and women’s comedy 
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is often evaluated upon how successfully it does this. Such accounts 
often cite Katharine Hepburn’s screwball comedies as high points of this 
effort. Clayton’s description of the star’s slapstick in Bringing Up Baby 
(1938) accentuates how ostensible her physical indignities are: ‘while 
her numerous accidents in the film (...) all result from a certain 
misplaced confidence, the film is less interested in scoffing at such 
assurance as it is in savouring her response to the mishap’ (2007, 149). 
He contextualises Hepburn’s performance paradoxically in an 
empowering desirability that stems from the ways she upsets gender 
norms, admiring ‘the attractively androgynous qualities of her 
physicality’ (ibid., 150; see also Dale’s praise of Hepburn’s ‘blend [of] 
slapstick and sexual charisma’ [2000, 129]). Hepburn’s mode of slapstick 
is paralleled in the film’s ‘comedy of the sexes’ narrative: her 
exceptional activity throws into relief who is in charge between the 
male and female leads, and the film is generally read as overpowering 
patriarchal masculinity and society in a romance context (Rowe Karlyn 
1995b, 147–56; King 2002, 52–55).  
Hepburn’s case exemplifies that women’s slapstick is inevitably created 
through the female performer’s relationship to sexual connotations, and 
its execution is, especially in the post-second-wave feminist era, 
interpreted on the basis of its political (liberating) potential. Because of 
the historic cultural disdain for women’s comedy, its practice continues 
to be entangled in the political project of struggling with this heritage. 
Boyle calls this a ‘double bind’ of women’s (physical) comedy: the 
imperative to be funny is in conflict with the imperative to be politically 
transgressive, or, as she extrapolates, to be taken ‘seriously’ (2013, 
2015). She maintains that the two projects, (physical) comedy and 
feminism, are conflicted since ‘paradoxically, assigning a serious, 
counter-patriarchal function to female-authored comedy means that 
the female comic never really takes herself seriously as a comedian’ 
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(ibid., 86) and vice versa. The ‘you are either funny or pretty’ dilemma 
translates for her into ‘you are either funny or a feminist’.  
While Boyle’s concept is flawed in its unexamined and assumed bond 
between seriousness and ‘disembodied’ politics, it demonstrates the 
stakes involved in women’s physical comedy as tethered to the politics 
of representation, and ultimately accounting for its value judgements. 
The release of aggressive impulses connected to ‘existential’ or 
‘universal’ struggles in the slapstick canon, as interpreted by its 
theorists, translates into feminised forms as a struggle that remains 
within the physical sphere. Here the conflict is not between the 
body/mind split but revolves around how that body is to be read in the 
first place: sexual or beyond. The double bind Boyle describes may then 
be replaced with a question contextualised in the female body’s location 
in comedy’s political possibilities: can women’s physical comedy be 
anything else than political, and can that politics ever be outside of the 
physical-as-sexual context? Karnick and Jenkins’ summary of the 
scholarship on the carnivalesque emphasises the ideological paradox 
inherent in these possibilities: comedy allows for the ‘exhilarating 
release from social control, as a source of transgressive pleasure’ on the 
one hand, but on the other, it can also work as confirmation of a 
‘cultural community’s most fundamental beliefs and values, directing its 
scorn against outsiders and nonconformists who threaten this basic 
order’ (1995, 270). The comic female body is repeatedly entangled in 
these opposing forces, and the reading of its display (perhaps even 
regardless of the joke’s and the female comic’s intentions) is always 
conflicted among social communities whose dispositions are always 
dependent on raced, classed, and gendered factors among others 
(themselves linked to the social mores of different eras). In short, the 
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displayed comic female body is always inevitably political due to its 
conflicted ‘inferior-yet-superior’ cultural position.29  
Boyle’s discussion of the (for her paradoxical) notion of ‘serious’ or 
political comedy involving the female body evokes theorisations of the 
satire. The proposed opposition between feminism and physical comedy 
can be juxtaposed with comedy theory’s statements about the uneasy 
relationship between satire and physical comedy/slapstick. Dale states 
that ‘problems (...) arise when people try to take a work of slapstick 
seriously: they usually attempt to “elevate” it by praising it either as 
satire, which often seems overstated or wrong, or for its pathos, which 
is often enough right but which is to praise a comedy for the moments 
when it ceases to be comic’ (2000, 17). (To foreshadow my argument, 
these two impossibilities for Dale aptly describe the basis on which 30 
Rock and Parks have respectively been included in the ‘quality comedy’ 
canon.) ‘Low comedy’ and ‘serious’ political intentions make strange 
bedfellows for King and Mills as well, as discussed earlier regarding the 
cultural hierarchies operating between the satire and the romantic or 
‘body’ comedy, implying that only one or the other dominates in 
comedy.  
If in this scholarship slapstick excludes, or eclipses, the political 
intentions of the satire, then the reverse must also be true, and this is 
clear in the quality comedy’s case. More generally, since quality 
television is often praised as intellectual entertainment, it could be 
expected that it excludes physicality for the sake of aesthetic and/or 
political sophistication. But television’s institutional specificities 
complicate this statement (as examined in Chapter 3): HBO’s 
establishment as not-TV entertainment involved a calculated 
valorisation of explicit content paired with artistic motivations, 
                                                          
29 The ‘sex war’ debates in feminist thought originate from a similar tension between ideas of ‘sexual liberation’ 
versus ‘liberation from the sexual(ised) body’. 
 159 
 
positioned against ‘regular’ TV. However, for quality comedy, this 
strategy is not so straightforward; whether on cable or on network 
television, critics treat the ‘distancing’ from the sitcom tradition partly 
in terms of a foregrounded cerebral-verbal humour. Hypothetically, the 
mobilisation of explicitness, corresponding to cable drama’s use of the 
corporeal, could be a turn towards a ‘carnivalesque’ mode of comedy. 
Granted, there have been instances of comedy capitalising on cable’s 
sanctioning of explicit content, such as Curb Your Enthusiasm’s (McCabe 
and Akass 2007b, 62–63) or Veep’s abundant use of profanities. But 
these are not ‘body’ comedies, i.e. they are not celebrated for a 
transgressive treatment of physical comedy, but for their use of verbal 
humour (however profane), improvisation, ‘authored’ mockumentary, 
and political-cultural satire.  
The ‘comedy of distinction’ then strives to break away from sitcom 
tradition’s reputation as ‘low’ comedy, including its physical 
associations. Sex and the City could provide an exception to this 
disregard of physical comedy, were its cultural work not located in a 
combination of political transgression around female sexuality, a 
‘cinematic’ look, and verbal wit regarding its frivolous subject matter. As 
such, it uses the female body as transgressive for its politics, but not as a 
source of humour itself. This practice of the series tethers the female 
body to the pretty/funny dilemma of postfeminist times: the sexually 
liberated female body cannot be funny, or else it will not satisfy the 
parallel imperative of glamour and desirability anchored to its political 
transgression (Winch 2013, 79). Indicatively, Sex and the City‘s generic 
hybrid between comedy and melodrama excludes comic female 
physicality for the sake of politically infused sexual and romantic angst. 
If physicality is not a much mobilised source of humour in the ‘comedy 
of distinction’, then women’s physical comedy is inevitably bound up in 
even more complicated anxieties about its presentability. Because it is 
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so entangled in the politics of its meanings and because these meanings 
link it to ‘low comedy’, there have only been a few TV comedies, 
‘quality’ or otherwise, premised on a central female character’s physical 
comedy. As mentioned earlier, attempts such as Fat Actress or The 
Comeback were financially unsuccessful, even though both mobilised 
metatextual discourses around female celebrity, authorship, and 
comedy performance, and thus were, hypothetically at least, sufficiently 
linked to ‘quality’ discourse. Fat Actress, Kirstie Alley’s metacomedy 
about her struggles in Hollywood after her weight gain, fared worse of 
the two, cancelled after seven episodes and unanimously panned by 
critics; while The Comeback was praised as a misunderstood gem and 
after some years recommissioned. These comedies’ relative failure is 
connected to their mobilisation of female physicality as source of the 
character’s indignity. The humiliations suffered differ however in the 
ways they are linked to ‘quality’ discourse and, importantly, to the kinds 
of physical appearance mobilised.  
The Comeback critiques the entertainment business’s sexism through 
the plights of the aging, but otherwise recognizably Hollywood-
attractive sitcom actress. Here, physical comedy’s emphasis on the 
discrepancy between performance and authenticity effects a sufficiently 
sophisticated cultural commentary for quality comedy. Fat Actress could 
however not be any blunter about its stance that its cultural 
commentary remains in relation to Kirstie Alley’s discursive fatness, 
starting with the title (it could have been named, after all, ‘Kirstie’). 
Indeed, critical reception dismissed it as a missed opportunity for 
exposing Hollywood’s mistreatments of not conventionally attractive 
actresses, instead relying on an overabundance of (visual) jokes about 
Alley’s body. Its failure as ‘quality’ amounted to not linking the fat 
female body to political representation but instead foregrounding its 
‘funny’. Further, if the initial reluctance with which The Comeback was 
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received can be attributed partly to Cherish’s victim status as deluded 
has-been star, then Fat Actress cannot be accused of such diegetic 
treatment of its female protagonist. Fictional Kirstie is portrayed to be 
aware of, and blunt about, her reputation in show business as a ‘fat 
actress’, and the programme is premised on her directly mediated 
struggles with this position without the mockumentary framework. 
Consequently, discrepancies between ‘authentic’ and ‘performed’ self 
and the resulting indignities do not play such a crucial role in the 
programme’s meaning-making as in The Comeback. Discursive 
victimhood does not gain such significance here, owing to the 
prominence of body jokes couched in the female protagonist’s relative 
self-awareness and associated female authorship. Alley the performer 
seems to wallow in excessively joking about Alley the comic persona’s 
fat body, hardly inviting interpretations of gendered victimhood. This 
trait inhibits the comedy from becoming ‘quality’ in its politics and 
aesthetics. Fat Actress’s economic and critical failure seems to be 
rooted in its relative refusal to be political(ly observant) about the fat 
female body, foregrounding instead the ‘funny’ of its central meaning as 
diegetic problem. 
The differences between The Comeback and Fat Actress illuminate a 
further aspect of women’s physical comedy, namely the discursive link 
of its politics to cultural inscriptions of female bodies’ anatomical 
‘types’. Arthurs and Grimshaw’s (1999) overview of feminist scholarship 
on the female body emphasises its theorisation as the ‘disciplined 
body’. Women’s relationships to the body’s cultural constraints are 
crucial in feminist writing and throw into relief ‘questions concerning 
female agency, motivation, and pleasure’ (ibid., 10). The political 
implications of women’s physical comedy are then inseparable from 
contemporaneous social mores surrounding the ‘acceptable’ female 
body type, a notion especially fraught with problems in postfeminism’s 
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much-examined connotation of empowerment rhetoric with visual 
representability. The specific body norms governing women’s media 
presentation come to bear on evaluations of women’s physical comedy, 
and the most prominent of these norms is to do with the dualism of the 
fat/skinny body, transposed to the dualism of excess/restraint or 
undisciplined/disciplined body. The politics of women’s physical comedy 
are infused with the meanings that these contrastingly configured 
bodies express, but this is not always acknowledged in critical 
evaluations. For instance, examining the sitcom Roseanne’s politics, 
Mills frames this in a contrast with Lucille Ball’s comedy, concluding: ‘it 
is arguable that Roseanne’s refusal to be laughed at for her body, no 
matter how unconventional that body is, may in fact be a more radical 
gesture than Ball’s unruly physicality’ (2005, 117–18).  Mills evaluates 
the two comedians’ feminist radicalism based on their relationship to 
physical/verbal comedy in general, and does not consider the different 
cultural readings attached to the two ‘types’ of female bodies in 
question, coming to bear on the avenues of transgression offered to 
them. For Lucy/Lucille Ball’s ‘disciplined’, middle-class body, this 
unruliness may manifest itself in ‘excessive’ acrobatics (similar to 
Katharine Hepburn’s slapstick); but for Arnold, her body already labelled 
undisciplined, the comedy may be understood as more ‘radical’ if 
strategically turning the attention from her corporeal presence towards 
verbal wit.  
Arthurs (1999) offers a useful concept accounting for this discrepancy, 
drawing on Mary Russo’s (1995) influential work on the female 
grotesque. She differentiates between two dominant extremes of 
female grotesques in a consumer market economy: one is the 
‘monstrous and lacking’ body, marginalised for its low-class fatness; the 
‘”stunted” body who transgresses in her being’, ‘the passive repository 
of all that is denied by the sleek and prosperous bourgeois’ (Arthurs 
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1999, 143). Her example is British stand-up comedian Jo Brand, but 
Roseanne or Melissa McCarthy’s film persona also mobilise this type of 
female grotesque by complicating it with verbal wit and (sexual) agency 
(Meeuf 2016). On the other end of the spectrum are bodies that are not 
excessive in their being but become so by denying the limits of 
femininity associated with them, ‘embracing the ambivalent possibilities 
of carnival through masculinisation’ (ibid.). These are the active, 
‘stunting’ bodies of acrobatic slapstick performers who might be 
conventionally attractive but express female agency by foregrounding 
‘funny’ physicality. This classification shows that the issue of perceived 
anatomical body type can drive female comedians in different directions 
to express political subversion.  
The female comedians central to 30 Rock and Parks no doubt fit into 
Arthurs’ second category of the female grotesque as they are both 
treated in media reception as attractive actresses transgressing in their 
comedy the boundaries that govern established readings of their 
displayed bodies. As will be shown however, the two programmes’ 
physical comedies move in disparate directions, and these strategies are 
linked to the earlier discussed shifts in comic tone and genre prominent 
in their production histories. Since these shifts in emphasis are linked to 
refusals to develop comedy in the postfeminist romance category, 
instead foregrounding satire and workplace narratives, they are also 
efforts to create ‘quality’ via the female comics’ thwarting of 
expectations of humour around sexual desirability and agency. Fey 
increasingly engages the ‘unruly’ female grotesque as source of comedy, 
while Poehler goes in a different direction with Parks’ ‘cerebral’ humour 
and foregrounded earnestness around feminist concerns. Both of these 
strategies are embedded in a rhetoric of feminist transgression, but, as 
shown, it is Fey’s comedy that became caught up in controversy about 
its questionable feminism. This was located in various connected 
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discrepancies, partly to do with quality comedy’s unease with bodily 
comedy in general, and intensified with the complex problems that the 
female comic’s authored physical comedy poses. Moreover, this 
particular comic’s celebrity was already involved in articulations of 
feminist politics as cerebral and verbal comedy, reconciled in popular 
journalism with a postfeminist ‘cover girl’ image. Consequently, the 
female grotesque’s increased prominence in 30 Rock caused anxieties in 
popular reception, coming to bear on the programme’s reputation both 
as ‘quality’ and ‘feminist’ entertainment. Parks in comparison solved the 
dilemma of Poehler’s physical comedy by gradually removing it from the 
series’ cultural work, or reserving it for the expression of an ‘authentic’ 
feminist subjectivity. ‘Transgression’ here operates as the refusal to 
offer the female body as an area of cultural contestations over its 
meanings. 30 Rock, on the other hand, confronts these contestations 
head-on in the sitcom narrative’s repetitive manner, occasionally even 
tapping into the conundrum of whether and how the comic female body 
can be read as political outside of the sexual spectrum. 
 
3.A 30 Rock 
 
If Liz Lemon’s ‘failed femininity’ (Mizejewski 2014, 26) is a parody of 
postfeminist femininities, then it emerges in discourses around the 
female comic’s authorship as her personal choice not to sexualise the 
female heroine (see first section). However, Mizejewski posits that while 
voicing cultural struggles about sexual politics, 30 Rock otherwise does 
not employ much physical comedy. She notes this when summarising 
the episode ‘Mamma Mia’s wrap-up, in which Liz only gets to appear on 
a magazine cover in a grotesque (‘funny’) pose instead of a glamorous 
one: ‘[n]either Tina Fey nor her character Liz Lemon is generally 
associated with bawdy, grotesque comedy, but the cover-girl episode of 
30 Rock strongly suggests that for both of them, gender expectations 
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about being pretty are rich comic material’ (2014, 75). Here I want to 
qualify this assessment by demonstrating that both Fey and Lemon did 
become gradually associated with an increasingly grotesque and 
physical parody of femininity, and this episode is one which perhaps 
most metatextually realises this. Further, this particular trajectory is 
connected to, and a foregrounded characteristic of, the generic and 
tonal shifts taking place in the series’ second season. 30 Rock’s physical 
comedy around the female lead greatly increased concomitant with its 
growing reliance on the absurdist satire of postfeminist dramedy. The 
humour employed mobilises tropes of the female grotesque; recurring 
jokes (both verbal and physical) involve virtually every aspect of Liz’s 
obtrusively abject female body from bowel movements, menstruation, 
vomiting, hairiness, and sweat to markers of the conventionally 
unattractive and/or aging body, such as large backside, bad skin, and 
wrinkles. 
Feminist blogosphere debates over the consequences of Lemon’s 
increasing grotesqueness for women’s representation demonstrate how 
prominent this feature became in 30 Rock‘s later seasons. I 
demonstrated earlier how this debate also set up a discursive 
competition between the ‘ideal’ feminisms of 30 Rock and Parks. 
Prominent in these discussions is the way in which they position 30 
Rock’s physical comedy, specifically Lemon’s grotesque femininity, as 
source of the missed feminist opportunity which Parks supposedly 
achieves. Some sample titles are: ‘The Incredible Shrinking Liz Lemon: 
From Woman to Little Girl’ (Holmes 2012) and ‘Has Liz Lemon Become 
“Dumbass Homer”?’ (S. Adams 2012). Liz Lemon’s character trajectory 
corrupts quality comedy’s reputation as ‘grown-up’ and intelligent 
entertainment in a medium otherwise seen as infantile, a reputation 
involving Fey’s existing author image as ‘to-be-taken-seriously’ female 
comedian (Mizejewski 2014, 11). Further, Mizejewski notes that 
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feminist critics’ disappointment with the series’ gender politics has to 
do with a perceived incongruity between Lemon’s visual portrayal as 
‘frumpy feminist’ and the fact that ’30 Rock does little to disguise Tina 
Fey’s attractiveness’ (ibid., 83).  
Two interconnected themes emerge from the criticisms regarding the 
programme’s treatment of women’s physical comedy: first and 
predictably, both feminist criticism and the quality comedy discourse 
continue to be territories especially fraught with anxieties about the 
female comic’s body in relation to its political meanings and cultural 
value. This is also evident in Boyle’s (2015) concerns about blending 
‘serious’ feminism with the comic’s imperative to be funny, or in the 
collective critical refusal of Kirstie Alley’s comedy of a fat body that is 
‘only’ fat and beyond control without being sufficiently political and 
sophisticated. Second, in Lemon/Fey the attractive female comedian’s 
treatment of desirability becomes questioned based on the ‘reality’ of 
said comedian’s body. Put bluntly, the pretty comedian looks suspect 
for using physical comedy to express ‘unruly’ ugliness, a suspiciousness 
doubled with the dubious satire of a feminist subjectivity. Boyle argues 
that such treatments play into the hands of patriarchal beliefs: ‘When 
the female physical comedian self-consciously highlights putative flaws 
in her appearance for comic effect (…) she reifies a singular, restrictive 
concept of gender performance’ (ibid., 87). Similarly, when Lemon’s 
hyperbolic grotesqueness is inscribed onto the attractive female body, it 
precludes for Fey’s feminist critics the possibility of an authentic 
feminism, and becomes retrograde in its misguided self-deprecation.30 
As Sadie Doyle puts it:  
                                                          
30 This Fey/Lemon tension evokes romantic comedy’s trope of the attractive (female) performer playing an ‘ugly 
duckling’ who gets a makeover as narrative twist, revealing her (and the star’s) ‘real’ self. Since makeover 
discourse is already prominent in Fey’s star text (see Mizejewski 2014, 72-74), signalling broader cultural 
anxieties about women’s cerebral humour, it becomes mobilised again for explaining the perceived Fey/Lemon 
discrepancy – as a ‘reverse’ makeover. This surfaces in Fey’s often repeated statements that while she can be 
dolled up to pose on magazine covers, she secretly prefers to play awkward nerds who represent better her 
‘authentic’ self (Fey 2011, 5–6). Further, flashback scenes of 30 Rock showing Liz in unflattering wigs and clothes 
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The character of Liz Lemon is played by beautiful, successful, smart, 
funny, apparently happy person Tina Fey, and is meant to be 
unattractive, only semi-successful, smart, funny, and unhappy. It’s 
interesting that ‘smart’ and ‘funny’ get to stay in the picture, as long 
as the looks, the success, and the happiness are toned down; it tells 
you something about who you’re allowed to like. (2010)  
The characteristic for which Lemon became a celebrated point of 
identification in her early media reception, namely her ‘deeply flawed’ 
femininity, was recognised in the backlash years by critics as becoming 
too exaggerated to be authentic to feminism.  
Since it revolves so much around both the fictional character’s and the 
comedian’s desirability and anatomical features, the backlash can also 
be considered according to Arthurs’ concept discussed above. The two 
distinct categories of female grotesque invite radical possibilities for 
female comedians to upset cultural expectations. For the ‘stunted’ 
female body, marginalised for her ‘passive’ fatness/ugliness, this 
unruliness can manifest itself via presenting an actively desiring female 
subjectivity combined with critical wit. The opposite, the ‘stunting’ 
body, denies the imperative of female bodily decorum by upsetting the 
meanings inscribed onto her conventionally feminine appearance. 
Arthurs’ example for the latter is the monstrous and ‘witch-like’ Patsy 
(Joanna Lumley) of Absolutely Fabulous (1992-2012), a much-examined 
character for British theorists of gender in comedy, whose unruliness 
was influenced by Lumley’s pre-existing star text: ‘we are not just 
contrasting her grotesque performance with an abstract idea of 
feminine norms of bodily decorum but with her previously established 
star persona as the epitome of upper-class, classical beauty’ (Arthurs 
1999, 146).  
                                                                                                                                                   
are regularly explained in paratexts as reflecting Fey’s pre-makeover look. ‘Ugliness’ is then here constructed not 
as a physical feature but as cultural status and identity to negotiate the Fey/Lemon tension. If Fey is considered 
then in some media discourses a ‘real’ feminist, this evaluation has much to do with her star text’s constant 
reminder of, and emphasis on, a pre-makeover identity. 
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If the two, in themselves already marginalised, types characterise the 
female grotesque of contemporary media, then Lemon/Fey pose a 
problem for their allocation in this matrix, which might account for the 
intense controversy around their (lack of) feminist potential. Nominally, 
Fey the postfeminist cover girl is incongruous with Liz the ugly and 
frumpy feminist with the large buttocks, pigeon-toed walk, and nasty 
eating habits. If the ‘stunting’ physical comedian expresses feminist 
unruliness by combining an enhanced version of femininity with an 
accelerated masculinity of behaviour, then Liz hardly fits this mould. Her 
visual portrayal and her environment’s constant appraisals of her as 
masculine and ugly position her in the former category, that of the 
‘stunted’, passive (albeit middle- and not lower-class) female grotesque, 
‘transgress[ing] in her being’ (ibid., 143). Portrayals and storylines of 
later seasons demonstrate how Lemon increasingly becomes the 
carnivalesque grotesque ‘spectacle’ that Rowe describes in relation to 
the unruly woman. She transgresses precisely those pollution taboos 
that the carnivalesque female body upsets in her being and behaviour: 
apart from her eating habits which provide a recurring gag both visually 
and verbally, many of the ‘cringe’ elements of 30 Rock emerge from 
jokes about her bowel movements. She gets diarrhoea on a date with 
her handsome neighbour Drew (Jon Hamm) and becomes exposed to 
him sitting on the toilet while a foul smell wafts from her direction (‘St. 
Valentine’s Day’). She gets food poisoning from a dodgy sandwich on a 
road trip, and is repeatedly shown hugging the toilet (‘Stone 
Mountain’). The episode ‘Reaganing’ has a flashback scene in which 
Lemon chattily shares with Jack embarrassing anecdotes like this: ‘...and 
I'd been on the toilet so long my legs had fallen asleep, so when I tried 
to stand I just fell into my throw up.’ Jokes about her menstruation are a 
similar constant in later seasons (e.g. ‘Standards and Practices’), and 
these and numerous other frequently referenced aspects of her leaky 
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female body’s abject liminality, be it bad breath, sweating, flatulence, or 
hairiness, are usually framed by Jack’s abhorrence. In these examples, 
Liz’s female body functions as the manifestation of the ‘lower stratum’ 
in Rowe’s account of the Bakhtinian grotesque: ‘[w]here the classical 
body privileges its “upper stratum” (the head, the eyes, the faculties of 
reason), the grotesque body is the body in its “lower stratum” (the 
eating, drinking, defecating, copulating body)’ (1995, 33). Mizejewski 
similarly references the Bakhtinian concept in her analysis of the 
‘Mamma Mia’ episode’s denouement, which shows Liz posing on a 
magazine cover in Lederhosen, squatting over a toilet and pretending to 
give birth to a rubber chicken (2014, 75). 
Rowe’s concept, like Arthurs’, understands the grotesque female figure 
as liminal already in her physical being, both in terms of ‘copiousness’ 
and sexual appetite; and these traits provide her with a feminist 
potential (1995, 48-49). If for Rowe the excessive female body expresses 
an out-of-control appetite, including sexual appetite, then the latter is 
emphatically reversed, and replaced with an out-of-control lack of 
sexual desire in Liz. The ‘Reaganing’ episode mines the potential for 
grotesque comedy in this lack-as-excess. A therapeutic discussion 
between the two leads reveals that Lemon’s ‘performance’ issues come 
from a traumatic childhood memory, shown in flashback with Fey in a 
bizarre ‘preadolescent girl’ costume: she once fell over in roller skates 
with her underwear down while grabbing a Tom Jones poster, and was 
found in this pose by an aunt.  
Further, the grotesque comic woman’s theorisation connects physical 
uncontrollability with excessive speech, as a ‘failure to control the 
mouth’ (ibid., 37). Here, Lemon fits the concept: her ‘mouthiness’ is 
another constant of the series, both literally in the structuring screwball 
exchanges with Jack, and in a broader sense, coming partly from her 
social status as comedy writer and from her affective portrayal as 
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stubborn and loud defender of strictly defined values. (This aspect of 
the character discursively connects her to Fey’s own cultural status as 
comedy writer and stern observer of gender relations; which, in an even 
broader association, accounts for the programme’s cultural position as 
female-centred quality – sophisticated and cerebral – text.) The 
carnivalesque female mouth is a repository of both physical and 
intellectual connotations, but as noted, in this concept these 
connotations are ‘never innocent when attached to the female mouth’: 
they suggest ‘an intrinsic relation among female fatness, female 
garrulousness, and female sexuality’ (ibid.). Lemon’s position does not 
fulfil this description fully (anatomically, and in its relation to sexuality), 
and this discrepancy accounts for the intense debates in feminist 
receptions of 30 Rock, discussed earlier in relation to Fey’s star persona 
as negotiating the ideal of the postfeminist celebrity body.  
If Fey explains in interviews Lemon’s excessive disinterest in sexuality, 
and the utilising of physical comedy at the expense of sexual 
desirability, as a mode of empowerment for the female comedy author 
(see chapter 4/1), then these features position the fictional figure in the 
second type of Arthurs’ female grotesque, the ‘stunting’ female body. 
This body transcends its preferred readings as primarily a sexually 
desirable object by demonstrating its other possibilities. However, this 
mode of grotesque needs performed desirability as a reference point for 
it to make sense, as in Hepburn’s star text or in Patsy Stone’s parody of 
hyperfemininity as masquerade. Lemon’s portrayal upsets this 
imperative because the text positions her body (extratextually coded as 
desirable) simultaneously as ‘stunted’ female grotesque. Such an 
ambiguity regarding Lemon’s status as female grotesque is an 
overdetermined result of the series’ and its star’s position both in 
quality discourse and in discourses of postfeminist desirability. If she is 
portrayed as the ‘stunted’ female grotesque, liminal in the 
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overemphasis on her abject bodily functions, then this is articulated as a 
resistance to the postfeminist codes of sexual agency, itself a contested 
notion in Fey’s author/cover girl image. The extent to which its purpose 
is to refuse the imperative of sexual desirability determines the comedy 
of the ‘stunted’ female grotesque: both the lack of sexual appetite and 
the excess of literal appetite become exaggerated features of comedy, 
and their precise meaning – empowering or humiliating – is a constant 
source of tensions.  
If Liz as ‘stunted’ female grotesque emerges due to a ‘stunting’, that is, 
actively chosen, mode of female transgression – i.e. she is frumpy and 
sloppy because she/Fey do not bother to abide by the codes of 
postfeminist femininity – then this is a problematic trajectory because 
of Fey’s celebrity as cerebral feminist come postfeminist cover girl. 
Indeed, the frumpiness and jokes about the feminist woman’s body 
multiplied on the series significantly following Fey’s increased exposure 
in popular media, allowing critics to lament that Liz’s figure became a 
pathetic caricature of her former portrayal. Thus, the communicated 
‘empowerment’ in Fey’s authorly choice to play Lemon against 
postfeminist womanhood and to develop 30 Rock as a rejection of 
romance in generic terms, became seen in reception less as 
empowerment than retrograde humiliation. The structuring paradox in 
this tension is that in Fey’s communication, creating bodily comedy 
about the female subject that is not rooted in sexual desirability is an 
act of self-liberation (so supposedly feminist and ‘authorly’); but this is 
an impossible notion precisely because it is so much embedded in the 
text’s association with intellectual feminist politics and comedy, starting 
with the fact that the heroine is constructed as a witty parody of 
popular feminism.  
Yet Lemon’s grotesque portrayal still strives to be interpreted as 
empowerment for the failed feminine/feminist character, echoing 
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paratextual discourses about Fey’s agency as female comedy author. 
This portrayal is linked to the programme’s ‘quality’ features, namely to 
its efforts to develop complex narrative and joke structures. Lemon as 
parody of postfeminist femininity in her grotesque, as in unfeminine and 
sexless, womanhood is carefully offset with a confirmation of agency 
and with her explicit rejection of the romance narrative, a characteristic 
also prominent in the text’s constant metatextual refusal of a Jack-Liz 
romance. In the most overt instances, as indeed in the ‘Mamma Mia’ 
episode, Lemon initiates many of these gross performances of 
unfeminine femininity, and they often function both as culmination and 
resolution of plot. In the episode ‘Black Light Attack!’, she lets her 
moustache, nicknamed Tom Selleck, grow out to help Jenna 
compensate for her anxieties about aging publicly. The scene in which 
she presents Tom to the world showcases both Liz’s subjectivity and the 
staff’s horror as she walks down the corridor in slow motion. The 
moustache itself is more of a Frida Kahlo than a Selleck, signalling a 
‘real’ image of female facial hair as opposed to comic exaggeration, but 
the upheaval it causes is hyperbolically comic precisely due to the 
moustache’s ‘realness’. Lemon has a blast being hairy while publicly 
eating, drinking (milk, nonetheless), and laughing with a full and open 
mouth at a male writer who retches at her sight. The scene is 
counterpointed with a shocked Jack who looks on in the background 
while in the midst of a scheme that involves convincing an employee 
that he is in love with Lemon. Lemon’s ‘unruly’ excess as female agency 
is balanced out with, and does not work without, an exaggeration of her 
environment’s disgust at it – the comedy emerges from this contrast.  
Other examples abound: In ‘The Tuxedo Begins’, she dresses up as a 
cartoonesque mixture of a bag lady and Heath Ledger’s Joker character 
from The Dark Knight, spending the whole episode in the costume to 
prove a point to Jack about the misery of urban living, again revelling in 
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the performance of repulsive female physicality. In ‘Apollo, Apollo’, she 
permits Jenna to show to the staff embarrassing footage of her in an 
early 1990s TV advert for a phone sex line; here, her colleagues’ rowdy 
amusement is countered with Liz’s resigned observations. At the 
raucous laughter following a close-up image of her and another woman 
trying to sexily eat a greasy slice of pizza, she comments: ‘I remember 
that girl. She cried all day.’ These instances show Lemon as revelling in 
or at least owning up to her environment’s revulsion over her gross 
bodily performance, be it a Chaplinesque waddle due to a bunion 
surgery (‘Aunt Phatso vs Jack Donaghy’), a number of awkward dancing 
scenes (‘Flu Shot’, ‘Retreat to Move Forward’, ‘Black Light Attack!’, 
‘Dance Like Nobody’s Watching’ etc.), and any instance of hearty eating. 
Whether throwaway joke or narrative twist, this active acceptance of 
her unfeminine body reads as calculated resistance to the eroticised 
context in which postfeminist womanhood is commonly articulated (i.e. 
sexual-as-empowered). This notion of resistance resonates with the 
extratextual trajectory of Fey’s growing popularity and her star text’s 
parallel sexualisation: it throws an ambiguous light on popular media’s 
production of meaning around the celebrity body via contrasting the 
funny/pretty body. 
The aforementioned episode ‘The Tuxedo Begins’ merits further 
examination for the ways it uses Fey’s physical comedy in the quality 
comedy context, and also because this episode often serves as 
shorthand example for Fey’s preference to play ‘ugly’ for comedy at the 
expense of glamour (Ess 2013). I finish this discussion with a detailed 
analysis of the episode to demonstrate the complexities of the 
programme’s body politics. The main plot is structured around a Jack-Liz 
debate on yet another sociocultural issue, starting with Liz lamenting 
her fellow city dwellers’ inconsiderate behaviour in public places. Jack 
suffers a mental crisis after getting mugged at the beginning of the 
 174 
 
episode, and the duo’s disagreement revolves around how urban living 
can be handled in a zeitgeist marked by recession and overpopulation. 
Jack insists that his mugging was a sign of class war and proposes to 
‘save’ the city and protect the elite’s rights by running for mayor. Liz is 
first bogged down in her exasperation with people ignoring common 
rules of decency, but an epiphany makes her leave behind her strict 
ethics, instead vowing to outperform her fellow citizens in selfishness. 
This decision is the rationale for her crazy costume change that 
becomes increasingly outlandish, and positions her as cartoon villain.  
Early in the episode, Liz dresses up as a homely old lady in a sketch to fill 
in for Jenna who refuses to look ugly and old. This scenario reaffirms 
that Liz lacks feminine vanity while now also living in a happy 
relationship: ‘Maybe I should wear this home’, she says studying herself 
in the mirror, ‘Show Chris what he will be looking at in forty years. 
Looser skin, same underwear’. When she later notices that the costume 
provides her with more space on the subway, combined with a horrid 
cough, a smell emanating from her gym bag, and her yelling nonsense at 
people, she decides that the only way to survive in the city is ‘to sink 
down into the filth’. Thus ensues her increasingly grotesque turn into 
the crazy bag lady, and, as the plot becomes more obviously a Dark 
Knight parody, into Ledger’s Joker (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). ‘Sinking down 
into the filth’ then unites the carnivalesque woman’s monstrosity and 
the (male) cartoon villain’s amorality: the abject body and the abject 
intellect. The Jack-Liz debate recreates the film’s opposition between 
the morose superhero and the crazy clown supervillain, similarly 
configured as a fight for the city’s ‘soul’. However, it is only Liz for whom 
this involves a bizarre costume change; for Jack, wearing a tuxedo 
throughout the episode suffices to perform the role of ‘privileged 
masculinity in crisis’ and to satirise this trend in television and cinema.  
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Figures 4.3 and 4.4 
Liz’s comic costume transformation into the menacing clown figure’s 
iconic version can in its first stage be interpreted in the terms of the 
female clown who, as Mizejewski summarises, is a marginal figure in 
traditions of the grotesque carnivalesque because of her associations 
with the ‘witch, spinster, or hag’ (2014, 21). If the classic male clown 
represents potentially sympathetic non-normativity in his resistance to 
authority that can also be mobilised in the romance narrative, then the 
female equivalent, the ugly crone, is harder to reconcile as sympathetic 
point of identification due to her non-compliance with normative codes 
of femininity. Liz’s first transformation as smelly old woman cruising the 
subway and the streets of Manhattan fits with this tradition, and also 
with the series’ consistent jokes about Liz as old and ugly spinster. 
Wearing a crone clown costume seems to logically fulfil Liz’s overarching 
portrayal in a cartoonesque comedy. Further, the carnivalesque nature 
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of this female unruliness is rounded off with other, sensory aspects of 
her abject body, repository of dirt and leakiness: she blows her nose, 
has an ugly cough throughout, eats boiled eggs while laughing 
maniacally, and her gym bag stuffed with smelly workout clothes 
becomes her signature weapon. But the crazy hag visually turns into the 
Joker, and the Liz-as-spinster gag begins to function as Joker parody in 
the plot’s overall metatextual paralleling of the film’s serious themes. If 
the hag costume literalises Liz’s cultural status, then her turning into the 
Joker in this intellectualized plot overrides the female clown’s feminine 
abjectness. The Joker already functions as receptacle of overdetermined 
meanings, partly confirmed in the Nolan film. Not least, these include 
his readings in queer theory as ‘stereotype of gay and transgender 
panic’ (Bishop 2015). The Joker is already a satire, albeit a menacing 
one, of (hetero)sexuality: his villainy represents a constant threat to 
Batman’s multiply coded ubermasculinity, an aspect that became his 
manifest trait as supervillain (gay innuendo, drag) in Batman comics of 
the 1980s and onwards (e.g. Arkham Asylum [Morrison and McKean 
1989]), to which the film briefly alludes as well.  
The woman-as-hag-as-Joker connotation throws into relief both the 
traditions of the problematic female clown and of the menacing male 
clown in Fey’s performance of the female grotesque, ‘stunting’ and 
‘stunted’ at the same time. On the one hand, melting the hag into the 
Joker works towards liberating the female clown figure from 
connotations that tether her to the ‘physically monstrous female other’ 
context. The intellectualizing plot that revolves around an issue of 
community and values, ascertains that the hag is read in this context 
and not a primarily gendered one. Further, the Batman satire helps 
interpret it as ‘comedy of distinction’ in which the female grotesque 
plays a pivotal role. On the other hand, she still remains the monstrous 
other in the debate, and when the hag turns into the Joker she also 
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turns into a figure onto whom a nexus of gender and sexuality 
transgressions are emphatically inscribed. This modifies the presumed 
liberation from the monstrous female other – in that she melds with the 
monstrous male other. While the episode strives to express a new kind 
of ‘unruliness’ for the female grotesque by inserting her into an 
intellectualized plot and thus shedding the hag’s meaning as gendered 
other, it also underlines the figure’s modes of upsetting gender binaries.  
Masculinisation is a key term for the female grotesque as performance, 
and the gendered ambivalence it expresses accounts for its popularity in 
camp culture. Arthurs notes in relation to Absolutely Fabulous’s Patsy 
that the character’s parody of hyperfemininity and hedonism became 
appropriated for drag performances, a trajectory that eventually 
allowed for her popular readings as ‘really a man in drag’ (later 
confirmed on the programme as well). For Arthurs, this reading 
‘recuperates’ the female grotesque’s radicalism, since it reduces her 
transgressive ambivalence to a definitive ‘clue to her identity and 
behaviour’ (1999, 160-161). In Lumley/Patsy ‘we have a woman playing 
a woman who can be appropriated as “really” a man’ (ibid., 148), 
eclipsing the original reading as that of a woman playing an 
‘authentically’ unruly woman. In contrast, Fey playing a woman who 
performs abject femininity as the hag, who transforms organically into a 
fictional man associated with upsetting gender norms (masculinity and 
heterosexuality), results in accelerating the anarchic potential in the 
female grotesque’s ambivalence instead of tying it down. For the hag’s 
metamorphosis into the Joker does not ‘fix’ her meaning as ‘really a 
man’ but rather upsets his menacing meanings: just as the whole 
episode mocks the Batman franchise’s po-faced masculinity, so the 
Joker parody says, ‘he is really an old hag’, performed by a woman (Liz) 
enacting a version of abject femininity (the hag). Because the episode 
never explicitly admits the allegory (unlike most of others), this 
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interpretation, however obvious, remains dependant on the viewer’s 
recognition. Further, Liz’s Joker costume and makeup keep their 
ambivalence visually such that the ‘Joker’ could still be read as a crazy 
old woman with overdone and smudged makeup. Textually Liz remains 
the hag, and the Joker impersonation happens only metatextually, even 
though the allegory function overtakes the episode without much 
remaining ‘realism’. 
The episode’s busy connotations and allegories are all inscribed onto 
the female grotesque whose performance initiates both the 
overdetermined codes of ‘quality’ comedy, and also the ambiguous 
treatment of gender. They strive to confirm that the glamorous female 
comedian can perform grotesque femininity in a way that occludes the 
pretty/funny problem (since the ‘issue’ allegory overrides the ‘hag’ 
performance’s associations), and the resulting chain of codes blurs 
expectations about gender whether as performance or identity. The 
episode then ends up a strategic undermining of gendered comedy 
around femininity and heterosexuality at the same time as it appears to 
overcome this whole tradition in favour of intellectual, ‘quality’ comedy.  
That the storyline’s meanings are ambiguous about overcoming or, on 
the contrary, centralizing physical comedy as about femininity and 
heteronormativity, is further nuanced in the episode’s B plot, revolving 
around Jenna and her female impersonator boyfriend Paul Lastnamé 
(Will Forte). This relationship’s serialised arc serves as mockery of the 
hedonism associated with celebrity culture, and at the same time as 
example of ‘edgy’ and progressive portrayals of sexual relations. 
Functioning to ‘humanize’ Jenna’s cartoonishly self-centred figure, her 
love story with Paul is shown as an obvious match since his biggest 
success as drag performer is his Jenna impersonation. The ‘progressive’ 
attack on heteronormativity is then rooted in Jenna’s extreme vanity; 
her ideal partner is herself, or at least a man looking like herself – 
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simultaneously upsetting and reaffirming codes of heteronormativity. 
Further, a recurring joke about the couple is their decadent sex life 
(possibly a comic take on Sex and the City’s Samantha [Kim Catrall]), 
which is disturbed in ‘The Tuxedo Begins’ by the threat of settling into 
normalcy as one night they accidentally fall asleep without having sex. 
Instead of accepting this as common trajectory of a settled relationship, 
they decide to view it as a new fetish they dub ‘normalling’. When the 
revelation strikes that their everyday activities together are indeed just 
‘couples’ stuff’, they agree to take a break in the relationship to both go 
on a ‘sexual walkabout’. This storyline unfolds parallel to Liz and Jack’s, 
in the wrap-up showing a partial diegetic connection between the two. 
As that other plot is resolved by Jack/Bruce Wayne throwing Liz/the 
hag/Joker into a pile of garbage on the street, followed by the two leads 
agreeing on the moral of the story, Paul and Jenna observe from a 
distance arm in arm. To Paul’s comment ‘Reminds me of us’, Jenna 
dreamily reminisces: ‘I’ll never forget the first time you dressed up like 
an old lady and I threw you into some garbage’.  
Thus, this couple’s story of ‘progressive’ love further informs the A 
plot’s tacit commentary on the ambiguity of gender roles (plus it 
continues to mock the idea of a Jack-Liz romance), but here in 
excessively sexual terms to balance out the excess of both Liz’s lack of 
sexual appetite and, extratextually, the female comic’s desexualisation. 
This continued duality is evident in the ending, which also serves as 
closure to The Dark Knight parody, in that it contrasts the film’s sinister 
aesthetic with Jenna’s comic hypersexuality. The camera slowly pans 
away from Jenna to show the dark Manhattan skyline (Paul has just run 
off in a pink wig and without underwear to find new sexual partners), 
and the episode’s signature score imitating the Batman franchise’s 
agitated string music returns to underline the connection with the film. 
Quality comedy’s ‘smartness’ is again expressed via voiceover like in the 
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‘Stride of Pride’ episode’s Sex and the City parody, providing the 
punchline to the joke set up by the stylistic imitation. This time the voice 
is Jenna’s (she ‘authors’ this scene), who monologues to the dark city’s 
image thus: ‘New York City. Villains and heroes. The one percent and 
the ninety-nine. Eight million people in this crazy beautiful city, and I, 
Jenna Maroney, am going to go to town on every last one of them.’  
 
3.B Parks and Recreation 
 
I demonstrated earlier that Parks’ positioning in the quality comedy 
cohort involved a paratextual association with the 1970s female-centred 
comedy, or ‘warmedy’. Willa Paskin’s (2011) review is especially direct 
about this connection, praising the programme’s ‘old-fashioned’ nature. 
This means for her that Parks lacks the ‘cringe’ moments so 
characteristic of today’s celebrated smart comedies, or in her term, 
‘comedies of discomfort’. Her analysis also shows that if cringe is 
replaced by ‘niceness’ on Parks, then this works as comic excess, or 
repetitiveness, of that niceness within character development:  
Has a sitcom ever had so many characters that are variations on 
‘sweet, kind person?’ The driven sweet, kind Leslie; the goofy sweet, 
kind Andy; the grounded sweet, kind Ann; the guarded sweet, kind 
Ben; and Ron, whose mustache only hides the sweet, kind guy lurking 
underneath. (Ibid.) 
The most hyperbolic expression of that niceness is Chris Traeger (Rob 
Lowe), who functions as the programme’s self-reflexive commentary on 
its own excessive reliance on optimism as storytelling strategy.  
The programme’s hyperbolic sweetness is paired with a toning down of 
physical comedy around the comic heroine, and foregrounding her 
aspirational feminist politics. Humour of humiliation and discomfort is, 
as mentioned earlier, projected onto the buffoon character 
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Jerry/Garry/Larry/Terry who is even denied his own name; and he is 
also the figure most frequently involved in slapstick gags around 
incompetence, clumsiness, and the leaky and large comic body. The 
episode ‘Halloween Surprise’ plays both his uncontrollable body and his 
environment’s ‘cruelness’ towards him to excess: when he has a heart 
attack triggered by Leslie and her friend Ann’s (Rashida Jones) prank, 
the colleagues’ genuine worry for him is mixed with ridicule as the 
attack is accompanied by his explosive flatulence, occasioning jokes 
about the ‘fart attack’. That this portrayal works as strategic 
counterbalancing of the programme’s overt niceness is demonstrated in 
scenes where Jerry/Garry/Larry/Terry is seen in his (overly nice) family 
circle: in the episode ‘Jerry’s Retirement’, Leslie is shocked to realize 
that not only is he surrounded by adoring family members, but that in 
his own house, i.e. in a domestic environment, he is not a clumsy loser 
at all. When in Jerry/Garry/Larry/Terry the series admits that the figure 
of discomfort and humiliation is a necessary function of contemporary 
workplace comedy (since he is positioned as such only in the workplace 
setting, one of American television tradition’s central locations) it also 
associates with this function an emphasis on physical cringe comedy.31 
Put another way, this ‘comedy of super niceness’ presupposes moving 
physical comedy to its fringes in favour of intellectual-verbal comedy at 
the same time as it removes the ‘cringe’ aspect. But such a shift in 
humour towards ‘niceness’ is apparently a little too old-fashioned 
without a tongue-in-cheek reference to more ‘cynical’ (Paskin’s term) 
modes of humour, hence the featuring of Jerry/Garry/Larry/Terry as 
eternal butt of slapstick jokes.  
As noted, the series links the toning down of physical comedy around 
the female heroine, including the female grotesque, to a progressive 
feminist politics. Leslie’s affective portrayal after the first season as fully 
                                                          
31 This admission becomes explicit in the episode ‘Park Safety’ when Ron explains to the camera Jerry’s function 
in the office precisely in these terms.  
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deserving the political goals to which she aspires presupposes her visual 
portrayal as that of the intellectualised female body, meaning an 
effective negation of that body as sexual object, and simultaneously, as 
central comic object. Since Poehler’s star text was never really 
imbricated in such discourses as Fey’s was (cover girl, makeover 
narrative, female authorship), and neither did the series foreground her 
body as spectacle in the way 30 Rock did Fey’s, no such struggles around 
the pretty/funny dilemma were overtly present in the series’ narratives 
and in its media reception.  
However, the question of the comic female body does come up in Parks’ 
portrayal of Leslie, which is connected to the series’ struggles to 
configure its novel take on the mockumentary-style workplace comedy. 
The course-correction between seasons one and two from 
mockumentary’s comedy of discomfort towards ‘niceness’ also involved 
a recalibration of physical comedy around the heroine. The short first 
series (consisting of only six episodes) based much of its humour on 
Leslie’s over-the-top enthusiasm and its inappropriateness; and many of 
these gags were structured around Poehler’s physical comedy. This also 
evokes the postfeminist chick flick’s use of slapstick, in which physical 
humiliations of the heroine tend to establish a link between physical, 
professional, and romantic incompetence. One of the most prominent 
of such gags occurs in the pilot, in a scene in which Leslie falls into the 
pit she intends to turn into a park, while inspecting it. Her blind delusion 
is evidenced in the monologue just seconds before the fall, as she 
describes her (comically oversized) plans for the future park: ‘Imagine a 
shiny new playground, with a Jungle Jim and swings, pool, tennis courts, 
volleyball courts, racquetball courts, basketball court, regulation 
football field. We could put an amphitheatre over there with 
Shakespeare in the Park’. As she tries to descend into the pit for a photo 
opportunity, her slip and fall are captured in mockumentary’s aesthetic 
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(long shot, whip pan, zoom-in, blurry image), enhancing the contrast 
between her head-in-the-clouds attitude and ‘reality’. Crucially, this 
contrast is articulated in slapstick comedy’s terms, that is, between her 
high-flying ambition and her clumsy comic body drawing her down, 
awkwardly contorting, rolling, and tumbling to finally stop at the literal 
and metaphorical bottom (see Figures 4.5-4.7).  
Figures 4.5-4.7  
Leslie’s body could be theorised here as the slapstick body in 
scholarship’s terms, that is, as body-as-machine (a recurring description 
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of Keaton’s or Chaplin’s physical comedy, see Clayton [2007, 91-94]), in 
its rigidity struggling with laws of nature and thereby expressing the 
fundamental contrast between body and mind. Yet, if ‘[t]he slapstick 
hero’s skill at deploying his paradoxically acrobatic clumsiness is central 
to his status as an Everyman’ (Dale 2000, 14), then Leslie’s fall, however 
clear an attempt to follow a comedy tradition, is caught up in 
ambiguous meanings, and only semi-successful in achieving this effect. 
This is because the slapstick female body offers other iconographic 
connotations, with the butt and spread eagled legs pointing to the sky in 
a tight skirt, and, after stopping at the bottom, lying limply on her back 
in the dirt with one shoe missing. Whether associated with sexual 
vulgarity or victimhood, this sequence shows why the efforts to play up 
Poehler’s physical comedy in the context of mockumentary’s cringe 
tradition were abandoned subsequently. These efforts showcase the 
female slapstick body in the male-centred tradition of that body as 
struggling and failing against its environment; but the above inscriptions 
are hardly reconcilable with the genderless and universal ‘body-as-
machine’ or ‘body versus environment’ meanings, instead resonating 
with issues of representation. The narrative context that positions 
Leslie’s social identity as post-second-wave female career politician, 
expressed in the outfit (grey skirt suit), amounts to the ridiculing of this 
figure. As discussed, women’s slapstick mainly exists in romantic 
comedy, and in that, as a body that triumphs in this context even in its 
clumsiness. This triumph follows from the discursive retention of 
desirability (Hepburn) and/or from the acrobatic skill celebrated both 
for its physicality and the politics it represents (consider Lucille Ball’s 
housewife appropriating public spaces).  
Developed within sketch comedy’s traditions, Poehler’s comic persona 
during her tenure at SNL was mainly understood in the latter terms. For 
instance, her popular recurring character Kaitlin, a hyperactive and 
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chatty girl wearing pink Minnie Mouse pyjamas, glasses, and braces 
makes use of Poehler’s energetic and cheerful persona in its physicality, 
the humour stemming from the discrepancy between this attitude and 
her tiny frame (e.g. Kaitlin at the Mall - Saturday Night Live 2013). 
Displaying an out-of-control possession of stage space (running and 
jumping around, climbing on furniture), the performance also involves a 
similarly out-of-control vocal expression: her signature gag is to 
repeatedly shout ‘Rick-Rick-Rick’ at her stepfather, the contrastingly 
laidback, quiet, and large Rick (Horatio Santz), and to bombard the 
weekly host with a chain of absurd questions. As a small, preadolescent 
girl, Kaitlin is also an effort to make use of Poehler’s comic body type by 
desexualising it. Here, the female grotesque mobilised is that of the 
‘stunting’ body in Arthurs’ term: in Kaitlin, Poehler’s comic body as 
spectacle is used to ‘transgress the norms of femininity by denying the 
limits of [her] female bod[y], embracing the ambivalent possibilities of 
carnival through masculinisation’ (1999, 143). In Kaitlin’s case, 
masculinisation amounts to de-feminisation, i.e. to ridding the body of 
markers of adult femininity. 
If Poehler’s pre-Parks physical comedy was that of the ‘stunting’ female 
grotesque, marked by a transgression of feminine decorum, then 
positioning it in ‘cringe’ mockumentary’s aesthetics caused a 
discrepancy of ideological meanings. The first season offers several 
instances in which the female politician’s masculinisation results in her 
humiliation rather than ‘empowerment’. This strategy comes eminently 
to the fore in the episode ‘The Banquet’ in which Leslie attempts to join 
the ‘boys’ club’ of politics by showing up at an event sporting a tuxedo 
and a short, masculine haircut. The humour stems from her misplaced 
pride at this seemingly feminist act, contrasted with her obliviousness to 
everyone’s amusement and Ann’s embarrassment as they are mistaken 
for a lesbian couple. While cross-dressing can be considered a 
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transgressive act of the ‘stunting’ female grotesque as theorised in 
feminist scholarship, Leslie’s inability to read the cultural inscriptions on 
her own chosen bodily display undermines such ideological subversions. 
Mockumentary’s cultural work operates here in its original meaning, 
that is, in revealing a conflict between social performance of self and 
‘actual’ self. However, while this method works in comedies like the 
British Office to demonstrate a universal condition of labour relations, 
here the satire is aimed at the ‘genuine’ state of a ‘feminist’ 
womanhood in the workplace setting, lampooned in its bodily 
expression. Leslie reads her attire as ‘empowered/ing’ (omitting to 
notice the loaded meanings of ‘masculine’), while her environment (and 
the viewer, supposedly) reads it as ‘butch lesbian’/’cross-dresser’. The 
humour relies on a shared recognition that not only are these identities 
encoded in fashion choices but that they present comic incongruities. 
However, since the programme was reportedly developed to express 
political progression in women’s portrayals (being Poehler’s star 
vehicle), such meanings were abandoned in the long term, which 
involved getting rid of the feminist career woman’s mockery in her 
physical display. 
Abandoning strategies that would ridicule Leslie’s feminist 
aspirationalism, the show in later seasons reconfigured Poehler’s comic 
physicality and performance of the female grotesque (including 
associations of the single career woman). This abandonment of ridicule 
corresponds to the postfeminist chick flick’s gradual decline in American 
cinema by the mid-2000s (Negra 2017) and to the discussed 
popularisation of feminist rhetoric in public discourses. In this, the series 
followed a different trajectory from 30 Rock’s, eventually relinquishing 
grotesque femininity as central element of the narrative. At the same 
time, Poehler’s minimised physical comedy was increasingly replaced 
with mobilising her skill at vocal work and impersonation – Rowe’s 
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unruly woman is mainly present here as the out-of-control female 
mouth. This characteristic overlaps with Liz Lemon’s and 30 Rock’s in 
that verbal sparring dominates the working woman’s portrayal and 
plays an important part in constructing ‘quality’ comedy. The rebooted 
second season’s first episode (‘Pawnee Zoo’, also the first with an ‘issue’ 
storyline, here about gay marriage) opens with a scene at the office in 
which Leslie bursts out rapping the full third verse of the 1980s hip-hop 
song ‘Parents Just Don’t Understand’. This scene comprises the whole of 
the cold open and has no narrative significance. Its only function is to 
set the new season’s mood and to display Poehler’s mock-rapping skills 
without any double-edged commentary on Leslie’s performance of self 
in mockumentary’s fashion, painting her as sympathetically silly. Leslie’s 
rapping even gets genuine applause from the colleagues, something 
that would have been out of place in the first season’s character 
relations. The jump-cut scene in ‘The Hunting Trip’ similarly makes use 
of Poehler’s vocal imitation skills, the performance in that case both 
embedded in the narrative, and also confirming Leslie’s ‘authentic’ 
feminism. Leslie/Poehler’s vocal skills are also showcased for instance in 
‘Park Safety’ or in the episode ‘Ron & Jammy’ in which she 
impersonates in jump-cuts Ron’s ex-wife Tammy 2 (Megan Mullally). 
The series’ remaining physical comedy is rearranged to not only 
neutralise gendered connotations, but to replace contempt among 
workplace colleagues with ‘genuine’ comradeship. The comedy 
abandons the satire of the workplace in the ways that Hight (2010) and 
Middleton (2014) lament in the Americanisation of the British Office, i.e. 
it configures it ‘as a space of individual and interpersonal happiness and 
fulfilment’ (ibid., 142). Still, comedy of discomfort rooted in 
incompetence is not completely abandoned; a scene in the episode ‘The 
Comeback Kid’ offers an example of this. Producer Mike Schur describes 
the scene in question as an uncharacteristic and ‘physically 
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uncomfortable scenario’ around which the whole episode was written 
(E. Adams 2012). Its plot revolves around Leslie’s public announcement 
that she will enter the race for city council. Due to a shoestring budget 
and her colleagues’ mistakes, the event goes massively wrong: they 
book an ice-hockey rink for the venue; the podium, built by Ron, is too 
small and lacks stairs; the campaign banner shows an enlarged quarter 
of Leslie’s face; and only the first few seconds of the entrance music 
(Gloria Estefan’s ‘Get on Your Feet’) play on a loop as she and the 
entourage enter the rink. Since her assistant was also unable to secure a 
red carpet that goes all the way to the podium, Leslie and the gang 
continue the rest of the way tiptoeing on the ice in a long slip-and-fall 
slapstick sequence. This scene, the episode’s narrative highlight, has 
been praised as one of the best executed gags of the series, both mining 
the slapstick potential gradually to its limits, and also functioning as 
narrative and character development: the gang, shuffling and slipping 
towards the stage, struggles to keep Leslie on her feet, with Ron 
eventually dropping to all fours to serve as a step for her to climb up, or 
rather for the others to shove and push her onto the stage (Figures 4.8-
4.12).  
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Figures 4.8-4.12 
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The workplace ensemble’s collective struggle towards a common goal 
becomes literal as physical comedy here, emphasising that this is all in 
service of realising Leslie’s political dream. Mockumentary’s satire of 
incompetence is reversed on affective terms: the first season’s 
character dynamic where everyone mocked Leslie as incompetent and 
inappropriate is here distributed evenly among the group since the 
whole collective is at fault for the disaster. The scene exploits the 
genre’s contrasting of disingenuous public performance and ‘reality’ as 
they try to smile and wave their way to the stage; and it is the rally 
audience who function as incredulous witnesses to the group’s failure. 
But the event, however disastrous, happens in the first place because of 
Leslie’s popularity among the team, and this results in the physical 
comedy gradually enveloping all of them. The comedy trope of ‘ragtag 
group of misfits prevail by helping one another’ (Heisler 2012) overturns 
the mockumentary’s ideological work such that it celebrates workplace 
incompetence and inappropriateness if mobilised to help the feminist 
woman achieve her goals.  
The female protagonist is still much involved in physical comedy, but 
her role in this changes. As seen in Figure 4.12, her arrival at the stage 
ends in her lying limply on her back to regroup; this position offers itself 
to be contrasted with the one in Figure 4.7 (Leslie lying at the bottom of 
the pit). While in both instances the camera angle and the long shot 
correspond to mockumentary’s relationship to its objects, that is, 
‘looking down’ at them and observing from the distance, the 
implications are different: in the earlier example, the POV is that of her 
colleagues making fun of her; in the second, it is that of the rally 
audience watching the bundle of doubled-over bodies of the same 
colleagues, holding Leslie up and doing their pratfalls. Leslie’s misery is 
not only her own, and the filming does not gender her physicality the 
way the pit scene does. Contrasted with the pilot’s visual and narrative 
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treatment that singles Leslie out from her environment, comradeship is 
here reinforced mockingly and affectively at the same time. Schur 
comments that this scene’s group arrangement visually resembles the 
Iwo Jima Monument, with Leslie being the human flag that the others 
are trying to raise (see Figures 4.10 and 4.11), encapsulating the 
comedy’s operation both as group slapstick and as a relationship to its 
own ideology (E. Adams 2012). 
The physical comedy’s set piece nature in ‘The Comeback Kid’ is not only 
an expression of cooperation but its singularity also illuminates the 
series’ otherwise muted reliance on slapstick. Indeed, if physical comedy 
is mobilised around the female heroine, it is to underline Leslie’s 
enthusiasm, couched in some form of cooperation and affective 
relationship. It also mostly involves dancing and dress-up. In the 
previously mentioned ‘Filibuster’ episode, her silly 1990s roller-skater 
garb lightens the political theme, and earlier in the episode she and 
boyfriend Ben (Adam Scott) perform a dance routine in their costumes. 
In ‘The Comeback Kid’, she attempts to break-dance in her camera 
confessional to celebrate re-entering the race; in ‘Halloween Surprise’, 
she and Ann start dancing enthusiastically after she decides to buy a 
house; in ‘The Fight’, Leslie and Ron’s conflict is resolved via her dancing 
to and reinventing the lyrics of Billy Joel’s ‘We Didn’t Start the Fire’, 
culminating in the pair’s reconciliatory rendition of the song. While 
these examples function to reinforce Leslie’s energy and comic 
relatability to counterbalance the ideologically argumentative plot 
around the feminist politician, they also stand out as incidental in the 
programme’s larger narrative trajectory. The body politics 
accompanying this narrative force gendered slapstick into the 
background in order to construct the female politician as primarily 
intellectual subjectivity, a characterisation also dominating the series’ 
humour as ‘sophisticated’ entertainment.  
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Parks then mobilises a different mode of comedy from 30 Rock‘s to 
express women’s comic performance and imagery. While both series 
are concerned to narrativise a politicised resistance to the pretty/funny 
dilemma dominating discourses about women’s comedy, Fey’s sitcom 
centralises the female comic’s body in self-referential narratives to 
showcase its possibilities and boundaries, and Parks strategically 
abandons it in order to articulate a rhetoric of respectability politics. 
This strategy affects the programme’s tone not only in its reliance on 
verbal and political comedy, but, gradually towards its sixth and seventh 
seasons, in its mixture of comedy and melodrama. The ‘niceness’ and 
empathetic character treatment of Parks, somewhat similar to The Mary 
Tyler Moore Show, eventually effects an affective tone with muted irony 
or mockery, best exemplified in the Leslie-Ben romance but also evident 
in portrayals of friendship. Mills notes that comedy usually avoids 
openly emotional characterisation methods, as psychological realism is 
more consistent with drama’s and soap opera’s modes of expression. 
These forms enhance the audience’s emotional involvement via a 
shooting style which entails the frequent use of close-ups, a less 
preferred shot in comedy (2005, 85). Mills’ examination of the series 
Friends (1994-2004) demonstrates how that programme balanced 
comedy and melodrama in a way that illuminates the difference 
between comic performance and (melo)dramatic acting, the former 
effecting a degree of emotional detachment, the latter empathetic 
audience involvement. Parks frequently exhibits a similar mixture of 
modalities in later seasons. The shooting style adapts to this shift, 
reducing mockumentary’s visual vocabulary around observational 
distance (long shots, shaky cam etc.). A scene at the end of the episode 
‘Smallest Park’, where Leslie and Ben make a pivotal decision about 
their relationship, abandons comedy for the sake of affective narration; 
the dialogue accordingly contains only a few jokes and turns serious by 
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its finish. The camera gradually zooms in on the actors’ faces to capture 
emotions and reactions, concerned to establish this as a moment of 
serious or ‘realistic’ tension and sentiment. In this, the remnants of 
mockumentary aesthetic (handheld camera, blurry image, re-focusing) 
are used against their original ideological intent: as the camera aims to 
catch ‘genuine’ behaviours and emotions, the style returns to a pre-
mockumentary state which could be called, in these instances at least, 
documentarism. Such modalities are mostly present, as this scene 
demonstrates, in the romance narrative and other intimate 
relationships like friendship and solidarity. The ‘progressive’ political 
narrative appears to presume a partial return to television forms 
(‘warmedy’) and aesthetic methods (documentarism) associated with 
earlier cultural periods. 
The increasing sincerity of generic and stylistic strategies corresponds 
then to an earnestness about feminist politics on Parks, evoking Boyle’s 
(2015) concept that women’s (physical) comedy and the intent to 
express feminist transgression are at best uneasily reconciled. This is an 
operative sentiment for Parks, which also effects its celebratory 
comparison with 30 Rock in media reception as more progressive in its 
portrayal of women and women’s comedy. A great deal of that critical 
judgement is rooted in Parks’ emphasised turn away from women’s 
physical comedy and from the practice of cringe slapstick. Since Parks 
expresses female unruliness via foregrounded intellectual-political 
narrative around the career woman, the occasional physical comedy is 
mostly present in service of the narrative’s ‘feminist’ intentions.  
 
As feminist and quality television, body politics are a pivotal issue for 
the two comedies, on which both the configuration of aesthetic-
ideological meanings and their critical appraisals hinge. A similar 
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ideological intent nevertheless leads 30 Rock and Parks in dissimilar 
directions in their usage of physical comedy and in exploring the 
question of ‘female experience in public spaces’. The issue of physical 
comedy and slapstick looms large for media reception’s evaluations of 
their ‘feminism’ and ‘quality’. In 30 Rock, the abundance of Liz’s physical 
comedy in later seasons was argued to have undermined a convincingly 
progressive feminist rhetoric. As shown, Fey’s physical comedy is pivotal 
to plotting, resulting in constant negotiation processes among 
intellectually-aesthetically ‘superior’ narrative, a mobilisation of feminist 
concerns, and the ideological tensions already inherent in women’s 
physical comedy. Efforts to focus on the female heroine’s idiosyncratic 
physical comedy, precisely because of the differing imperatives of these 
paradigms, account for both the text’s noticeable struggles to offset 
them, and for critical reception’s unease.  
Representative of this problem is the episode ‘The Natural Order’ and 
its mixed critical reception for a backwards treatment of gender and 
race politics (West n.d.). The episode rehashes an already dramatised 
‘issue’ narrative around the different ways ‘women’ and ‘black men’ are 
treated at the workplace. In this iteration, Liz and Tracy feud over who 
gets undue preferential treatment based on gender/race, occasioning 
another exercise in a social experiment with the opposed parties forcing 
the other to accept what it means to have ‘full equality’. This leads to 
Tracy being expected to behave like a professional adult and not a 
spoiled TV star (so in his case race and celebrity discourses collide), and 
Liz to be treated as literally ‘one of the guys’. She is forced to participate 
in ‘masculine’ activities, like changing a heavy water bottle and going to 
a strip club with the male writers. Reviews lamented the episode’s 
illogical politics conflating ‘equality’ with ‘uniformity’, again illuminating 
how the series’ ‘quality’ features are associated with its identity politics, 
thanks to its own appeal to these as narrative foundations. Yet the 
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political plot allows the series to foreground another set-piece physical 
comedy from Fey: when Tracy challenges Lemon to replace the empty 
water bottle without help in the name of ‘equality’, this culminates in a 
prolonged slapstick gag of the ‘(wo)man against inanimate object’ kind 
in a mostly dialogue-free sequence. Lemon’s minute-long battle with 
the bottle, splashing water everywhere and repeatedly missing the 
cooler’s opening, fully exploits the opportunity to showcase the 
slapstick comedian’s skill at interacting with her physical environment.  
If Poehler somersaulting downhill in the pit scenario amounted to the 
comic female body’s contradictory usage for its visual execution and 
narrative function, ineffectual in achieving ‘acceptable’ slapstick for 
women, then the Lemon-versus-water-bottle scene works better in 
positioning itself in the genre’s iconography.32 As such it is a clear 
example of the programme’s efforts to make women’s physical comedy 
attainable in a ’non-gendered’ tradition – yet it achieves this by 
positioning it within a heavily politicised plot around gender and race. 
The episode’s political clumsiness, and this scene’s set-piece position 
(stopping the storytelling around the halfway mark in favour of fully 
playing out the incident) suggest that the political plot is subordinated 
to physical comedy and not the other way around; in other words, the 
political plot is an excuse for Fey to display her slapstick skills. 
The method of emphasising Fey’s body comedy in a way that reinforces 
the ‘quality’ comedy’s aesthetic sophistication is a recurring strategy on 
30 Rock: the episodes ‘Sandwich Day’ and ‘Jackie Jormp-Jump’ are 
memorable in their overdetermined combining of displayed comic 
performance and stylisation. Both use a long-take sequence of Fey’s 
                                                          
32 The slapstick gag of man vs water bottle is a recycled one: e.g. the sitcoms Ellen (1994-1998, ‘The Hand that 
Robs the Cradle’) and Joey (2004-2006, ‘Joey and the Critic’) both executed it. For these series, the scene is pure 
sitcom gimmick characteristic of multi-camera TV comedy, i.e. an insulated gag for the sake of comic 
performance, and not integrated with plot. Contrastingly, 30 Rock both embeds the sequence in ‘quality’ 
comedy’s convoluted plotting and inflates it: much longer than in these earlier instances, it is played more to its 
limits via repetition and extended interaction between diegetic space and body.      
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medium close-up (their length fairly unconventional on American 
network television) to forward narrative as played out on the actor’s 
face, effecting a comic shtick. In ‘Sandwich Day’, Liz/Fey eats a whole 
sandwich in one go (and take) to get through airport security. In ‘Jackie 
Jormp-Jump’, the minute-long close-up tells the story of a day when 
Lemon hangs out with a group of rich socialite women and indulges in 
their activities (spa, plastic surgeon’s office, sushi restaurant etc.) 
without noticing the passage of time (Figures 4.13-4.20). The story plays 
out fully on Liz’s face (and via her monologue), isolated from its 
environment and moved into an imaginary space that the viewer’s 
recognition fills with ‘realistic’ context (helped by colour-coded 
background and props). This gimmick foregrounds Fey’s facial 
performance and separates it from the rest of the diegetic space, 
reinforcing aesthetic singularity in the filming method.  
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Figures 4.13-4.20 
These sequences use close-up against the conventions of melodrama 
and soap opera, preferring the comic possibilities of the human face 
instead of seeking emotional involvement – again demonstrating the 
different aesthetic strategies between 30 Rock and Parks, stemming 
from their different relationship towards the question of how feminist 
politics and the female body can be mobilised in the quality comedy. 30 
Rock‘s ‘face’ examples work similarly to the ‘The Natural Order’s full-
body slapstick sequence in that they negotiate between narrative and 
‘show-stopping’ comic performance. But the critical failure of the 
latter’s political story arc points to the contradictions in which female-
led quality comedy is caught up, and from a perspective directly 
opposed to Parks’: if 30 Rock strives to be progressive in constructing 
physical comedy that strategically overcomes the sexual connotations of 
the female body, and the sexual/feminist politics in which it is inevitably 
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entangled, it relies on an overdetermined politicising of plot around 
gender to achieve this. In contrast, an emphasised political motivation 
causes Parks to ditch women’s physical comedy almost altogether, even 
though its central comedian’s star text emerged on SNL as a discursively 
transgressive (feminist) foregrounding of physical comedy.  
Ultimately, the two comedians’ pre-existing star texts, including their 
differing involvement in discourses of ‘feminist’ entertainment, of 
women’s physical comedy, and of female authorship, come to bear on 
the ways their respective sitcoms struggle to articulate a feminist 
politics in the ‘comedy of distinction’. Parks tempers Poehler’s earlier 
bodily comedy as ‘stunting’ female grotesque in favour of earnest and 
intellectual feminist politics, effecting shifts in the series’ generic 
signifiers (mockumentary) and modalities (comic versus melodramatic). 
This indicates more generally the cultural unease with narrativising 
women’s political and identity struggles in the comedy framework. That 
this unease is linked with tensions around the female body’s 
representability in comic forms surfaces in the way feminist rhetoric on 
Parks seems to necessitate the neglect of Poehler’s physical comedy. 30 
Rock contrastingly insists on the possibility of a successful melding of 
these, in the process constantly at pains to secure its position 
simultaneously in the ‘quality’ cohort (aesthetic innovation) and as 
feminist television (politicised plotting); both of which are thoroughly 
complicated by the intensity with which the series promotes Fey’s 
physical comedy.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Case studies II – Dramas 
 
1. Cultural status and genre in the female-centred prestige 
drama 
 
While comedy’s cultural position and its connection to sanctioned 
cultural transgressions allow for a relatively prominent female presence 
and authorship, the dramatic mode is a more complicated area to 
negotiate this presence. TV scholars agree that feminism’s influence on 
the medium has primarily meant the relative abundance of women-
centred situation comedies (Rabinovitz 1999; Dow 1996; Lagerwey, 
Leyda, and Negra 2016), and according to industry truism, female 
performers have better chances at making a career in half-hour comic 
forms than in prime-time hour-long drama. Similarly, comedy provides 
more opportunities to foreground female authorship: the female comic 
performer/comedy writer has become a prominent figure in post-
millennial American television. This trend mobilises the ‘comic alter ego’ 
trope of comedy traditions (Roseanne, Kirstie, Cybill, Ellen, Fey/Lemon, 
Cherish/Kudrow, Amy Schumer, Lena Dunham/Hanna Horvath, Mindy 
Kaling, the double act of Abbi and Ilana in Broad City) where comic 
meaning emerges from the perpetual interplay between fictional 
character and ‘author’. This mode of comedy is influenced by stand-up 
traditions, and provides fertile ground for centralising gender politics via 
the inexhaustible tension between performance and authorship, 
‘enacted’ self and ‘real’ self (Gilbert 2004). It is partly due to this 
relationship, and its rootedness in embodied performance, that quality 
comedy has been a more welcoming form for female-centred narratives 
and authorship than quality drama. In the latter, performance (visual 
presence) and authorship are rarely intertwined in discourses around 
modes of expression and cultural value. The notion of the author-
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mastermind emerges here as an intellectual but not embodied 
presence, existing outside of/above the text and within paratextual, 
critical, and industry discourses (Newman and Levine 2012, 38–58).  
The issue of women’s representation in television and cinema has 
predominantly revolved around screen presence (women ‘in front of 
the camera’), corresponding to women’s traditional location in art 
history. Consequently, the idea of female authorship as purely 
intellectual presence (‘behind the camera’) has been a much thornier 
issue in debates about gender in dramatic forms (see Tasker [1998, 201–
203] on discussions of female film directors’ public personas and 
gendered authorship). Academic accounts of post-network quality 
drama’s masculinism stress that this extends beyond the text’s aesthetic 
features and involves discourses around the male author-genius, 
complicating television’s previous understanding as un-authored and 
feminine medium (Newman and Levine 2012, Lotz 2014, Martin 2013, 
Bigsby 2013). Quality drama’s accelerated masculinisation, including 
authorship discourses borrowed from art history, accounts for the 
contradictory situation in which the medium previously derided as 
‘feminine’ evidently struggles in its prestigious formats to reconcile 
female presence; understood both as female talent in front of and 
behind the camera, and also as gendered cultural meaning attributed to 
television.  
While female authorship and centralised female subjectivity have 
always been scarce and problematic in American television drama (as 
Cagney and Lacey‘s production history attests, recorded in detail by 
Julie D’Acci [1994]), it is in the current context of ‘non-televisual’ and 
’masculine’ quality TV that this historic difficulty surfaces with higher 
stakes than previously. This contentious negotiation has in recent years 
taken a more pronounced turn due to the new trend of ‘feminist quality 
TV’. For instance, The Huffington Post‘s Zeba Blay announces and 
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examines ‘How Feminist TV Became the New Normal’ (2015), as 
programming focused on ‘difficult men’ in millennial quality TV becomes 
overshadowed by series with ‘complex female leads’; thus attributing 
foregrounded female subjectivities in fictional programming to 
feminism. Blay’s article cites programmes of different formats and 
institutional backgrounds as influenced by this trend, highlighting the 
upsurge of quantity in prestige programming across the board. The 
article celebrates a transition in representational politics of race and 
body image, and the attendant media dispute over television’s 
responsibility around representational ‘realism’. The Atlantic’s Kevin 
O’Keeffe (2014) also describes ‘TV’s renaissance for strong women’ as a 
matter of representational diversity, citing How to Get Away with 
Murder’s (2014-) central protagonist Annalise Keating (Viola Davis) as 
prominent example of progressive transgression both in terms of racial 
diversity and in the programme’s portrayal of an ‘unlikeable’ leading 
female character.33 O’Keeffe’s description of ‘a Walter White among 
women’ creates a link between gendered categories of prestigious 
television, while invoking existing hierarchal positions and favoured 
avenues of emulation. However, he sees a crucial imbalance in these 
representational trends, chalked up to institutional context: in his 
estimation, network television is more accommodating to the ‘strong 
female character’ than cable due to the former’s broader audience 
                                                          
33 Blay’s article discusses as epitome of transgressive portrayal the series’ famous scene in which tough lawyer 
Keating slowly removes her wig, fake eyelashes, and make-up to dramatic music (‘Let's Get to Scooping’). 
Similarly to Blay, publicity discourses herald the scene as ‘one of the most revealing moments on television” 
(Viola Davis on Her 'How to Get Away with Murder' Scenes 2015). Within the context of representational 
transgression as quality TV, it is notable that this portrayal’s link to highbrow drama’s depiction of complex male 
characters revolves around getting rid of the markers of a raced femininity, and thus around an embodied 
tension between public performance (masquerade) and ‘genuine’ black womanhood. The trope of a woman 
removing her wig/make-up in front of a mirror is in TV’s and cinema’s visual vocabulary traditionally linked to 
female duplicitousness and monstrosity, as characteristics associated with villainous female protagonists’ desire 
to gain social power. While here signifying a cleansing process, the mise-en-scène evokes Glenn Close’s Marquise 
de Merteuil in Dangerous Liaisons (1988) wiping her make-up off in shame, but Kimberly Shaw (Marcia Cross) 
dramatically removing her wig in Melrose Place (1992-1999), or Tilda Swinton’s Karen Crowder and her anxious 
ritual of donning her lawyer garb in Michael Clayton (2007) also come to mind. However, in discourses around 
the complex and raced female character, this trope struggles to express authenticity and relatability, inscribed 
onto the black female body and encapsulated in her (removal of) accoutrements of femininity, thus modifying 
the trope’s original associations. The narrative still involves female duplicitousness but if it is positioned as the 
monstrousness of a power-hungry woman it becomes justifiable as complexity or ‘reality’ of character, of which 
this scene operates as key depiction. 
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reach and targeting of women viewers: ‘cable has become a boys' club, 
and network TV is the true land of women’ (ibid.). Both Blay and 
O’Keeffe describe these shifts in representation as emerging in the early 
2010s, the ‘only outlier’ being Alicia Florrick (Julianna Margulies) of The 
Good Wife with her few years of head start (ibid.).  
Feminist academics contextualise such representational changes in 
recessionary culture’s broader social-economic background. Diane 
Negra (2015) argues that while ‘quality’ TV has until recently been 
understood as ‘masculinised’ TV, the recent ubiquity of the ‘strong 
female character’ in series like Orange, Homeland or The Good Wife 
provides narrative-affective frameworks for making sense of economic 
precarity in American life, channelling female anger and a 
‘negotiated/situational morality’. Negra describes these (anti)heroines 
as ‘troubled by forces that are shown to be systemic and social’ and 
thus ‘[the programmes’] importance lies in the critiques they can 
generate of our current affective marketplace’ (ibid.). Kathleen 
McHugh’s (2015) examination of Orange and Top of the Lake expresses 
a similar stance. She sees these series as premium examples of feminist 
quality TV in contemporary female-centred television, describing them 
as feminist interventions in the postfeminist representational paradigm, 
since they ‘share deep structural concerns with power, inequality, and 
gender-based violence’ (ibid., 18). The specific production contexts and 
authorship discourses betray for her a feminist politics, also accounting 
for the series’ singular aesthetic-narrative traits; in short, their political 
motivation produces their superior aesthetic and cultural value. 
If TV critics interpret the ‘feminist turn’ in recent female-centred quality 
drama as a breakthrough in women’s portrayals on post-network, post-
recession quality television, then this notion of success corresponds to a 
more general understanding of the recession’s impact on gendered 
narratives of success and crisis. Negra and Tasker’s (2014b) examination 
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of these narratives outlines popular culture’s ascription of an imbalance 
to the recession’s impact on men and women, contrasting 
dramatisations of troubled masculinities with narratives around female 
(economic) success. Similarly, Suzanne Leonard interprets the 
emergence of female-centred TV dramas like The Good Wife as media 
representations where ‘women routinely serve as symbols of financial 
vitality’, contrasted with ‘male insignificance’ in the workplace (2014a, 
51).  
While academic works situate media texts in the post-recessionary 
financial-economic context of female success and male crisis, the 
dualism corresponds to the logic inherent in popular writings on 
representational trends of gender in quality television, evidenced in the 
above cited think pieces. These journalistic accounts interpret the 
programmes’ increasing engagement with social critiques of women’s 
oppression and gendered adversity as female-centred television 
overthrowing the expired ‘masculinity in crisis’ narratives (without 
describing these female-centred programmes in terms of a ‘femininity in 
crisis’ or ‘troubled womanhood’). In doing so they translate the 
thematic trends which feminist academics locate within popular texts 
into the terms of industry trends. Fictional critiques of female precarity 
and institutional oppression become a success story for women’s 
representation and for ‘feminism’ in critical evaluations of quality 
television’s gender dynamics. The progress attributed to this category 
revolves around the question of character complexity as key marker of 
both quality and gender representation: ‘quality’ here means feminist 
intervention with the effect that protagonists become more complex, 
morally ambiguous, and diverse than before, recycling the terms on 
which highbrow quality drama articulates masculinities. Yet, while 
character complexity is the buzzword habitually used to measure both 
of these gendered subjectivities’ significance, such shared attributes 
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perform different cultural work: the complex female character, 
regardless of narrative context, stands for feminist success and the 
legitimation of a female subjectivity (strong female characters), while 
her male counterpart’s ambiguous morality mediates anxieties about 
fragile patriarchal masculinities and their tenability.  
While journalistic and academic discourses around gendered quality TV 
tend to revolve around character complexity and thematic concerns, the 
differences drawn as ‘masculinity in crisis’ versus ‘female regrouping’ 
say little about the complex relationships between such 
characterisations and traditional television forms or tropes of aesthetic-
narrative ‘complexity’. Female-centred (melo)dramatic storytelling is 
nothing new in American television and a significant body of scholarship 
exists around the topic. A comprehensive account is Amanda Lotz’s 
Redesigning Women (2006) which examines the unprecedented 
increase of female-led TV dramas around the millennium. Lotz 
advocates for the review of existing analytical tools, and for considering 
television’s institutional and economic shifts, in the examination of this 
trend. Attributing the period’s upsurge in female-centred programming 
to the acceleration of narrowcasting, itself connected to cable 
television’s increased dominance, she contends that the prevalence of 
female-targeted cable channels like Lifetime or Oxygen in this time 
organically led to the ubiquity of fictional content incorporating 
‘women’s issues’ storytelling. Her approach centralises generic 
attributes, such that the book is structured around ‘types’ of dramatic 
forms most influenced by such female-centred content. Of these, she 
views the workplace drama as the form in which diachronic shifts in 
women’s representation are most obvious, due to the form’s prominent 
position in American TV drama history on one hand, and to the 
discursive centrality of the issue of women’s depiction outside of the 
home and in workplace narratives on the other (ibid., 144-164). Her 
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examination of the Lifetime series Strong Medicine (2000-2006; a 
medical drama) and The Division (2001-2004; a cop drama) emphasises 
that the former’s episodic format is better suited for incisive 
dramatisations of ‘women’s issues’ and for concentrating on patients 
and women’s health issues via disease-of-the-week storytelling, than 
the latter’s serialised narration focusing on central characters’ 
individualised melodrama. Strong Medicine ‘educat[es] viewers through 
fictional storytelling’ (ibid., 151) and is ‘feminist in nature, providing a 
service for women beyond narrative entertainment’ (ibid., 153), while 
The Division ‘offers little innovation, tells few original stories, and mainly 
provides a different version of the cop series by exploring interpersonal 
relationships among officers more than the work they perform’ (ibid., 
155).  
Lotz then evaluates the programmes’ alignment with feminist concerns 
by considering the modes of their incorporation into television’s 
narrative forms (episodic versus serialised). The question of cultural 
value, or more specifically these examples’ relationship to discourses of 
post-network quality television is not addressed – although she briefly 
notes that the series’ innovation is due to the niche audience focus, 
relative low cultural status, and limited budget of a cable programmer 
like Lifetime. This cultural position stands in obvious contrast with that 
of cable programmers producing high production value original content; 
Lifetime’s reputation as female-targeted channel that modernised the 
‘women’s weepies’ in the TV movie subgenre is an easy target of 
parodies in US culture (not least on 30 Rock) precisely for its ‘feminine’ 
aesthetics and storytelling. Further, the importance Lotz ascribes to 
episodic storytelling for incorporating feminist material is at odds with 
quality drama’s valorisation of high concept serialization, and poses the 
question of how contemporary female-led quality drama negotiates 
these gendered hierarchies of storytelling. 
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In Lotz’s account also reverberates a generally held belief about the 
hierarchical position among genres. For cultural critics, drama is the 
ultimately desired form to fulfil the obligation of progressive female 
representation as ‘true’ innovation in gendered storytelling. As argued 
earlier, this distinction goes back to the disparate cultural position of 
serious/funny storytelling where the former is understood as more 
‘genuine’ representation and the latter as a comparatively distorted 
reflection of reality (Mills 2005, 22). The historic scarcity of women 
protagonists in highbrow dramatic forms speaks to the polarised 
cultural value of drama and comedy (Rowe Karlyn 1995a), and following 
this logic, the unease that this signifies has to do with drama’s ‘genuine’ 
nature as opposed to comedy. Such discursive distance from a dignified 
‘realism’ is similarly true for female-targeted melodrama with its 
associations with over-the-top pathos, gendered victimisation, and 
physically excessive audience (over)identification (Williams 1991; 2014, 
107–36). If these genres are further removed from the ‘realism’ of 
representation than drama, then the gender disparities among them 
follow from ascribing a similar, hierarchal dynamic between the 
representability of male and female subjectivities: female experience is 
traditionally portrayed as further removed from ‘realism’, again 
confirming the feminist adage that patriarchal culture normalises 
male/masculinised experience.  
Academic and journalistic accounts demanding or celebrating more 
female presence in prestigious dramatic forms are always at risk of 
reproducing this logic of value hierarchy; the carving out of a female 
space within the higher echelons of artistic representation runs the risk 
of reinforcing such differences in pursuing a relative proximity to 
representational ‘realism’. When Bridget Boyle (2015) detects a 
discrepancy in the ‘feminist comedy’ phenomenon, her concern is that 
feminism as ‘serious’ or direct political effort is hard to reconcile with 
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the genre’s aesthetic intentions; implicitly assuming that ‘serious’ 
representation is in closer proximity to ‘reality’ than comedy. Likewise, 
Lotz’s repeated use of phrases like ‘educating’ audiences when 
discussing the recent increase of ‘women’s issues’ themes in TV drama, 
betrays this concern with the ‘real’, equated with ‘serious’. This link 
motivates popular and academic critical evaluations of feminist 
concerns’ narrativisation in television, also inscribed onto character 
development. The pursuit of ‘real’ representation effects ideals of 
cultural value for female-centred drama that are markedly different 
from the male-centred quality drama’s existing signifiers. It additionally 
creates the much-discussed divide between prestige dramas along 
gendered lines, as the two quoted articles by Blay and O’Keeffe 
exemplify. 
‘Realism’ has a special resonance for television’s representational trends 
which have been established in their difference from those attributed to 
film. In their survey of debates around television drama’s ideological 
work, Thornham and Purvis summarise these as rooted in a core 
contradiction between ‘television’s ubiquitous sense of “nowness”’ and 
its appeal to realism on one hand, and the imperative to organise the 
‘disorder of reality’ into ‘recognisable, meaningful and safe’ forms on 
the other (2005, 66). Onto television’s understanding as unique 
purveyor of a narrativised reality is inscribed its inherent feminisation 
(the ‘fluidity’ and ‘formlessness’ of mass culture), contrasted with 
cinema’s ‘more coherent, structured – and prestigious – narratives’ as 
masculine features (ibid.). As the authors note, these contrasting 
characteristics also apply for the hierarchies existing among television 
forms: ‘those forms of television which have sought to identify 
themselves as “serious”, as concerned with “quality”, as producing 
“difficult knowledge” rather than “easy entertainment”, have sought on 
the one hand to identify themselves with realism and on the other to 
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distance themselves from the general “flow” of “television itself”, with 
its “trivialising” tendencies’ (ibid., 67). Current female-led television 
drama strives to occupy precisely this cultural space: for instance, the 
‘difficult knowledge’ that the vision of a black woman removing her wig 
and make-up on How to Get Away with Murder produces as ‘serious’ 
entertainment and as heightened ‘quality’ of realism, emerges by 
appropriating the terms on which television’s ‘genuine’ and masculine-
coded realism has historically operated. Meanwhile, the ‘difficult 
knowledge’ produced by ‘masculine’ highbrow drama involves the 
pursuing of an aesthetic-narrative singularity associated with cinema. 
Quality drama’s much-praised aesthetic superiority is caught up in the 
contradiction that Thornham and Purvis describe: the cinematic 
aesthetic and self-contained narrative of high concept dramas 
strategically departs from previous prestige television’s discursive 
alignment with a narrativised ‘realism’ and ‘nowness’. It is now female-
led quality programmes whose cultural value is marked by an alignment 
with representational realism and political ‘nowness’, producing their 
own gendered distanciation from ‘the general “flow” of “television 
itself”’. In this way, the historic gendered differentiation as described by 
Thornham and Purvis continues to exist within quality drama’s 
establishment, even in the discursive praise of ‘feminist quality drama’ 
and its overcoming of both the masculinist and postfeminist paradigms. 
Prestige drama continues then to yield distinct generic and aesthetic 
markers influenced by a gendered address. This is prominently 
governed by television’s historic discursive relationship to representing 
‘reality’ as opposed to cinema’s investment in creating ‘fantasy’. The 
lively academic debate around the ‘aesthetic turn’ is similarly divided 
along an ideological line governed by the dualism of aesthetic and 
political analysis. Scholarship arguing for the legitimacy of aesthetic 
evaluation (Mittell 2015a, Dasgupta 2012, Nannicelli 2016, Logan 2016) 
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bemoans the dominance of political approaches in television studies 
and considers it a methodological obstacle (Logan 2016). As dominant 
strand of political analysis, feminist scholarship centralises questions of 
representation as a potential aspect of cultural value. While this has also 
started to investigate how female-centred programming negotiates 
masculine-coded quality TV culture (Lagerwey, Leyda, and Negra 2016; 
Nygaard and Lagerwey 2016), the two academic discourses rarely 
overlap.  
An exception to this divide is Amanda Lotz’s work since she has 
separately studied both the female-led drama’s millennial popularity in 
Redesigning Women (2006) and the prestige male-led drama’s 
representation of masculinities in Cable Guys (2014), the latter 
considering prestige cable television’s aesthetics. Her approach 
champions a narrative of progress inscribed both onto the examined 
texts’ presumed feminism and, in Cable Guys, onto the higher cultural 
value they represent in industry and media discourses. In Cable Guys 
she posits that these texts signify a departure on television not just 
aesthetically but in their progressive alignment with feminism as male-
centred television (as such, she understands the ‘masculinity in crisis’ 
trope as feminist).34 Her political stance is directly opposed to 
scholarship sceptical of quality TV’s gendered hierarchies, the seminal 
example being Newman and Levine’s (2012) work. Their engagement 
with the minutiae of classed and gendered processes in the legitimation 
of cinematic quality TV is a useful intervention into the quality trend’s 
celebratory analyses, but provokes the question of how quality 
television’s existing and historically influential invocations of feminism 
and the attendant relative prominence of female protagonists relate to 
this. The June 2016 special issue of the journal Television and New 
                                                          
34 Jason Mittell’s Complex TV (2015a) argues similarly, positing that the aesthetic complexity of contemporary 
’quality’ TV (although he disapproves of this term) involves a political complexity of gender relations (see next 
section). 
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Media, focusing exclusively on The Good Wife’s cultural work, addresses 
this question of political and aesthetic evaluation (Miller 2016, Nygaard 
and Lagerwey 2016), but such a simultaneous consideration of these 
approaches is rare in scholarship. Put another way, while much has 
been written about the ways in which the male-centred quality drama 
re-purposes storytelling traditions of television’s derided female-
targeted forms, especially the soap opera and melodrama, the recent 
academic and journalistic focus on female-centred drama has not yet 
engaged much with how this trend relates to the prevailing paragon of 
prestigious televisual aesthetic. 
The two programmes selected as case studies are well-suited for 
examining quality drama’s alignment of masculine-coded aesthetic 
value with a discursive feminism, since media reception hails both as 
quality and feminist entertainment. In academia, the latter perspective 
dominates; i.e. with the ‘quality’ status taken for granted, scholarship 
tends to examine the texts’ politics. This is also true for Jason Mittell’s 
short study of The Good Wife in Complex TV, demonstrating as it does 
how the series’ ‘progressive’ gender politics affects its ‘complex’ 
storytelling (2015a, 258–59). Media discourses similarly position the 
programmes as pioneers of highbrow drama’s specifically female-
oriented modifications. As O’Keeffe’s article indicated, these see The 
Good Wife as precursor of the ‘strong female character’ trope and of 
the narrative emphasis on female experience in prestige drama. 
Broadcast on CBS, the network associated today with procedural crime 
series and franchises mainly targeted at older audiences, TV journalists 
considered the programme at its debut in 2009 exceptional both for its 
focus on a female lead and for its serialised political narrative (Flint 
2013); and it is still regarded as CBS’s flagship entry into the prestige 
drama category (Adalian 2016, Goldberg 2016). As will be shown, 
Orange’s promotional campaigns since its 2013 launch highlight both its 
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aesthetic singularity and its concentration on diverse womanhood in 
order to establish Netflix’s reputation as prime programming brand with 
female-targeted and -centred quality content. While a number of other 
series followed Orange on Netflix mobilising similar marketing strategies 
(e.g. Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt, Jessica Jones), the series continues to 
be seen as the content provider’s flagship prestige series targeting 
female audiences. 
Apart from the programming context and promotional strategies, the 
two series are also useful to unpack how the negotiation of two 
discursively irreconcilable major components – the masculine-coded 
quality show’s stylistic features and female-led drama’s politics – 
redefine the aesthetic-narrative terms in which television appeals to 
cultural value, supported by reception and industry discourses. By way 
of a prelude to the individual analyses, I provide an analytic overview of 
a common characteristic of the two series that both use to reconcile the 
‘feminist’ and ‘quality’ monikers: the programmes speak to and contest 
a notion of specifically marginalised female subjectivities as key 
component in their inception and cultural positioning. This usage 
emerges in the following aspects: theme and characterisation technique 
as novelty trait of the quality series; stylistic-generic markers resulting 
from this thematic focus; and finally the programmes’ broader 
understanding in their respective institutional environments as 
problematically categorisable within the quality cohort.  
As thematic device, the centralisation of otherwise marginalised female 
experiences works as a dominant issue to create dramatic tension that 
is reproducible for convergence television’s storytelling practices. Both 
series are known for a novel storytelling style via focusing on 
subjectivities typically excluded from prime-time narration. The Good 
Wife unusually centralises the ‘wife’ in the scenario of the high-profile 
politician’s sexual scandal, and the wife figure also allows the series to 
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intertwine this serialised political plot with the legal procedural’s 
episodic structure. Alicia’s position as ‘underdog’ (both as politician’s 
wife and as attorney re-entering the workforce) allows for a narrative 
mobility between the husband’s world of high-profile politics and the 
legal workplace environment’s case-of-the-week plotting with its more 
‘televisual’ narrative; signalling how centralised female subjectivity 
affects gendered codes of television storytelling. Orange similarly 
focuses on marginalised female identities, even using this theme to 
complicate power dynamics and points of identification in its premise to 
contrast the postfeminist woman’s (young, privileged, attractive white 
hipster Piper Chapman’s [Taylor Schilling]) perspective with those of the 
other inmates in Litchfield Penitentiary. Upsetting the fish-out-of-water 
storyline’s conventions is the programme’s and its promotion’s key 
hook to the extent that the centralising of marginalised femininities, 
associated with a discursive realism, becomes the basis on which critics 
celebrate its novelty as quality TV. New York Post journalist Robert 
Rorke’s assessment is representative; for him Orange is a ‘TV revolution 
for women’ because it has changed ‘our notions of what kind of 
actresses we saw on TV’ (2014).  
The two programmes also integrate the theme of highlighting 
marginalised womanhood with the requirements of aesthetic 
exceptionalism that the quality brand advocates. For The Good Wife, the 
portrayal of the underdog female lawyer who is at the same time a 
representation of the ‘scorned wife’ figure in political sex scandals, 
expresses a departure from characterisations that these female roles 
arguably invite, rooted in melodrama’s aesthetic and narrative 
traditions. Much has been made of Alicia’s portrayal in Margulies’ 
understated performance as opaque, Sphinx-like figure resisting 
gendered martyrdom and scrutiny, and it also speaks to the 
programme’s aesthetic efforts. Suzanne Leonard (2014b) argues that 
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this characterisation technique offers a resistance to the intense 
publicity and media frenzy over political sex scandals via her silence ‘as 
a strategy of power rather than compliance’, offering a ‘feminist stance’ 
(ibid., 14). I want to highlight from Leonard’s assessment that the 
‘strong female protagonist’s characterisation as stoical and calculatedly 
undecipherable figure, problematising the relationship between 
marginalised subjectivity and silence, corresponds to the series’ 
aesthetics hailed as sophisticated and subtle. Due to its blending of the 
political serialised and episodic narrative, paired with a clinical visual 
style and performances stressing characters’ ‘unknowability’, Emily 
Nussbaum heralds it for its cynical and critical take on ‘pretty much 
every institution under capitalism’, even though it started out ‘much like 
an empowerment procedural for the ladies, a “Lean In” fairy tale about 
a strong woman who would find her way’ (2014, 110). Nussbaum’s 
article demonstrates how the series uses the ‘strong female character’, 
defined by her resistant silence, to overwrite a specifically feminine-
coded mode of storytelling and aesthetics in order to appeal to more 
prestigious trends of televisual narration and ideologies. 
The theme of ‘marginalised femininities’ means for Orange an affiliation 
with realism as aesthetics and ideology, allowing the programme to 
express cultural value as politically motivated narrative-aesthetic 
complexity. McHugh’s (2015) praise of the series’ feminism points to the 
realist-documentarist style of its title sequence, a dynamic montage of 
real-life female prisoners’ ‘multi-ethnic’ (ibid., 20) faces in extreme 
close-ups. Analysing the sequence, she finds that it is unusual in its 
refusal to present a linear narrative or associative structure typical of 
opening credits, instead highlighting reversibility and ‘seriality without 
direction or progress, a fitting structure for its prison setting’ (ibid., 21). 
Linking the overt diversity of the collage of faces to realist aesthetics, 
she concludes that the documentarism, a unique stylistic choice, 
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exposes the ‘privileged demographic’ of Netflix subscribers to the 
‘reality’ of incarcerated women’s subjectivity and experiences (ibid., 21-
22). The documentarism that, as McHugh argues, provides the series 
with feminist credentials is also what lands it in the quality cohort for 
journalists – ‘a TV revolution for women’ for Rorke. Alan Sepinwall 
(2013) remarks that ‘not since The Wire has there been a show that's 
been this large and great a showcase for obscure actors of color’. The 
Wire is regarded in television criticism as a pinnacle of quality television 
for narrativising social-political commentary via documentarist aesthetic 
and representational diversity; the comparison appreciates Orange as 
superior television for a similar race politics and realism. 
The manner in which the two programmes mobilise ‘marginalisation’ as 
narrative tool and characterisation technique yields dissimilar 
configurations of the ‘quality’ aesthetic, impacted by institutional and 
generic environments. For The Good Wife, the inscrutability of Alicia’s 
(and Kalinda’s [Archie Panjabi] and Diane’s [Christine Baranski]) face and 
character, complete with the text’s aesthetic choices (polished, 
symmetrical), indicates a critical view on American politics, law, and 
expectations of female morality. For Leonard, the resulting moral 
ambiguity offered to the viewer stems from the series’ refusal to judge 
Alicia’s character in the context of her sexual life. The fact that the 
stress is on her sexuality as the most debated and politicised arena also 
aligns with broadcast television’s own negotiations of self-censorship 
and wide audience address foregrounded in the discursive 
cable/network dualism. Where The Good Wife refuses insight into the 
thoughts and sex life of a political wife dissected in her media coverage, 
Orange contrarily advocates revelatory insight into lives (including sex 
lives) so far rendered invisible in popular media, corresponding to 
Netflix’s brand identity as response to the masculinist sexual 
explicitness of reigning cable aesthetics. This contrast between the two 
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series surfaces in McHugh’s article, where she uses The Good Wife as 
counterpoint to Orange‘s laudable feminism-as-realism-as-quality, citing 
the ‘lush mise-en-scène’, the chic costuming, and the relative lack of 
diversity accounting for the former show’s failure to become feminist 
(as opposed to postfeminist) quality TV (2015, 22). I will return to this 
point later, but for now it demonstrates that the two programmes’ 
narrative choices around the marginalisation of specific femininities 
account for the aesthetic superiority to which they aspire; and these 
womanhoods’ specific position in the media landscape and the two 
shows’ respective programming backgrounds impact on the disparate 
manner in which these aesthetics emerge.  
Specific visual renditions of female faces reveal the two shows’ different 
focus on mobilising a certain feminist politics: fictional Alicia’s or 
Kalinda’s ‘Kabuki mask’ face (also implying the face’s permanent 
coalescence with make-up/masquerade) is in obvious contrast with the 
multiplicity of real and nameless paratextual faces in Orange’s title 
sequence, framed ‘up-close-and-personal’ (ibid., 21) and without make-
up, showing every wrinkle and blemish (Figures 5.21 to 5.24). 
Figure 5.21           
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Figure 5.22      
Figure 5.23  
 Figure 5.24 
Yet these strategic associations of female faces with certain kinds of 
female subjectivities and feminist struggles, however disparate they 
seem, logically follow from the series’ institutional, cultural, and generic 
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environments influencing the manners in which they articulate the 
theme of ‘women’s marginalisation and overcoming thereof’. 
Programming and industry background is the third area in which the 
notion of marginalisation (or rather marginality here) emerges. This has 
less to do with creative choices and critical judgements and more with 
broader negotiation processes of positioning the two series generically 
and institutionally as ‘quality’ television. Both programmes’ production 
histories are marked by widely mediated struggles over categorisation 
as female-centred quality dramas in relation to both the male-led 
quality drama and the female-centred dramedy/melodrama. This 
surfaces most noticeably in annual awards circuit discussions, as trade 
press sees both series as perennially overlooked at prestigious television 
award competitions like the Golden Globes and the Emmy Awards. 
Journalistic accounts attribute this undervaluation less to artistic merit 
and more to their respective liminal positions in their programming 
contexts: in Orange’s case this is expressed in terms of genre, and in The 
Good Wife’s in terms of institutional background associated with 
cultural value. When the latter programme is lauded as quality 
television, this is often formulated as a virtue emerging despite the 
network environment (e.g. Goodman 2013). Yet, precisely this 
environment is also understood to forever preclude the series from 
entering the big league of cable quality by way of winning the industry’s 
coveted awards (Hinckley 2014, Travers 2014, Idato 2014); a verdict that 
speaks to the discursive dualism of cable and network television’s 
associated value hierarchies of aesthetic and narrative. I discuss this 
issue in more detail below; for now I want to highlight that the series’ 
murky position in its programming context and in media discourses 
(‘straddling the line between ambitious cable fare and network series’ 
[Lowry 2015]) accounts for its reputation as ‘marginalised’ quality 
television, since this surfaces most visibly as a disadvantage in the 
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annual awards circuit. This liminal position indirectly follows from the 
programme’s female-centred storytelling and ‘feminism’ rhetoric: the 
theme of marginalised female experience propels its lauded ‘quality’ 
aesthetic and narrative. The series’ modes of expressing this theme earn 
their reputation as ‘sophisticated’ television by turning the constraints 
of broadcast TV into a virtue, as shown via Leonard’s (2014b) analysis or 
via Nussbaum’s appraisal of the series as critique of institutions in the 
guise of an ‘empowerment procedural for the ladies’ (2014). 
The issue of marginalisation as affecting a programme’s cultural cachet 
emerges for Orange around the question of genre; namely, the 
programme has been since its launch variably described as comedy-
drama and dramedy. To this description contributed series creator Jenji 
Kohan’s previous work on the Showtime programme Weeds, a 
prominent representative of the channel’s cultivated female-led half-
hour dramedy programming. The question of genre first became an 
obvious burden for Orange’s cultural capital, similar to The Good Wife, 
in the Emmy Awards nomination procedure. This initially revolved 
around its hour-long episode length, in itself considered an anomaly at 
the programme’s first launch.  
In response to the accelerated blending of comedy and drama in high-
end hour-long American television, the Television Academy announced 
several changes to its Emmy nomination rules in 2015. One of the most 
controversial of these concerned the categories in which a series can be 
submitted for nomination, from this year on determined not by content 
but by length: only series shorter than 30 minutes can compete in 
comedy categories while longer programmes are considered drama 
(Birnbaum 2015b). To offset the new rule’s rigidity, programmes can 
petition for re-consideration of their category; their eligibility for this is 
decided by a panel of industry members. All of the series that used this 
opportunity to apply for changing categories, including Orange, were 
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hour-long series switching from drama to comedy; and only Orange was 
denied this and had to compete as drama in 2015 (Birnbaum 2015a). 
The media commentary on this new rule and its controversial effect on 
programmes’ chances at winning soon honed in on Orange‘s problem, 
specifically on the industry’s efforts to shoehorn the show into a generic 
category, upsetting its cultural position as quality television (Viruet 
2015). The series’ reputation in media discourses as side-lined in the 
industry’s annual re-evaluations of its value hierarchies is then eerily 
similar to The Good Wife’s notoriety as ever the underdog in the awards 
circuit. The quoted articles illustrate the controversial industry trends by 
citing these two series respectively in their headlines as prime 
casualties.  
While Orange’s position does not primarily revolve around the 
straddling of aesthetic-narrative practices associated with institutional 
backgrounds but rather around generic categorisations, the root cause 
for its neglected status is similarly the series’ appeal to cultural value via 
a gendered mode of upsetting generic traditions. Netflix executive Ted 
Sarandos’ comment on the Emmy ruling highlights precisely this status, 
calling Orange ‘a truly pioneering series and an iconoclast which has 
always defied genre or easy categorization’ (Birnbaum 2015a). If Orange 
is a ‘pioneering’ and ‘iconoclastic’ series, this reputation has everything 
to do with its novel concentration on female subjectivities rectifying a 
blind spot for television. Into this reputation of marginality and 
iconoclasm feeds the series’ institutional background, questioning 
whether it is television at all – the media convergence era’s re-
organisation of gendered value hierarchies and audience targets further 
influences the series’ understanding as hovering on the fringes of those 
established categories of quality that have dominated industry and 
media discourses in the last decade.  
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In the following I provide a detailed analysis of each series’ 
configurations of their ‘quality’ status in connection with genre, and 
their alignment with a female-centred and discursively feminist 
storytelling. 
 
1.A The Good Wife 
 
Critics and academics alike discuss The Good Wife’s cultural value in 
terms of a tension between institutional background and aesthetic-
narrative achievement (Lowry 2015; Miller 2016, 5). This argument 
characterises Emily Nussbaum’s (2014) New Yorker review as well, who 
in her praise likens the series to The Wire for its similar invisibility in the 
awards circuit; at the same time distinguishing it from prestigious cable 
output by setting up a duality between contemporary notions of 
‘quality’ and the ‘nostalgia’ of network television that this show for her 
emanates (ibid.). After listing convergence media’s lauded products as 
examples of today’s ‘anything goes’ approach, she continues: 
... the show didn't even get nominated for best drama at this year's 
Emmys (although the snub might be a point of pride: The Wire was 
never nominated for best drama at all). As sharp and as deep and as 
witty as The Good Wife is, it lacks all the Golden Age credentials. The 
series' showrunners, Robert and Michelle King, a married couple, 
don't have a pugnacious-auteur reputation or Hollywood glamour. 
They're collaborative workhorses, producing twenty-two hour-long 
episodes a year, more than twice as many as their peers on HBO, FX, 
or AMC. (...) Their series débuts every September, on schedule — no 
year-and-a-half-long hiatuses for them to brood about artistic aims. 
(Ibid.) 
She celebrates the programme as quality series both because of and 
despite its institutional origins: for sticking to the formula of network 
prime-time drama without the arty nonsense of cable shows, for 
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adhering to the constraints of commercial breaks, product integration, 
and censorship, and for the sharpness that for her emerges mainly due 
to these constraints because it keeps the – in this context suspicious – 
creative freedom of television producers in check. Nussbaum also 
laments that the show’s liminality entails a gendered aspect, 
demonstrated by an anecdote where a male TV executive dismisses it, 
to her disdain, as ‘being “for women”’ (ibid.). Her praise thus exposes, 
and highlights a frustration with, a gendered double-standard in the 
industry where the network/cable dualism also involves a gendered 
differentiation of ‘quality’ (see also Miller 2016, Nygaard and Lagerwey 
2016). Yet in her analysis of the series’ subtlety emerges another, this 
time only implied, duality, that of gendered genre hierarchies. She 
describes the fifth season plot twist of killing off major character Will 
Gardner (Josh Charles), who had that far been one angle of the show’s 
central love triangle, through the aesthetic difference between 
highbrow drama’s subtlety and female-targeted melodrama’s excess: 
‘instead of playing as cheap melodrama his death reinvented the series. 
(...) It also, daringly, broke The Good Wife's primal link to a feminine TV 
narrative formula: the love triangle — the secret sauce for many female 
fans’ (ibid.). 
It is then the negotiated allure of and distance from a tradition of 
feminine-coded network melodrama in which the series’ cultural cachet 
becomes pivotal for Nussbaum. In this echoes partly the common 
wisdom about the network/cable dichotomy’s genderedness and its 
rigid boundaries; only this time this revolves around the question of 
television forms. When Nussbaum defines the series’ quality she 
emphasises what it is not: a feminine and ‘cheap melodrama’ or ‘an 
empowerment procedural for the ladies’, and invokes by this the type of 
television that according to industry truism sells best to female 
audiences. Indeed, generic ambiguity is a prominent narrative-aesthetic 
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device for the series’ premise and promotion, starting at the title that 
sarcastically invokes an archetypal female figure of American popular 
media in order to unhinge the associations that this epithet invites. The 
generic associations of the melodrama and soap opera become focal 
reference points to be upset; in this we can see a play of ‘distancing 
while invoking’ or ‘absent presence’, a similar method to that of 
network TV’s female-centred comedy of distinction. 
The pilot episode’s much-discussed first scene (Leonard 2014b, 944; 
Miller 2016, 7) works out precisely the duality of gendered generic 
conventions from mise-en-scène to dialogue to performance. The press 
conference in which Illinois State’s Attorney Peter Florrick (Chris Noth) 
announces his resignation following his sexual scandal is in its first 
minutes filmed concentrating on him and the attending reporters; the 
slow-building tension promises a political drama revolving around his 
ordeal. The revelation that we are instead going to follow his wife’s 
perspective comes as the scene’s narrative surprise, with the camera 
discovering her quiet presence next to the orating husband. As both 
Leonard and Miller note, we first see her face through a diegetic TV 
camera, indicating that the novel focus on the scorned wife will entail a 
scrutiny of the mediatised nature of political sex scandals (Leonard 
2014b, 944; Miller 2016, 7). The dramatic/soapy slap that Alicia 
subsequently places on Peter’s face backstage completes the scene not 
only to ‘transition... [her] into the star of the show’ (Leonard 2014b, 
944), but also to confirm the gendered complexity of generic TV 
traditions displayed in the series. The novel aspect of focusing on the 
marginalised female figure is complemented by the similarly novel and 
much-praised dogged silence and restraint characterising Alicia (and 
which Leonard argues contributes to the series’ feminist credentials), in 
the scene governing the power dynamics between husband and wife. If 
the cold open serves as Alicia’s complex portrayal it is unusual precisely 
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because it lacks any dialogue or other verbal confirmation from her. It 
relies on wordless performance, visual narration, and a characterisation 
technique conveyed via character action (Alicia attempting to remove 
lint from Peter’s suit and the slap which in this context is less a 
melodramatic trope and more a characterisation method) – to the 
soundtrack of the male protagonist’s speechifying. These stylistic 
choices demonstrate how the series emulates cable television’s 
‘cinematic’ filming methods, and they tap into the discursive dualism of 
‘average’ TV fare’s ‘feminine’ verbosity and image-driven highbrow 
drama. The aesthetic novelty is a consequence of the gendered novelty 
of characterisation which associates powerful silence – and 
accompanying dominance of visual ‘cinematic’ aesthetic – with the 
female protagonist, while verbosity – a traditionally feminine/feminising 
trait of disdained TV genres – dominates our first impression of the male 
protagonist. Initially, this reversed setup describes the bloated 
politician–meek housewife scenario, but the premise (her centralisation 
and the dynamic between her constraint and the unfolding narrative) 
makes full use of the medium’s and the form’s gendered associations to 
achieve the ‘quality’ effect. The cold open’s stylistic choices set up the 
terms on which the series positions itself as subtle and sophisticated 
television rising above the level of average network offering, and thus 
indirectly mobilise those features which in Nussbaum’s assessment help 
differentiate it from the suspicious stain of ‘cheap melodrama’ and 
other feminine television.  
Critics also routinely evaluate the programme’s storytelling, 
characterisation methods, and aesthetics in comparison with 
contemporaneous series seen as its peers in terms of institutional 
origin, theme and genre, and gendered representation and cultural 
value. As such, it is mainly the hit ABC shows produced by celebrated TV 
writer Shonda Rhimes’s production company Shondaland, like Scandal 
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(2012-) and How to Get Away with Murder, that become reference 
points for what The Good Wife is not. While both debuting a few years 
after The Good Wife, the terms on which their differences emerge 
further illustrate the ways in which the series navigates gender and its 
associated television traditions. Shondaland dramas’ cultural 
importance revolves for critics around the interconnected dynamics of 
race and gender in political/legal drama; and these representational 
methods contribute to the series’ understanding as exceptional, 
accounting for the occasional ‘quality’ label. Yet Scandal, How to Get 
Away with Murder, and other Shondaland output are at the same time 
considered otherwise fitting into female-targeted TV melodrama and 
soap culture (Leonard 2016, 8) with their fast-paced plotting, emphasis 
on romance and sex, narrative twists relying on scheming galore, and 
the attendant emotionality and verbosity. It is this type of television 
with which contrasted, The Good Wife becomes for critics a laudable 
anomaly for network TV. For a somewhat reversed demonstration, 
consider Neil Kirkpatrick’s review (2015) of the seventh season episode 
‘Cooked’, in which he laments the series’ increasing reliance on intrigue 
as a gradual shift from cable-like narration towards Shondaland’s and 
other network shows’ ‘fast-burning and twisty’ (ibid.) plotting. 
If The Good Wife gains ‘quality’ credentials in its negotiated difference 
from programmes that thematically resemble it but are deemed too 
reliant on established TV formulas, this difference involves a complex 
relationship to network television’s ‘feminine’ reliance on verbosity and 
displayed affect. Again, the measured silence characterising Alicia 
comes to bear on the programme’s aesthetics and its reputation as 
sophisticated TV complimenting viewer intellect rather than emotional 
involvement, in contrast with Shondaland shows’ critical and academic 
evaluation. In her investigation of the dynamic between fan practices 
and Shonda Rhimes’s authorship, TV scholar Anna Everett (2015) 
 226 
 
celebrates the latter by highlighting a defining emotionality and its 
effect on audience engagement in physical terms. Her description of the 
typical Rhimes drama as ‘ultrafast-paced, frenetic, and head-spinning 
storylines, as well as mind-blowing and off-the-chain plot points that 
mesmerize audiences every week’ (ibid., 36) speaks to a connection 
between these shows’ mobilisation of narrative-emotional excess and 
the cultural understanding of ‘body’ genres where centralised 
physicality and sensation is mimicked in audience reaction.  
Linda Williams’ (1991) work, as ever, is instructive here. Theorising 
melodrama as one of the ‘body’ genres that Carol Clover (1987) 
identified in horror and pornography, she finds that all ‘low’ genres fall 
under the expressive mode of melodrama, ‘encompass[ing] a broad 
range of films marked by “lapses” in realism, by “excesses” of spectacle 
and displays of primal, even infantile emotions, and by narratives that 
seem circular and repetitive’ (Williams 1991, 3). While this description 
already proffers a connection to ‘feminine’ television forms’ narrative 
practices, and especially to those of the Shondaland stable, it is the link 
drawn between low cultural value and an ‘over-involved’ spectatorship 
that further confirms the similar context in which Shondaland series are 
positioned. If ‘the success of these genres is [...] measured by the 
degree to which the audience sensation mimics what is seen on the 
screen’ (ibid., 4) then their cultural value stands in reverse connection 
with this success because of the ‘apparent lack of proper esthetic [sic] 
distance, a sense of over-involvement in sensation and emotion’ (ibid., 
5). Everett’s description of the intense fan culture phenomenon around 
Shondaland shows stresses viewer involvement in similar terms, while 
locating its cultural importance in the democratising, racially-socially 
inclusive interaction of fan communities and ‘author’:  
Clearly, it was not only Rhimes herself who was yearning for the kind 
of brazenly postmodern, culturally reflexive, and visually tantalizing 
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expressions of America's singularly pluralist societal composition, 
historically erased from mainstream television, that Shondaland 
consistently delivers to its gobsmacked or astounded viewers without 
apology. Like fans of horror and slasher films, who enjoy being scared 
in the dark, Rhimes' fans relish the hypersuspended disbelief that 
motivates their real-time tweets of delighted shock and awe. (Everett 
2015, 36) 
The mention of horror fandom similarly caught up in physical over-
involvement links this discussion to Williams’ theorisation of ‘body’ 
genres, which she also interpreted as placed low in genre hierarchies for 
centralising female bodies caught up in intense displays of physical 
action/reaction. But when Everett insists that Rhimes’s oeuvre fits the 
bill of ‘quality’ television, underlying her discussion of authorship–
fandom–media reception relations lurks an unease with considering the 
programmes in relation to ‘low’ and ‘feminine’ TV genres: she cites 
Scandal’s 2014 win of the Peabody Award as a triumph that finally 
‘helped to quell somewhat unfair dismissals of Scandal as mere soap 
opera’ (ibid., 40). Everett’s project strives to save Shondaland 
programmes for the quality brand according to the terms advocated by 
industry and reception discourses – here for their gendered-raced 
political progressiveness, cult fandom, and discursive authorship – 
overlooking the loaded problem of cultural value in television culture 
and the attendant academic debate.  
Nonetheless, questions of ‘feminine’ entertainment and associations 
with melodrama do underlie Scandal’s journalistic assessments. In a 
think piece considering the series’ race and gender politics, Nussbaum 
frames this in a context she calls the show’s ‘post-racial fantasy’ and a 
connected lack of cultural prestige (2012b). That is, at a time when race 
politics and ‘diversity’ are central talking points in public discourses, 
these tend to invoke other, more prestigious, series since Scandal is ‘the 
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type of show the TV digerati don’t care about: it’s network, it’s 
formulaic, and it fits squarely in the feminine junk drawer, with Grey’s 
Anatomy, chick lit, and women’s magazines, where few consumers go 
looking for artistry or deep meaning’ (ibid.). Whether Nussbaum 
assesses correctly Scandal’s neglect in journalistic discussions of race 
politics is beside my point; but her argument demonstrates Shondaland 
programming’s cultural position as low quality, feminine television. 
Crucially, Nussbaum cites The Good Wife as counterexample that for her 
tackles race in a more complex manner; again tapping into the terms on 
which this programme signals its distinctive status on network 
television, struggling to redefine its relationship to the codes of 
‘feminine’ entertainment. 
The discursive contrast between these female-centred network dramas 
then involves a gendered body-mind dualism in relation to preferred 
modes of audience engagement and related genre conventions: The 
Good Wife’s sophistication involves a negotiated distance from 
melodrama’s displayed embodied affect. Despite thematic-formal 
similarities, the series is regarded as profoundly different from its 
network neighbours, celebrated for a cool intellectuality found sorely 
lacking in the others. This discursive difference mostly hones in on 
Shondaland shows with their proximity to Williams’ ‘body’ genres in 
terms of a feminine display of sensation and emotion, inviting audiences 
to connect to them on these bases. The Good Wife’s courting of viewer 
intellect is epitomised in its female protagonists’ intellectuality and 
powerful reticence, describing both Alicia and most of the appearing 
female attorneys, politicians, and even clients of the law firm. Further, 
the series often brings this characteristic into play in emphasised 
contrast with the trope of female garrulousness and emotionality as 
masquerade. The programme is lauded for bringing in memorable guest 
stars playing opposing counsel whose courtroom tactic involves a 
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performance, carefully emphasised as such, of stereotypical femininity, 
like attorneys Nancy Crozier (Mamie Gummer) performing the ingénue 
or Patti Nyholm (Martha Plimpton) the overwhelmed mother (Miller 
2016, 13). Portrayals of restrained female behaviour and their 
oppositional relationship to these masquerades of femininity – enacted 
in Alicia’s recurring ‘eye roll’ reaction shots in court scenes – contribute 
to the series’ ‘quality’ reputation, also being contrasted with expected 
generic conventions per Nussbaum (2014). 
Expectations of feminine self-presentation provide fertile ground for 
extended commentary on the series, demonstrating the high stakes 
with which these feature for establishing its prestige credentials. The 
second season episode ‘VIP Treatment’s procedural storyline gives an 
example of this, also useful for analysing the series’ self-distancing from 
melodrama conventions and mobilising the ‘feminism’ theme, both as 
feeding into individualised narratives and as political discourse (Miller 
2016). The episode revolves mainly around a case-of-the-week: high-
profile masseuse Lara White (Natalie Knepp) walks into the law office 
accusing a (fictional) celebrity philanthropist of sexually assaulting her 
during a massaging session just a few hours before, and looks for legal 
representation from Alicia. The episode recounts the events of a few 
hours, revolving around whether Alicia’s bosses Diane and Will will take 
up the suit at all, and works this out in a series of backroom debates.  
Given the subject matter, this plot predictably focuses on issues 
associated with popular media treatments of sexual violence like 
women’s agency, challenged credibility, sexuality as political issue, the 
power relations of those involved and so forth. Here these concerns 
emerge because the accused man (never shown in person and thus 
remaining a symbol, ‘the most beloved Democrat in America’) is also a 
Nobel Peace Prize winner famous for his advocacy of women’s rights in 
Africa. The plot foregrounds popular feminism not only as a focus of 
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individualised narrative but as politics, especially since it concentrates 
narrative tension on Diane’s status as powerful liberal feminist public 
figure. It revolves around her moral conundrum between believing the 
wannabe client and ruining a feminist organisation’s work by exposing 
its celebrity figurehead as, potentially, a rapist.  
The exposition already demonstrates how the series mobilises 
politicised feminism as narrative device to generate its ‘smart’ status. I 
deal with the question of feminist politics and cultural value in the next 
section, but the detail I want to highlight here concerns Lara’s portrayal, 
and the series’ relationship to melodrama’s expressive modes, that this 
signals. If the series strives to shake off the taint of ‘cheap’ melodrama 
by configuring its plot as primarily a political issue, then this becomes 
overdetermined through Lara’s portrayal as an excessively calm and 
eloquent woman. This is presented from the moment she first appears 
as an oddity given the circumstances, and intensifies the theme of 
credibility and character authenticity circulated in media treatments of 
real-life sexual assault scandals which the episode thematises. Further, 
this makes Diane’s dilemma especially poignant, creating the narratively 
fruitful irony where ‘the’ feminist is the sceptical one about a woman’s 
credibility who accuses a powerful man of sexual violence. The 
exchange between Diane and Lara in which this struggle culminates 
speaks not only to this narrative conundrum and associated moral-
political dilemma but to the series’ own stakes in generating a tension 
between generic expectations and women’s portrayals: 
Diane: Miss White, don’t take this the wrong way but given that this 
happened five hours ago, you seem remarkably calm.  
Lara: I’m not sure how I’m supposed to take that the right way. 
Diane: Take it as the first of a long line of hard questions. 
Lara: Would it make a difference if I was crying?  
Diane: You were sexually assaulted. Wouldn’t that make sense? 
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Lara: When I was kicked out of college, I cried for an hour, then I 
stopped, and I never cried again. That’s who I am. But if it helps I wish 
this had happened to somebody who cried a lot. 
Delivered with bone-dry sarcasm and a wry smile, the last line taps not 
only into expectations of female behaviour given the subject matter but, 
in terms of genre conventions, the associations of ‘women’s issues’ 
melodrama and its characterisation and plot tropes. Lara’s derisive 
description ‘somebody who cried a lot’ evokes melodrama’s excess as 
‘body’ genre in Williams’ terms, and signals the distancing the 
programme performs, while also adding a personalised clarification for 
the character’s un-melodramatic behaviour via a summary backstory. 
The need for this explanation signals the continued discursive 
importance of the personal/political dualism which crystallises here 
both as an issue of television storytelling and as an historic framework 
of feminist thought. The plot negotiates between television’s 
established method of individualising-privatising ‘issues’ and efforts to 
politicise them. Generically, this surfaces in a negotiation between the 
heritage of ‘women’s issues’ melodrama excess and contemporary 
quality drama’s ‘sophistication’. Lara has an intimate melodrama 
backstory that has evolved into ‘intellectual’ drama. That this ‘evolution’ 
revolves around the programme’s overall refusal to employ tropes of a 
disdained femininity is underlined in the scene by the immediate cut to 
Alicia’s face after the last line. To boot, Lara is interviewed by Diane and 
the name partners; Margulies has no lines throughout the scene and 
rarely has any reaction shots. The final cut to her medium close-up 
signals that while Alicia is there only as silent observer, her presence is 
vital to the scene’s effect. The exchange between Diane and Lara is 
presented in reverse-angle single shots, yet Lara’s last utterance is 
completed not by Diane’s reaction shot but rather Alicia’s, articulating a 
special resonance between them (Figures 5.25 and 5.26). 
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Figure 5.25      
Figure 5.26 
Her visually emphasised stare at the client on which the scene ends 
confirms the similarity between the procedural plot’s heroine and the 
programme’s star. This partly refers to the obvious parallel of the two 
women’s involvements in high-profile sexual scandals; but in the 
context of the preceding exchange it also highlights Alicia’s by then 
customary depiction as similarly refusing to conform to expectations of 
‘feminine’ behaviour, replaced with ‘excessive’ silence. As discussed, the 
programme makes great efforts to create a link between these 
expectations of femininity and genre traditions; thus a refusal to abide 
by the rules of one speaks to the struggle to shake off associations of 
the other. 
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The programme then counters the ‘excess’ of melodrama in terms of 
displayed affect with an equally ‘excessive’ refusal of emotive 
performance. However, this signifier of the melodramatic mode remains 
prominent via scarce outbursts of emotional-physical performance 
(what Anna Everett calls the ‘WTF’ moments characterising Shondaland 
series [2015, 38]). The Good Wife’s storytelling uses strategically placed 
and memorably grand displays of character breakdown which gain their 
significance from their scarcity and the sometimes season-long build-up 
to them. Positioned at distinct and accentuated points of the whole 
series’ narrative, they dominantly involve physical expressions of 
grandstanding and anger. The pilot’s slap is an example; others include 
Will storming into Alicia’s office and knocking the items on her desk to 
the floor in the season five episode ‘Hitting the Fan’ after finding out 
that she had been plotting to abandon the firm. The title indicates the 
binary of slow-burning tension and outbursts of crisis, signalling their 
‘plot device’ employment as self-reflexive smartness. Similarly, the same 
season’s game changer episode in which Will is killed in the courtroom 
is titled ‘Dramatics Your Honour’ – the metatextual admittance of 
relying on melodrama twists highlights the series’ constant negotiations 
of expressive modes.  
Another instance of enacted excessive emotionality occurs in the season 
seven episode ‘Iowa’ in which campaign manager Eli Gold (Alan 
Cummings) admits to Alicia that years ago he erased a voicemail from 
her phone in which Will professed his love. This is an example of serial 
memory: viewer attention is rewarded by recalling an unresolved 
conflict from six seasons ago. Mobilising a textual feature of ‘quality’ 
narration in a storyline embedded in domestic melodrama (the love 
triangle plot for Nussbaum accounts for a ‘feminine’ address), the 
sequence following the confession juggles the requirements of both 
forms. It struggles to express the adequate affective response this 
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moment invites, while keeping at arm’s length the associations of 
‘melodramatic’ performance and mise-en-scène. Eli’s confession is 
followed by Alicia’s signature measured silence and composed ‘Get out’, 
turning into a physical expression of anger: knocking over a chair, 
shoving away a table. The following sequence balances the moment’s 
heightened emotional stakes via mobilising comedy and drama, in this 
mixed mode offsetting ‘sophisticated’ drama and melodrama aesthetics 
via dialogue-free performance. Alicia, visibly struggling to hold back an 
outburst, slowly takes a stack of dishes out of the kitchen cabinet, and 
sorts them into two piles by checking the inscriptions on the bottom. 
She then picks up the pile of cheaper china and flings them one by one 
at Eli, chasing him out of the apartment (Figures 5.27 to 5.29).  
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Figures 5.27 to 5.29 
The emphasised calculatedness of physically enacted female anger 
transforms a classically (melo)dramatic trope into ‘sophisticated’ 
slapstick in Margulies and Cummings’ comic double act, and tellingly 
this mixture is only present when the female protagonist performs 
anger toward someone else. Once Eli is gone and Alicia loses her 
diegetic audience, the tone turns purely serious, but continues to work 
out the tension between the character’s composure and physical 
enactments of emotional upheaval. The following sequence in which 
she returns to an open suitcase and continues packing, then flips it 
around before collapsing on the bed screaming complies with 
melodrama tropes, and is arguably an anticipated payoff for a seven-
year long audience hook (Figures 5.30 to 5.32). 
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Figures 5.30 to 5.32 
The previous examples of expressions of anger mobilised character 
interactions, suggesting a correlation between ‘quality’ aesthetics and 
the diegetic performance of ‘melodramatic’ anger. This parallels 
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Leonard’s interpretation regarding the series’ treatment of mediated 
sexual behaviour: for her, the programme expresses scepticism vis-à-vis 
notions of a ‘sexual truth’ in public dissections of sex scandals through 
its main character’s exaggerated opaqueness (the ‘ethic of quiet 
refusal’) and through its emphasis on performance (i.e. inauthenticity) 
of ‘sexual explanations’ in public (2014b, 953–56). If this stance informs 
both the ‘feminism’ and high cultural status of the series, the scene in 
which Alicia enacts (as opposed to performs) an emotional breakdown is 
a break with this trend, since it provides us with an exclusive insight into 
her emotional turmoil – this at a cost of aesthetic superiority, operating 
in full-on melodramatic mode. The episode’s critical reception bemoans 
precisely this dualism, seeing the bedroom breakdown’s over-the-top 
feminine melodrama as uncharacteristically direct, at odds with the 
usual subtlety of the series’ aesthetics. The Vulture critic’s dismissal of 
its handling of performance is representative, finding Margulies’ 
signature ‘subtle acting’ irreconcilable with this ‘over-the-top reaction’, 
effecting what ‘just feels like melodrama’ (Anon. 2016). 
The analysis of the minutiae of this sequence gives an indication of the 
issues with which the series struggles around cultural value, genre, and 
female subjectivity. It also exemplifies the ways in which it 
problematises gendered affect in its link to television forms and 
narrative traditions. The programme navigates this by segmenting its 
serialised and procedural storytelling between the protagonist couple, 
and into this feeds the discursive ‘straddling the line’ between cable 
television’s high-concept storytelling and network TV’s standard 
episodic narration with their respective cultural positions. Yet as these 
two aspects constantly bleed into each other, so does the series aspire 
to complicate the associated genderedness of these narrative forms. 
Alicia’s centrality to the legal procedural aspect with its case-of-the-
week formula, while roughly fitting into traditions of female-centred 
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television dramas, becomes upset via character portrayal, but also 
confirming its tropes of femininity and affect. The prestige drama aspect 
and empowerment-procedural-for-the-ladies aspect merge in the initial 
function Alicia performs within the law firm: a draw for high-profile 
clients with her connections and reputation as a politician’s wife, her 
position extradiegetically connects these narrative strands. But this 
function extends pragmatism since, as established early on, her 
professional skills are enhanced by her exceptional empathy toward 
clients which the firm exploits – the procedural plot emphasises the 
heroine’s emotional availability counterintuitively manifested in 
restrained behaviour (empathetic silences, curt but sensitive 
utterances). This emotional availability blends with her portrayal as 
politician’s wife refusing melodramatic excess, using silence ‘as a 
strategy of power rather than compliance’ (Leonard 2014b, 955). This 
way, the series builds a mixture of gendered storytelling practices that 
meet in the titular figure’s portrayal, determining the programme’s 
genre associations and position in the ‘quality’ brand. 
The female heroine’s portrayal revolving around silence and its 
relationship to power and affect determines then the series’ reputation 
as sophisticated television, embedded in genre hybridity. Another 
aspect of this ‘sophistication’ is the cynicism with which the serialised 
narrative treats legal and political institutions, understood in journalism 
as a rare signifier of grown-up entertainment in a sea of infantilising 
popular culture. When Slate critic Willa Paskin (2014) calls the series 
‘television for adults’ for its ‘unprecedented depth and cynicism’ in 
addressing corruption and political power, she draws on terms 
frequently employed by critics to justify contemporary television’s 
artistic value, namely programming context and associated narrative-
aesthetic methods. Similar to Nussbaum, she heralds the ways the 
series exploits the constraints of network television, but unusually 
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discusses these features as more mature, i.e. more intelligent, than 
cable drama’s modes of address. However, while the series 
‘understands power as both a more subtle and insidious force than 
series like The Sopranos or Breaking Bad do’, its prestige is forever 
tainted by its procedural form (ibid.). Paskin inscribes onto the values of 
programming context the dualism of infantilising popular culture versus 
‘mature’ art, involving notions of complexity and intelligence. But here it 
is cable television, rather than (as could be expected) network drama, 
that falls short of a ‘mature’ address of issues of morality and power.  
Paskin’s writing poignantly displays the common belief that quality TV 
overwrites historic understandings of television’s cultural status as 
immature and feminine entertainment, further feeding into cultural 
studies’ debates around value judgements of arts and media. To support 
her argument about The Good Wife as ‘television for adults’, she cites 
New York Times film critic A. O. Scott’s seminal article ‘The Death of 
Adulthood in American Culture’ (2014), a lengthy elegy over the demise 
of paternalistic maturity’s legitimacy in contemporary popular culture. 
Uniting the status of convergence media culture under the umbrella of 
an increasingly dominant ‘juvenile’ aesthetic, Scott juxtaposes this with 
this media’s transitional gender politics, finding these processes 
intertwined. Described as a ‘frontier’, they culminate for him in 
television’s cultural shift whereby prestige male-centred dramas codify 
the fall of patriarchy, while virtually every other TV phenomenon 
participates in digging its grave. Since Scott lends great importance to 
popular feminism’s simultaneous triumph – not least via the ubiquity of 
female-centred TV comedy and dramedy – his argument is another 
example of processes described in the previous section whereby post-
recessionary Western culture narrativises itself as a crisis of patriarchy 
and a consolidation of female independence and subjectivity. With its 
link between immature culture and triumphant feminism, Scott’s article 
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expresses the grown-up/immature divide’s associated genderedness 
that continues to underlie cultural criticism, as feminist scholarship 
previously demonstrated (see Chapter 2).35 
Scott’s article incited a wide array of commentaries, repeatedly pointing 
out its elitism and masculinism (Kalick 2014, Bustillos 2014, Sternbergh 
2014). In this light, Paskin’s reference to the article as underscoring her 
reading of The Good Wife as member of the endangered group of 
‘grown-up entertainment’, is especially contradictory. Scott leaves no 
doubt about the connection between popular feminism’s emergence 
and the ‘crisis of adulthood’ associated with patriarchal authority and 
television’s generic legacies: he pits the ‘gloomy-man, angry-man, 
antihero dramas’ against the half-hour comedy and dramedy as spaces 
where feminist discourses flourish (Scott 2014). When he argues that 
these generic formulas accommodate ‘female rebellion’, he also 
articulates this as resistance against prestige drama’s ‘serious’ and 
‘mature’ modes of expression. Consequently, Paskin placing The Good 
Wife into this nexus means that she has to abandon the chain of 
associations on which Scott’s writing is founded: if the programme is 
one of the remaining few examples of mature TV while showcasing 
female subjectivity and dramatising its relationship to social power, 
then this is at odds with the idea that the ‘feminist’ attack on traditional 
patriarchal authority espouses ‘juvenile’ modes of expression. Her 
gesture thus assures that the programme is understood as ‘masculine’ 
entertainment whose treatment of social power’s seductive appeal is 
even subtler than that of male-led cable dramas.  
The Good Wife once again becomes an anomaly in television culture: it 
concentrates on politicising female subjectivity and treating feminism as 
                                                          
35 Tellingly, the film magazine Sight and Sound referenced Scott’s piece in its 2014 end-of-year poll of best UK 
film releases to support leading film critics’ lament of  the ‘eclipse of what we think of as adult themes’ and a 
growing ‘attachment to childhood’ in Hollywood cinema, concluding that ‘mature’ art has relocated to prestige 
TV drama manifested in the trio of Mad Men, Breaking Bad, and The Sopranos (Romney 2015). Here, television 
has become the last bastion of cinema’s best values, outperforming not just its own medium but cinema itself. 
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part of the political intrigue, but complicates the generic associations 
and performance traditions that this seemingly invites via mobilising the 
‘quality’ text’s aesthetics. This aesthetic and political ‘subtlety’ lands it 
for Paskin in that disappearing cohort of adult and patriarchal 
entertainment that Scott eulogises. Evidently, the feature contributing 
to the series’ importance for its supporters, namely a feminine-coded 
address married with the distancing from melodrama’s generic 
conventions, makes it uncategorisable for popular cultural criticism’s 
sensemaking of gendered TV trends. 
 
1.B Orange Is the New Black 
 
While The Good Wife’s awkward position in quality television discourses 
stems from the intertwined contexts of institutional background and 
gendered generic practices, for Orange, the notion of 
‘uncategorisability’ is not simply a consequence of these contexts but an 
integral feature of the show’s inception and publicity. Its flagship status 
for Netflix’s foray into original programming bears down on every 
aspect of the show’s political economy, effecting that its cultural status 
in the convergent media landscape is inseparable from Netflix’s brand 
building strategies generally. When Netflix executive Ted Sarandos calls 
Orange ‘pioneering’ and ‘iconoclastic’ to defend its aesthetics (see 
previous section), this description applies to the company’s own self-
positioning in the industry as reformer of convergence-era television.  
The touted innovative aesthetics, distribution models, and viewer 
engagement notwithstanding, these strategies still tie Netflix to existing 
television culture, as TV scholar Anthony Smith (2015) demonstrates. 
His overview of industry, journalistic, and scholarly discourses around 
Netflix challenges their combined efforts to position it as innovative in 
every aspect of its original programming production and distribution, 
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such as the promotion of autonomous viewing practices as opposed to 
television’s linear scheduling, and its effects on storytelling methods. 
The discourses that Smith problematises, especially those lauding 
Netflix as evolutionary in convergence media for its production, 
distribution, and consumption models, which distinguish it from the 
cable/network context, are not new. They evoke the rhetoric mobilised 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s to celebrate the appearance of 
premium cable TV’s, and specifically HBO’s, business model and 
branding strategies for its original programming. Tellingly, Netflix 
positions HBO as its main competitor both in terms of economic 
prowess and generational and aesthetic innovation (Spangler 2014; 
Jenner 2016, 261). The rhetorical contradiction Smith describes is also 
familiar from this era, scrutinised in still-ongoing academic debates 
around the television industry’s efforts to re-define ‘quality’. Smith 
demonstrates that despite Netflix’s and its media reception’s insistence 
that it ‘invent[s] a new art form’ that is ‘not quite TV and not quite film’ 
(VanDerWerff 2015b), its programming’s narrative strategies do adhere 
to traditional TV storytelling conventions while accommodating a 
changed consumption context. Similar to HBO’s case then, whose status 
as forerunner of quality programming presupposed the surrounding 
force field of ‘average’ television, Netflix’s position as cable and network 
television’s progressive ‘other’ assumes their presence as 
complementing competitors. 
The similarities between HBO and Netflix regarding branding strategies 
and reception have been noted in scholarship (Jenner 2016), but less 
has been written about the commonalities in the ways in which their 
first flagship series were segmented into respective gendered interests. 
Just as HBO established its reputation with two programmes (The 
Sopranos and Sex and the City), both transgressively representing the 
complexity of contemporaneous cultural identities within two different 
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sets of gendered generic contexts, so did Netflix develop its ‘iconoclast’ 
status with the double bill of Orange and House of Cards (2013-). 
Accordingly, these two series’ cultural significance has become marked 
in the interconnected areas of gendered address, aesthetic novelty, and 
genre hybridity. However, while HBO’s reinvention of the ‘quality’ brand 
involved the term’s masculinisation, Netflix prominently targets affluent 
young female viewers, which complicates the dominant ideal of 
‘quality’. While both programmes are marketed as trendsetting and 
exceptional, in terms of establishing the programming platform’s 
cultural cachet it was Orange that Netflix eventually heralded as the 
series securing its position in the high-end programming market, even 
though House of Cards’ launch preceded Orange’s by a few months. This 
is clear from the ways Netflix set up a hierarchal relationship among its 
programmes in terms of popularity and buzz marketing. The strategy is 
boosted by the company’s secretiveness about its viewership statistics 
and viewer preference patterns by demographic, while competitors’ 
ratings data are publicly available (Matrix 2014, 125). Lacking these 
numbers, the public must rely on Netflix’s communication, which 
frequently asserts in nebulous language Orange’s primacy in the ratings 
and its popularity among millennials (Spangler 2014, Kafka 2013, 
Hanson 2014). The latter contributes to the show’s reputation as 
surprise ‘word-of-mouth hit’ (Harvey 2014) thanks to its popularity on 
social media, reportedly outperforming House of Cards’ following base 
on Twitter and Facebook (Wallenstein 2014).  
Complemented by the enthusiastic critical reception, Orange‘s novelty 
feature, namely the focus on diverse femininities in hour-long format 
and in a tone deemed unusual for female-centred narration, 
contributed to Netflix’s hyped status as exceptional in the otherwise 
saturated quality television market. While House of Cards fits into the 
quality paradigm with its antihero male protagonist, goal-oriented 
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narrative, milieu of national politics, polished aesthetics, promotional 
reliance on Kevin Spacey’s name recognition as the production’s top-
billed star, and the evocation of a literary quality (‘Shakespearean’ is a 
moniker mobilised both by the programme and critical reception), 
Orange does not display these familiar signifiers of aesthetic superiority. 
Netflix promotes the programme as subversive precisely via this 
contrast, highlighting the unprecedented focus on multiple female 
subjectivities in a rhetoric around social realism and political critique 
associated with the prison setting, its dramatising of race, class, and 
sexual identity politics, and the initial lack of name actors in the cast. 
Female address, the politics of representation, and social awareness are 
the signifiers singling out the series in the field of exclusivist television.  
Consider the promotional article commissioned by Netflix in 2014 on 
The New York Times website, timed to coincide with the series’ season 
two launch and mimicking the format of an investigative report that 
addresses institutional issues of women’s incarceration in the US (Deziel 
n/d). For a piece of native advertising, most conspicuous about the 
article is its obfuscation about the show or programmer it sells: Orange 
and Netflix are mentioned only once in the lengthy article, name-
dropped once with ostensibly no promotional intent. This and a small 
banner on top of the page are the only hints that this is a sponsored 
advert. The writing style applies techniques characteristic of 
investigative journalism to put forward its argument around women’s 
incarceration, combining ‘human interest’ stories and a general 
examination of policies and their shortcomings supported by statistics. 
Considered by marketing experts the debut of a new type of multimedia 
campaign strategy (Moses 2014), this advert places the series in the 
context of a politically-socially argumentative aesthetic tradition 
associated with a prestige newspaper, and highlights an aspect of the 
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drama that mobilises ‘social awareness’ rhetoric in order to increase 
viewer interest.36 
Promoting Orange as female-centred and politically subversive 
entertainment compliments other aspects of Netflix’s branding policies, 
most characteristically its popularisation of online binge-watching 
culture, termed by Sidneyeve Matrix the ‘Netflix effect’ (2014). Her 
examination of Netflix’s branding strategies around binge-viewing 
connects these with young consumers’ (or ‘screenagers’) use of digital 
media platforms. She challenges media discourses positioning the 
binge-watching phenomenon as potentially problematic youth 
consumership due to its associations with physical-mental passivity 
(‘couch potato culture’) and exposure to inappropriate (mature) 
content. Countering this historically familiar moral panic rhetoric via 
audience research, she demonstrates a ‘participatory cultural 
citizenship’ among millennial audiences using social media (ibid., 134).  
Matrix’s considerations of generational discourses around digital media 
consumption and binge-watching also reveal a connection to a history 
of gendered rhetoric about mass culture. With the term ‘binge’ 
etymologically originating in the description of excessive drink and food 
consumption, it ‘suggests some form of shameful indulgence, and a lack 
of control’ (Ramsay 2013), whether describing drunkenness, eating 
disorders, or compulsive shopping sprees. Couched in discourses around 
consumer citizenship, this association is linked to the terms in which 
cultural critics analyse identity in late modern capitalist societies, which 
according to feminist scholars (Joyrich 1996, Petro 1986, Brunsdon 
1997) betray a gendered understanding of consumer identities 
(‘feminine’ passivity, uncontrollability, indulgence but short attention 
                                                          
36 Promotional methods highlighting the series’ social-political relevance started to become dominant only 
around season two’s launch, that is, after audience and critical buzz hailed Orange as a novel text of women’s 
representation. For more on the ways in which Orange’s promotional strategies capitalise on issues that the 
series problematises see DeCarvalho (2015). 
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span etc.). Without engaging with gendered implications of the cultural 
distrust toward binge-watching, Debra Ramsay’s examination evokes 
these earlier discussions around gender and hierarchal cultural values 
applied to different media (2013). She laments that the intensive 
consumption of literature or classical music is never called ‘bingeing’, 
since these art forms have higher currency in cultural hierarchies than 
television (ibid.) 
Jenner quotes Ramsay in arguing that binge-watching as cultural 
phenomenon in fact derives from DVD box set culture (2016, 265), 
which contrastingly is associated more with cult television and a 
‘valorisation (...) of (…) texts as symbolically bounded and isolatable 
“objects” of value’ (Hills quoted in Jenner 2016, 265). Here the 
operative term of consumption is ‘marathon viewing’, a more respectful 
description of watching multiple episodes of a series as Ramsay notes. 
To return to Matrix’s analysis of surveys among teen audiences, the 
binaries she pinpoints and complicates fit into these oppositional 
hierarchies around media consumption practices. Notions of a 
‘mediated culture of instant gratification’ (the online availability of a 
programme’s entire seasons) and ‘guilty pleasure’ viewing are 
demonstrated with a quote from a teenage girl who admits to ‘eat[ing] 
that sappy teen drama up like it’s my Grandma’s spaghetti’ (Matrix 
2014, 130), which Matrix counters with increased viewer control, and 
fan activities like criticism and interpretation (ibid., 133). These 
(problematised) oppositions are reminiscent of the terms in which A.O. 
Scott’s (2014) apocalyptic vision of grown-up culture’s demise betrays 
its value hierarchies: it may not be a wild guess to assume that Scott 
would share the worried rhetoric around binge-watching culture as a 
feature of the ’immature’ mediasphere’s increasing dominance. And as 
noted, his influential think piece openly links generation and gender 
politics.  
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When Netflix incorporates binge-watching culture into its brand identity 
as preferred mode of audience engagement, it simultaneously strives to 
upset the existing implications of a ‘lazy’ consumption culture. The role 
it assigns to Orange as purveyor of this effort, and its direct address to 
the millennial female audience base, speak to the binge phenomenon’s 
underlying genderedness. The series’ ‘quality’ moniker is generated 
around the text‘s ‘socially aware’ epistemology, which in turn engenders 
viewer engagement practices aiming to complicate notions of a passive 
and infantilised viewer culture. These dynamics become focused on 
binge-watching whose cultural relevance is controlled by Netflix: the 
company markets its products as ‘instant gratification’ and escapism 
(especially in its sexual connotations as seen in the teen slang use of 
‘Netflix and chill’) while also tactically upsetting this by simultaneously 
promoting the programme’s political ‘iconoclasm’. 
Just as Netflix manoeuvres its entrance into the quality television 
business with contested distribution and consumption practices and 
with Orange‘s gendered subversions, difficulties of categorisation 
emerge in the programme’s other attributes as well. As noted, this 
surfaces poignantly in its nomination process for the Emmy Awards. 
Here, Orange’s form as hour-long drama/comedy, evidently clashing 
with expectations of a female-centred generic address, confuses the 
industry’s self-applied categorisation models that function to facilitate 
evaluation. Yet another aspect of the ways in which Orange’s 
‘iconoclasm’ involves a gendered assessment of its merits is Netflix’s 
own marginalisation of the series on its online interface as female-
targeted entertainment. Sarah Arnold calls this Netflix ‘ghettoising’ both 
the ‘strong female lead’ trope and the targeted, presumably female, 
audience (2014). Arnold challenges Netflix’s touted liberation of the 
viewer from scheduled broadcasting traditions – frequently accused of 
imposing ideals of taste and cultural value – by showing how its 
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algorithmic personalised recommendation system similarly imposes a 
viewer identity enabled by demographic analysis: 
… the consequence of such personalised viewing is the eradication of 
diversity. (…) [T]he navigation model offered by Netflix (…) leads to a 
narrowing of views, perspectives and identities. (…) However 
unintentional it may be, the recommendation model, coupled with its 
‘ghettoising’ of women, results in a mode of address that assumes 
the masculine and marginalises the feminine. (Ibid.) 
Arnold demonstrates this by noting that the recommendation system 
suggests programmes categorised under the header ‘strong female 
lead’ once the viewer finished watching Orange, while not offering 
‘strong male lead’ type programming upon finishing House of Cards. This 
undermines appeals to personalisation and scientific objectivity in the 
algorithmic method’s ‘”truth claim” about audiences’ (ibid.), highlighting 
Netflix’s gender-coded address stemming from the social audience’s 
pre-existing demographic categorisations. The streaming platform’s 
production of a ‘ghettoised’ female audience as one homogeneous taste 
group betrays its unease in positioning Orange as figurehead of the 
company’s novel programming and business model; originating in the 
choice of packaging these as ‘feminised’ configurations of cultural value.  
Even though Orange is considered one of Netflix’s signature series, it 
nevertheless carries the moniker ‘female-centred’ in a way that, while 
capitalised on for its ‘iconoclasm’, also encapsulates a suspicion about 
how and to whom it is to be marketed. This is also evident in the series’ 
media reception that on the one hand celebrates it for its 
representational politics and for catapulting Netflix into the quality TV 
market; it is ‘a bull’s-eye with the sort of premium-cable space the 
distributor is eager to carve out with its original efforts’ (Lowry 2013). 
On the other hand, media discourses frequently engage with the 
assumed problem of Orange’s female-centredness and address, 
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evidenced in articles aimed to convince male audiences to watch the 
series despite this: pieces like ‘What Men Can Learn from Orange Is the 
New Black’ (Dockterman 2014) or ‘5 “Girl Shows” That Guys Should Be 
Watching’ (Outlaw 2013) both argue for the series’ accessibility for male 
audiences by highlighting features that help situate it in discourses 
about prestige drama, either by comparing it to HBO’s prison drama Oz 
(1997-2003; Dockterman 2014) or by the reassurance that ‘This is no Sex 
in [sic] the City fashion show’ (Outlaw 2013). These examples 
demonstrate again the discursive connection between aesthetic 
evaluation practices and a gendered address within the ‘quality’ 
discourse. 
The specific ‘feminisation’ strategy in the ‘quality’ category – women in 
central roles and dramatisations of gender politics – works then as a site 
of tensions, inscribed onto questions of established generic, aesthetic, 
and narrative conventions. Similar to the other examined programmes, 
much of Orange’s notoriety as something ‘other’ than its peers is linked 
to the textual-discursive upsetting of these conventions, which, again, 
follow from the politicised centrality of women and their allocated 
televisual spaces. Just like for 30 Rock and women’s sitcom/ comedian 
comedy/ satire, Parks and women’s sitcom/ comedian comedy/ 
mockumentary, and The Good Wife and melodrama/ political drama/ 
legal drama, this female presence disturbs the masculine-coded 
format’s generic signifiers where this disturbance becomes a 
problematised focus both of the text and the programme’s political 
economy. For Orange, contestations over the show’s cultural position 
and its decoding revolve around the dubiousness of situating its female-
centred themes in a dramedy format that is hour-long instead of the 
tried-and-tested half-hour length of female-targeted quality 
programming.  
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As shown in earlier chapters, the form I call postfeminist dramedy 
developed by the end of the 1990s as a female-targeted televisual 
template of focalising changing gender scripts in America. Popularised 
by its Urtext Sex and the City, this is also the format in which the tonal 
mixture of ‘blue’ comedy and melodrama allows for transgressively 
thematising changing sexual mores. While Showtime’s replication of the 
format does not necessarily concentrate on themes of ‘risqué’ sexuality 
in Sex and the City‘s style, shows like Nurse Jackie, Weeds, The Big C, 
and HBO’s Enlightened and Girls still use the template to explore female 
subjectivities whose portrayal offers a dramatised clash with assumed 
norms of white middle-class femininity. Central protagonists’ summary 
descriptions undergird this, such as: nurse with a pill addiction, weed-
dealing widow, wife and mother who starts to behave bizarrely after her 
cancer diagnosis, and career woman experiencing a nervous 
breakdown. In Girls’ case, the Sex and the City formula’s generational 
and tonal updating similarly offers a politically committed focus on 
female subjectivity (for a comparison between the two series see Winch 
[2013]). Additionally, the ways in which the programme and media 
discourses focalise central star Lena Dunham’s body as transgressive 
both anatomically and as sexual agent, also drive home the point that 
female transgression is the issue at stake here. ‘Idiosyncratic 
femininities’ (in terms of individual difference) is then the common 
operative description determining the programmes’ generic-aesthetic 
properties as half-hour dramedies. While genre-mixing is an expected 
trait for the expression of such transgressions in quality television, the 
half-hour format’s predominance speaks to an assumed closeness of 
these themes to the comic mode. The half-hour length is historically 
connected to sitcom, a legacy that may have been upset with the dawn 
of convergence-era television and its generic hybridities, but the female-
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centred half-hour dramedy’s popularity reveals a tight link between 
gendered address and longstanding format paradigms.  
The discussed controversies around the 2015 Emmy nomination process 
indicate as much, with the Television Academy codifying the connection 
between episode length and generic traits – paradoxically in an effort to 
address the increased complexity of television’s genre traditions. The 
new category system’s task was to eliminate the issue of genre precisely 
for its contemporary elusiveness, using episode length instead as a 
presumably more objective classification method. Thus when media 
debates translated the decision back into genre terms, this illuminated 
the continued hold of the connection between generic address and 
episode length, all linked to taste hierarchies. The decision ties generic 
descriptors to television series whose status as pioneering revolves 
around their mixed tone and hour-long episode length in media 
discourses (Viruet 2015). That cultural hierarchies between drama and 
comedy govern tensions around the new nomination process surfaces in 
the industry’s and critics’ explicit agreement that the drama category is 
more competitive than comedy, which Viruet also mentions discussing 
Orange’s case (ibid.). When the Academy panel ruled that only Orange 
had to compete in the drama category from the petitioning series, not 
only did this formalise industry confusion over the programme’s generic 
standing – the Screen Actors’ Guild Awards and the Golden Globe 
Awards both continue to nominate Orange as comedy –, it also 
diminished its chances for winning the Emmy, the most coveted award 
in the TV industry. In the drama category, Orange counts as an outlier 
too light to compete with dark prestige dramas, not least House of 
Cards.37  
                                                          
37 One of the reasons Netflix prefers Orange’s classification as comedy is to avoid competition in award seasons 
with House of Cards, its other prominent nominated series (Viruet 2015). This again shows a strategic split linked 
to gendered generic address and marketability that governs the company’s choice of its pair of signature series. 
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The series’ promotion also favours the comedy description, as 
evidenced in a tongue-in-cheek tweet on Orange’s official Twitter 
account reacting to the ruling. The post reads ‘Drama Category? We got 
this...’ and includes an embedded video showing a season one scene in 
which fan favourite character Suzanne ‘Crazy Eyes’ Warren (Uzo Aduba) 
recites a monologue from Coriolanus to a stunned fellow inmate 
('Orange Is the New Black' 2015). The choice of scene is characteristic of 
the series’ self-promotion as generically subversive, here through 
tweaking the meaning of ‘Shakespearean’ frequently applied to male-
centred prestige dramas (including House of Cards). This possibility 
comes from its slippery position as drama/comedy linked with a 
transgressive cultural position. This is intensified around both the 
fictional Suzanne – a popular black female character who functions as 
tragicomic jester figure, quoting Shakespeare in a widely circulated 
comic scene –, and around Aduba who, as frequently highlighted in 
media commentary, is the second actor ever after Ed Asner to have won 
Emmy awards for the same role both in the comedy and drama category 
(Donnelly 2015).38  
Lack of industry accolades and discourses around them have become a 
pivotal site on which the series’ treatment of gender, genre, and cultural 
value are publicly negotiated, and assumed problematic to reconcile 
with existing paradigms. If Orange’s attraction as ‘quality’ TV lies in its 
politicised examination of the US prison industrial complex and 
women’s incarceration via focusing on individualised stories of diverse 
womanhood, this topic sits uncomfortably within the hour-long 
comedy/drama format per industry judgement. Emmy nomination 
controversies suggest bluntly that Orange needs to either be half-hour 
                                                          
38 The difference between Aduba’s and Asner’s wins, overlooked by commentaries, is that Asner’s wins for the 
role of Lou Grant in two different generic categories were due to the fact that he was nominated for two, 
generically different, programmes, The Mary Tyler Moore Show and Lou Grant – I examined in Chapter 2 this 
character’s prominence in MTM’s two prestigious series and how it exemplifies the ‘quality’ discourse’s historic 
development in terms of genre and gender. In contrast, Aduba won for the same series in 2014 and 2015. 
 253 
 
long to secure a familiar generic position or lose the comic tone tied to 
diverse womanhood to be considered full-on drama.  
Issues of tone connected to a gendered focus are also the subject of 
Emily Nussbaum’s analysis and advocacy of the series (2015). This article 
is especially relevant for my argument as it contrasts Orange’s cultural 
work with acclaimed prestige drama Show Me a Hero (2015), an HBO 
miniseries produced by celebrated TV auteur David Simon. In many 
aspects following in the mould of Simon’s earlier series The Wire and 
Treme (2010-2013), the miniseries exemplifies the ideal of a complex TV 
drama, providing a point of reference for unpacking issues of tone, 
gender, and cultural value in Nussbaum’s comparison-and-contrast 
analysis.  
Recounting the story of a housing desegregation scandal in the city of 
Yonkers, NY in the late 1980s, Show Me a Hero is the quintessential 
authorly text, conceived in Simon’s familiar politically argumentative 
initiative to discuss race as a social class issue in America, expressed via 
documentarist aesthetic. Nussbaum argues that the ‘social issue’ 
interest of Simon’s work ‘with plots torn not from the headlines but 
from the op-ed page’,39 might form a great part of Simon’s auteur status 
but this approach is not that rare in television culture. In fact, it is 
prevalent today in less respected forms like ‘comedies, shows aimed at 
women and teens, [and] sci-fi’, of which she calls Orange ‘the most 
striking example’ (2015). Nussbaum’s argument recalls historic notions 
of television’s political-social responsibility to reflect ‘reality’, steeped in 
the medium’s assumed immediacy. But as discussed, convergence-era 
trends shift cultural value onto aesthetic-narrative complexity, while 
television’s traditional pursuit of a ‘difficult knowledge’ and political 
realism is re-focused onto less-revered programming foregrounding 
diversity rhetoric and/or female presence, exemplified in How to Get 
                                                          
39 Shades of Netflix’s native advert in The New York Times (see above). 
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Away with Murder’s Annalise Keating. The basis on which Nussbaum 
compares Show Me a Hero and Orange is a shared appeal to political 
advocacy, or a ‘mission to educate and to illuminate’ (ibid.). The 
difference of their critical evaluation and categorisation lies in a 
gendered governance of generic-aesthetic address: the former displays 
signifiers of quality drama, i.e. ‘realism, male protagonists, big-name 
Hollywood directors’, the latter a ‘tonally perverse’ genre hybridity that 
leaves the TV Academy puzzled (ibid.).  
Nussbaum details the two series’ different aesthetics, outlined in the 
‘realistic drama’ versus ‘vaudevillian comedy/drama’ dualism, but there 
is an even more demonstrative difference between their modes of 
expression tied to gendered traditions. As part of their efforts to 
narrativise political advocacy, both series use raced and classed 
femininities inscribed with political meanings. As Nussbaum comments, 
the inmates of Litchfield ‘are demographic cousins of the women on 
Show Me a Hero’; the difference being the formers’ portrayals as ‘blown 
up, not life-size’ representations (ibid.). But Show Me a Hero‘s 
reputation is not tied to centralising previously neglected femininities; 
instead, it is the series’ treatment of race and class as sites of tensions in 
American society that critics herald in its subject matter. Yet its 
storytelling allocates a gendered and generic coding of narrative strands 
to make its socially conscious argument, an aspect that remains 
unexamined in critical reception. The plotting structure repeats 
methods Simon used in earlier series by employing parallel storylines 
around characters representing different social strata, producing a 
tableau of a community observed in its complexity. The central story of 
Yonkers Mayor Nick Wasicsko (Oscar Isaacs), battling local government 
to get new low-income housing built in white middle-class 
neighbourhoods, is contrasted with micro-stories of black and Latina 
women living in the projects, functioning as illustrations of racially 
 255 
 
segregated communities’ lived realities that politicians only argue about 
in the abstract. The multiple focus characteristic of The Wire and Treme 
is here separated along gendered lines, Wasicsko’s privileged white 
masculinity pitted against victimised raced femininities.  
The series then works out race and class issues via an unacknowledged 
gendering that feeds into aesthetic modes allocated to these multiple 
storylines: there is a clear effort to associate Wasicsko’s story with 
codes of tragedy, while the women’s stories operate in the 
melodramatic mode. These strategies fit with Simon’s earlier work, but 
as Linda Williams’ analysis of The Wire demonstrates, both that series 
and its producer’s commentaries struggle to shake off associations with 
melodrama (2014). Williams’ re-considered concept of melodrama helps 
ameliorate this tension, positing that its definition is not tied to 
feminised excess but to portraying moral struggles and fights against 
fate.40 But Williams also proposes that some storylines of The Wire do 
exhibit features of classic tragedy, particularly in Stringer Bell’s (Idris 
Elba) and Frank Sobotka’s (Chris Bauer) stories as ‘important members 
of their community who try to make change but when fate overcomes 
them, they accept it’ (ibid., 103). For Williams, the crucial difference 
between melodrama and tragedy lies in protagonists’ differing relation 
to justice, fate, and victimhood: The Wire is an ‘institutional melodrama’ 
in its outrage at an unjust social system, via stories of socially vulnerable 
individuals defenceless against a ‘predetermined fate’ (Williams 2014, 
104). These stories are in contrast with Bell’s and Sobotka’s tragic 
stories, yet the latter are embedded in ‘a larger melodrama that seeks 
justice and that is governed by the outrage that so little justice exists for 
the poor and the black’ (ibid., 104). 
                                                          
40 Jason Mittell incorporates this definition into his concept of ‘complex’ serial television to prove the paradigm’s 
political progressiveness and to fend off accusations of its ‘masculinism’ (2015, 233–260) –  see next section. 
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A similar generic struggle characterises the multiple storylines of Show 
Me a Hero, clearly delineated between Wasicsko’s central narrative and 
the victimised black and Latina women’s parallel micro-stories. The title 
openly communicates the discursive intent to interpret his story as 
tragedy: coming from the F. Scott Fitzgerald quote, ‘Show me a hero 
and I’ll write you a tragedy’, the text makes this literary reference 
explicit via a character’s utterance, also repeated in critical reception. 
The generic struggle then becomes a feature of the text’s meaning, 
complementing Simon’s own struggles to associate his oeuvre with this 
genre to signal its political-aesthetic superiority. And Wasicsko’s story 
can be interpreted via Williams’ concept, making him a prototypical 
tragic hero in his attempts to change fate (hubris), in his ‘tragic 
knowledge’ i.e. his recognition of the full picture’s significance (ibid., 
104), and in his acceptance of his struggles’ failure, expressed via 
suicide. The series negotiates between portraying the tragic hero’s 
exceptionalism and institutional melodrama’s operation. Unlike The 
Wire however, it inflates the tragic hero’s narrative importance: 
Nussbaum finds that the women’s stories suffer from a ‘peripheral 
quality’ (2015). This negotiation between tragedy and institutional 
melodrama betrays gendered oppositions, a feature never this 
prominent in Simon’s earlier work – Williams remarks that The Wire 
exhibits a ‘hard dominant masculinity’ and even misogyny (2014, 161), 
demonstrating that its institutional melodrama inscribes its political 
argument onto male protagonists’ stories. When Show Me a Hero uses 
raced female suffering to articulate its meanings, it does so by 
simultaneously centralising the male hero’s individual tragedy in a way 
that is more pronounced than it ever was in The Wire. 
As such, Nussbaum’s comparison not only codifies oppositional tonal 
and gendered strategies tied to ‘educational’ quality texts but starts to 
unearth a specific generic function of raced womanhood. In the contrast 
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between these two texts, Orange’s ‘iconoclasm’ emerges from its 
outrageously comic tone and sexual explicitness making it inappropriate 
for classification as ‘authentic’ message drama: ‘[w]ith its scenes of 
shower sex, [the series] has got the side eye from those who prefer 
their prison politics straight, so to speak’ (2015). Yet recall McHugh’s 
analysis of Orange‘s title sequence highlighting a documentary realism 
that may well be regarded as aesthetic signifier of a ‘straight politics’ 
(2015). ‘Realism’ becomes a key word in paratextual material as well, 
witnessed in series creator Jenji Kohan’s statements about Orange’s 
mixed generic tone: ‘dramas that are only dramatic are a lie, because 
life isn't just a drama and if you're reflecting reality, part of it should be 
humorous. When you have just a dry hour, I don't think it's reality’ 
(Fienberg 2013). For the hour-long serial, realism as an aesthetic mode 
to exhibit ‘social awareness’ becomes especially fraught with 
definitional tensions when it comes to centralised raced femininities. In 
Show Me a Hero, prestige drama’s educational ambition places raced 
women in relatively side-lined melodrama contexts as narrative support 
to the male hero’s tragedy, cumulatively producing the ‘social realism’ 
intent. In Orange, reversing the narrative focus results in a ‘realism’ that 
embraces grotesque and sexually explicit comedy. This on the one hand 
helps promote the series in an existing female-centred generic paradigm 
– the half-hour dramedy with which Kohan herself is associated via her 
work on Weeds. On the other, this strategy is in conflict with the 
allocation of high cultural value in ‘quality drama’ discourses, as Show 
Me a Hero’s generic-aesthetic negotiations demonstrate. These tensions 
ultimately stem from the uncertain location of socially marginalised 
femininities within quality television’s generic traditions: if their 
centralised presence signifies political progressiveness, i.e. a ‘serious’ 
message as benchmark of cultural worth, it is also entrapped in the 
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struggles over how their specific ‘realism’ can be allocated a mode of 
expression and at what cost of cultural value. 
 
2. Female-centred prestige drama and (post)feminism 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that foregrounded gender politics in 30 
Rock‘s and Parks‘ ‘comedy of distinction’ produced an acute 
nervousness in media discourses about their interpretation, surfacing in 
competitive comparisons. Moreover, critical debates inscribed onto Tina 
Fey’s and Amy Poehler’s ‘feminist’ star personas their respective 
comedies’ gender politics. The journalistic question ‘who/which series is 
the better feminist’ originates from the comic form’s specifics: 
comedian comedy’s transparency between ‘author’ and performed alter 
ego invites this condensation of attributed meanings onto the 
comedian. The 21st century popularity of ‘feminist’ female comedians in 
US television shows that the form is well-suited for its cultural 
significance to be configured in a political meaning. This owes to its 
status as relatively ‘low’ genre, the unique relationship between 
authorship and performance, and the assumed negotiation between its 
aesthetic aim (funniness) and feminism’s ‘serious’ political aim. In short, 
the two comedies’ understanding in cultural consciousness as quality 
television hinges greatly on their modes of engagement with feminist 
politics, concentrated onto their comic stars’ celebrity personas.  
If these comedies’ cultural significance involves the ambiguous critical 
interpretation of their emphasised gender politics, then this is in 
contrast with the hour-long female-centred drama’s allocation of 
cultural significance in critical debates. Rather than centring on notions 
of an adequate feminism, critical and industry discourses reveal more 
confusion about the televisual forms and appropriate programming 
contexts of The Good Wife and Orange. This is not to say that gender 
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politics do not feature in their evaluations at all; but the way these two 
series upset the perceived norms of ‘quality’ television surfaces 
primarily in critical-institutional unease about their aesthetic location. I 
also do not imply that genre is not a contested issue for 30 Rock and 
Parks, since the two comedies undoubtedly struggled to situate 
themselves in relation to gendered comedy traditions. But they are still 
firmly positioned as quality comedies in critical evaluation and genre 
description; the two dramas however, while critically acclaimed, occupy 
more contested generic spaces. The Good Wife straddles the apparently 
hierarchal expressive modes of network and cable television, also 
struggling to shed the taint of melodrama and the ‘ladies’ 
empowerment procedural’ label (Nussbaum 2014). Orange upsets the 
half-hour dramedy formula and the sincere tone of ‘message drama’, 
resulting in award season controversies. While all four case studies are 
objects of critical and institutional contestations originating in their 
foregrounded gender politics, for the hour-long series this primarily 
closes in on how to place them in categories of genre and programming 
context.  
The programmes’ treatment of postfeminism’s and feminism’s 
relationship derives from genre traditions too, namely from the female-
led half-hour dramedy’s influence on the four series (and other female-
centred programming) as immediate ideological precursor. A.O. Scott’s 
discussed rhetorical link between feminism’s and immature culture’s 
21st century triumph emphasises Sex and the City’s significance for 
American culture’s gender politics: he calls the programme ‘in 
retrospect the most influential television series of the early 21st century’ 
(2014), responsible for female-centred half-hour dramedies’ and 
comedies’ ubiquity – but avoids mentioning female-centred prestige 
drama. Comedies appear to be traceable back to the millennial half-
hour dramedy and gain on this basis cultural significance; but this 
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lineage is less easy to establish for hour-long series like the ones I 
analyse. I argue that the critical-institutional unease around their 
generic categorisation partly originates in their contested relationship to 
this formula. The aesthetic choice to narrativise female subjectivity in 
‘sophisticated’ and masculine-coded forms, rather than in half-hour 
dramedy format creates this unease and relative marginality. Moreover, 
the two comedies both use the opportunity to reference historic 
predecessors (female-led sitcoms) to establish generic validation, which 
is a less viable avenue for female-centred prestige drama due to the 
form’s scarcity and lack of ascribed significance in American TV history. 
For the comedies, genre provides a reliable framework, and it is rather 
the specific insertion of gender politics into it that incites critical 
debates; female-led drama has no such framework to fall back on, 
evidenced in discussed ambiguities of genre categorisation. 
While form is a contested issue for these two series in critical 
discourses, there is more consensus about their significance as 
politically novel programming, an agreement deriving from their 
categorisation around the ‘strong/complex female lead’ and her 
discursive importance. The trend variously called feminist or female-
centred quality programming, in which female protagonists’ narrative 
centrality signifies ‘feminism’, lends programmes the aura of political 
novelty and thus ‘quality’. It is this category into which The Good Wife 
and Orange fit with no critical uncertainty, and via which their cultural 
value is most recognised (O’Keeffe 2014, Blay 2015). Due to the 
category’s defining aspect – the centrality of a type of fictional figure – 
issues of genre and expressive modes are not priority for this discourse 
apart from celebrating the breadth of genres in which she is present 
(ibid.).  
The ‘complex female lead’ is then indeed a complex figure in that in her 
cultural status several ideological and aesthetic presuppositions 
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converge. As symbol of a triumphant feminism and diversity on 
television, she accounts for a representational realism that lends 
programmes novelty value. This figure provides proof for critics that the 
masculinist paradigm of quality television has met its challenge; if 
Annalise Keating is a female Walter White, then this makes How to Get 
Away with Murder a Breaking Bad for women (O’Keeffe 2014). The 
‘strong female character’s signifying power outranks issues of generic 
and aesthetic positioning, and becomes the main carrier of prestige for 
prime-time drama. In a presumed evolutionary trajectory, she becomes 
charged with increasing responsibility for an identity politics connected 
to issues of gender, race, class, and sexuality. This ascription of political 
progressiveness then follows a trajectory that in feminist scholarship’s 
terms can be described as struggling to overcome the postfeminist 
ethos to embrace intersectionalist feminism. Amanda Lotz’s concepts 
(2007, 2014) apply this logic to a certain extent: her cultural optimism 
about television’s increasing engagement with ideals of a feminist 
representational model feeds into her work on ‘quality’ television’s 
development, and corresponds to media criticism’s reliance on the 
‘strong female character’ as proof of this narrative of progression. A 
case in point is O’Keeffe’s article (2014) about the ‘TV renaissance for 
strong women’, which draws on quotes from Lotz to lend academic 
authority to its argument. However, this concept attaches little 
importance to issues of generic-aesthetic practices and value 
hierarchies in its rhetoric about political innovation. 
The understanding of the ‘strong female character’ as purveyor of 
feminism is also prominent in scholarship primarily engaging with 
‘quality’ television as aesthetic object; an approach dominant in Jason 
Mittell’s influential book Complex TV (2015a). Mittell’s work provides 
insight into the ideological divide in academic theory about the quality 
TV category and its relationship to gender politics. He looks at the 
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specifics of the ‘narrative complexity’ phenomenon, the term he coined 
for his seminal article on the subject (2006). As such, this examination 
concentrates on the aesthetics, or as he terms it the poetics of 
storytelling in convergence television, a concept building on literary 
theory and film studies models. He sets up this approach in a dualism 
with the analytic focus on what is often called the politics of television. 
Mittell describes the shift in television scholarship since the 1990s as a 
transition away from a primary interest in issues of representation, 
political economy, and identity (i.e. politics). This millennial 
development has led to what Lury calls the ‘aesthetic turn’ (2016, 120), 
or a preference for examining how television texts express formal 
innovations, i.e. poetics (Mittell 2015a, 3-4).  
In the chapter ‘Evaluation’ (ibid., 206-232), Mittell engages with the 
academic debate on ‘quality’ TV, arguing that excessive scholarly focus 
on the term and its problematic nature is an unproductive dead-end 
because it shuts off possibilities of evaluation based on aesthetic 
achievements – hence his suggestion for the description ‘complex TV’ 
instead, which for him does not imply evaluative hierarchy but is rather 
an apolitical designation of a narrative trend. His argument attempts to 
mediate between the groups debating the primacy of aesthetic versus 
political analysis in television scholarship (see Zborowski 2016). 
Nonetheless, he agrees with Sudeep Dasgupta (2012) who advocates for 
shunning Bourdieusian critical concepts about ‘quality’ TV and ‘quality’ 
audiences. Dasgupta finds it a patronising and elitist position from 
academics like Newman and Levine, Jane Feuer, or Michael Kackman to 
assume a direct correlation between ‘the people’ (social audiences) in 
need of ideological defence and the TV texts they presumably consume. 
The debate Mittell engages with forms along the lines of poetics versus 
politics in television scholarship, similar to the discipline’s earlier 
periods, and his intervention intends to do away with this framework by 
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avoiding issues of ‘quality’ or ‘antilegitimation’ discourses and by 
‘return[ing] to questions of aesthetics and value to open up the 
possibilities of evaluative criticism of popular arts’ (2015, 215). 41  
I find it representative that Mittell’s endeavour to offer a ‘pure’ 
aesthetic evaluation of television texts devoid of ideological 
complications relies on political interpretation in one particular area: 
genre and expressive mode. The chapter ‘Serial Melodrama’ (ibid., 233-
260), concentrating on genre blending, explores complex narratives’ 
predominant use of the melodramatic mode. Mittell engages with 
melodrama’s cultural standing as excessively feminine, admitting that 
he used to refute the view that this mode has any influence on complex 
serial drama with the latter’s ‘intellectual seriousness, measured 
production style, and claims to authenticity and realism’ (ibid., 244). As 
he admits, Linda Williams’ (2014) argument changed his position, which 
as discussed finds melodrama’s defining feature not in emotional excess 
but in the construction of moral oppositions. From this originates for 
Mittell the ‘engaging emotional response to feel the difference between 
competing moral sides as manifested through forward-moving 
storytelling’ (2015, 244, italics in original). It is via Williams’ analytical 
framework that his intellectual and affective appreciation of ‘complex’ 
texts gains academic validation, such that having a ‘good cry’ over The 
Wire‘s pathos is both a non-gendered reaction and also disproves claims 
that the programme operates in masculinist realms of signification 
(ibid., 248).  
Mittell then embraces melodrama’s ubiquity in prestige drama drawing 
on Williams’ structural analysis, also setting out to disprove the 
widespread agreement in media theory that complex drama’s formal 
aspects derive from soap opera. He supports this by a detailed 
investigation of daytime soaps’ and prime-time dramas’ different 
                                                          
41 For more on the debate see Nannicelli (2016), Logan (2016), and Piper (2016). 
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historic production models and textual characteristics, concluding that 
in lieu of any formal or production background link between the two 
there is no evidence that ‘contemporary serials “masculinise” the soap 
opera form’ (ibid.). It is rather the melodramatic mode that for him 
informs television storytelling, and ‘the pervasive spread of serial 
melodrama has added an effeminate layer to traditionally masculinist 
genres such as crime dramas, espionage thrillers, and science fiction’ 
(ibid.). He sees in this gendered genre mixing a politically progressive 
potential that breaks down gendered barriers of televisual traditions 
and viewing experiences, per John Fiske’s description in his seminal 
book Television Culture (2011 [1987]). Mittell demonstrates this in the 
way melodrama, as ‘effeminate’ mode, pervades television, and also in 
the way traditionally masculinist genres accommodate female 
characters.  
Mittell’s example for the latter is The Good Wife, whose narrative 
operation he sees as ‘complicating its gendered appeals’ through mixing 
serialised and procedural narration via the central character, ‘merging 
the familial, professional, romantic, and political, often within a single 
story thread, and exploring how these threads connect with the 
emotional and rational choices of its female protagonist’ (ibid., 258). His 
interpretation celebrates the series for a feminist progressivism 
following from its narrative choices; for him the ‘complex female 
character’ carries an ideological import whose meaning cannot in fact 
be interpreted outside of the ideological. This is clear from the figure’s 
centrality to the issue of genre-mixing in ‘complex TV’s development, 
whose importance he links here to a feminist appeal. As such, ‘complex 
TV’s otherwise non-ideological, purely aesthetic examination relies on a 
strand of feminist media theory to apply the narrative of progression 
and democratisation of viewing experiences:  
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Male viewers weep at the sentimental melodrama of Friday Night 
Lights or Lost, female fans celebrate female power and analytic 
intelligence featured on Alias or Veronica Mars, and all viewers feel 
the affective interconnections of The Good Wife’s personal and 
professional realms – such viewing experiences problematize strict 
gender dichotomies, offering sites of fluidity and empathy, however 
imperfect and partial, that seem consistent with feminist critiques of 
gender norms. (Ibid., 259-260) 
Mittell’s advocacy of redirecting academic focus on poetics becomes 
sidetracked around the question of genre and gender, as he engages 
here with a selection of feminist media analysis. This itself need not be a 
problem given feminist theory’s contestations over this connection, but 
it throws into dubious light the claim of non-ideological engagement 
since the investigation’s rhetoric seems to gloss over an ideological bias 
masked as focus on aesthetics. The ‘complex female character’ is an 
ideological term mobilised to support ‘complex television’s meaning as 
aesthetic term, laying bare ‘complexity’s own ideologically laden nature, 
much like ‘quality’s.  
Further, Mittel ignores in his examination two intertwined areas both 
vital to an approach considering gender politics in genre and television 
theory. First, as noted, while he draws on some feminist work on 
television and gender, he only references that which supports his 
rhetoric of progressivism, resulting in a neglect of the postfeminism 
debate dominating the last few decades of the field. Ignoring this also 
means that Mittell does not engage with feminism’s historic presence in 
television, a crucial area in feminist scholarship for discussing notions of 
progression/co-option. As shown throughout the thesis, the 
postfeminism/feminism issue has had a structuring importance for the 
field even before (and regardless of) the post-millennial ‘quality’ 
television debate. I do not argue that this issue is equally problematic in 
Mittell’s chosen examples, or that these series are uniformly reactionary 
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in their ideological meanings, or even that he should employ a feminist 
critical approach, but rather that declaring all ‘complex TV’s genre 
mixing progressively feminist, and invoking a fitting selection of feminist 
theory to do so, oversimplifies issues that otherwise structure the 
discipline. In the effort to demonstrate an aesthetic evolution allegedly 
devoid of ideological implications, Mittell does invoke political debates 
(those around gender) to chart this evolution. The fact that he only 
depends on this methodology when discussing genre correlates with 
industry and critical contestations around my drama case studies’ genre 
categorisations. This illuminates again that for serialised drama, 
aesthetic evaluations of genre continue to be an area especially fraught 
with ideological implications around gender. 
The other issue Mittell eschews is cultural circulation’s signifying 
processes affecting ‘complex TV’s contextual positioning. For instance, 
when he demonstrates why its narrative features could not have been 
derived from soap opera, he dismisses the term’s discursive dominance. 
Declaring that ‘soapy’ is an inaccurate description of a prime-time TV 
text might be factually correct but he avoids considering not just 
popular and industry usages of the term but also the ways in which 
‘complex TV’ aesthetics often explicitly rely on it. Fittingly, scholarship 
has investigated The Sopranos for its textual reflection on soap opera 
(Donatelli and Alward 2002), and journalistic think pieces about 
serialized drama’s links to the form’s narrative traditions and affect (e.g. 
Lyons 2015b) are products of a culturally ingrained chain of signification. 
When Mittell dismisses these phenomena as factually misleading, he 
ignores arguments that he advocated in his earlier book on television 
genres, which saw genre as a cultural category produced in a discursive 
formation operating within industry, audience, and cultural practices 
(2004). This avoidance also leads him to draw on Williams’ concept on 
melodrama in a way that mitigates her earlier work’s significance. While 
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Williams’ more recent concept does demonstrate the melodramatic 
mode’s structural ubiquity, it does not dismiss its cultural connotations 
as ‘bad object’ due to its centrality in female-targeted and female-
centred entertainment but engages with this link’s ideological 
implications.  
Mittell’s application of Williams’ concept comes off as an effort to 
reconcile the melodramatic mode with ‘complex’ TV’s operation in a 
way that simultaneously removes connotations of a suspicious 
femininity (such that crying over a ‘masculinist’ drama becomes both 
the true appreciation of its complexity and proof of the text’s feminist 
progressivism), recalling earlier periods’ academic contestations over 
the gendered meanings of television genres. Lynn Joyrich’s (1996) 
scrutiny of cultural critics’ engagement in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
with postmodernity, television, and melodrama as their prime 
expressive mode comes to mind, detailed in Chapter 2. Here I want to 
highlight Joyrich’s problematisation of the ways in which critics like John 
Fiske attribute to male-oriented TV dramas a disruption of the 
medium’s oppressive gender norms. This discussion is all the more 
relevant since as mentioned, Mittell also references Fiske’s framing of 
television genres as polar opposites along gendered lines to argue that 
‘complex TV’s formal features progressively overwrite this state (Mittell 
2015a, 251). Joyrich is sceptical of Fiske’s celebration of Miami Vice‘s 
(1984-1990) ‘anarchic’ self-liberation from ‘traditional meanings of 
gender by opening up the program to the postmodern pleasures of 
spectacle and style’ (Joyrich 1996, 92), which for him is ‘the ultimate 
political act’ (Fiske 1987, 24 cited in Joyrich 1996, 93). Her criticism 
highlights what Fiske’s analysis of style overlooks, namely the social and 
ideological context in which the TV text is situated, concluding that   
[t]he problem with this view [the ‘purity’ of a non-ideological 
pleasure in style] lies not only in its reductive notion of ideology as a 
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force which can simply be evaded or separated from pleasure and 
the formation of identity, but also in its misreading of the 
marketplace. (...) 
(…) The same may be true of television’s own repeated male displays: 
far from marking the end of gender and power divisions, TV’s 
masquerades – a response to the discursive constructions that put 
television and its viewing subjects in their (feminised) place – 
contribute to these very disparities; indeed, the primary thing often 
masked in such male masquerades is the desire to be rid of 
femininity itself. (Ibid., 94-95) 
By referring to Joyrich’s criticism of leading TV theorists’ one-sided 
application of gender theory, my aim is not to reproduce it, i.e. I do not 
intend to disprove Mittell’s reading of ‘complex’ television as 
progressively feminist. After all, my own reading of The Good Wife 
argued that the female character’s centralisation has fundamental 
consequences for mixing television forms and modes in ways that upset 
these forms’ gendered meanings. But rather than apply ideological 
determinism to such genre rearrangements, I contend that their 
emergence and contestations around their cultural value are 
inseparable from the postfeminism/feminism debate’s current visibility 
(see Chapter 1). Mittell’s reliance on a gender politics framework for his 
argument about recombined television forms’ aesthetic novelty points 
to this inseparability. But his nominal effort at a ‘poetics only’ approach 
renders TV texts’ explicit negotiation of generic hierarchies’ 
genderedness invisible, such as The Good Wife’s struggles with 
melodrama and its connotations with a suspicious feminine excess, and 
the programme’s own ambiguous standing in industry and critical 
discourses. Mittell mobilises a definition of melodrama that helps him 
limit the question of ideological and cultural context to an argument 
about progression linked to aesthetic innovation.  
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Mittell’s position and methodology are representative of broader trends 
in a television scholarship historically divided along the lines of the 
poetics/politics approach; but the ‘quality’ television phenomenon has 
thrown this trajectory into even sharper relief. Fiske’s analysis of 
‘postmodern’ TV genres strived to prove aesthetic innovation linked to 
‘progressive’ gender politics in an era when television still carried the 
stigma of aesthetic dubiousness. Joyrich’s rebuttal to Fiske and other 
cultural critics readjusts the political focus, stressing that examining TV 
texts’ political-ideological work is not a supplement to charting aesthetic 
developments but intrinsic to understanding them. I argue that the 
academic divide’s problematic nature is even more pronounced in this 
period’s paradigm of prestige television precisely because, as will be 
shown through the case studies, a significant segment of serial dramas 
are products of the aforementioned discursive struggles between 
postfeminism and popular feminism. While this discursive 
contestation’s visibility in popular culture is undoubted in feminist 
scholarship, its ignorance in academic studies of ‘quality’ or ‘complex’ 
television suggests this literature’s invisibility in the wider field. The two 
programmes’ cultural position as exceptional in (and for) their 
programming contexts is embedded in promotionally and textually 
foregrounded gender politics, promptly moving them to the centre of 
analytical attention in feminist scholarship. Meanwhile, they are mostly 
considered outside of this field if the ideological context, i.e. prestige 
drama’s genderedness, requires it. This helps sustain the gendered split 
of the poetics/politics divide present in television culture and 
reproduced in scholarship. 
The Good Wife and Orange are both representative examples of the 
ways in which post-recessionary prestige drama centralises contested 
gender politics projected onto issues of genre categorisation. This is 
prominent in the industry and media focus on the two programmes’ 
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formal volatility and contradictoriness, and in Mittell’s account in 
Complex TV that frames the question of genre blending in a progressive 
gender politics, an approach elsewhere not dominant in his book about 
narrative complexity. These formulations rely on the ‘strong/complex 
female lead’ and her fixed ideological importance governing this 
programming’s cultural novelty and ‘complex’ genre treatment. Yet 
academic feminism shows that if this figure expresses complex female 
identity, then her ideological importance is not exhausted in a ‘feminist’ 
influence on genre complexity but involves historic and highly 
mediatised negotiations of feminist politics’ presence in popular culture. 
More specifically, she reflects the postfeminist cultural paradigm’s 
changing context, problematised via the post-recessionary resurgence 
of a popular feminism and its contestations. Similar to the examined 
comedies which centralise these contestations in the relatively 
respected forms of satire and mockumentary, thus elevating this 
dialogue’s discursive prestige, the examined hour-long series narrativise 
this politics in the high-end serial’s framework. Lending prestige to 
gender politics works however more ambiguously here, coming to bear 
on negotiations of genre signifiers, and testifying to the serialised drama 
form’s especially fragile dependence on gendered ideals of cultural 
value.  
 
2.A The Good Wife 
 
The series’ use of the ‘complex/strong female lead’ overlaps in her 
signification with the ‘independent woman’ figure, a symbol in US 
culture of the achievements of the women’s liberation movement. The 
latter term encompasses historic feminism’s most visible and 
recognisable critique of patriarchal society in white and middle-class 
womanhood, and denotes in this figure an era’s changing gender 
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politics. As such it has become a somewhat outmoded expression, yet 
one that is still prevalent for making sense of female identity in popular 
culture, of which television is an especially favoured area given its 
discursive amicability to women’s representation. This comes to the 
fore in the four-part PBS documentary America in Primetime (2011), in 
which each episode focuses on the evolution of a character type of 
American TV. To contextualise my argument, I provide a short analysis 
of the documentary’s first episode here, titled ‘Independent Woman’, 
not least because it references The Good Wife extensively; as such it 
provides a useful platform for unpacking how American television’s 
reflection on its own character type’s evolution makes sense of the 
show’s gender politics.  
The episode charts the figure’s historic development starting from the 
post-war period across a variety of scripted programmes and 
institutional contexts via interviews of influential creative personnel, 
and showing representative footage of the programmes. It provides 
useful insight into the industry’s self-reflexive circulation of its cultural 
influence on American identity politics, and its implied significance for 
shifting gender politics. Its trajectory describes a progressive 
development of representation that finds its final completion in The 
Good Wife, supported by a curious structuring method: the otherwise 
historically linear narrative opens with a detailed discussion of The Good 
Wife before moving on to its timeline’s origin point, the post-war 
period’s portrayal of the white middle-class housewife. After this, the 
documentary offers a whistle-stop tour of TV series corresponding to 
the narrative of growing female independence and character 
complexity, its rhetoric appealing to social realism via links with 
American socio-political reality. For instance, footage of women’s 
liberation movement rallies supports the discussion of The Mary Tyler 
Moore Show’s cultural importance. Magazine and newspaper clippings 
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are used throughout as referential illustrations to gender discourse 
themes; the headlines in focus often highlight the word ‘feminist’ in a 
context of debate. Roseanne is contextualised in relation to class 
difference and the ‘realities’ of motherhood, and to Roseanne Arnold’s 
controversial star persona. Sex and the City’s appeal to women’s sexual 
liberation is discussed as a response to broadcast television’s strict 
content regulations and its operation as ‘business’, as opposed to 
premium cable’s ‘freedom’ from these constraints.  
Into this presentation of the ‘independent woman’s televisual history 
blends the contemporary term ‘complex female character’, the former 
evoking links with an historic and referential feminist politics, the latter 
a focus on individualised identity politics in fictional storytelling. In this 
context, singling out The Good Wife as culmination of the ‘independent 
woman’s diachronic evolution – placing it in the front of the 
documentary’s narrative; both outside of linear history and an endpoint 
to it – produces a slipperiness of the series’ attributed meaning. That is, 
its discussion by creators and stars asserts the programme’s political 
‘realism’ in referring to real-life political sex scandals,42 and invoking 
postfeminism’s ‘choice’ debates for the character’s inception. At the 
same time, co-creators Robert and Michelle King frame this in a primary 
interest in ethical dilemmas of the socio-political world: here, the terms 
of female independence and ‘work-life balance’ merge with the 
examination of the workplace as highly politicised space, complicating 
the ‘independent woman’ trope. ‘Alicia really is consistently trying to do 
the right thing, and it’s just difficult because so much is being thrown at 
her,’ says Michelle King. The documentary illustrates her words with a 
scene from the programme where Eli Gold tries to involve Alicia in a 
scheme to get rid of her workplace rival Cary Agos (Matt Czuchry). 
Viewers of the series can easily associate this with its general focus on 
                                                          
42 For more on this, see Leonard (2014b, 2016). 
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political machinations around and outside of Alicia’s storyline, providing 
both its viewing pleasures and critical approval. The series’ producers 
interpret the ‘independent woman’ figure in a way that foregrounds 
ethical-political dilemmas affecting the presentation of identity politics.  
Here, the series’ broader cultural work comes into play, lauded in media 
reception for a critical take on institutional politics and law. This aligns it 
with a popular model of prestige television that reflects a public 
scepticism with these institutions, in series like House of Cards, Veep, 
True Detective’s second season, or producer David Simon’s output. 
Because of the high cultural currency of this institutional scepticism, 
attributed with intellectual sophistication, The Good Wife’s focus on 
political scheming associates it with this programming type. Yet, the 
‘independent woman’s centrality complicates both her meaning and the 
configuration of this political scepticism. That is, if this figure is 
associated with women’s economic and psychological empowerment, 
then centering the narrative on her involves questioning the meaning of 
this character. As noted, the narrative often brings into play a liberal 
feminist politics as an extant force of organisational lobbying: in 
presenting political variables and influences, the series calls on the 
terms and traditions of liberal feminism as one of the factors that put 
the ‘independent woman’ heroine in a nexus of social power relations 
(Miller 2016). This emphasis on the complicated social-political forces 
affecting the character creates the series’ slipperiness of meanings. The 
complexity of these forces provides its high cultural value, at the 
expense of the ‘independent woman’s ideological fixity as sign of 
feminist progression: the series’ celebrated concentration on 
institutions and politics diverts the individualised identity politics 
towards an interest in the web of political power relations in spaces of 
American governance, law, and business. Yet the ‘independent woman’ 
 274 
 
has crucial bearing on this interest for her centrality in popular culture’s 
contestations of feminism and postfeminism. 
The middle-class white woman is a preferred figure onto which popular 
culture tends to project ideas of shifting gender roles, from the post-war 
housewife to the postfeminist career woman. Feminist scholarship has 
shown how postfeminism imagines women’s gain of (some) social 
power in this figure’s successes, an image that by the 1990s had become 
ingrained into American cultural consciousness. This narrative of 
economic success and upward mobility contributed to the dissociation 
of a generation of young women with feminist politics in the 1990s. 
Lynn Spigel attributes this partly to television’s role in promoting the 
idea of that present’s ‘enlightened’ gender scripts (1995). In a survey 
project, Spigel interviewed American female college students about 
their notions of ‘women’s progress’ to see how television’s canonised 
images inform these. She finds that the medium’s own perpetuated 
centrality to shaping popular memory is linked to her students’ unease 
with discussing feminism as still relevant political factor: 
Almost all students agreed that we are now living in an age of 
enlightenment where women have more choices and more career 
opportunities. Within this construction of the present, the past 
served as a comparative index by which people could measure their 
relative liberation. In this regard, television reruns and nostalgia 
shows might well have served the purpose of legitimation because 
they provide us with pictures of women whose lives were markedly 
less free than our own. (…) Television thus served as a central form of 
legitimating the present. 
(…) [F]or some women, faith in progress seemed to close off the need 
for a feminist movement in the present. (Ibid., 27-28) 
Spigel’s study describes a connection between television’s 
representational politics and how real-life women in the 1990s 
interpreted these to make sense of their own present’s gender scripts. 
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This is in retrospect a symptomatic iteration of postfeminism’s cultural 
work.  
To the extent that what Spigel shows here is representative of that 
period’s popular discourses affecting a generation of young educated 
women (e.g. dissociation from feminism, belief in gender progress, 
‘having-it-all’ rhetoric), it is indicative that three of my case studies 
centralise fictional women that can be seen as part of this generation, 
now in their late thirties and early forties. Liz Lemon, Leslie Knope, and 
Alicia Florrick, the central characters of three network series about 
women at the workplace, fall into an age bracket that affiliates them 
with Spigel’s examined demographic group. With the caveat that this 
argument blends the real with the fictional, the three protagonists can 
be imagined as representative portrayals of early 1990s postfeminist 
womanhood, now fifteen-twenty years older, drifting out of the age 
group that female-targeted consumer culture prioritises.  
Positioning these characters in workplace narratives that struggle to 
speak to political (including feminist) and institutional matrices affecting 
their social identity, has crucial consequences. First, it reconfirms 
popular culture’s fascination with the shifting meaning of the affluent 
white career woman figure who possesses some social power gained at 
the height of postfeminism’s cultural dominance, continuing to 
interrogate her identity as gendered and sexual subject.43 In addition, 
the three series’ foregrounding of social, cultural, and political forces as 
variably oppressive or confounding betrays a tendency to question the 
diachronic trajectory of identity and institutional politics promoted in 
                                                          
43 The four series’ industry backgrounds are indicative of their preferred affiliations with specific fictional 
womanhoods and target audiences. The three network series focalise the ‘mature’ career woman at the 
workplace; contrastingly, the online streaming service invests in a story that initially focuses on a young 
‘postfeminist’ woman, then gradually mitigates her role as subversive gesture, conceiving a ‘future’ of 
progressive television storytelling that aligns itself with the future of television distributing and consuming 
practices. Network television can be contextualised in this relationship of generational conflict as negotiating its 
growing bad reputation, struggling to survive in the post-network economy: it continues to invest in a figure to 
whose mediatisation it has largely contributed, but now problematising her cultural meanings in a way that 
confirms broadcast television’s cultural relevance via mobilising institutional and character scepticism. 
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Western societies. The most relevant example here is the treatment of 
late 1990s liberal feminism: problematised by feminists as a realised 
political force, the programmes explicitly take institutional gender 
politics to task. In this regard 30 Rock and The Good Wife are ideological 
cousins for their overt scepticism about the realities of a ‘visible’ 
feminism.  
The institutionalised liberal feminism in question is reminiscent of what 
McRobbie analysed in her seminal unpacking of ‘gender 
mainstreaming’, i.e. the incorporation of some feminist concerns into 
governmental and global institutional policymaking in the late 1990s 
under the banner of the elusive ‘human rights’ discourse (2009, 152). 
She argues that this development removed the movement’s ‘radical’ 
aspects, especially those that could be deemed problematic for 
feminism’s absorption into late capitalist institutions, such as 
postcolonial feminism or the critique of dualistic gender difference. 
Drawing on Mizejewski’s (2014) work, I showed in the previous chapter 
how 30 Rock enacts its scepticism about this ‘mainstreamed’ version of 
feminism in both Liz Lemon as parody of the uninformed (postfeminist) 
feminist possessing some social power, and in commenting on the ways 
in which political ideals play out in the nexus of corporate capitalism 
and television culture. Further, all four of the examined series thematise 
the problematic relationship of ‘gender mainstreaming’ to race 
discourses and postcolonialism, with the network programmes 
narrativising this as a matter of labour relations in the white-collar 
workplace. This is clear in 30 Rock’s and Parks’ mockery of race 
relations, repeatedly bringing this into connection with gender politics.  
The Good Wife often channels its criticism of ‘realised’ feminist politics 
through Diane’s character; I indicated previously that the series often 
contrasts her political ideals and their institutional presence via 
backroom discussions and deals. On the one hand, the programme 
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promotes a discursive affiliation with political second-wave feminism via 
Diane’s figure, as analysed in detail by Miller (2016, 10-11): she is a 
member of EMILY’s List (a political action committee devoted to helping 
elect pro-choice Democratic female politicians into office), and is 
repeatedly involved in legal cases challenging her gender politics. 
Ideological convictions and their complications dominate her storyline 
even when it depicts her private life, as seen in her marriage to Kurt 
McVeigh (Gary Cole), a hyperconservative Republican. Further, the list 
of featured guest stars portraying female lawyers and influential 
political figures whose politics determine their narrative significance 
includes Maddie Hayward (Maura Tierney), a feminist businesswoman 
and Democrat, and in one much-promoted instance Gloria Steinem, 
cameoing in Alicia’s daydream to persuade her to run for State’s 
Attorney (‘Dear God’). On the other hand, the presence of liberal 
feminism is imbued with the same scepticism that characterises the 
programme everywhere, which, like 30 Rock, is also linked with a 
criticism of race relations. Black female characters tend to be 
foregrounded in these instances, such as in a storyline that focuses on 
Diane and Cary’s condescending post-race attitudes as corporate bosses 
in season seven (‘Lies’), or in the multi-episode portrayal in season three 
of systemic racism in the State’s Attorney’s office run by Peter Florrick, 
both plots using the affected black female lawyers to voice this criticism. 
If these instances feed into the series’ cynicism and even paranoia about 
the state of affairs in American politics (a stance characteristic for a 
strand of prestige drama), then centralising a female figure recognisable 
for her multiple meanings in the culturally projected history of gender 
relations throws into relief the question of her utility. How can the 
character function in this double bind that mobilises both a gendered 
success story in the ‘independent woman’ figure and also political 
scepticism, including the history of feminism? The central figure’s 
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specific paratextual and textual positioning is informative here. The 
above quote from co-producer Michelle King indicates the character’s 
function as not just the scorned political wife’s fish-out-of-water story, 
but as an intensification of the dynamic between protagonist and 
environment. As narrative centre, Alicia is a ‘blank page’ on which 
different forces (in the form of surrounding characters and their 
convictions) try to leave their ideological mark. Her signature Sphinx-like 
reticence works then not only as gendered generic statement (see 
previous section) but as the preferred presentation of a figure whose 
significance as plot device lies in her lack of ideological affiliations.  
The producers’ comments are further reinforced by their other remarks 
interpreting the character’s function, coming to the fore in their 
frequent description of the show as ‘The Education of Alicia Florrick’. 
This unofficial subtitle has featured at pivotal points of the programme’s 
production history: upon the fan and critical upheaval following the 
killing off of love interest Will Gardner, the producers’ open letter 
defended the twist by describing the show with this expression, here 
explaining his removal by implying that unlike Alicia’s, his presence was 
not essential to the show (Anon. 2014). They once again used it, this 
time on Twitter in a series of posts, after CBS announced the 
programme’s cancellation in its seventh season ('GoodWifeWriters' 
2016). This communication is especially telling because it also re-
emphasises earlier ‘authorly’ statements about the narrative’s closed 
nature, envisaged at its conception as a seven-seasons long exploration 
of Alicia’s ‘education’: 
Telling the story of the Education of Alicia Florrick is the creative 
dream of a lifetime. It was always our plan to tell it over 7 seasons. 
We wanted the story to have a beginning, middle, and an end – that's 
the only way actions can have real consequences – and it's the 
reason we had episode titles count up from one word to four, then 
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back down again. (…) We're excited to celebrate the final 9 eps and 
bring the story to its natural conclusion. Here's a spoiler: the last 
episode will be called ‘End.’ (Ibid.) 
‘Quality’ drama’s valorisation of grand narrative, seriality, linear and 
goal-oriented storytelling, and implied authorly presence feeds into the 
producers’ interpretation, mitigating those aspects of storytelling that 
align it with ‘traditional’ television, i.e. procedurals’ repetitive yet open-
ended plotting. The grand narrative here denotes the ‘independent 
woman’s character study who, owing to her blank page status as 
privileged ex-housewife, functions less as ‘complex character’ and more 
as catalyst of her social world’s ideological-ethical complexities. Prestige 
cable drama’s fascination with character complexity and concentrated 
psychological study of exceptional antiheroes is then reorganised in the 
balance between social world and central character, a development that 
follows from network television’s aesthetic-narrative constraints. In 
Mittell’s analysis of cable drama’s antihero, the ‘complex’ aesthetic is 
matched with the focus on a protagonist ‘whose behaviour and beliefs 
provoke ambiguous, conflicted or negative moral allegiance’ (2015b, 
75).  Alicia is not an antihero in this sense, yet the issue of moral 
corruption through social power is at stake in The Good Wife, providing 
the programme’s primary cultural distinction. Cable drama’s focus on 
exceptional and morally ‘hideous men’ (ibid.) is countered here with her 
exceptional (initial) morality. In performance this translates into the 
character’s signature silence that, as Leonard theorises, also speaks to a 
refusal to play along with media culture’s scrutiny of public figures’ 
sexual life (2014b, 955).  
The series’ focus on Alicia Florrick’s moral compass and ‘relative 
morality’ (ibid.) then describes a trajectory in which these shift in a 
process of ‘education’ via her encounters with social-political forces. 
This foregrounded dynamic between individual and social world evokes 
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the literary tradition of the Bildungsroman. The Kings’ preferred 
description of the series, appealing to a certain artistic status, confirms 
as much, considering that Bildungsroman translates as ‘novel of 
education’ or ‘formation’. This loose form has been popularised in 
Anglo-American literature and modern media as the coming-of-age 
story, concentrating on a young person’s emotional-psychological 
maturation over a longer period of time. But the producers’ terminology 
shows an ideological connection to earlier literary iterations of the 
genre, especially the early 20th century German novel such as Thomas 
Mann’s Der Zauberberg (2011 [1924]). In its German incarnations, the 
Bildungsroman was a form allowing the presentation of a society’s 
ideological complexities by focusing on a young protagonist’s years-long 
‘journey’ through its various spaces and via the protagonist’s meetings 
with characters embodying specific ideological convictions (Slaughter 
2011). The protagonist is then both central to their story and also 
negotiates a mere functionality: while their moral-emotional maturation 
is at stake in the narrative, this is often more interested in presenting 
the social environment they move through. As such, a tension 
dominates in the form between the hero’s personal psychology and the 
social world’s depiction, such that in its modern versions, the 
problematic reconciliation between the two surfaces in parody and a 
‘perversion’ of the hero’s portrayal. In an extreme example, the 
protagonist in Günter Grass’s Die Blechtrommel (1984 [1959]) lives his 
whole life in a three-year-old boy’s body, refusing to grow up (Slaughter 
2011, 94). Der Zauberberg’s protagonist Hans Castorp is a parody of 
German philistinism, a bland and sober member of the middle class 
without any worldviews and opinions, taking the expression ‘blank slate’ 
to the extreme (Pongs 1984, E.H.V. 1970). The Good Wife’s cultural work 
and its producers’ appeal to artistic significance recalls the satirical-
parodistic Bildungsroman‘s interpretation in literary theory: both the 
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notion of ‘education’, and the denotation ‘good wife’ as reference to a 
trivial female role, work in the satirical mode. 
The Good Wife producers’ ambition to cultural distinction then appeals 
to an established narrative tradition already widespread in popular 
forms, but rarely so reliant on its literary origins. The network drama 
competes with cable serials’ discursive distinctiveness by projecting the 
antihero’s ‘complex’ (a)morality onto the social world, presenting it 
through a ‘naïve’ protagonist’s educational journey in the 
Bildungsroman tradition. As valorised modes of expression, cynicism 
and irony dominate these forms. In The Good Wife this is two-tiered, 
applying to both the described social world and the protagonist’s 
cultural meaning as gendered subject. Both the title and the circulated 
subtitle signal an emphatically sarcastic interest in the ‘wife’ as 
television culture’s stock figure who represents the medium’s historic 
femininity and an associated ‘blandness’ of character. Alicia Florrick is 
extremely familiar from American culture (housewife, mother, career 
woman, Hillary Clinton allegory [Leonard 2014b]), and this familiarity 
includes millennial television’s subversion of her meanings. That is, in 
the figure’s ironic evocation and complication, the programme builds on 
female-centred dramedy’s portrayal of the ‘difficult mom’ (Scott 2014). 
But the genre in which the figure is centralised here throws into sharp 
relief this portrayal (high-end legal-political drama rarely dramatizes 
domestic femininity at its narrative core), via the dialectic between her 
morality and the portrayed political culture’s corruption.  
De-familiarising the ‘housewife’ is then a fairly established trend for 
post-millennial television, but the political theme and generic 
environment reconfigures it as an ideological tug-of-war over her 
meaning and cultural utility. In the focus on ‘The Education of Alicia 
Florrick’, the opening up the narrative to the Bildungsroman formula 
(individual vs social-political world) provides an avenue to negotiate the 
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requirement of ‘character complexity’ and bland morality in order for 
the fractious encounter between character and ‘complex’ social world 
to work. The concentration on the figure and her cultural meaning’s 
complexity is also what differentiates the series from the two analysed 
comedies’ portrayal of the ‘mature’ career woman: both embedded in 
the workplace comedy tradition, they disperse narrative attention 
among the group of ensemble figures, of which the central comedian is 
an integral, albeit prioritised, member. The programmes’ titles also 
indicate this: while the comedies designate a workplace, The Good Wife 
is explicit about its fascination with the central character’s ‘archetypal’ 
meaning. In contrast, consider Tina Fey’s statement (see previous 
chapter) that rather than providing the career woman’s singular 
viewpoint, 30 Rock enacts its ‘issue’-based satire in the ensemble 
comedy where each character stands for a particular ideological stance, 
of which Liz’s middle-class white feminism is an emphasised but 
nonetheless equalized one. But The Good Wife’s intense interest in the 
central character requires that she is an outsider: she is portrayed as 
liminal to any ideological conviction, including a political feminism, and 
the series’ commentary on politics and the protagonist’s identity 
emerges from this liminality. 
Following from her overdetermined meanings as symbol of an historic 
femininity, the confrontation between Alicia and the social world 
inscribes this prominently onto issues of the above analysed liberal 
feminist politics, postfeminism, and, entangled in all this, the 
generational politics of feminism’s ‘waves’ (see Miller 2016, 10-15). That 
is, The Good Wife is engaged with Alicia’s social status as ‘mature’ 
career woman and mother in her forties, and with the awkward 
categorisability of this age and position both in terms of its affiliation 
with feminism and in its location in cultural imagination. ‘Alicia’s gender 
politics are in constant negotiation’ as Miller posits (ibid., 14), their 
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meanings offered via her interactions with the numerous supporting 
female characters who function primarily in their relative fixity at odds 
with her shifting identity.  
Diane is a clear contrast figure and questionable mentor, a childless 
second-wave feminist with explicit ideological convictions, and 
possessing a great deal of social power.44 A quote from Michelle King in 
a New York Times article highlights the interest in examining 
intergenerational relationships between women in a way that avoids 
portraying the older, and more powerful, career woman as a ‘bitch’ 
(Hoffman 2011). This qualifier evokes the established narrative formula 
of inscribing generational difference between women onto a 
confrontation of their relationship to feminism and preferred routes to 
social power. In these narratives, theorised in scholarship as 
postfeminist, the older woman signals the dangers to femininity and 
morality in her villainous or contradictory acquisition and (ab)use of 
power, as seen in the influential film The Devil Wears Prada (2006) 
(Rowe Karlyn 2011, 92–97; Winch 2013, 104-105). Glenn Close’s star 
text and career path also build on this postfeminist suspicion of female 
social power, in roles like the aforementioned Marquise de Merteuil in 
Dangerous Liaisons, Fatal Attraction’s (1987) pathologised single career 
woman Alex Forrest, Cruella DeVil of 101 Dalmatians (1996), and the 
duplicitous and influential lawyer Patty Hewes in the television series 
Damages (2007-2012), the latter especially concerned with generational 
conflict and the symbolic avenues of morality Patty’s figure offers up to 
a young female lawyer.  
In the context of gendered generational conflict, Diane’s character 
seems to fit formula, but also eschews it (as per King’s authorial 
statement) by not being portrayed as villainous ‘bitch’. Yet in the 
                                                          
44 Additionally, as Miller shows, the series translates its explorations of different types of feminism and femininity 
into a fascination with fashion as ’surface area’ (ibid., 9), which for Diane means a preference for large power 
necklaces and ‘flamboyant’ clothing (ibid., 11). 
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dynamic between Diane and Alicia, generational tension and distance 
are still dominant. This is linked to the question of feminist generations 
given both Diane’s portrayal as feminist lobbyist, and Alicia’s 
extradiegetic understanding as symbol of a postfeminist ‘retreatist’ 
(Negra 2004) generation. However, the millennial configuration of 
postfeminist generational conflict mostly concentrates on young 
femininities and often narrativises it in teen-targeted genres (Rowe 
Karlyn 2011). Prestige drama’s ‘grown-up’ aesthetic, and in it, Alicia’s 
portrayal as mother herself and as ‘mature’ woman shifts this trope’s 
meanings. The popular debate about the utility of generational and 
biological rhetoric (i.e. mothers versus daughters) for feminism’s history 
clearly informs the portrayal of Alicia and Diane’s relationship then, but 
eludes dramatising a ‘toxicity’ of historic feminism in the way that a 
strand of mainstream cinema does (Bowler 2013, 191–92). This follows 
from the series’ hyperfascination with its protagonist’s complex cultural 
meaning, emerging from the interplay between her symbolic simplicity 
(American television’s housewife figure, the politician’s scorned wife), 
her shifting position in the workplace environment, and the show’s 
commentary on the ‘good wife’ figure as existing through her 
mediatisation in political discourse (‘Saint Alicia’).  
A story arc from the third season illuminates the dynamic of the ‘flexible 
feminist flow chart’ (Miller 2016, 13), initiated by supporting character 
Caitlin D’Arcy’s (Anna Camp) narrative and by the character relations 
that her appearance inspires among the three women. Caitlin is a newly 
hired junior associate who has a short career at the firm, spanning 
between the episodes ‘Marthas and Caitlins’ and ‘Long Way Home’. Her 
figure is used, as customary for the series, to further refine the titular 
character’s symbolic meaning. In ‘Marthas and Caitlins’, Alicia is 
assigned with hiring a first-year associate, and the interview process 
presents a scenario where she has to choose between two women 
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signalling two archetypal femininities ubiquitous in American popular 
culture: the homely, smart, and brown-haired Martha (Grace Rex) or the 
blonde, pretty, and seemingly superficial Caitlin, who is also equity 
partner David Lee’s (Zach Grenier) niece. Alicia prefers Martha (she 
identifies with ‘Martha’-ness) but Lee and Will force her to hire Caitlin. 
Upon complaining to Will about the immorality of nepotism, he informs 
her that when she was hired at the firm, she was also a ‘Caitlin’ 
competing against a more qualified ‘Martha’ – meaning it was not her 
talent or qualifications that landed her the role but her friendship with 
Will, and David Lee had approved her hire at his request and in 
exchange for Will’s later vote for the niece. This inscribes onto the 
familiar dualistic imagery of women’s sexual desirability the cutthroat 
intricacy of patriarchal office politics (the women are not hired for their 
desirability but for their connections with male bosses at the firm), both 
reinforcing the symbolism of female ‘types’ in their iconographic 
allusions and also upsetting their meanings by throwing Alicia’s identity 
into the mix, unsettling her position.  
If the twist exemplifies the series’ much-celebrated sophisticated 
cynicism, ‘wafting over you finely in a way that only The Good Wife can 
provide, that wonderfully bitter outlook on how to get ahead in life’ 
(Sims 2011), then it dominates in every further aspect that involves 
Caitlin’s presence in the narrative. It also continues to relate to Alicia’s 
signification both diegetically (the character’s self-reflection) and in the 
extratextual shifting of how the viewer should interpret her already self-
referential figure. In the next few episodes, Alicia mentors Caitlin, 
whose initial image as vapid blonde quickly disperses as the plot 
constantly confirms her professional skills and quick wit. Yet public 
performances of femininities continue to inform her storyline and the 
two women’s working relationship, culminating in the episode ‘After the 
Fall’. The case-of-the-week sees Alicia battling against Nancy Crozier in 
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court, the attorney notoriously enacting a naïve young femininity to 
manipulate judges’ and juries’ sympathies. As discussed, the series 
showcases masquerades of femininity and other performed personas in 
the courtroom (Miller 2016, 13), signalling its critique and Alicia’s 
distance from them in her similarly showcased signature eye-rolls.45 But 
if we are to understand Alicia’s professional performance of self as more 
‘authentic’ than that of her opponents’, then this episode complicates 
this, inscribed onto other women’s performances of femininity. Alicia is 
losing the case because the young male judge is enamoured of blonde-
haired Crozier’s ingénue act, ignoring the older, deep-voiced, and 
brown-haired Alicia’s arguments. In a new tactic, she makes Caitlin 
argue in court, deploying her young, chirpy blondness against Crozier’s. 
Caitlin quickly catches on and hyperperforms the role under Alicia’s 
tutelage and silent approval, and a battle of female stereotypes ensues 
between the two attorneys for the judge’s sympathy (Figures 5.33 to 
5.35). Diane is also present at Caitlin’s big moment, and when she 
eventually wins the case, this earns her a promotion.  
Figure 5.33 
 
                                                          
45 The protagonist’s signature eye-roll is another common trait of Alicia and 30 Rock’s Liz Lemon, and for both a 
self-referential punchline expressing the character’s exasperation at and ideological distance from her 
environment. Both underline the two series’ lauded sarcasm and pessimism about the social world, signalling the 
discrepancy between her ‘authenticity’ and the environment’s hypocrisy. 
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Figure 5.34 
Figure 5.35 
It is de rigueur by this point in the series to incorporate into the legal 
world’s depiction the intricacies of institutionalised sexism and women 
lawyers’ navigation of it by assuming a type of recognisable femininity, 
and this plot uses it to complicate the protagonist’s distance from this 
strategy. The frequent assurance that this kind of posturing is beneath 
Alicia (via eye-rolls for instance) as an aspect of her morally sound 
character, is undermined when she uses Caitlin as her proxy, a tactic 
that still effects Alicia’s sympathetic character portrayal as clever 
puppet master. She mobilises a masquerade of femininity in another 
woman to professional ends with success, and is not taken to task for it: 
while the programme avoids constructing a scenario where Alicia 
herself performs inauthentic femininity, it involves her in the strategic 
mobilization of one in a way that allows her to continue with the 
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disapproving eye-rolls in later episodes. If the programme’s aim is to 
portray Alicia’s ‘education’ as a gendered initiation process into the 
ways in which politics and social power corrupt, it is also at pains here to 
limit this corruption to an extent that keeps her in a liminal position to 
everyone else’s corruptness as a matter of semantic jugglery. 
Centralising female lawyers’ performance of feminine ‘authenticity’, the 
episode also continues to position them in a generational interrelation. 
Alicia’s mentorship and manipulation of Caitlin involves a generational 
aspect that puts the older woman in a role that invokes Alicia and 
Diane’s relationship. As Miller writes, ‘TGW doesn’t offer much in the 
way of solidarity or sisterhood for its female characters’ (ibid., 12), a 
sentiment dominating the three women’s relationship. But the ‘good 
wife’s inscribed/complicated meaning again effects an elusiveness of 
her ideological role, demonstrated in the next stages of Caitlin’s 
storyline. Due to Caitlin’s quick promotion, Alicia starts to see her in the 
next episode as a professional threat, complicating the already 
ambiguous mentor-protégé dynamic. Competitiveness surfaces in 
Alicia’s growing paranoia about her job security in the recessionary 
workplace vis-à-vis a younger female lawyer with her talent, 
connections, and popularity. The programme’s signature paranoia and 
cynicism translates here into the protagonist’s own, but remains a 
subjective and thus unreliable relation. That is, the mise-en-scène and 
narrative highlight Alicia’s suspiciousness about Caitlin’s potential 
danger in a way that forebodes a misunderstanding, since her portrayal 
outside of her connection to Alicia remains neutral.  
In Caitlin’s final episode ‘Long Way Home’, the underlying theme of 
competition becomes explicit. Following an incident that can be 
interpreted as Caitlin stealing Alicia’s ideas and spotlight, Alicia 
confronts her via an oblique threat thinly disguised as mentor’s advice. 
Alicia subsequently finds out from David Lee that Caitlin has given her 
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notice thanks to her ‘mean girls act’. If the plot has so far hinted in 
prestige drama’s subtle fashion at the uncertainty of character morality 
(was Alicia right in her paranoia or did she bully Caitlin into leaving?), 
then the resolution shifts these questions to the plane of gendered 
identity and generations of feminism articulated in the interactions 
among Diane, Alicia, and Caitlin. Guilt-ridden, Alicia tries to convince 
Caitlin to stay, upon which she reveals that the real reason of her 
leaving is not their conflict but her personal life: she is pregnant and 
getting married. As Miller notes (ibid., 13), the discussion among the 
three women recalls the postfeminist choice rhetoric: against Diane’s 
explanations about the company’s generous maternity scheme, Caitlin 
declares that her life plan is ‘to be a mom’. The utterance is positioned 
as the episode’s comically shocking highlight. Alicia later apologises to 
Caitlin, admitting that office politics ‘tend to make people paranoid’, 
thus confirming that in this instance, the series deployed its 
characteristic cynicism and paranoia to mislead the audience. This 
conflict was in fact about (post)feminist generational discourse around 
lifestyle and identity, with Caitlin declaring that  
I want to choose. Maybe it’s different for my generation but… I don’t 
have to prove anything. Or if I have to, I don’t want to. I’m in love.  
This conflict and utterance would not be out of place in an Ally McBeal 
(1997-2002) episode, the legal series considered the quintessential 
signifier of 1990s postfeminist popular culture’s relationship to 
feminism’s historic relevance in the workplace (Hermes 2006), and by its 
feminist critics described as shifting the concerns of feminist politics 
onto issues of individual choice. Caitlin’s ‘choice’ monologue could work 
as a summary of Ally McBeal’s ending, which saw Ally giving up her 
career for full-time motherhood. In this context, Alicia’s character 
history recalls even more prominently a postfeminist past, picking up 
fifteen years later from where Ally McBeal left off. For Bonnie J. Dow 
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(2002), Ally McBeal, and most American TV centrally concerned with 
gender politics, represents the movement as ‘lifestyle feminism’, i.e. as 
narrative quest for the individualised heroine. But postfeminism 
especially turns feminist concerns into an issue of personal happiness, 
thus deflecting questions of institutional power and, fittingly for Ally 
McBeal, putting feminism on trial for allegedly complicating women’s 
personal lives, i.e. traditions of romance and marriage (ibid.).  
Critical responses to the Caitlin twist were mixed, either dismissing it for 
a datedness or celebrating it for tackling the apparent real-life issue of 
young educated women dropping out of the workforce to become 
housewives (Bosch 2012). Harnick (2012) lauded the swift elision of a 
storyline of women’s competition, noting that its suspense relied on 
viewer recognition of this narrative tradition, toying with its possibility. 
The AV Club reviewer’s analysis is perhaps most telling for bringing the 
series’ general tone in connection with this plot: celebrating the twist as 
‘refreshing’-ly innocent and idiosyncratic in the otherwise cynical and 
disillusioned world of The Good Wife, it also ascertains its rootedness in 
a conservative ideology with Caitlin going away to ‘liv[e] a life that 
belongs in a goddamn oil painting’ (Sims 2012).  
Both Ally McBeal and The Good Wife betray then a continued 
fascination with the singular female lawyer figure and her gendered 
meaning, encapsulated in their titles. But if Ally McBeal centralised the 
issue of postfeminist ‘choice’ throughout its dramedy narrative, The 
Good Wife as recessionary political-legal drama parodies it as passé 
cultural phenomenon; a treatment that for its critics speaks to the 
series’ ideological novelty. 
The Caitlin storyline’s resolution then works as an oddity for its gender 
politics, a blatant callback to the millennial postfeminist ‘retreatism’ 
trend discussed by Negra (2004). And again, following from the 
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programme’s broader ideological and generic aspirations – painting a 
socio-political tableau of Chicago’s legal world as cynical ‘education’ of a 
symbolic female figure – it is Alicia’s diegetic position and identity that 
are at stake. Diane represents the second-wave feminist’s familiar 
standpoint, commenting on Caitlin’s decision ‘I’m not sure the glass 
ceiling was broken for this’, also comparing Caitlin’s life choices to 
Alicia’s: ‘She’ll be back in fifteen years. Like you.’ Alicia disagrees, and 
the two women’s shifting generational relationship continues to remain 
uncertain.46 Diane assumes that their shared social position as working 
women allows here for an ideological union with Alicia who distances 
herself from this. But if Caitlin represents a postfeminism that is similar 
to the 1990s postfeminism of Alicia’s backstory, then this connection is 
also limited due to the protagonist’s present as ‘mature’ working 
mother with fiscal problems: the exchange between Diane and Alicia 
moves on to Alicia’s requested pay raise, and reminds viewers both of 
her relative financial hardship and the firm’s recessionary struggles. 
Alicia’s figure continues to stay liminal to diegetic ideologies and 
identities, a suitable central figure for the Bildungsroman narrative. 
Sims’ (2012) reference to the ‘refreshing’ lack of cynical scheming that 
makes the twist so out of place further confirms the series’ primary 
ambition to depict the various ways in which the world of law and 
politics is immoral and petty; a characterisation allowing for the theme 
of gender politics and feminist generations to be discussed as collateral 
damage in institutional politics. It is in this contrast in which the 
centralised symbolic female character allows the series to generate 
narrative tension around political morality. The ‘refreshing’-ness that 
the critic describes comes from the discrepancy between the Caitlin 
storyline and this episode’s other two plots, the case-of-the-week and 
                                                          
46 Caitlin comes back sooner than that, namely in the series’ final season, as a divorced working mother, this way 
’eventually punished for [her postfeminism]’ as Miller notes (2016, 13). 
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the serialised political narrative, both depicting the moral murkiness of 
their respective social spaces.  
The case revolves around a client, acquitted wife killer Colin Sweeney 
(Dylan Baker), a recurring character notorious for rotten sexual and 
social mores. While critical reception dubbed Sweeney The Good Wife’s 
resident Hannibal Lecter for his sophisticated monstrosity, superior 
intellect, and intimate emotional connection to Alicia, the series is also 
at pains to demonstrate her personal distance from the sexuality he 
represents, depicted as perverted and predatory (which Lecter’s 
portrayal lacks). At stake here are the ethical questions presented by 
fulfilling professional duties in institutions of the law, and negotiating 
the hyperbolically opposed sexual and other mores between client and 
attorney. While this dilemma is a favoured theme in cinema’s 
narrativisation of the legal world (Lucia 2005) – see 1990s Hollywood 
dramas The Devil’s Advocate (1997) and Primal Fear (1996) – television’s 
episodic seriality and the centralised female protagonist both 
complicate ideological consequences. Because the series dramatises the 
above detailed issues of feminism as political factor and generational 
identity, this viewpoint feeds into its depiction of the legal world’s, and 
the client’s, rottenness. Sweeney’s is a paternity case, an ex-colleague 
suing him for sexual harassment that had resulted in a pregnancy. The 
details of the case, characteristically for the series and its Sweeney 
plots, depict both parties as ethically and sexually depraved: Sweeney 
insists during a discussion that the sexual encounter had been 
consensual and oral only, to which David Lee offers (correctly) that she 
might have used a turkey baster (implying that she spat his semen into 
it to later artificially inseminate herself). Lee’s suggestion is followed by 
Diane’s world-weary remark: ‘And so it devolves: from hopes, ideals, 
dreams, the glory of the law, to a turkey baster’. Diane is often used as 
the voice of disillusionment with the realities of the legal world’s 
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morality, embedded in her portrayal foregrounding her left-leaning 
liberal convictions and the second-wave feminism that motivated her 
career choices. The series mediates a suspicion about the world of law 
and politics through the contrast of her established liberal feminist 
politics and this world’s disappointing ‘realities’.  
Additionally, the same episode’s serialised political plot concerns the 
aforementioned accusations by Geneva Pine (Renée Elise Goldsberry), a 
black Assistant State’s Attorney, of racist favouritism at the State’s 
Attorney’s office, and similarly verbalises a discord between ethics and 
office politics. Pine dresses Cary down for having been unfairly 
promoted to Deputy State’s Attorney over more experienced, and non-
white, ASAs who had been sacked for errors Cary himself had made. At 
the end of this scene, she voices her disgust over Cary’s spinelessness 
for accepting the promotion in a sarcastic tone and wording similar to 
Diane’s: ‘That’s right. It’s a bad economy for ideals’. Both of these 
remarks construct an idealised past with which contrasted, the 
present’s ‘realities’ of law and politics are found wanting, emerging 
from themes of feminist and race politics. Especially in Diane’s case, 
given her prominent status in the ensemble cast, the repeatedly 
expressed frustration with the law keeps the discursive ‘women’s 
empowerment’ narrative around the series ambiguous, into which feeds 
the sarcastic ‘education’ context circulated by the producers.47 
According to its critics, a great deal of the series’ viewing pleasures 
originates from its exploration of how systems of the law are 
semantically manipulated such that ‘[b]attles between the letter of the 
law and the spirit of the law come up again and again’ (Yuan 2012). The 
programme’s ideological novelty, accounting partly for its ‘quality’ 
                                                          
47 Additionally, the producers explain the series’ final scene that mirrors the pilot’s cold open – Diane slaps Alicia 
for a betrayal – as completing Alicia’s ‘education’, defining this as a process in which ‘the victim becomes the 
victimizer’ (Ausiello 2016). Alicia’s moral corruption is complete once she openly betrays the (already ambiguous) 
feminist sisterhood (see Conclusion).  
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status, combines the critical examination of American political and 
institutional culture and the female lawyer’s centralisation – including 
the history of feminist politics she evokes – in this critical viewpoint. The 
conflict between individual and institutions is a favoured popular 
cultural narrative, and its gendered implications became more 
foregrounded upon second-wave feminism’s cultural impact. By the 
1980s and 1990s, confronting patriarchal institutions of law-making and 
-practising with the female lawyer figure was a popular theme in 
American cinema. Cynthia Lucia’s book Framing Female Lawyers (2005) 
examines the cultural anxieties this subgroup of films expresses both 
about the idealised vision of the law and the increased inclusion of 
women lawyers in its institutions, connecting this with cinema’s 
aesthetic traditions. She finds that the ‘woman lawyer’ film cycle 
negotiates oppositional ideological tendencies: first, that ‘the law is a 
stable, immutable force beyond the reach of transitory political and 
cultural influences’ (ibid., 3), second, this is upset by a set of political-
cultural factors allowing women’s appearance in its institutions. As such, 
feminist politics clashes here with traditions of law and patriarchal 
culture, into which is inscribed psychoanalytic theory’s symbolic 
meaning-making (the Lacanian law as word of the father) (ibid., 12). 
These two opposing tendencies produce the ‘uneasy acceptance of 
women in law’, negotiated in these films by positing her as symbolic 
problem to be resolved (ibid., 3).  
Women in legal film drama then signal a ‘crisis of patriarchy’, a term 
familiar from journalistic discourses about prestige male-centred TV 
drama, here describing the symbolic equation of the law with male 
institutional power which the female lawyer figure calls into question. 
However, ‘[i]n foregrounding the status of the female lawyer, these 
films displace overt interrogation of patriarchal power and its uses, by 
placing the female lawyer on trial, interrogating her role as woman and 
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as lawyer’ (ibid.). Lucia contrasts these films with those centralising 
male lawyer protagonists, and finds a structuring difference in the ways 
they dramatise the law/justice discrepancy, a theme that the lawyer 
film typically interrogates. When cinema’s male lawyers restore the 
balance between justice and law by putting the latter to its proper use, 
they simultaneously resolve the crisis of patriarchy inherent in the initial 
imbalance (ibid., 159). In contrast, the female lawyer struggles with a 
lack or ambiguity regarding professional competence (usually paired 
with personal incompetence), signalling her inherent inability to acquire 
‘the father’s law’ (ibid.). Thus, she not so much resolves the law/justice 
imbalance but is its root cause as ‘a destabilising presence who 
frequently is shown to subvert justice through her excess’ (ibid., 20). 
Lucia considers the cinema context crucial for the 1990s ‘woman lawyer’ 
film cycle’s ideological work. If the female lawyer poses an 
epistemological problem for the law, hers is an exceptional presence, an 
anomaly that needs investigating as such. This meaning conforms to 
cinema’s dominant narrative form ‘which places individual agency 
above collective agency or action’ (ibid., 21). Thus, the way in which 
female presence is ‘singular/”symbolic”’ (ibid.) within the law, is 
especially well-suited for cinematic narratives, two systems Lucia 
combines under the umbrella of a patriarchal operation that negotiates 
popular feminist discourses: ‘”success” for the female lawyer (…) 
[means a] ‘“right” to gain access to both these systems as lawyer and as 
protagonist’ (ibid.). The lack of a ‘female collective’ in these films 
highlights her exceptional-exclusive status within male-dominated 
organisations (ibid., 22). Cinematic narrative’s discursive masculinism 
underlies this argument with its linear narrative, single focus, and closed 
ending, making it especially suitable for speaking to this theme. Lucia 
briefly notes that scripted television focalising lawyers and law firms is 
less amenable to such ideologies due to its narrative traditions: the 
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medium’s usage of ensemble casts and episodic storylines allows for a 
‘far less intensive interrogation of the female lawyer’ (ibid., 238).  
Lucia’s concept is useful in unpacking television’s use of the legal theme 
and the female lawyer’s centralisation in relation to a discursive 
feminism. A conspicuous issue is cinema’s single character focus versus 
television’s ensemble cast, which Lucia theorises as a crucial reason for 
the latter’s less intense interrogation of its female protagonist. Yet 
scripted television’s tradition of narrativising an evolutionary course of 
women’s social roles has been a lucrative strategy for establishing the 
medium’s cultural status; the character-focused ‘independent woman’ 
programming is ubiquitous across forms and genres. Negotiating 
episodic ensemble storytelling with the single character focus is network 
TV’s specificity with its wide audience target favouring upscale women 
viewers, and with its mixed serial and episodic structure allowing for the 
thematisation of socio-political concerns without resolution (Lotz 2006). 
Thus, television’s fascination with the singular ‘independent woman’ 
speaks to narrative and ideological differences between the two media’s 
treatment of the ‘woman and law’ theme. The woman lawyer may be 
an anomaly in the dual patriarchal systems of cinematic narratives and 
institutions of law, but this anomaly is trumped by the relative 
prominence of the ‘career woman as political symbol’ theme in 
television.  
Nonetheless, woman lawyers, as Lucia also remarks, are usually 
members of an ensemble cast in both procedural and serialised series. 
In this regard, Ally McBeal and The Good Wife are somewhat 
exceptional for their centralisation of a singular female lawyer, and for 
their cultural status connecting them both to popular feminist and 
‘quality’ discourses. Both series investigate their central character’s 
identity in the legal framework to an extent that allows for Lucia’s 
concept to be mapped onto their cultural work. As discussed, Ally 
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McBeal represents for Bonnie J. Dow the extreme privatisation of 
feminism’s political role; the title character is a career woman who 
‘searches her soul a lot’, and the show is more concerned with 
dramatising this than legal issues, making it the quintessential 
postfeminist text (2002, 261, italics in original). The series’ episodic 
formula resolves the tension between the legal world and the gendered 
central character’s function, such that legal cases thematise a concern 
of gender politics reflecting the heroine’s own soul-searching about 
romance, changing gender scripts, lifestyle choices etc. In this regard, 
the series’ tone is closer to Sex and the City‘s; the journalism framework 
allows for Carrie to muse over similar concerns. The two series, as Joke 
Hermes observes, together signalled a new moment in television culture 
as ‘key agents in establishing the era of quality popular programming, or 
“must see” television’, and as key texts of postfeminism in their use of 
introspective discourses around gender roles (2006, 79). Lucia’s notion 
that female lawyer films put women, and indirectly feminism, ‘on trial’ 
within the law/justice discourse is relevant for Ally McBeal’s 
postfeminism too: the series’ examination of the heroine’s curious 
social position as single career woman propelled the narrative forward, 
utilising the public and ‘objective’ domain of the law as an instrument to 
scrutinise women’s ‘lifestyle’ issues. Sex and the City’s use of journalism 
and Ally McBeal’s use of legal discourse served similar ends, signalling a 
hierarchal dynamic between investigating the gendered self and 
professional labour relations, the latter insofar mobilised as to express 
the former’s concerns. The ‘feminisation’ of legal discourse then, with 
its disruption of the boundary between the ‘feminine’ private and the 
‘masculine’ public domain (Cooper 2001) still keeps the dualism intact 
under the governance of postfeminism and its valorisation of gendered 
self-surveillance.  
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If Ally McBeal’s ‘lifestyle feminism’ privatises the public and patriarchal 
domain of the law via the dramedy framework and its focus on the 
female lawyer’s emotional journey, then The Good Wife’s appeal to 
‘quality drama’ status is based on the tactical probing of these dualisms. 
Mapped onto this is network drama’s hybridisation of episodic and 
serialised narratives; the centralisation of a recognisable female 
character as catalyst for both legal and political plots aims to upset their 
hierarchal connotations. As per Leonard’s analysis (2014b), Alicia 
Florrick gains her significance in the reflection on her figure as media 
creation, throwing this issue into relief both within the diegesis and in 
the interconnection between fiction and the viewer’s recognition of 
political and television culture. Within the diegesis, this emerges via the 
tension between ‘authentic’ self and its sexualised mediation in politics, 
a storytelling device that Leonard argues insists on the ‘fundamental 
unknowability of personal desire and sexual exchange’ (ibid., 946). This 
insistence reinforces the central figure’s ‘enigmatic’ character, suitably 
aligned with ‘quality’ drama’s emphasis on image, sparing distribution 
of information, and relative lack of verbal confirmation.  
Extradiegetically, the titular character already operates, even before the 
text’s commentary on the private and the mediatised/public, as a 
multiply signposted reflection on American television’s portrayals of 
respectable womanhood, involving in this the housewife figure’s 
prominence for popular feminist politics’ history. Alicia’s inception as 
overdetermined commentary on her ‘media-created’ nature is familiar 
from 30 Rock’s treatment of the ‘urban career girl’ trope – both series 
establish their ‘quality television’ status through a critical reflection on 
mediatised femininity and its consequences for women’s precarious 
command of public and professional spaces. If commentary on 
mediatised femininity undergirds both programmes’ ‘quality’ standing 
on network television in the respective genres of legal drama and 
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workplace comedy, then it is not too far-fetched to find a further 
common feature: their problematising of a sexual ‘truth’ as ideological 
motivation. The Good Wife’s defence of the ‘unknowable’ sphere of 
sexuality can be paralleled with 30 Rock’s extradiegetic confirmations 
that Fey, as female comedy ‘author’, refuses to enact sexual desirability 
unless it is in the grotesque comic mode, a less ‘realistic’ representation 
than the dramatic mode. As shown in Chapter 4, Fey articulated this 
insistence, which has become an integral part of her star text, in the 
chasm between Sex and the City’s introspective concentration on 
female sexuality, and 30 Rock’s ideological self-distancing from it via 
political satire and via creating women’s physical comedy that tackles 
the pretty/funny dualism. The issue of female sexuality is for both series 
a question of the boundary between the private and public, informing 
the female-centred ‘quality’ text as politicised reaction to the 
postfeminist circulation of female sexual agency. This also fits with 
network television’s institutional constraints regarding sexually explicit 
content, a vital component in the cultural distinction between the kinds 
of ‘quality’ that cable and network television are sanctioned to produce. 
The Good Wife’s narrative device to enact its politics of ‘refusal’ is to 
place the action in institutions of law and national politics, with the 
result that the rhetorical boundary between such dichotomies as 
private/public, private/political, feminine/masculine, emotion/intellect, 
justice/law, and so on is shown to be affected by cultural paradigms 
similar to the scorned and retreatist housewife’s mediated image. If for 
Lucia the 1990s female lawyer film negotiates the contradiction of 
woman/law in a closed narrative trajectory that defends the ideal of an 
immutable and patriarchal justice system against the disruptive force of 
changing gender politics, then broadcast narration’s episodic structure 
is especially well-suited to enact a reverse course: a prominent aspect of 
the series’ narrative hook is its investigation of the endless ways in 
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which the law is a fickle and fluctuating system. In its case-of-the-week 
plots, the series notoriously highlights the fine curiosities of the 
American legal system and its shortcomings, and narrative pleasure is 
derived from the ways in which its practitioners navigate its semantic 
traps and loopholes. This narrative interest provides the series’ fit with 
network TV’s circular and endlessly recyclable storytelling formula; a 
tradition also accounting for the medium’s low reputation and gendered 
connotations. Interconnecting this theme with the serialised political 
plot via the female protagonist associates political institutions with the 
same suspicious and endlessly recyclable fickleness. Further, the 
recurring reference to a nostalgia for an idealised past of political-legal 
justice is, as shown above, embedded in feminist, and occasionally race 
discourses. This maps onto the law/justice divide a present/past divide, 
and an attendant dualism of gender politics – the glorious past of 
second-wave feminism versus the disappointment with its 
contemporary involvement in political scheming.  
Discourses around political and legal institutions are profoundly 
gendered in The Good Wife, best exemplified in the law firm Lockhart & 
Gardner’s carefully gender-balanced makeup with its symbolic 
consequences for the protagonist. Often referenced as the ‘mom and 
dad’ of the firm, Diane and Will are overdetermined figures of network 
TV’s historic representation of polarised American worldviews and 
identities – the other two network series I analyse also operate with 
lead figures in similar capacities. For The Good Wife, this contrasts 
Diane’s second-wave feminism and disillusioned legal idealism with 
Will’s cocky and opportunistic masculinity, both portrayed 
sympathetically for their command of the law/justice dynamic, as they 
symbiotically navigate the firm through the economic crisis. But unlike 
the comedies’ centralised pairing (with the female protagonist on one 
pole), Alicia is an outsider to this dynamic, yet instrumental to both 
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sides’ ideological and narrative relevance. Her connection to Will 
mobilises the romance narrative, fuelling its intimate melodrama 
component whose affective significance looms large for the 
programme’s critical estimation as women’s entertainment (see 
Nussbaum’s comments). The connection between Diane and Alicia is 
professional, and concerns feminist generational politics at the 
workplace, underlined with the pragmatism of their interactions. Will’s 
drastic removal from the drama further emphasises this difference of 
relationships – his absence continues to inform the melodrama in terms 
of intimate character portrayal, and shows the Diane-Alicia dynamic to 
be crucial to the character’s final estimation as corrupted by social 
power. In her overdetermined symbolism – as commentary on 
mediatised femininity, postfeminist womanhood, a historic ‘blandness’ 
of American womanhood in the housewife figure, the career woman 
etc. –, Alicia’s character enacts an outsider function that allows her an 
intermediary position among narrative forms and modes, realms of the 
private/public, and ideological divisions of gender politics. Ultimately, 
she is a fitting symbolic figure for network television’s response to 
industry-driven reconfigurations of masculine-coded ‘quality’ drama. 
 
2.B Orange Is the New Black 
 
Piper Chapman (Taylor Schilling), Orange’s central protagonist fulfils a 
symbolic position similar to Alicia’s in that she mediates a shift in 
women’s representational traditions. This political function contributes 
to the programme’s novel generic hybridity (what Mittell terms 
complexity) and the programme provider’s brand identity. Most of 
those female-centred American series that became iconic for an 
unconventional portrayal of women protagonists operated in this vein 
(The Mary Tyler Moore Show, Roseanne, Cagney and Lacey, Sex and the 
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City, Ally McBeal etc.), registering a ‘past’ of women’s representation 
with which the protagonist’s ‘progressive’ identity dialogued, and this 
provided the text’s narrative-aesthetic strategies and cultural value. In 
Orange however, the symbolic progression for which critics commend 
the series reverses this narrative tradition: it is the protagonist herself 
who denotes a ‘past’ of representational politics. Like Alicia Florrick, 
whose titular description evoked ironically a traditional trope of 
women’s portrayals, Chapman functions as conduit between ‘outdated’ 
stereotype and ‘subversive’ gender politics. This comes from the 
tumultuous encounter between the protagonist and her new social 
environment, but while The Good Wife focuses attention on the 
protagonist’s shifting identity (‘the education of Alicia Florrick’), 
paratextual discourses around Orange insist that Chapman’s narrative 
function is exactly that, a function: her identity is insofar important as it 
contrasts with a ‘realism’ of social context represented in the ensemble 
cast. While the subtitle ‘the education of Piper Chapman’ would work 
for Orange as well, the two programmes use the protagonist differently 
as signifier of a mediatised and ‘outdated’ femininity. If The Good Wife 
and its producers promise a disruption of women’s established 
portrayals located in the singular protagonist herself, Orange finds 
narrative-political novelty in using Chapman’s ‘stereotypical’ figure to 
disrupt historic portrayals of other(ed) women and their stigmatised 
social world. The narrative strategy underlines this, using multi-
threaded and flashback storytelling to gradually mitigate Chapman’s 
symbolic centrality. 
As previously shown, ‘realism’ is a key term in producer statements to 
highlight the programme’s cultural significance, exemplified in Jenji 
Kohan’s reference to genre hybridity’s role in this. For programmes 
operating in mixed genres, notably when blending comedy and drama, 
authorly explanations routinely invoke a ‘realist’ intent by referring to 
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an artistic necessity that maps the opposite poles of ‘comic’ and 
‘serious’ modes onto a presumed referential reality. In her statement 
‘dramas that are only dramatic are a lie, because life isn't just a drama’ 
(2013b), Kohan challenges highbrow drama’s connotation between 
‘realism’ and ‘seriousness’ to demand cultural recognition for ‘authored’ 
dramedy. The hierarchal status of comedy and drama is at stake here 
again, which for Orange involves the physical comedy and sexual 
explicitness around othered female bodies. The defence also refers to 
the cultural confusion surrounding Orange for its generic ‘perversity’ 
(Nussbaum 2015) or, in Netflix programming chief Ted Sarandos’ 
terminology, its ‘iconoclasm’ that both precludes it from institutional 
recognition and produces its cult status. 
The slippery genre description and its discursive link to ‘realism’ are 
then intertwined with the programme’s gender politics, expressing an 
‘iconoclastic’ transition between prevalent portrayals of women and a 
‘realism’ of a stigmatised social environment. A quote from Kohan is 
again exemplary, namely her ubiquitous metaphor for Chapman as her 
‘Trojan horse’, i.e. serving as point of identification for upscale female 
demographics prioritised by the television industry, and facilitating 
through her fish-out-of-water story the discovery of a diverse social 
world:  
In a lot of ways Piper was my Trojan Horse. You're not going to go 
into a network and sell a show on really fascinating tales of black 
women, and Latina women, and old women and criminals. But if you 
take this white girl, this sort of fish out of water, and you follow her 
in, you can then expand your world and tell all of those other stories. 
But it's a hard sell to just go in and try to sell those stories initially. 
The girl next door, the cool blonde, is a very easy access point, and 
it's relatable for a lot of audiences and a lot of networks looking for a 
certain demographic. It's useful. (Kohan 2013) 
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Onto the tension between a typified womanhood and a multiplicity of 
diverse femininities can be mapped a tension between postfeminism 
and popular feminist discourses criticising pre-recessionary media’s 
gender treatments for the narrow focus on the ‘lifestyle’ politics of a 
privileged womanhood. ‘Quality’ television’s narrative requirement of a 
Big Idea – promising both overarching linear narration and the 
possibility of open-ended and circular plots – is grounded here in this 
use of popular feminism. Orange dramatises a clash between a 
mediatised postfeminist, and consequently ‘unreal’, femininity with a 
‘realism’ of femininities, which locates differences between ‘real’ and 
‘unreal’ in embodied and demographic signifiers (class, ethnicity, 
nationality, sexuality, gender, age, body image). Promotional paratexts, 
like Kohan’s quotes, emphasise this grand narrative of a political 
collision of femininities, also involving in it the dualism of the singular 
‘author’s political-aesthetic progressiveness and television industry’s 
conservatism.  
As customary for the ‘quality’ brand, authorship discourse is essential to 
the programme’s publicity, predominantly conceived in the author’s 
ideological resistance to industry constraints, and demonstrating the 
text’s unique attributes in the ways in which the creator’s singular vision 
dissents from average medium-produced fare. This is routinely 
expressed in the art-versus-television dichotomy that creators of male-
centred prestige dramas reference; at the same time praising the laissez 
faire attitude of cable channels like HBO that provide them with artistic 
freedom. These communications court the host network via the 
‘author’s expression of their need and receipt of artistic licence, 
strengthening the symbiotic link between the programme’s marketed 
singularity and the network’s unique brand identity. For Orange 
however, publicity discourses entail a narrative of political distance 
between host network and authorly intent (i.e. Chapman’s protagonist 
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function was a necessity for network commissioning). In this, they 
presume an audience whose consumption practices are affected by 
their political awareness and ideological resistance to the cultural 
industries’ capitalistic directives. Gender politics govern this ideological 
resistance, reproduced within the programme’s grand narrative: 
Kohan’s promoted opposition to industry standards corresponds to the 
postfeminism-feminism tension inscribed onto the Chapman versus 
prison-as-social-environment plot. Chapman stands for an ‘industry 
standard’ mandatory postfeminism, and the prison’s inhabitants speak 
to Kohan’s subversive, ‘authorly’, and feminist narrativising of diverse 
womanhoods and critique of the prison industrial complex, themes 
otherwise excluded from television’s traditional narration.  
The notion of representational resistance as ‘realism’ is connected in 
publicity to the unordinary genre hybridity (hour-long comedy-drama); 
such that the ‘seriousness’ of highbrow drama is imagined as a 
conservative and inauthentic norm that needs updating. This generic 
‘complexity’ is simultaneously positioned as feminine/feminist address 
existing outside of quality television’s categories. If ‘realism’ links 
gender politics (postfeminism versus feminist resistance) with genre 
hybridity (‘serious’ drama versus dramedy), then its use is at odds with 
its discursive formation. Consider Nussbaum’s article comparing the 
series’ female characters with those of Show Me a Hero, and the 
difference in the two programmes’ tone. Orange for her ‘rejects 
realism’, and she summons descriptors like ‘tonal perversity’, 
‘vaudevillian’, and ‘blown up, not life-size’ female characters, to explain 
the series’ generic indecipherability contrasted with the David Simon-
esque message drama’s ‘educational’ intent (2015). ‘Surreal’ is another 
word habitually used to describe the series’ tone; for instance, the initial 
concept for the title sequence according to its production company’s 
executive was meant to evoke ‘the surreal contrast’ between 
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Chapman’s old and new lives (Anon. 2013). Not only does this qualifier, 
upsetting the connotations of ‘real’, inscribe this onto a clash between 
privileged and demographically ‘othered’ femininities; it also reflects on 
body and sexuality politics. The title sequence’s aesthetic expresses the 
tension between ‘real’ and ‘surreal’ bodies: for McHugh it denotes a 
documentarist realism (featuring real, formerly incarcerated women), 
but the extreme close-ups of face details and skins evoke a ‘surreal’ 
closeness to the filmed subjects. 
The ‘progressive’ representations of female bodies and sexualities in 
both the gender politics and genre recombinations of Orange are a 
contested notion in academic literature. As noted, McHugh’s analysis 
briefly mentions as contrasting example The Good Wife to argue its 
reactionary postfeminism in the ways it uses female attire as signifier of 
social status, while Orange’s uniforms eliminate the possibility of 
consumerist indulgence:  
Alicia’s business suits and apartment evidence a decidedly 
postfeminist ethos. Orange’s generic setting, however, disallows any 
such production values, particularly related to mise-en-scene; 
instead, the inmates wear shapeless uniforms and live in close, 
spartan institutional quarters. (2015, 22) 
McHugh traces oppositional ideologies between the two series: a 
postfeminist conservatism of female consumption against a progressive 
feminist politics of refusal. This verdict ignores different institutional, 
generic, and narrative contexts influencing the series’ aesthetic choices, 
and which in themselves hardly presuppose a specific gender politics. 
(Additionally, the production values of a series do not necessarily 
correlate with the diegetic look and class specifications of costuming 
and sets.) But the dichotomy is again located in body politics, specifically 
in the costuming’s symbolism as site of negotiated femininity and 
feminism (Miller 2016).  
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McHugh’s argument about the significance of women’s attire can be 
extended to the overdetermined contrast between the two shows’ use 
of the female face as bearer of gender politics: Alicia’s or Kalinda’s 
‘Kabuki mask’ faces, always in full make-up, denote impenetrability and 
limited decipherability, whereas Orange’s title sequence with its 
extreme close-ups promises a revelation of ‘truths’ about its female 
subjects to the point of uncomfortable intimacy. These opposing 
meanings follow from the series’ different production contexts and the 
avenues they offer for invoking a ‘feminism’ as source of cultural status. 
Leonard’s study finds feminist The Good Wife’s refusal of insight into the 
protagonist’s sexual life, critiquing mediatised attempts to arrive at 
sexual ‘truths’ around scrutinised female public figures. This notion of 
progressivism is embedded in the visual and thematic constraints of 
network television. Since the programme is situated in a double bind 
between its chosen theme (sexual scandal in politics) and institutional 
regulation of sexually explicit imagery, it uses this contrast by turning 
the ban into a politics of refusal, and explores the various power 
negotiations within the scenario. These negotiations are inscribed onto 
female characters’ faces and costumes (as opposed to their 
corporeality), which extratextually include a struggle between the 
publicity value of the female star’s (eroticised) image and the feminist 
‘power of refusal’. Consider promotional posters depicting Margulies in 
suggestive poses and lingerie at odds with the series’ tone and aesthetic 
(Miller 2016, 9) or the symbolism of Kalinda’s attire, her leather jackets 
and stiletto boots linking the notion of commanding female silence to 
fetishised female glamour (the dominatrix iconography). Contrastingly, 
Netflix’s institutional approval of sexually and otherwise explicit content 
propels in Orange a discursive feminism that finds a suitable site of 
tensions in visually rendered body politics, which the prison 
environment makes especially fraught with ideological meanings.  
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Inseparable from these discursive negotiations is the issue of race and 
class involved in the constructions of a ‘feminist’ resistance. Orange’s 
appeal to representational diversity involves a classed lack of 
accoutrements of glamorous femininity following from the prison 
setting, itself inviting discourses of social inequity and race and class 
relations expressed on the ‘exposed’ body. The previously discussed 
How to Get Away with Murder, and Annalise Keating’s symbolic 
importance in critical discourses, offers another point of comparison: 
while that series is associated with feminine and middle-brow viewing 
pleasures, Keating functions as embodied revelatory realism of black 
femininity, securing the programme’s political significance. The famous 
transition scene (getting rid of make-up and wig) also inscribes tensions 
between race and class and domains of the private and public: the 
series’ spaces of privilege (e.g. the courtroom or classroom setting) 
dominate such that this ‘revelatory’ scene can only happen in the 
private, signalling secrecy and intrigue, feeding further into the series’ 
world of scheming. This aligns with network television’s narrative 
traditions (legal drama, plot-heavy narration); and as such the show’s 
race and class politics are linked to the programming context’s 
restrictions. The ‘revelation’ around the raced and classed female image 
centres on masquerade of the face but not of the body. The publicity 
and critical reception of Orange lauds it for a brutal honesty 
foregrounding the corporeal in its critique of the prison industrial 
complex. The series exploits Netflix’s loose restrictions around explicit 
content by establishing its ‘quality’ aesthetic in the focus on a social 
space where a ‘revelation’ around culturally hidden female bodies is 
diegetically moot – yet is mobilised in the ‘fish-out-of-privileged-water’ 
story. In the prison setting, female bodies exist in a constantly transitory 
space between the private and the public, whereas Keating’s 
‘revelation’ happens in the darkness of her bedroom. The political 
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‘realism’ of race, class, and gender is inscribed onto the visual renditions 
of bodies, which are involved in Netflix’s institutional configurations of 
the programme’s ‘quality’ features. 
Danielle Hancock (2016) argues that the ‘othered’ bodies of Orange’s 
inmates correspond to Mary Russo’s (1995) concept of the female 
grotesque. This concept is central to feminist media scholars’ 
examination of the liminal and excessive female body in popular culture, 
especially in its subversive potential for women’s comedy (Rowe Karlyn 
1995b, Arthurs 1999). Hancock draws attention to the contradictory 
ways in which the first season of Orange mobilises the grotesque: it 
differentiates Chapman’s classical, clean, ‘bourgeois’ body from those of 
the prison inmates, which are associated with a threatening abject 
physicality. Since Chapman functions, as reiterated by Kohan, as a 
middle-class audience’s ‘host’ body, i.e. the viewer’s ‘adopted identity’, 
the threat of intrusion that the surrounding grotesque bodies express is 
rendered a threat onto this audience. The text’s emphasis on the 
physically overbearing presence of the women around Chapman 
reconfirms the distance between postfeminist femininity and ‘othered’ 
femininities, keeping her audio-visual portrayal aligned with codes of 
conventional femininity. The programme’s seriality allows for gradually 
mitigating the grotesque’s threatening aspect: although Chapman 
remains an ‘isolated body’, the other inmates’ grotesqueness becomes 
contextualised via the explanatory flashback technique and the shifting 
narrative importance between them and the protagonist. Moving the 
other prisoners toward the narrative centre effects a portrayal of 
institutional victimisation, such that the grotesque turns from alienating 
character trait into a consequence of the ‘monstrous’ prison 
environment, generating audience sympathy for its victims (ibid.). 
Hancock’s observations are helpful for unpacking how the series’ use of 
the grotesque feeds into its ‘quality’ status by being mobilised in the 
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postfeminism-feminism tension. If the difference of cultural-social 
status between protagonist and ‘othered’ inmates is located in the 
body, the distance between them can also be measured in their shifting 
ideological difference. The pilot’s opening sequence revolving around 
Chapman’s showering habits is, as Hancock remarks, characteristically 
linked to the physical (‘I Wasn’t Ready’). The flashback montage of 
‘blissful bathing scenes’ (ibid.) appears as nostalgia-fuelled fantasy 
contrasted with the dank prison shower connoting ‘harsh reality’. 
Chapman’s subsequent exchange in the prison shower with fellow 
inmate Tasha ‘Taystee’ Jefferson (Danielle Brooks) is the viewer’s first 
glimpse into her prison interactions. In this regard it is striking that 
Taystee not only violates Chapman’s personal space but makes 
comments on her body’s cultural connotations. Rushing Chapman out of 
the shower, she catches a glimpse at her breasts and exclaims ‘You got 
them TV titties, they stand up on their own all perky and everything’. 
The dialogue puts into corporeal terms Kohan’s comments about 
Chapman’s inception as media fantasy, rendered so in the alien point of 
view of a black, loud, and large fellow inmate (see Figures 5.36 and 
5.37). (While the performance emphasises Chapman’s discomfort, a 
moment later we also witness that once on her own, she looks down at 
her breasts with a proud smile – the threat Taystee symbolises is thus 
tempered.) If Chapman is the viewer’s ‘adopted identity’, then the 
narrative points out through the comment on her body that this is 
linked to television culture’s iconographic traditions.  
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Figure 5.36      
 Figure 5.37 
The ‘TV titties’ comment can be further contextualised in the image 
preceding the exchange: as Taystee enters the communal bathroom, 
the footage opens on a semi-naked nameless extra providing a visual on 
her large sagging breasts. The issue of mediatised femininity versus 
‘reality’ is then nuanced in the difference of what kinds of breasts are 
eligible for what kinds of narration: if Chapman’s ‘TV titties’ are an 
anomaly in the prison environment, symbolising her postfeminist 
femininity, then the nameless extra’s chest promises a ‘realist’ body 
politics via which the programme communicates its difference from 
cable television’s practices of offering female nudity. Considering that 
Netflix positions HBO as its main competitor, and that HBO’s marketed 
legacy of ‘controversy’ involves showing explicit sex and eroticised 
female nudity, Orange’s visual rendering of female bodies poses a 
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challenge to these institutional practices right in the opening scene. If 
the beginning of the series mobilises the grotesque as alien threat to 
visualise the embodied difference of Chapman’s postfeminist femininity 
from the others, it also communicates the female grotesque’s 
‘otherness’ as a consequence of its exclusion from the ‘quality’ TV trend. 
Chapman continues to mediate in later seasons the tension between 
these femininities via body politics, aligned with institutional policies 
that position Netflix in a ‘transgressive’ contrast with cable TV culture, 
and corresponding to the postfeminism-feminism dichotomy. Consider 
the season three storyline in which she sets up an illegal business 
operation selling fellow prisoners’ worn underwear online. Critical 
commentary noted that this plot completes Chapman’s increasingly 
negative portrayal where the former underdog turns into a gang boss: 
she manipulates inmates into passing their underwear on to her in 
exchange for flavour packets that make the horrible prison food more 
palatable, keeping the business profits for herself. She becomes a prison 
queenpin doling out sophisticated punishment to those who cross her, 
establishing a social hierarchy by the misuse of her class and 
educational privilege. Her transformation is paralleled with the prison’s 
privatisation plot in the ways in which inhumane labour practices of the 
corporate power structure exploit incarcerated women: it is the new 
prison job, sewing women’s underwear in a sweatshop, that prompts 
Chapman’s idea of the ‘dirty panties’ business. As Hancock notes, the 
critique of the corporate prison’s victimisation of women uses the 
female grotesque, while Chapman’s portrayal as villain maintains her 
iconographic distance from the physical aspects of prison life. If she was 
characterised in earlier seasons as different from the others with her 
‘clean’ femininity, linked with her hipster entrepreneurship selling 
artisanal soaps, this portrayal now involves her exploitation of other 
inmates’ physicality in a business venture. With her refined, white-collar 
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business smarts, she always recognises profitability of other female 
bodies, arching from merchandising obscure toiletries to a middle-class 
market to her small-time capitalisation on fellow inmates’ ‘leaking’ 
bodies. Juxtaposing her narrative with that of the prison system’s 
exploitative practices, her increasing villainy reaffirms the dichotomy 
between postfeminist protagonist and a ‘feminist’ portrayal of the 
others in their uneven social power. This produces a critique of the 
postfeminist female subject that connects her meanings to late 
capitalism’s working mechanisms. 
Chapman’s villainy is then expressed in her economic exploitation of 
‘othered’ women’s bodies. Critical reception interprets her shifting 
portrayal, combined with increased narrative attention on other 
protagonists’ plots and characterisations, as the creation of a female 
antihero similar to male antiheroes. Alan Sepinwall comments that 
‘Pipes had been broken bad’ (2015c), and Orli Matlow (2015) interprets 
the ‘Piper as villain’ theme in its interconnection with the series’ 
political commentary on the prison industrial complex and the ways in 
which it further corrupts prisoners. This eventually results in a portrayal 
reminiscent of – who else’s – Walter White’s (Bryan Cranston) character 
trajectory: ‘It may be panties instead of meth, but Piper's trajectory 
from where she started is growing just as stark as Vince Gilligan's 
famous "Mr. Chips-to-Scarface" paradigm’ (ibid.).  
Akin to How to Get Away with Murder, Breaking Bad’s iconic antihero is 
the template against which critics measure the female protagonist’s 
‘complexity’, but for both series, the female antihero’s establishment is 
directly linked to an embodied femininity involving classed and raced 
identity politics. Further, critics’ comparison ignores a difference 
between the cultural position of Walter White’s and Chapman’s villainy. 
Chapman’s growing unpopularity among fans (noted by Matlow) is in 
stark contrast with the popularity and iconic status of Walt’s Heisenberg 
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alter ego, evident in the figure’s prominence in the series’ 
merchandising strategies (Murray 2014). 
Chapman’s inclusion into the pantheon of ‘quality’ television’s antihero 
paradigm is contingent on her inception as quintessential postfeminist 
woman, a definition that the narrative links to her physical depiction, 
and, by season three, to her ‘antiheroic’ rise to social power in prison. 
Because of the character’s ‘hipster’ postfeminism, the nature of 
criticism inherent in her ‘Mr-Chips-To-Scarface’ trajectory yields 
specifically gendered results different from male-centred dramas. Abuse 
of unethically gained social power is a central concern to both series, 
which Matlow illustrates by matching up memorable lines like Walter 
White’s ‘I did it for me. I liked it. I was good at it. And (...) I was alive’ 
(‘Felina’) with Chapman’s ‘I’m scared that I’m not myself in here... and 
I’m scared that I am’ (‘Bora Bora Bora’). In the ideological chain of 
associations around morality, this comparison offers a juxtaposition of 
the male-centred drama’s discursive expression of a ‘patriarchy in crisis’ 
with Orange’s expression of a ‘postfeminism in crisis’. In this 
comparison, questions of fan popularity, narrative centrality of 
character, and genre hybridity gain further significance.  
As argued, male-centred prestige dramas like Breaking Bad possess high 
cultural status for their successful recombination of televisual forms 
while offering compelling examinations of troubled ‘patriarchal’ male 
identities. The core contradiction within this paradigm is that while it 
denotes in cultural circulation a ‘crisis’ of traditional masculinities, it 
does so by mobilising cultural forms that leave the fictional male figure’s 
ideological-narrative centrality intact. The popular cultural fascination 
with the psychological complexities of dominant masculinities, 
describing their cultural-social-ideological crisis, lays the foundation for 
a set of programmes canonised as attaining the highest achievement in 
contemporary television storytelling. This continues to normalise male 
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experience, however troubled, via dominant norms of aesthetic 
judgements.  
Mittell (2015a) discusses the gendered dynamic between Walter and his 
wife Skyler White’s (Anna Gunn) stories in Breaking Bad as linked to 
generic traditions: as a thought experiment, he first recites at length the 
programme’s narrative arc from Skyler’s point of view to argue that 
while the promotional-textual treatment foregrounds crime drama’s 
masculinity, the text gradually emphasises her story of emotional abuse 
at the same time as Walt’s ‘patriarchal role and masculine prowess 
begin to crumble and erode’ (ibid., 257). He adds that ‘[o]f course, it is 
not Skyler’s story’ (ibid., 256) and more importantly acknowledges that 
her ‘presence serves as an irritant for some viewers’ (ibid., 257). This is a 
tamed-down allusion to a social media controversy around Skyler’s 
apparently too foregrounded narrative presence. The controversy, 
which critical responses challenged for fan discourses’ blatant misogyny 
(Poniewozik 2013), eventually devolved into Anna Gunn’s online 
bullying. The extent of the harassment led Gunn to write an op-ed in the 
New York Times, calling out gendered online vitriol that conflates 
fictional characters with the actors portraying them (2013). Setting 
aside Mittell’s rhetorical mitigation of the incident and the gendered 
expectations of ‘quality’ drama forms that it signals in fan cultures, his 
final remark about Skyler’s story betrays similar connotations between 
character gender and their suitable forms of storytelling: ‘By considering 
Skyler’s perspective, Breaking Bad functions in part as a “women’s film” 
in reverse, told through the rationalizing perspective of the abusive 
spouse whom we only slowly grow to recognize as the villain’ (Mittell 
2015a, 257). As supporting character, Skyler participates in a masculine 
crime drama and is a minor player in a story concentrating on the 
troubled patriarch’s complex identity; were she the central character, 
we would be in ‘women’s melodrama’ territory centralising domestic 
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victimhood. To expand on Mittell’s thought experiment, this type of 
drama would exist in a different programming context aimed at a 
different demographic and as such in a different relationship to the 
‘quality’ paradigm, allowing to escape fan outrage at the insertion of her 
alien narrative into masculine crime drama.48 
My consideration of Breaking Bad’s gender dynamics and fan responses 
to them is occasioned by invocations of the series in Orange’s critical 
analyses for making sense of Chapman’s growing villainy. If her plot can 
be interpreted as ‘postfeminism in crisis’ akin to prestige drama’s 
‘patriarchy in crisis’, the textual interest in and fan responses to it 
betray a different attribution of cultural value. Orange‘s discursive 
feminism-as-quality involves mitigating the character’s centrality to the 
narration, articulated textually (character flashbacks increasing fellow 
inmates’ narrative significance, dialogue frequently calling out 
Chapman’s class and race privilege) and paratextually as justified, since 
her villainy revolves around her social status. This stands in obvious 
contrast with male-centred prestige drama’s obsession with the 
troubled patriarch’s psyche, whose ‘crisis’ similarly signals a post-
recessionary cultural interest in shifts in social identity. Fan discourses 
dismissing Chapman further confirm the text’s explicit suspiciousness 
about its protagonist, counterintuitively making her case similar to that 
of Skyler White. The ‘postfeminist’ antiheroine’s villainy does not echo 
the male antihero’s in that his character trajectory is subject to 
thorough textual and cultural fascination. Rather, she starts from a 
space of social privilege for which both the series and fan discourses 
punish her by taking away her narrative privilege, coinciding with the 
diegetic time when her character reaches full antihero status (learning 
                                                          
48 Gunn’s letter also cites as troubling trend the unpopularity of ‘unhappy suburban wife’ characters in other 
male-centred prestige dramas like Carmela Soprano (Edie Falco) of The Sopranos or Betty Draper (January Jones) 
of Mad Men (2013). Mittell’s argument about the ‘women’s melodrama’ positioning equally fits these characters, 
further signalling both cultural production’s reliance on this gendered generic tradition and the similarly 
gendered value judgements of fan cultures’ reception practices. 
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to navigate the prison space and asserting a higher status in its power 
structure). Lotz (2014) considers the male antihero quality drama’s 
mobilisation of a laudable feminism for reflecting on patriarchal 
masculinities’ grappling with historically shifting gender norms. 
Chapman’s postfeminist antihero is similarly conceived in a political 
shifting of identities, and stands for the aforementioned ‘past’ of gender 
scripts linked to social privilege. But unlike in the male-centred prestige 
drama, this shift emphasises the gesture of turning narrative attention 
away from her and towards those overshadowed by her social-cultural-
narrative centrality. Orange defines both its feminism and its ‘quality’ 
status by this gesture, linked to the politics of the female body. In this, it 
fulfils more literally the promise of ‘crisis’ for its examined system of 
privilege and cultural paradigm than does the male-centred drama.  
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Conclusion 
 
The goal of this thesis has been to demonstrate the emergence of a 
group of American TV programmes characterised by their use of 
feminism as historical movement and political force to establish their 
position in the post-millennial paradigm of ‘quality’ television. This 
combination, i.e. American television’s association with feminist politics 
via specific programming forms, narrative traditions, audience targets, 
and publicity strategies, is a historically well-worn path for broadcasters 
to claim the cultural value of their scripted programming. But the 
changing cultural and technological context of the ‘quality TV’ discourse 
means that the most recent ‘feminist quality TV’ trend has tended to be 
understood as a reaction to, and consequence of, a preceding 
‘mainstream’, masculine-coded prestige television on the one hand, and 
of a postfeminist cultural paradigm on the other. By the time of the 
completion of this thesis, the trend has solidified to an extent that its 
narrative patterns, characterisation methods, genre hybridity, details of 
production background (particularly the promotion of female 
authorship), and institutional positioning are recognisable signifiers of a 
subcategory of television both for journalists, academics, and audiences. 
  
The ‘complex female character’ 
 
Symptomatically, the ‘complex’ or, increasingly, ‘unlikeable’ woman 
character is often claimed to possess such cultural influence as to have 
developed her own subgenre within English-language prestige TV. The 
American reception of the BBC3 comedy Fleabag (2016-), co-produced 
and released in the US by Amazon, provides a representative example. 
Both Stassa Edwards, the female-targeted entertainment blog Jezebel‘s 
critic (2016) and Emily Nussbaum (2016) praise the series as a novel 
 319 
 
entry in the ‘unlikeable woman’ or ‘bad-girl’ comedy genre, updating 
the trope with an ‘aggressive’ tone (Edwards 2016). The journalists 
place considerable emphasis on how the comedy articulates the titular 
character’s (Phoebe Waller-Bridge) moral ambiguity in terms of her 
conflicted relationship to feminism, quoting a line in which the heroine 
confesses, ‘I’m a greedy, perverted, selfish, apathetic, cynical, depraved, 
morally bankrupt woman who can’t even call herself a feminist’ 
(‘Episode 1’). Completing the litany of unflattering personality traits, the 
reference to feminism imagines the movement as another, albeit 
unattainably positive, identity marker. If Bonnie Dow describes 
millennial postfeminist television as ‘lifestyle feminism’ in that it 
provides ‘a narrative quest for central female characters’ to work on the 
self (2002, 261, italics in original), then this is an already failed quest for 
Fleabag: over before the narrative starting point, its failure fodder for 
comedy (see also Gill 2017).  
Jason Mittell argues that quality comedy’s characterisation of the 
antihero allows the audience to ‘root[…] against them (…), watch[…] 
them fail for our amusement as well as laugh[…] at their boundary-
pushing behavioural extremes’ (2015, 75). In Fleabag, these faults and 
extremes are often rooted in the heroine’s failed connection to a 
socially ubiquitous feminism, as Nussbaum notes describing a scene in 
which Fleabag and her sister visit a feminist seminar: ‘A dignified older 
woman (…) asks the audience, “If you could lose five years of your life to 
have what society considers the perfect body, would you?” Everyone 
else stays still, but Fleabag and her sister shoot their hands straight to 
the ceiling’ (2016). For Nussbaum, the sequence expresses the two 
characters’ ‘feminine masochism’ (ibid.), but it also falls into the pattern 
I identified in Orange’s treatment of its central character Piper: both 
series establish the protagonist’s postfeminist femininity to be 
scrutinised and critiqued by the narrative as basis of her ‘unlikeability’ 
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or ‘complexity’, presented in a social space in which this femininity 
equals an inappropriate and exceptional position (the above scene ends 
on Fleabag whispering into the awkward silence: ‘We are bad 
feminists’). Traces of 30 Rock’s ‘Liz Lemonism’ can be detected here at 
least in terms of Liz’s ‘failed’ or uninformed feminism, but The Good 
Wife’s treatment of Alicia’s character arc also falls into the pattern. 
Consider that the latter programme’s most resonant (at least according 
to producer statements) gimmick of serialisation, namely the narrative 
and visual mirroring of the pilot’s cold open with the last episode’s final 
scene, grounds its affective resonance in the heroine’s fall from grace in 
terms of female solidarity. When Diane slaps Alicia, this confirms that 
the protagonist’s ‘moral corruption’ in the world of politics and 
corporate labour is complete by betraying a character whom the series 
portrays as robust symbol of a nostalgia for the virtues of second-wave 
feminism. This betrayal, just like the ‘failed feminisms’ in the other 
examples, is closely tied to a narrative of the private sphere (Alicia 
betrays Diane by destroying her marriage) or to the body politics central 
to postfeminism’s cultural work.  
Comedy and the half-hour dramedy have been the preferred narrative 
forms for this character-specific subgenre (due to the genres’ historic 
amicability to ‘authored’ female performance), but some prestige 
dramas similarly use the tension between character and historic 
feminism as serialised arcs, as seen in The Good Wife. Nostalgia 
television set in the 1960s favours this route; consider Masters of Sex’s 
references to second-wave feminism affecting the female protagonists’ 
lives, or Amazon’s Good Girls Revolt (2015-), a fictionalised account of 
the 1969-1970 class action lawsuit brought by female employers of 
Newsweek against the paper’s gender discrimination practices. The 
much-ridiculed cable company Lifetime’s first notable effort to fix its 
reputation as provider of female-targeted mediocre programming was 
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UnREAL (2015-), an hour-long series fitting into this pattern and killing 
several birds with one stone to secure industry prestige. Set behind the 
scenes of a fictitious dating reality show called Everlasting, UnREAL 
allows for the kind of self-referential and self-critical tone that has been 
a method of a number of series – at least since The Mary Tyler Moore 
Show – appealing to ‘quality’ audiences’ teleliteracy and presumed 
smart suspiciousness of the medium. The dating contest show setup 
satirises the kind of content associated with feminine viewing pleasures, 
the lifeblood of cable channels like Lifetime. Concentrating on the 
personal and professional drama among the (mainly female) producers, 
UnREAL also presents the central conflict as these characters’ 
corruption by the television industry, articulated as a betrayal of the 
feminist cause and, in the second season especially, of progressive race 
politics. Rachel (Shiri Appleby), Everlasting’s mid-level producer is an 
expert at manipulating contestants (or in insider parlance ‘producing’ 
them) in order to get footage and narratives associated with female-
centred reality TV, and to shoehorn the participating women into the 
genre’s reductive character types. As noted by critics, she first appears 
in the pilot wearing a T-shirt with the slogan ‘This Is What a Feminist 
Looks Like’ (‘Pilot’), and has dropped out of college where she had read 
women’s studies to join the production team. The contrast between the 
TV industry’s sexist mediatisation of womanhood, and one of its mid-
level female members’ political background as has-been feminist 
provides a central drama of gender politics. The series dramatises 
Rachel’s exploitation of the contestants’ personal lives to produce ‘good 
TV’ (a recurring phrase in the series used by showrunners and 
executives) by emphasising her failed feminism. The female protagonist 
then personifies an ideological clash between historic political feminism 
and ‘low’ television culture, in this way consolidating the programme’s 
cultural value; a setup somewhat familiar from 30 Rock. 
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‘Failed feminism’, postfeminism, and cultural value 
 
The feminism that these programmes’ protagonists fail to achieve is 
implicitly presented as a morally ‘right’ choice and social-political 
backdrop, in contrast with the fictional feminism that Dow describes in 
relation to millennial postfeminist television. Her critique stresses that 
the Ally McBeal-type dramedy strategically conflates personal affect and 
social policy to blame feminism for personal ills:  
If feminism was supposed to make women’s lives better, this logic 
goes, why are they unhappy? From my perspective, the central 
problem with this equation is that it confuses feminism with 
women’s personal fulfilment (…). Feminism has never promised 
women happiness – only justice. (2002, 263) 
While still connected to ‘personal fulfilment’, feminism is not a cause of 
the ‘unlikeable’ (predominantly white and affluent) female antihero’s 
ambiguous morality; rather, her failure to live up to its expectations is. 
The areas in which the heroine fails demonstrate precisely where these 
expectations lie: female solidarity, body acceptance, resistance to 
mediatised femininity, social consciousness, and awareness of racial, 
class, and other privileges. The familiar rhetoric of ‘choice’ in 
postfeminism between career and domesticity, being single and 
marriage, motherhood and childlessness etc. has been critiqued by 
feminist scholarship as a false dualism, offering only the appearance of 
options by presenting issues of social policy as a matter of domestic 
decision-making. In contrast, these series’ setup of their protagonists’ 
failed feminisms offers a dualism (and choice) between ‘good’ feminist 
behaviour and ‘bad’ collusion with patriarchal institutions, played out in 
the heroines’ intimate psychological portrayals. This reconfigured 
relationship between historic feminism and television’s fictional women 
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protagonists merits further investigation for its consequences in 
gendered media discourses, but this falls outside the scope of the thesis. 
As stressed throughout, the generic and aesthetic signifiers of ‘feminist 
quality TV’ are discursively formulated as a ‘backlash’ to the 
masculinism of the quality TV paradigm, evident in TV critics frequently 
comparing (often competitively) ‘complex’ female characters to iconic 
male roles, and the programmes’ narration to those of popular prestige 
series. Nussbaum compares Fleabag to ‘that tragicomic asshole Larry 
David’ (2016); Maureen Ryan of Variety describes UnREAL’s set as 
‘Westeros, but with more headsets and walkie-talkies’ (2016b) and the 
friendship between Rachel and her boss Quinn (Constance Zimmer) as 
’one of the most complicated and fascinating bonds on TV, now that 
Walter White and Jesse Pinkman of Breaking Bad are gone’ (ibid.). 
Masters of Sex and Good Girls Revolt have both been claimed to 
capitalise on, and function as the feminist correctives of, Mad Men’s 
cultural influence (Prudom 2016; Miller 2013). These rhetorical pairings 
of female- versus male-coded series produce the continued ambiguity in 
American television culture about the allocation of cultural value to the 
aesthetics of female-centred quality TV: they suggest that this 
programming exists primarily in relation to its ‘mainstream’ male-
centred counterpart, and has evolved via its departure from the latter’s 
gendered political signifiers. The rhetorical dualism allows for the 
celebration (and canonisation) of these female-centred series for their 
political significance, while leaving the terms on which aesthetic 
evaluation in the ‘quality TV’ era has developed unquestioned. 
In a parallel process, institutional policies also promote a number of the 
discussed series as a response to current ideals of ‘quality’ in gendered 
terms, and frequently as a tool for re-branding the broadcaster’s image. 
I have shown how Netflix made this a bedrock of its promotion of 
Orange, but CBS’s promotion of The Good Wife was equally borne out of 
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a tactic to affiliate ‘quality’ with ‘feminism’. As Miller shows, the channel 
recycled some of its strategies from its legacy of the 1970s female-led 
sitcom, this time via a dualism of cable TV’s sexism and broadcast TV’s 
political progressiveness. As such, CBS ‘uses female characters in [The 
Good Wife] to deflect critiques of its rustic reputation by pointing out 
prestige television’s rampant, old-timey sexism, characterizing the 
network and the show as more progressive, contemporary, and 
educated’ (2016, 7). NBC used 30 Rock and Parks in a similar capacity, as 
demonstrated in the Introduction and the detailed analyses. As noted 
above, UnREAL is reputed among critics as the series solely mandated 
with fixing Lifetime’s bad reputation, and cleverly exploiting this 
reputation to produce quality drama (Lyons 2015a). Further, online 
streaming services have cultivated a form of half-hour dramedy that 
places identity politics at their narrative core and dramatises this in the 
American low-key independent, or ‘mumblecore’,49 movie aesthetic 
(Master of None [2015-], Easy (2016-) Transparent, One Mississippi 
[2015-]), associating the companies with ‘edginess’ both in terms of 
aesthetics and politics. 
 
Body politics and cultural value 
 
The utilisation of feminist and identity politics in the series analysed in 
this thesis also illuminates a tight but conflicted relationship between 
quality TV’s genre conventions, gender, and body politics. Notable in the 
programmes’ invocation of feminism as the basis of aesthetic 
exceptionality is the significance lent to body politics, which is directly 
connected to their appeal to cultural value, and in turn to the media 
reception of this appeal. The generic exceptionalism of both 30 Rock 
                                                          
49 A loosely defined term, ’mumblecore’ describes for critics a trend starting in mid-2000s US independent 
cinema characterised by a documentarist aesthetic, the dominance of (often improvised) dialogue, and a 
thematic concern with young urban professionals’ ‘uncertainties regarding sense of self, finding one’s place in 
the world, and the struggle to communicate, connect, and forge meaningful relationships’ (Johnston 2014, 68). 
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and Parks affects the female comedians’ use of physical comedy: 
paratexts articulated 30 Rock‘s increasing usages of the female 
grotesque and the series’ shifting tone toward cartoonesque satire as a 
response to the postfeminist dramedy’s oppressive dominance, and to 
the pretty/funny dilemma faced by the female comedian. But critical 
reception considered Fey’s ‘feminist comic’ star text, popularised in 
glossy-magazine discourses as a negotiation between female glamour 
and humour, at odds with the grotesque femininity mobilised on 30 
Rock. This effected the series’ problematic acceptance by critics both as 
feminist and quality television in the ‘backlash’ years of Fey’s celebrity. 
Parks’ more unanimous reputation as feminist quality TV stems from 
the series’ change of tone after its first season, a change involving the 
downplaying of Amy Poehler’s physical comedy situated in 
mockumentary’s ‘cringe’ aesthetic, instead emphasising her verbal 
comedy and impersonation skills. As stressed, these changes in 
gendered bodily performance affected the two comedies’ generic 
signifiers and their associated cultural value.  
Body politics are a similarly pivotal issue for the hour-long programmes’ 
‘quality feminism’ too: as Miller (2016) shows, The Good Wife and its 
promotion use high fashion and the female ensemble’s looks to 
articulate the series’ production value and relationship to feminism, and 
I have demonstrated how the female face and masquerades of 
femininity serve symbolic functions both for ‘sophisticated’ aesthetics 
and gender politics on the programme. In the context of online 
television culture, Orange’s touted ‘iconoclasm’ concerns its promoted 
realism around both the female body and genre conventions, the 
former strategically contrasted with premium cable television’s 
gratuitous female nudity and, via Chapman’s centralisation, with 
postfeminist femininity. In another example, the very premise of 
Masters of Sex is built around the connection between sexual and 
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feminist politics: charting the ‘revolution’ within the historic academic 
research of human sexuality, it connects this process to the cultural 
influence of the women’s liberation movement.  
Female sexuality and body politics continue to be pivotal yet contested 
areas for the ‘feminist quality TV’ trend then, given the body’s centrality 
to visual arts and the historic debates surrounding representations of 
the female body. As shown, the programmes’ tone and modes of 
expression, and their representation methods of the female body and 
sexuality are interrelated: dramatic series lend much significance to a 
discursively progressive ‘realism’ of dealing with the corporeal as claim 
to authenticity and exceptionality (see e.g. Orange, Masters of Sex). This 
applies to The Good Wife too in a reversed way: the institutional 
regulations of network television restrict a promotion of ‘realism’ 
around the female body, which the programme exploits by emphasising 
the masquerade of femininities among its female cast, complicating the 
dualism of artifice/reality.  
For comedy, this connection is less straightforward due to the perceived 
conflict between funniness (the genre’s prime signifier) and ‘serious’ or 
‘realistic’ political intentions. The cultural understanding of seriousness 
as the norm of human expression lies at the core of this contrast. Since 
comedy and funniness are seen as deviations from this norm (and 
requiring clear signals to be decoded), the usage of the female body and 
sexuality in comedy as site of political meanings is bound to be 
controversial. I argue that this cultural ambiguity partly accounts for the 
emergence of what can be called the ‘half-hour dramedy of 
identity/sexual politics’ on cable and online platforms (Girls, 
Transparent, One Mississippi, Master of None etc.). In industry awards 
shows, these series fall into the ‘comedy’ category without exception, 
and this association follows from their production backgrounds 
especially in cases where they are developed from a well-known 
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comedian’s stand-up persona (Louis C.K., Aziz Ansari, Tig Notaro). Yet 
they deal in a ‘progressive’ treatment of sexual and identity politics in a 
way that appears to require the dramatic tone’s increased influence. 
Fleabag is perhaps a better example for this, given its explicit sexual 
comedy and its roots in women’s stand-up comedy (Waller-Bridge 
wrote the series based on her stand-up character). The ‘blue’ comedy of 
women’s sexuality is played initially for laughs but creeps toward 
psychological drama, and the series’ narrative twist in the last episode 
reveals that Fleabag’s cynical promiscuity is rooted in unprocessed 
trauma, explaining the increasingly dramatic tone. For critics, the 
seriousness with which these dramedies treat sexual and identity 
politics accounts for much of their cultural value, a seriousness 
expressed in tonal changes from the comic towards the dramatic. 
 
The ‘aesthetic turn’ and feminist scholarship 
 
These summarised considerations of the thesis’ findings and of their 
relevance in the wider landscape of mid-2010s American television 
serve to support my investigation’s engagement with the academic 
debates, to which I finally turn. As stated, my argument has aimed to 
intervene in the ongoing discussion within television studies about TV 
texts’ scholarly aesthetic evaluation practices. The ‘aesthetic turn’ has 
been met with suspicion in the academic community of cultural and 
media studies. My approach in this thesis has been to combine the 
methods of feminist media studies, aesthetic analysis, critical reception 
studies, industry analysis, and star studies for the examination of a 
current trend within ‘quality’ television culture to argue for the 
necessity of considering the interconnection of these aspects in order to 
tease out this trend’s cultural significance. Mobilising feminist media 
studies alongside aesthetic analysis was motivated only partly by an 
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emancipatory gesture of, as Nygaard and Lagerwey phrase it, 
‘reclaim[ing] TV studies’ feminist roots’ (2016, 7). While I share the 
authors’ concern that the debate sidelines the discipline, or rather, 
treats it as an obligatory constituent of social and political study, I find 
the role of feminist analysis in the debate more complicated than this 
suggests.  
I demonstrated in Chapter 5 via the scrutiny of Jason Mittell’s Complex 
TV how his championing of the aesthetic exceptionality of certain TV 
programmes draws selectively on feminist analysis to argue their 
political exceptionality as an auxiliary feature. Using tools of feminist 
media analysis in similar ways crops up frequently in the academic 
debate. A recent characteristic example can be found in James 
Zborowski’s (2016) intervention into the discussion, which, as 
mentioned, offers a reconciliation between the ‘TV aesthetics’ versus 
‘media and cultural studies’ approaches. Zborowski engages at length 
with the opposing arguments of the two camps’ prominent 
representatives, and quotes a long passage from Jason Jacobs and 
Stephen Peacocks’ introduction to their anthology Television Aesthetics 
and Style (2013) to demonstrate the untenability of this divide. Jacobs 
and Peacock’s passage discusses a scene from Mad Men that has a 
specifically gendered theme (centralising the 1960s housewife’s 
subjectivity in a domestic dispute), in order to show that while the scene 
offers itself for feminist analysis, this would be ‘critical hubris’ (ibid., 13) 
because this method would not allow for capturing the scene’s 
‘expressive punctum’, i.e. aesthetic significance (ibid.). Zborowski 
exposes the false dualism, arguing that ‘[t]o analyse a text for its 
representations of particular dimensions of sociocultural identity and to 
treat it as an aesthetic object are different activities, but not necessarily 
mutually exclusive ones’ (2016, 12). He goes on to claim that our 
understanding of the ‘aesthetic achievements’ of series like Mad Men or 
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The Wire can only be enriched by enlisting history, sociology, and so on 
‘as tools that might fine tune our ability to do justice to the[se] aesthetic 
achievements’ (ibid., 13). 
While Zborowski’s point is laudable in its reconciliatory effort, it also 
lays bare a representative problem within the academic community’s 
approach to the debate. In discussing this, I will set aside for now 
another issue with this argument, namely the prevalent and widely 
debated implicit assumption in the field that scholarly inquiry has a 
mission to ‘do justice’ to aesthetic achievement. Just like feminist media 
studies is by now at least sceptical about the academic usefulness of 
approaches used to prove a media text’s feminist achievements (the 
feminist Ur-article per Charlotte Brunsdon [2005]), it is similarly unclear 
how aesthetic evaluation furthers existing scholarly knowledge and 
methods. This question has recently become a central point in the TV 
studies debate; for instance, the prestigious academic journal Screen 
devoted its Summer 2016 issue to examining it. But what I want to 
highlight in Zborowski’s account is that the dialogue it joins invokes 
feminist analysis as an example to make its broader point about 
different academic approaches. This is a representative and tendentious 
method in the field, effecting that feminist analysis does not necessarily 
become ignored in the discipline (as Nygaard and Lagerwey warn) but is 
strategically put on display as a prominent mode of sociopolitical 
engagement, in the process mischaracterising its usefulness. This 
utilitarian logic is similar in both Jacobs and Peacock’s, and Zborowski’s 
positions despite their difference about feminism’s role in aesthetic 
analysis, and recalls Mittell’s strategy in Complex TV, in each case 
reducing feminist analysis to a toolkit gauging (‘doing justice to’) the 
text’s political achievements (shades of Brunsdon’s feminist Ur-article). 
Just like in Mittell’s case, this reduction means that a whole set of 
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arguments prominent it the field become glossed over, ones that could 
derail this rhetoric of achievement.  
In respect to Mad Men, we can note for instance that the series has 
been subject to the scrutiny of feminist scholarship as a product of 
postfeminist nostalgia television. Mimi White (2011) suggests as much 
when examining a promotional documentary for the series that 
introduces American women’s social history in the depicted era, and 
thus places the programme’s fictional women in ‘historic/realist 
representation, despite their often stereotypical referents’ (ibid., 157). 
The appeal to historic realism produces a contradiction for the 
programme’s own relationship to its women characters, since it both 
positions them as types of mediatised womanhood within its 
mythologising aesthetic artifice, and also associates them with 
discourses of social history. As a result, ‘the very artificial (sometimes 
parodic) representations of women are turned into the stuff of history’ 
(ibid.). Another example of feminist scholarship’s incisive scrutiny of 
Mad Men’s gender politics is Lynn Spigel’s (2013) account, who claims 
that the programme’s nostalgia rewrites the historic presence of 
second-wave feminism: while the series clearly deals in representing the 
era’s gender politics, it never directly refers to the women’s liberation 
movement, a move made even more conspicuous by constant textual 
references to other social-political events and by creator-producer 
Matthew Weiner’s statements that his prime inspiration for creating the 
series was reading Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique and Helen 
Gurley Brown’s Sex and the Single Girl (ibid., 272). This way, Spigel 
suggests, the show imagines a prefeminist past that has organically lead 
to a postfeminist present, without ever depicting the political struggles 
of actual feminist movements in the middle (ibid., 275).  
White’s and Spigel’s accounts provide only two examples of the feminist 
criticism surrounding Mad Men’s cultural work, and their arguments 
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around the slick aesthetic of nostalgia television in relation to its gender 
politics are at odds with the language of political-aesthetic achievement 
used by Jacobs and Peacock, and Zborowski. They also expose that 
‘treat[ing a TV text] as an aesthetic object’ and considering their social, 
political, and even promotional context are not, or need not be, 
‘different activities’ as Zborowski would have it, and combining them 
(along with other approaches necessitated by the text’s cultural 
position) should not serve to further foster the already prominent 
processes of canonisation, but to understand the cultural forces 
underlying them. (To boot, a hypothetical investigation of the 
emergence of ‘post-’ or ‘anti-’Mad Men nostalgia television like Good 
Girls Revolt and Masters of Sex would have to prioritise Spigel’s and 
White’s arguments over a mainly ‘TV aesthetics’ analysis.)  
This thesis’s aim has been not only to contribute to the ‘TV aesthetics’ 
debate but to expose its false dichotomies by demonstrating via the 
analysis of post-millennial ‘feminist quality TV’ the necessity of a 
synthesis of approaches. It could be argued that my examination of this 
particular group of texts and the cultural context in which they exist 
quite obviously calls for feminist media analysis alongside aesthetic 
study, and in fact could work without considering aesthetics and the 
issue of cultural value. But if we are to chart how the texts work in 
television culture, and how as a group they signal shifting trends around 
the cultural position of gender politics in the American mediasphere, 
these approaches cannot be divorced from each other. I believe that 
this applies to the examinations of most aspects and trends of the 
medium, but has become essential in the ‘Peak TV’ era. After all, 
television culture, and certainly ‘quality’ television culture was from the 
medium’s beginnings conceived by the industry and its surrounding 
public discourses as a specifically gendered set of practices. Aesthetics-
focused television scholarship, in its evaluation of formal-narrative 
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achievements, tends to mitigate or misinterpret the role of this 
genderedness and the relevance of feminist scholarship for its analysis. 
But equally, feminist scholarship, being as it is side-lined in television 
aesthetics, often ignores querying the role of form, aesthetics, and 
attendant cultural status in its ideological analysis of gender and 
television, instead prioritising judgements over TV texts’ gendered 
progressivism or conservatism. The contrived rift between political 
versus aesthetic approaches to TV culture then still allows for a 
commonality between them: an increased conflation between ‘analysis’ 
and ‘appreciation of achievement’. Television studies needs to 
reconsider its relationship to these approaches; otherwise it risks 
undermining its academic usefulness for unpacking the cultural forces 
that govern convergent-era television’s meaning-making practices, 
eminently displayed in the ‘quality TV’ phenomenon.  
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